Rowena Ledgeway v R [2026] EWCA Crim 956

[2026] EWCA Crim 956Case No 202600722 A3
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL (CRIMINAL DIVISION)
ON APPEAL FROM YORK CROWN COURT
His Honour Judge Simon Hickey
12NY0470923
Venue Royal Courts of Justice, Strand, London, WC2A 2LLDate 24 July 2026
Before
LORD JUSTICE POPPLEWELLMRS JUSTICE STACEY DBEHER HONOUR JUDGE KARU(Sitting as a Judge of the Court of Appeal Criminal Division)
Between
Rowena LedgewayAppellantRexRespondent
Mr Richard Wright KC (instructed by Kingsley Napley) for AppellantHearing Hearing date: 17 July 2026
Approved JudgmentThis judgment was handed down remotely at 10.30am on Friday 24 th July 2026 by circulation to the parties or their representatives by e-mail and by release to the National Archives..............................
[1]At the conclusion of the hearing we announced our decision that the appeal would be allowed, with reasons to follow. These are our reasons.[2]With the leave of the single judge the appellant appeals against the sentence imposed in the Crown Court sitting at York before HHJ Hickey on 29 January 2026. The appellant pleaded guilty to causing serious injury by careless driving contrary to s.2C Road Traffic Act 1988 and was ordered to serve a four month custodial sentence, suspended for two years. It was a stand alone suspended sentence order as she was not made subject to any ancillary community orders. She was disqualified from driving for the minimum mandatory period of one year and was not required to take an extended driving test at the end of the disqualification period. The statutory surcharge was imposed. The facts[3]At around 5.40am on Thursday 24 November 2022 the appellant was on her way to the gym before work, driving her Volkswagen Golf along the single carriageway A59 between Harrogate and York. It is a 60 mph national speed limit road. It was damp but not raining. It was dark and there was no street lighting. It was a road she knew well. The appellant was the second car in a line of cars behind a heavy goods vehicle (HGV) which was restricted to driving at 51mph. On a relatively straight section of the road with a slight right hand curve and after indicating, the appellant overtook the car in front of her, a VW Scirocco, at a speed that the driver of the Scirocco estimated to be at, or slightly over the speed limit. She did not pull in after overtaking the Scirocco but continued to overtake the HGV in front, accelerating to between 70 and 75 miles an hour. As she did so, whilst she was parallel with the back axle of the HGV or thereabouts, she collided with a motorbike being driven by Mr Saville, the victim, that was travelling towards her in the oncoming lane.[4]The victim recalled seeing a large truck on the other side of the road, heading east, with a queue of vehicles following behind. As he was alongside the truck he became aware of a set of headlights heading straight towards him on his side of the road. It happened very quickly and he had no time to stop. Whilst he was trying to move further to the left he heard a big bang, was thrown through the air and landed on the grass verge, rolling a few times before coming to a stop. He was immediately aware that he was badly injured, in great pain and could not feel or move his right arm. His right thigh bone was broken and protruding through his protective clothing and his lower leg was bent at an unnatural angle.[5]The driver of the HGV remembered seeing the motorbike pass him and from his rearview mirror saw the appellant’s car reach his back axle when he saw it slow down dramatically and tuck in behind his HGV. The motorbike was being driven at a steady pace on the correct side of the road and well within the speed limit. The HGV driver frequently used that route at that time of day and recognised the motorbike as it often passed him travelling in the opposite direction and it had a distinctive headlight which was dim, more like a side light, consistent with an older motorbike. All the other eye witnesses noticed the dimness of the motorcycle light. The victim’s motorbike was an older model, a Suzuki GN 125cc registered in 2004. Its headlight was fully compliant with the current Driver and Vehicle Standards Agency regulations and deemed sufficient and fit for purpose, but is not as bright as the prevalence of very bright lighting now seen on the roads and through no fault of the victim would have been hard to discern. There was no prosecution expert evidence, but the defence had served a road traffic collision expert report from Mr Andy Wooller (BSc, ABIPP, FARRM) of Acuity Forensics Ltd, which the prosecution accepted. It concluded that from about 8 seconds prior to the collision the motorcycle’s headlight would have been within the appellant’s field of vision however the combination of its relatively low intensity, the difficulty that all drivers face when attempting to observe objects outside the pool of their headlights and the plethora of other light sources in the appellant’s immediate field of vision including a significant reflection from the rear of the HGV, would have made it very difficult to discern. Had she been able to discern the headlight ahead of her it would have appeared consistent with a roadside light, reflective sign, or other object and what it was would only have been apparent between one and two seconds prior to collision. In his report Mr Wooller noted with concern that headlights with a reflector of dated design, fitted with a 35w incandescent bulb are still deemed fit for purpose.[6]When the appellant was interviewed under caution later that day on suspicion of causing serious injury by dangerous driving, she answered all the police questions. She explained that she had overtaken the car and had started to overtake the lorry. She only saw the motorcyclist at the last minute and when she did, she braked hard and swerved to try to pull in behind the lorry and to avoid a collision. But she had seen the motorbike too late to prevent the accident and also clipped the HGV as she tried to pull back in behind it to avoid the motorbike.[7]The appellant stopped her vehicle and stayed at the scene for the emergency services to arrive. She could not find her phone in the car so could not call them herself.