Tom Johnson v Bank of Scotland [2025] EWCC 22

[2025] EWCC 22Case No L00HR125
IN THE COUNTY COURT AT BRISTOL
BUSINSS AND PROPERTY WORK
ON APPEAL FROM THE COUNTY COURT AT HEREFORD
(DDJ GIMSON)
Venue Bristol Civil Justice Centre, 2 Redcliff Street, Bristol, BS1 6GRDate 14 May 2025
Before
HHJ PAUL MATTHEWS
Between
TOM JOHNSONAppellantBANK OF SCOTLANDRespondent
The Appellant in person for in personJack Brett (instructed by Eversheds Sutherland International LLP) for RespondentHearing Hearing dates: 7 May 2025
This judgment was handed down remotely at 10 am on 14 May 2025 by circulation to the parties or their representatives by e-mail and by release to the National Archives.HHJ Paul Matthews :

Introduction

[1]This is my judgment on an appeal brought by Tom Johnson against the order of DDJ Gimson made on 28 October 2024, recording that his claim against the respondent bank under reference number L00HR125 had been automatically struck out under the provisions of CPR Practice Direction 3C, para 3.3(1), following an extended civil restraint order (“ECRO”) made by me on 5 September 2023. The appellant’s claim was commenced by claim form issued on 6 August 2024 in the County Court at Worcester. No application for permission was made, and no permission was given, under the terms of the ECRO dated 5 September 2023.[2]On 29 August 2024 an order was made transferring the claimant to the County Court at Hereford. On 28 October 2024 DDJ Gimson made the order complained of. On 7 November 2024 the appellant issued his appellant’s notice, seeking permission to appeal against that order. On 29 November 2024, HHJ Salmon transferred the matter to me, on the basis that I had made the original ECRO. On 7 April 2025 I gave permission to appeal to the appellant.

Background

[3]The background to the matter is that this claim is the fourth to be brought by the appellant against the respondent. The first was brought in August 2016 in the County Court. It was settled in August 2016 on confidential terms. I have not seen any papers relating to it. However, the respondent’s skeleton argument says that the brief details of the claim were: “Claim for harassment, loss and distress suffered: aggravated/exemplary damages, injury to feelings through Birmingham Midshires (BM, trading division of BOS plc). Intimidatory Insulting behaviour (division of Bank of Scotland) who are in turn directed by LBG plc”.[4]The second claim was issued on 20 March 2022 in the High Court in Bristol, claiming the sum of £723,450. The particulars of claim were written in note form, and lack precision, but the claim was said to arise out of the loan made by “Birmingham Midshires” (a trading division of the respondent since 2007) to the appellant in July 2010. The particulars read in part:
“1 Claimant mortgagor. Pensioner dob 14.11.1950. Original loan (ref 60922494220100) from mortgagee Birmingham Midshires (BOS) £86,274.00 inc. fees started on 29.7.2010. Interest rate 4.24% above BBR bank base rate. 2 Claim for extreme distress/humiliation by repeat harassment oppression by BOS spurious interest to Claimant’s mortgage account; defamation consequent adverse credit record. Fiduciary breach Oct 2016 settle; Data Breach [ see WS1 doc 9 “Pentland”]. C PTSD anxiety home being repossessed, frequent suicidal thoughts. 3 Harassment/coercion – Roberts v BOS [2013]; Kosar v BOS [2011] WS1 Defamation/libel – Triad v Makar [2022]; Turley v Unite [2019] D repeat continued to publish. Data Breach Fiduciary Duty Unfairness UCTA – Vidal-Hall v Google [2015]; NI 2014 (all re BOS) “shocking” unfair trading/“unilateral” contract, Rea; McGready; Laverty (here C not ever in arrears) Distress/humiliation/intimidation/oppression – Roberts; Kosar; Fin Conduct A Report 2020 (WS3) Aggravated/Exemplary damages – NI 2014 cases R, M & L “shocking” (all 3 J’s concur); repeat harassment repeat adverse credit libel repeat BOS insolence/denial liability reneged Oct 2016. 4 Particulars 4.1 Harassment/coercion unconscionable repeated via BOS PLC £86,000.00 4.2 Defamation / Libel / Slander by BOS £80,000.00 4.3 Duty of Care / Data Breach Con/Fiduciary re persistent A/C errors UCTA; shocking NI 2014 case; Data breach/Conf Vidal-Hall 2015 £163,000.00 4.4 Distress / Humiliation - Repeated Fail; False accts. e.g. re 2000 FCA Report £42,000 4.5 Aggravated Damages 30% – 4.1 to 4.4; persistent repeated oppressive BOS unlawful conduct £111,300.00 (i) Exemplary Damages - set at 50% As the Court sees fit. “Shocking”
NI 2014 cases re BOS conduct. Reneging Oct 2016 agreement. £241,150.00 Total amount on Claim N1 £723,450.00”.

