"An adoption order may not be made if the child has a parent or guardian unless ...... the court is satisfied - (a) That the parent or guardian consents to the making of the adoption order, (b) That the parent or guardian has consented under section 20 ..... (c) That the parent's or guardian's consent should be dispensed with"
“The court cannot dispense with the consent of any parent or guardian of a child to the child being placed for adoption or to the making of an adoption order in respect of the child unless the court is satisfied that- (b) the welfare of the child requires the consent to be dispensed with.”
"116. The guidance is, we think, simple enough. The judge must, of course, be aware of the importance to the child of the decision being taken. There is, perhaps, no more important or far-reaching decision for a child than to be adopted by strangers. However, the word 'requires' in s 52(1)(b) is a perfectly ordinary English word. Judges approaching the question of dispensation under the section must, it seems to us, ask themselves the question to which s 52(1)(b) of the 2002 [Act] gives rise, and answer it by reference to s 1 of the same Act, and in particular by a careful consideration of all the matters identified in s 1(4). 117. In summary, therefore, the best guidance, which in our judgment this court can give is to advise judges to apply the statutory language with care to the facts of the particular case. The message is, no doubt, prosaic, but the best guidance, we think, is as simple and as straightforward as that." [56] The more frequently quoted passage that follows was not intended to detract from the simple and straightforward, case-specific, approach described in paragraphs 116 and 117. Wall LJ expressly states that this is so at paragraph 118: "
"This is the context in which the critical word "requires' is used in s 52(1)(b). It is a word which was plainly chosen as best conveying, as in our judgment it does, the essence of the Strasbourg jurisprudence. And viewed from that perspective "requires' does indeed have the connotation of the imperative, what is demanded rather than what is merely optional or reasonable or desirable." 59. This key passage in Re P then concludes in the remaining three paragraphs [126 to 128] as follows: 126. What is also important to appreciate is the statutory context in which the word "requires" is here being used, for, like all words, it will take its colour from the particular context. Section 52(1) is concerned with adoption - the making of either a placement order or an adoption order - and what therefore has to be shown is that the child's welfare "requires" adoption as opposed to something short of adoption. A child's circumstances may "require" statutory intervention, perhaps may even "require" the indefinite or long-term removal of the child from the family and his or her placement with strangers, but that is not to say that the same circumstances will necessarily "require" that the child be adopted. They may or they may not. The question, at the end of the day, is whether what is "required" is adoption. 127. In our judgment, however, this does not mean that there is some enhanced welfare test to be applied in cases of adoption, in contrast to what Mr Geekie called a simple welfare test. The difference, and it is an important, indeed vital, difference, is simply that between section 1 of the 1989 Act and section 1 of the 2002 Act. 128. In the first place, section 1(2) of the 2002 Act, in contrast to section 1(1) of the 1989 Act, requires a judge considering dispensing with parental consent in accordance with section 52(1)(b) to focus on the child's welfare "throughout his life."
“..the court must consider whether there should be arrangements for allowing any person contact with the child; and for that purpose the court must consider any existing or proposed arrangements and obtain any views of the parties to the proceedings.”