R v Christine Linda Rawle [2026] EWCA Crim 912
[1]This is a renewed application for leave to appeal against conviction following refusal by the single judge.[2]The applicant initially relied on grounds settled by her trial counsel. Following the single judge's refusal of leave and the applicant's criticism of her legal representatives, they no longer act for her. We understand that the applicant continues to rely on the original grounds. In addition, she has subsequently sent in various letters and documents to the Court of Appeal Office. She has sent two letters consolidating her submissions at their request, and further letters immediately before the listing of this application. We have considered all of the submitted material.[3]In a recent letter sent to the Court of Appeal Office, the applicant says that she is worried that she is unrepresented. We have seen a letter, dated 11 May 2026, addressed to the applicant from UEA Justice Project, to the effect that they are unable to help her.[4]It has been over a year since the applicant's trial representatives withdrew. There has been ample time to seek to obtain alternative representation. The applicant has sent many documents and letters to the court setting out her position, of which we are well aware. There has been no application for an adjournment, and in all the circumstances we see no reason not to proceed with the renewed application today.[5]On 22 March 2024, following a trial in the Crown Court at Exeter before His Honour Judge James Adkin and a jury, the applicant was convicted of murder. She was sentenced to life imprisonment, with a minimum term of 15 years and 153 days (16 years, less the days spent in custody on remand).[6]The facts may be briefly stated. There was no dispute that on 21 August 2022 the applicant fatally stabbed her husband to his back. She was aged 69 and he 71 at the material time. They had been married since 1995.[7]It was the prosecution case that alongside their love for each other, the applicant and her husband regularly bickered and argued. There was tension between them at the time of the killing over the potential sale of some land. The applicant wished to sell it to pay for an eye operation and to make some home improvements. The deceased had initially agreed, and then changed his mind.[8]The prosecution case was that on 21 August 2022 the applicant had stabbed the deceased to his back as he was pushing a wheelbarrow away from her. She walked away as he asked her to remove the knife from his back.[9]To prove the case, the prosecution relied in part on evidence from the deceased's former partners, including his ex-wife, Jill Doherty. Her evidence was that the deceased always treated her with kindness, was never violent and did not become angry with her. Further evidence was called from family members, friends and work colleagues as to the nature of the relationship between the applicant and the deceased. This included evidence to the effect that they argued and that the deceased was dismissive of the applicant's physical capabilities and ideas, and could be very critical of her. One witness saw the applicant hold a knife to the deceased's throat on an occasion they visited. Evidence was also called from those who had spoken to the applicant on the day of the killing.[10]Full details of the evidence relied upon by the prosecution can be found in the Court of Appeal Office Summary.[11]The defence was one of self-defence. In the alternative, the following issues were raised: first, that the applicant did not intend to cause really serious harm; second, loss of control; and third, diminished responsibility.[12]The applicant did not give evidence at trial, but relied on her account in police interviews in which she said that she had felt threatened when the deceased made a gesture suggesting that she was crazy, as well as making a throat-cutting gesture. She further said that she had "snapped", could not take it anymore and had maybe lost control.[13]On the applicant's behalf, it was suggested that the deceased had been physically, mentally and sexually abusive to her for many years and that she had been the victim of coercive and controlling behaviours. Finally, it was submitted that the medical evidence supported the submission that the violence used by the applicant on the day in question was a symptom of her mental illness and therefore the partial defence of diminished responsibility was available to her.[14]The applicant called witnesses to the deceased's general behaviour towards her. She further called Dr Clifford, a clinical psychologist, who assessed the applicant and spoke of her account of the relationship which the defence relied upon as part of the defence of loss of control and her conclusion that the applicant suffered from PTSD.[15]The applicant also relied on Dr Farnham, a psychiatrist, who concluded that the defence of diminished responsibility was open to the applicant who suffered from a significant level of depression, complex PTSD and an emotionally unstable personality disorder.[16]The prosecution psychologist agreed that the applicant presented with a major depressive disorder and PTSD, but was of the opinion that her self-report was of questionable validity, due to her high score on the deception scale.[17]Dr Falcowski, a psychiatrist called by the prosecution, agreed that the applicant suffered with the conditions identified by Dr Farnham. He did not, however, conclude that the defence of diminished responsibility was open to her. In his view, her long history of anger and depression, including violence towards the deceased, were more likely to have led to her actions.