Distress/humiliation/intimidation/oppression – Roberts; Kosar; Fin Conduct A Report 2020 (WS3)

[5]That claim was struck out by DJ Wales (actually sitting in Bath), of the court’s own motion, on 16 June 2022. The appellant applied for an order to set aside that order. The application was dismissed by DJ Woodburn on 15 November 2022. Further applications were made to the court on 24 and 25 November 2022, which were both dismissed by DJ Wales as totally without merit on 5 December 2022. The appellant applied for permission to appeal against these orders on 6 December 2022, but permission was refused by Mr Justice Zacaroli on 4 May 2023 on the papers, and in person on a renewed application on 11 July 2023.[6]The appellant issued four further applications, including one seeking to join six further parties as defendants, all of which I dismissed as totally without merit on 5 September 2023. At the same time, I made an ECRO against the appellant for two years. There has never been any application to set aside that order. The appellant did seek permission to appeal it, but that permission was refused by Asplin LJ in the Court of Appeal on 29 April 2024. Until the present appeal, there has never been any suggestion that the order was in any way defective.[7]It will be helpful if I explain briefly the logistical steps involved in producing an extended civil restraint order, and what happened in the present case. First of all the judge decides that such an order should be made. Secondly, that decision is communicated to court staff. Thirdly, court staff fill out a prescribed form, N19A (available via the internet), which they then seal and send out. That prescribed form contains all the necessary information for the validity and efficacy of the order. In particular, it makes provision for stating which courts the order is to apply to. In the present case, on 5 September 2023, I sent my draft of the order to court staff for the N19A to be filled out, sealed and sent out. Unfortunately, the member of staff who received it did not realise that there was a prescribed form, and simply sent out the order in the form in which I had communicated it. This did not state which courts the order applied to.[8]The third claim was issued on 24 October 2023 in the King’s Bench Division of the High Court. It was recorded by Master Sullivan on the court’s own initiative as automatically struck out by virtue of the ECRO of 5 September 2023, no permission to be issued having been given to the claimant. Master Sullivan’s reasons include the following: “The [second claim] arose out of arrears on a mortgage contract dated 29 July 2022. This claim makes many of the same claims, and some new claims but all arise out of arrears on the same mortgage contract dated 29 July 2022. They are claims in relation the subject matter of the Bristol proceedings. The claims again [sic] the other parties who were not parties to the Bristol proceedings arise out of the arrears on the same mortgage contract so are in relation to the subject matter of those proceedings”. (The reference to “29 July 2022” is clearly a mistake for “29 July 2010”, the date of the mortgage contract.)[9]The fourth claim (the subject of this appeal) was issued by the appellant in the County Court at Worcester on 6 August 2024. The particulars of claim alleged an unfair relationship within section 140A of the Consumer Credit Act 1974, arising from a mortgage loan taken out on 29 July 2010, with direct debits paid to the respondent from 29 August 2010 to 29 June 2024. The particulars include reference to allegedly fictitious loan arrears from 16 February 2012, and alleged falsehoods published to credit agencies. Becoming aware of this claim, the respondent wrote to the court referring to the ECRO which I had made in 2023. As I have said, DDJ Gimson on 28 October 2024 made the order under appeal, recording that the claimant been automatically struck out because no permission had been obtained under the ECRO.