[8]The victim was very seriously injured. He had a fractured shoulder blade, extending into the shoulder joint, a fractured elbow resulting in multiple bony fragments, a fracture to the right forearm also resulting in multiple bony fragments, fractures to multiple bones in his right hand, a wound in his right thigh with a bone protruding through and a wound to the front of his right leg.[9]In the following year he had several operations to try and rescue his lower leg and multiple skin grafts which were unsuccessful. His right leg was amputated below the knee and he was fitted with a prosthetic limb. He undertook extensive physiotherapy. He had to move house in order to accommodate his hospital equipment and wheelchair. In December 2024, two years post-accident, he was still receiving treatment, including acupuncture for phantom limb pain, hydrotherapy and hypnotherapy. He was also receiving treatment for pain in his right hand from the metal work inserted during operations on his hand injuries, physiotherapy for his knees and upper limbs and he was only able to walk using his prosthesis and walking aids. In an updated victim personal statement in January 2026, he described some of the ongoing treatment and problems. He still attends physiotherapy once a week, relies on taxis for transport, cannot make a full fist with his right hand, has had to move house again because of the adaptations requited, he is still not working and he cannot return to his previous role which involved manual labour.[10]After being interviewed under caution in the police station the appellant was released pending further investigation. Solicitors instructed by her submitted written representations to the Crown Prosecution Service in July 2023 and chased the officer for regular updates thereafter, and were told that matters were still pending. On 4 November 2024 a decision was made to charge the appellant and she was charged with causing serious injury by dangerous driving in January 2025, two years and two months after the incident. There was no prosecution expert evidence and the defence report from Mr Wooller of Acuity Forensics Ltd was served in September 2025. Shortly before the trial date listed the prosecution accepted that there was no evidence of dangerous driving and agreed to reduce the charge to one of causing serious injury by careless driving.[11]The appellant was 30 years old at the time of the offence and 33 years old at time of sentence. She was of exemplary character with no previous convictions or any cautions or police reprimands and had impressive character testimonials. She was in employment in the family business. By the time that court proceedings were initiated against her three years after the incident she was pregnant with her first child and seven months pregnant at the time of sentence.[12]The pre-sentence report that found her to be at a very low risk of re-offending and noted the extent of the appellant’s genuine remorse. No community orders were recommended because there were no pro-criminal tendencies that needed addressing and unpaid work would be impractical given her pregnancy and impending birth of her child. The appellant had provided a thoughtful, articulate letter to the court explaining her remorse, the lessons that she had learned and that she accepted full responsibility for her actions. Sentence[13]The sentencing judge agreed with both counsel that the offence fell into category B1 under the sentencing council guidelines for causing serious injury by careless driving. He set out the facts and noted that there was the greatest remorse and that the appellant would live with the effects for the rest of her life, as would the victim.[14]The Judge accepted that it was not a prolonged piece of negligent driving but a single overtake that was careless because she could not see the road sufficiently far ahead that had resulted in a drastic consequence. He considered that the only aggravating factor that applied under the guidelines was that Mr Saville was a vulnerable road user as a motorcyclist.[15]The Judge agreed with the pre-sentence report author that no rehabilitative community orders were appropriate and the Judge was concerned about the practicality of imposing unpaid work given the impending birth of the appellant’s child, although accepted it was a possibility he could consider.[16]The Judge concluded that the aggravating features balanced the mitigating features and that the starting point under the guidelines of 26 weeks’ custody should also be the finishing point. He agreed that the appellant was entitled to full credit for her guilty plea notwithstanding that it was given late in the day, because it was only then that the prosecution agreed that the driving was careless and that she had been driving without due care and attention, not dangerously. The appellant pleaded guilty to the lesser charge as soon as she could. The Judge therefore deducted one third of the sentence and arrived at a custodial sentence of four months which he considered could be suspended under the sentencing council overarching guidelines on the imposition of community orders and suspended sentence orders. He suspended it for the then maximum period of two years.[17]The Judge decided that an extended driving test was not necessary. Although the harm was great, this was not a prolonged piece of bad driving but a negligent overtaking and an isolated incident over the appellant’s long unblemished career of driving both before and after the incident. Grounds of Appeal[18]Two grounds of appeal are relied on: firstly that the Judge erred in imposing a custodial sentence: had he applied the imposition guideline correctly he would have imposed a fine. Secondly, and alternatively, that the Judge erred in setting a two year operational period for the suspension period of the sentence. A much shorter period was appropriate. Discussion and conclusion[19]This was a difficult sentencing exercise for the Judge given a number of unusual features in the case. We agree that under the sentencing council guidelines for the offence it was a category B1 offence and thus had a starting point of 26 weeks custody, with a range from a high level community order to one year’s custody.