The grounds of appeal

[10]The grounds of appeal as attached to the appellant’s notice are as follows:
“1. GROUND 1 – PROCEDURAL ERROR IN APPLICATION OF THE LAW There was an apparent misreading of PD 3C paragraph 3.3(1) by which the new [unfair relationship] claim was unlawfully struck out by wrongly deciding that the 5.9.2023 ECRO applies to the [unfair relationship] claim proceedings when it does Not apply. 2. GROUND 2 – UNFAIRNESS AND ABUSE OF PROCESS Regarding the alleged pressure/misconduct by the Defendant detailed in the Claimant’s Statement: The Court seemingly allowed itself to be wrongfully pressurised to strike out by the Defendant attempting to mislead the Court into believing that Practice Direction 3C paragraph 3.3(1) allowed the strikeout of the [unfair relationship] claim.”
[11]From the other documents provided by the appellant, and confirmed by the appellant at the hearing of this appeal, I read the first ground as encompassing two distinct points. The first point is that the ECRO is a nullity and has no legal effect, because it does not comply with paragraph 3.9 of CPR Practice Direction 3C, in that it does not specify which courts it applies to. The second point is that, even if the ECRO is effective, it does not apply to this claim, because the subject matter is entirely different from that of the second claim.[12]At the hearing of the appellant’s application for permission to appeal, on 5 April 2025, I intended to give permission for both these points to be argued on the appeal. Unfortunately, the order which was drawn up and sealed did not accurately express this. It referred to giving the appellant permission “on both grounds set out in his grounds of appeal”. That would suggest that I was giving permission on what is described above as “Ground 2”. That was not my intention. In my judgment, the second ground as set out above does not add anything to the first. If either limb of the first ground succeeds, the second ground is unnecessary. If both limbs of the first ground fail, the second ground can take the matter no further, and indeed falls away. At the hearing of the appeal, the appellant accepted this. The real points in this appeal are the two limbs of the first ground.

Appeals generally

[13]I remind myself of certain relevant rules concerning appeals. By virtue of CPR rule 52.21(1), an appeal is limited to a review of the decision of the court below, unless the court considers that in the circumstances of a particular appeal it would be in the interests of justice to rehear the case: Audergon v La Baguette Ltd [2002] EWCA Civ 10, [83]. There being no need for a rehearing in this case, this appeal is a review. A second point is that the appeal court will not receive oral evidence or evidence not before the lower court, unless it orders otherwise (rule 52.21(2)).[14]Thirdly, rule 52.21(3) provides that the appeal court will allow the appeal where the decision was(a) wrong, or(b) unjust, because of serious procedural or other irregularity in the proceedings below. Here wrong means wrong in law, wrong in fact, or wrong in the exercise of discretion. Fourthly, at the hearing, a party may not rely on a matter not contained in that party’s appeal notice unless the court gives permission (rule 52.21(5)). And, lastly, under rule 52.20, the appellate court has all the powers of the lower court, and may affirm, set aside or vary any order or judgment given by the lower court, and order costs if it is just to do so in all the circumstances. The law Civil restraint orders

The law

[15]The extended civil restraint order regime is part of the civil restraint order regime, contained in CPR Practice Direction 3C. There are three kinds of[16]So far as concerns the extended civil restraint order regime, Practice Direction 3C relevantly provides as follows: “3.1 An extended civil restraint order may be made by –(1) a judge of the Court of Appeal;(2) a judge of the High Court; or(3) a Designated Civil Judge or their appointed deputy in the County Court, where a party has persistently issued claims or made applications which are totally without merit. 3.2 Unless the court otherwise orders, where the court makes an extended civil restraint order, the party against whom the order is made – (1) will be restrained from issuing claims or making applications in – (a) any court if the order has been made by a judge of the Court of Appeal; (b) the High Court or the County Court if the order has been made by a judge of the High Court; or (c) the County Court if the order has been made by a designated civil judge or their appointed deputy, concerning any matter involving or relating to or touching upon or leading to the proceedings in which the order is made without first obtaining the permission of a judge identified in the order; (2) may apply for amendment or discharge of the order provided he has first obtained the permission of a judge identified in the order; and (3) may apply for permission to appeal the order and if permission is granted, may appeal the order. 3.3 Where a party who is subject to an extended civil restraint order – (1) issues a claim or makes an application in a court identified in the order concerning any matter involving or relating to or touching upon or leading to the proceedings in which the order is made without first obtaining the permission of a judge identified in the order, the claim or application will automatically be struck out or dismissed – (a) without the judge having to make any further order; and (b) without the need for the other party to respond to it; (2) repeatedly makes applications for permission pursuant to that order which are totally without merit, the court may direct that if the party makes any further application for permission which is totally without merit, the decision to dismiss the application will be final and there will be no right of appeal, unless the judge who refused permission grants permission to appeal. [ … ] 3.9 An extended civil restraint order – (1) will be made for a specified period not exceeding 3 years; (2) must identify the courts in which the party against whom the order is made is restrained from issuing claims or making applications; and (3) must identify the judge or judges to whom an application for permission under paragraphs 3.2(1), 3.2(2) or 3.8 should be made. 3.10 The court may extend the duration of an extended civil restraint order, if it considers it appropriate to do so, but it must not be extended for a period greater than 3 years on any given occasion.” (1) a judge of the Court of Appeal; (2) a judge of the High Court; or (3) a Designated Civil Judge or their appointed deputy in the County Court, (1) will be restrained from issuing claims or making applications in – (a) any court if the order has been made by a judge of the Court of Appeal; (b) the High Court or the County Court if the order has been made by a judge of the High Court; or (c) the County Court if the order has been made by a designated civil judge or their appointed deputy, concerning any matter involving or relating to or touching upon or leading to the proceedings in which the order is made without first obtaining the permission of a judge identified in the order; (2) may apply for amendment or discharge of the order provided he has first obtained the permission of a judge identified in the order; and (3) may apply for permission to appeal the order and if permission is granted, may appeal the order. (1) issues a claim or makes an application in a court identified in the order concerning any matter involving or relating to or touching upon or leading to the proceedings in which the order is made without first obtaining the permission of a judge identified in the order, the claim or application will automatically be struck out or dismissed – (a) without the judge having to make any further order; and (b) without the need for the other party to respond to it; (2) repeatedly makes applications for permission pursuant to that order which are totally without merit, the court may direct that if the party makes any further application for permission which is totally without merit, the decision to dismiss the application will be final and there will be no right of appeal, unless the judge who refused permission grants permission to appeal.[17]For present purposes, the important points to notice about the extended civil restraint order regime are the following. The first one is that it applies to cases other than that in which the order was made, and to cases in courts other than that in which the order was made. It covers “issuing claims or making applications in” the courts to which the order applies, “concerning any matter involving or relating to or touching upon or leading to the proceedings in which the order is made”. These are wide words of connection. It is hard to think of wider ones.[18]The second point is that a failure to obtain permission to bring a claim or make an application covered by the ECRO before bringing that claim or making that application does not make this claim or application liable to be struck out by the court. Instead, the claim or application concerned is automatically struck out without the need for the court or any party to do anything. So, in a case like the present, the order made by the court simply records that the automatic striking out has taken place. It makes matters clear to judges, parties and court staff alike.[19]Thirdly, it is clear from paragraph 3.9(2) that the order itself “must identify the courts” in which the ECRO is to have effect. However, and fourthly, paragraph 3.2 precisely specifies those courts, as depending on the identity of the court which made the order in question.