[20]There is no doubt that the harm was at level 1, the highest level. In moving and very measured victim personal statements Mr Saville has described the series of operations and his chequered path to limited recovery and the devastating impact the accident has had on his life. We were impressed by his dignity and fortitude and determination to recover as much as possible and his acknowledgment of all the support and help he has had from others. Nothing that we can say or do can minimise the effect of the accident on his life.[21]There is also no challenge to the agreed position of the parties that the appellant’s level of culpability was level B under the guideline because she was performing an unsafe manoeuvre as she had left insufficient room safely to overtake both the Scirocco and the HGV. However we find that the offence fell towards the bottom of culpability level B by reference to both to the nature of her carelessness and the powerful mitigation.[22]Her standard of driving was close to the threshold for careless driving because, through no fault whatsoever of the victim, his motorbike was hard to see. On Mr Wooller’s analysis when she pulled out she had almost but not quite enough time to clear the two vehicles before anything from beyond her line of sight in the very gently curving right hand bend would prevent her; but had any oncoming vehicle had normal lighting, she would very likely have been able to adjust to tuck back in behind the Scirocco or the HGV. She was not careless in failing to see the approach of the motorcycle earlier or take avoiding action as a result of the dimness of the light. As soon as the appellant saw him she immediately braked and swerved and tried her best to avoid him, just as he also tried to avoid her, by swerving to the left. Unfortunately, by the time that they had both seen each other, there was not enough time for either of them to take sufficient action to prevent the accident.[23]We agree that as a motorcyclist Mr Saville was a vulnerable road user, but that was the only aggravating feature that applied in this case. By contrast there were many mitigating factors that outweighed the aggravating factors, such as the appellant’s impeccable positive good character. For many years she has provided support and voluntary work for the elderly and young as part of her religious community and she is involved in pastoral work. She has an exemplary work record and expressed deep and genuine remorse for the accident. When the HGV driver approached her after the accident her first thought was for the motorcyclist and she tried to find her phone so that she could use the torch app to help look for him.[24]The inexplicable delay in the police progressing this matter weighed heavily on the appellant, as did the prospect of the more serious charge of causing serious injury by dangerous driving for which there was no evidential basis. It had been based on a police officer’s witness statement which had inaccurately recorded the appellant’s roadside account. What she had actually said was recorded on the body worn footage and tallied with what the appellant explained in her interview under caution. The appellant was not arraigned on the amended indictment and able to plead guilty until 29 Jan 2026, three years and two months after the incident. The delay in this matter coming to court is a factor to be taken into account.[25]We are satisfied that from a starting point of 26 week under the guideline the mitigating factors far outweighed the single aggravating factor, and with full credit for plea, this is a case that would have fallen towards the bottom of the B1 sentencing range and merited a high level community order.[26]However as Mr Wright KC so articulately said in his cogent submissions, the complicating factor here was that the appellant was pregnant and of such positive moral character that there was nothing that the probation service could recommend as an element of a community order, which he submitted did not justify the imposition of a custodial sentence, albeit a suspended sentence order.[27]The sentencing council guideline on the imposition of community orders and custodial sentences is of valuable assistance. Even where the seriousness of the offence indicates that the threshold for a community order has been passed, sentencers must consider all available disposals at the time of sentence. A fine or discharge can achieve the purposes of sentencing (with, if relevant, any appropriate ancillary orders):
“If, in all the circumstances of the case, a fine can achieve the purposes of sentencing, it may be imposed as an alternative to a community order. Generally: a Band D fine may be a suitable alternative to a low level community order a Band E fine may be a suitable alternative to a medium level community order, and a Band F fine may be a suitable alternative to a high level community order.” a Band D fine may be a suitable alternative to a low level community order a Band F fine may be a suitable alternative to a high level community order.”

a Band D fine may be a suitable alternative to a low level community order

[28]We therefore conclude that the imposition of a custodial sentence, albeit a suspended sentence, was manifestly excessive in this case since the offence did not pass the custody threshold. We conclude that the fact that the normal forms of punishment and rehabilitation in a community order were neither suitable nor available meant that on the facts of this case a fine would achieve the purposes of sentencing. It is therefore not necessary to address ground 2 of the appeal.[29]We allow the appeal and quash the suspended sentence order. In setting the level of the fine following discussion with Mr Wright it was acknowledged that taking the appellant’s financial resources alone would not be appropriate, given her maternity leave, but the calculation of the level of fine should be based on the family finances. We replace the suspended sentence order with a Band F fine calculated as £3,000, with 12 months to pay and we set a period of 28 days custody in default of payment.[30]The statutory surcharge must be reduced and amended appropriately.[31]The period of disqualification remains the same.[32]Finally, we shall draw this case and the report prepared by Acuity Forensics Ltd to the attention of the Driver and Vehicle Standards Authority to consider the adequacy of the current headlight regulations and whether they remain fit for purpose.