Defective court orders

(b) Defective court orders

[20]I turn to the question of the effectiveness in law of an order of the court which may be thought to be in some way defective, for example because not complying in some way with the provisions under which it is made. As to this, there is a long and consistent line of high authority dealing with the point. Thus, in Chuck v Cremer (1846) 1 Coop t Cott 338, Lord Cottenham LC said, at 342-343: “A party, who knows of an order, whether null or valid, regular or irregular, cannot be permitted to disobey it … It would be most dangerous to hold that the suitors, or their solicitors, could themselves judge whether an order was null or valid - whether it was regular or irregular. That they should come to the Court and not take upon themselves to determine such a question. That the course of a party knowing of an order, which was null or irregular, and who might be affected by it, was plain. He should apply to the Court that it might be discharged. As long as it existed it must not be disobeyed”.[21]In Hadkinson v Hadkinson[1952] P 285, Romer LJ said, at 288:
“It is the plain and unqualified obligation of every person against, or in respect of whom, an order is made by a court of competent jurisdiction, to obey it unless and until that order is discharged. The uncompromising nature of this obligation is shown by the fact that it extends even to cases where the person affected by an order believes it to be irregular or even void”
. Romer LJ then set out the statement of Lord Cottenham LC cited above as authority for his proposition.[22]In Isaacs v Robertson [1985] AC 97, at 101-102, Lord Diplock, giving the advice of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, cited the statement of Romer LJ in Hadkinson (including the quotation from Lord Cottenham LC), and then added:
“This, in their Lordships’ view, says all that needs to be said upon this topic. It is in itself sufficient reason for dismissing this appeal.”
[23]In Johnson v Walton [1990] 1 FLR 350, a non-molestation undertaking had been given to the county court, and then breached. An application to commit the defendant for that breach failed in that court on the ground that the court had had no jurisdiction to accept the undertaking. The Court of Appeal held that the judge had been wrong to dismiss the application on that ground. Lord Donaldson of Lymington MR said (at 352):
“If it had been an injunction, no question could have arisen before him as to whether the injunction was rightly imposed. That could only have arisen if the defendant had either appealed against the injunction if one had been granted or, which is the equivalent in the case of an undertaking, had been asked to be released from his undertaking. It cannot be too clearly stated that, when an injunctive order is made or when an undertaking is given, it operates until it is revoked on appeal or by the court itself, and it has to be obeyed whether or not it should have been granted or accepted in the first place.”
[24]In M v Home Office [1994] 1 AC 377, HL, Lord Woolf (with whom the whole judicial committee of the House of Lords agreed) said, at 423:
“Having come to the conclusion that Garland J.'s order was properly made, the next question which has to be considered is the effect of the advice which was understandably given to [the Home Secretary] that the order was made without jurisdiction. Here there are two important considerations. The first is that the order was made by the High Court and therefore has to be treated as a perfectly valid order and one which has to be obeyed until it is set aside.”
For this proposition Lord Woolf referred to the advice of Lord Diplock in Isaacs v Robertson.[25]In B v B [2004] EWCA Civ 681, an order had been made by the county court without jurisdiction to do so. Wall LJ (with whom Arden LJ agreed) said:
“68. In my judgment, although made without jurisdiction, the order was not a nullity. The normal rule about orders which, on their face, are regular, but which are in fact made without jurisdiction is that they remain in force until such time as they are discharged: - see Hadkinson v Hadkinson [1952] 285, 288 per Romer LJ … ”
[26]In R (Lunn) v Governor of Moorland Prison [2006] 1 WLR 2870, CA, a warrant of imprisonment contained an error. Moore-Bick LJ, giving the judgment of the court, said:
“22. It is an important principle of the administration of justice that an order of a court of competent jurisdiction made in the exercise of that jurisdiction, as it was in this case, is valid and binding until it is varied or set aside, either on appeal or in the proper exercise of the court's own jurisdiction. (It is unnecessary in this case to consider the position in relation to an order which is unlawful on its face or which is made in excess of jurisdiction, though, as appears from the authorities, an order which is valid on its face is binding even if it was made in excess of jurisdiction and is therefore liable to be set aside.) It is necessary that that should be the case, both in order to preserve the authority of the courts and thereby the orderly administration of justice and to ensure that those who have to take action on the basis of the court's orders may be confident that they can lawfully do so.”
[27]In R v Kirby (John Martin) [2019] 4 WLR 131, CA, the question was whether convictions could stand for the breach of a non-molestation order that was subsequently set aside because of a procedural irregularity. The court held that they could and should. Singh LJ, giving the judgment of the court, said:
“13. In approaching this appeal, we remind ourselves that there is a long-standing principle of our law that there is an obligation to obey an apparently valid order of a court unless and until that order is set aside. This is a crucial feature of a civilized society which has respect for the rule of law. The authorities amply demonstrate that that is the long-standing principle of our legal system.”
For this proposition, Singh LJ relied on Chuck v Cremer, Hadkinson v Hadkinson, Isaacs v Robertson, and M v Home Office.[28]Finally, in R (Majera) v Home Secretary [2022] AC 461, SC, Lord Reed (with whom all the other Supreme Court justices sitting agreed) considered all these cases (and indeed others), and concluded:
“56. In the light of this consistent body of authority stretching back to 1846, it is apparent that the alleged invalidity of the order made by the First-tier Tribunal had no bearing on the challenge to the decision of the Secretary of State. Even assuming that the order was invalid, the Secretary of State was nevertheless obliged to comply with it, unless and until it was varied or set aside. The allegation that the order was invalid was not, therefore, a relevant defence to the application for judicial review of the Secretary of State’s decision.”
Discussion The first limb of the first ground of appeal

Discussion

[29]In the light of the authorities referred to, it is plain that an apparently valid order of a court, whether of unlimited or limited jurisdiction, is effective in law unless and until it is set aside on application or overturned on appeal. Thus, the fact that it was made without any jurisdiction to do so, or that it is defective in some way in not complying with other relevant legal provisions, is irrelevant. Subject to one point, in the application of that principle to the facts of this case, and given that the ECRO of 5 September 2023 has never been set aside or appealed, DDJ Gimson was right to treat it as valid and effective in making his order of 28 October 2024.[30]The one point of reservation relates to the words “issues a claim or makes an application in a court identified in the order” in paragraph 3.3(1) of the practice direction. If the defect in the order made the order itself unworkable, the position would be different. If, in the present case, the appellant could not know or find out in which courts he was restrained from issuing claims or making applications, then I do not think it would be effective. But, although the order in the present case fails expressly to specify which courts are covered by the order, the matter is nevertheless clear enough.[31]First of all, paragraph 3.2 makes plain that, where the original order was made by a judge of the High Court, the order restrains the issuing of claims and making applications in both the High Court and the County Court. That is this case. Secondly, and even if that were not so, it is obvious that where a judge of the High Court makes the order it must apply in the High Court, and, in order not to make that order nugatory by creating an easy route to avoidance, must apply in the County Court too, as an inferior court of similar civil jurisdiction.[32]Accordingly, in my judgment the first limb of the first ground of appeal fails. The ECRO was valid and effective at the time of the order of 28 October 2024. Therefore, assuming that the ECRO applied to the new claim, the order of DDJ Gimson was correct to record the automatic striking out of the claim.

Delay and affirmation

[33]The respondent also submitted that it was too late for the appellant to raise the defective nature of the order only now, in what are effectively proceedings about breach of the order. It relied on the statement of the Divisional Court (Richards LJ and David Clarke J) in Director of Public Prosecutions v T [2007] 1 WLR 209, that “27. … there is no obvious reason why the person against whom the order was made should be allowed to raise that issue as a defence in subsequent breach proceedings rather than by way of appeal against the original order … ” The appellant applied for but failed to obtain permission to appeal against the order, and stood by, saying nothing, whilst the third claim was recorded as automatically struck out. In view of my decision above, it is not necessary for me to reach a concluded view on this point. But I will say that I think there is considerable force in the submission.

The second limb of the first ground of appeal

[34]I turn now to the second limb of the first ground of appeal, concerned with the scope of the order and in particular whether it covered the new claim. I have not seen any documents concerned with the first claim, made and settled in 2016. But the respondent’s skeleton argument says that it was a claim for harassment, injury to feelings and intimidatory/insulting behaviour. I assume this arose from the mortgage contract between appellant and the respondent entered into in July 2010. In any event, it is clear that the second, third and fourth claims all arose from that mortgage contract.[35]At the heart of these claims were allegations that the respondent wrongfully processed false data on the same loan account, accused the appellant of falling into arrears, and published the appellant’s consequent negative credit status to credit agencies. It is true that the fourth claim focused on an allegation that the relationship between the parties was unfair within the meaning of section 140A of the Consumer Credit Act 1974. But the allegation still arose out of that original relationship, which was the subject of at least the second and third claims, if not the first as well. The legal causes of action and remedies sought were similar too.[36]The appellant says that the new claim did not “lead to” the earlier claims. He relies on an analogy to be drawn between this case and a motorcar collision. He says that a claim for the damage to the driver’s motorcar is quite different from a claim or a broken leg sustained by the driver at the time of the accident. I do not accept this. Both the damage to the car and the damage to the leg arise from the same cause, which is whatever caused the accident, for example, the negligent driving of the other driver. The two claims are clearly connected. A claim for a broken leg sustained in the accident plainly concerns a matter “relating to” the claim for the damage to the motorcar.[37]In like fashion, here the claim by the appellant that the relationship between the parties was an unfair one within the meaning of the 1974 Act concerns a matter “relating to” at least two of the previous claims, where that relationship, and the conduct of the respondent within it, was the source of the claims. The new claim does not have to be about exactly the same thing. It simply has to concern a matter “involving or relating to or touching upon or leading to” the earlier claim. The reason for such wide words of connection is obvious. There is an obligation upon a civil litigant to bring the whole of his case forward at the same time.[38]This is the celebrated rule in Henderson v Henderson (1843) 3 Hare 100, where Wigram V-C said (at 115) that “the Court requires the parties to that litigation to bring forward their whole case, and will not (except under special circumstances) permit the same parties to open the same subject of litigation in respect of matter which might have been brought forward as part of the subject in contest, but which was not brought forward, only because they have, from negligence, inadvertence, or even accident, omitted part of their case.”[39]If an earlier claim were struck out for some reason, or summary judgment was given against the claimant, any attempt to launch a new claim involving matters which should have been brought in the original proceedings would be treated as an abuse of the process of the court. The wording of paragraph 3.3(1) makes similar provision where an extended civil restraint order has been made, though without the need for an application to be made to strike out the new claim under Henderson v Henderson.[40]In my judgment, therefore, the ECRO of 5 September 2023 applies to the fourth claim brought by the appellant, and accordingly DDJ Gimson was right to record that it had automatically been struck out. The second limb of the first ground of appeal accordingly fails.

The second ground

[41]I have already explained above why the second ground of appeal does not assist the appellant. I will not repeat myself. The second ground fails also.

Further submission

[42]On Monday 12 May, after I had prepared this judgment in draft, but before I had circulated it in the usual way, I received a further written submission from the appellant, dated last Friday, 9 May, and apparently sent to the court at 10:47 pm. This dealt with the decision of the Supreme Court in Majera, to which I have referred earlier in this judgment. That case had been cited by the respondent and discussed in its skeleton argument as paragraphs [24]-[26] of its skeleton argument. This is dated 1 May 2025, and was sent to the court and the appellant on Friday 2 May.[43]The appellant must have read this skeleton, because on 3 May 2025 he prepared and sent to the court and the respondent a document, for which he had no permission, headed “THE APPELLANT'S REPLY TO THE RESPONDENT'S SKELETON ARGUMENT”. This states at paragraph 1, “The Respondent's 1.5.2025 argument is disputed in its entirety.” He does not in terms deal with the Majera line of authorities, but there is not doubt that he knew of Majera and had the opportunity before the hearing to prepare submissions on it if he wished.[44]I know that the appellant is a litigant in person, but (and I have said this before) litigants in person are not dispensed from complying with basic principles of civil procedure designed to ensure fairness as between the parties, whether represented or unrepresented. The time and the place for making submissions is at the court hearing, and not afterwards, unless there is some special reason why the court permits that course to be taken. If the respondent, after the hearing was over and I had reserved my judgment, had sent me further written submissions bearing on something that should have been dealt with at the hearing, I have no doubt that the appellant would (rightly) have been critical of the respondent and its lawyers for acting in such a fashion. But what is sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander. The parties must have equality of opportunity. I have therefore ignored the further written submission.

Conclusion

[45]For the reasons given above, this appeal fails, and must be dismissed.

order

limited civil restraint orders, extended civil restraint orders, and general civil restraint orders. Limited orders apply only to the particular proceedings in which they are made. Extended orders apply beyond the original proceedings to other proceedings which are related to the original proceedings. General orders apply to all proceedings, whether related to the original proceedings or not.