[18]The applicant continues to rely on the three proposed grounds of appeal settled by counsel to support her contention that her conviction is arguably unsafe.[19]On ground 1, she submits that the judge erred in refusing to allow the defence to adduce expert evidence in relation to coercive control from Professor Monckton–Smith (a criminologist). The defence sought to rely on passages of her report to address, in general terms, concepts of coercive control, violent resistance to control, coercive patterns and tactics, the response of victims to coercive control, and the assessment of risk in coercive control and intimate partner abuse. It was argued that this evidence would assist the jury in recognising coercive behaviour and properly understanding how someone might respond. The information was outside of their general knowledge and would guard against them drawing adverse erroneous inferences based on myths.[20]This issue was determined in a hearing before the trial by His Honour Judge Parker KC, who was originally due to be the trial judge. He refused to admit the evidence on the basis that there was a danger in adducing evidence of the study of criminal behaviour in general terms based on evidence from other criminal cases. The jury in this case had to assess the evidence in the trial in its own context, without being drawn into assessing more generalised interpretations of the behaviour of other women in other cases. There was a plethora of material for the jury to consider the issues relevant to the applicant's trial. The jury could properly determine those issues from their own life experience and did not require expert opinion. They would be directed on myths in the summing up.[21]We do not consider this ground to be arguable. The judge was right, in our view, to exclude this evidence for the reasons he gave. We observe that during the trial the applicant called Dr Clifford, who gave evidence about coercive and controlling relationships and violent resistance. In his summing up the trial judge, His Honour Judge Adkin KC, gave a careful direction on myths and stereotypes. Generic, unfocused opinion evidence was inadmissible.[22]On ground 2, the applicant submits that the judge erred in refusing to allow the defence to adduce evidence from the deceased's medical notes which were disclosed during the trial. These showed that shortly before their separation the deceased and his ex-wife, Ms Doherty had attended upon a psychiatrist due to marital problems, which led to the deceased having a two week inpatient stay at a psychiatric unit. He was found not to suffer from any psychiatric condition, but was under stress by reason of marital issues. It is submitted that this evidence would have undermined Ms Doherty's account that she had a happy marriage with the deceased and that he was a kind man who did not suffer from any mental health issues.[23]The judge did not accept that there was anything in the disclosed notes which was inconsistent with the witness' account that the deceased had not used domestic violence against her and was not a domestic abuser. The deceased was not diagnosed with any psychiatric condition, but was suffering from stress. It was therefore irrelevant, and there was no need for the witness to be recalled. This ground is also, in our view, unarguable. The judge was right to exclude the evidence to ensure that the jury were focused on the relevant issues. Ms Doherty and the deceased separated in 1981. The records from March 1981 did not contradict her evidence that he was not controlling or violent towards her. The reasons for the marital difficulties were irrelevant.[24]On the third ground the applicant is critical of the prosecution. She claims that they relied on prejudicial material in the form of myths and stereotypes on the issue of domestic abuse. Examples are taken from the opening, cross-examination of the defence psychiatrist and from their closing remarks.[25]We also consider this ground to be unarguable. We agree with the single judge who pointed out that no criticism was made of the judge's summing up, which clearly directed the jury on myths and stereotypes. In opening and closing, the prosecution warned of the need to guard against gender stereotyping. Any words used in the opening, of which no objection was taken before it was delivered, could have no significant effect on the fairness of the trial or the safety of the verdict.[26]We summarise the points made by the applicant in letters that she has sent to the court. In these she speaks of her problems with the deceased and his behaviour towards her; she complains that witnesses lied on oath; and she asserts that she was not properly defended at trial. The applicant states that she was unwell at the time of the trial which was unfair, and that she wanted another trial.[27]We have considered these additional points. In our view none of them, either individually or collectively, affords any arguable ground of appeal. The points raised about the applicant's relationship with the deceased were raised and explored at trial. It was a matter for the jury whether the witnesses, who were cross-examined, were truthful.[28]Following her complaints about her legal representatives, the applicant waived legal professional privilege. It is clear from the response that we have seen that there is no basis to her assertion that she was not properly represented. To the contrary, she was afforded a great deal of time by her legal team who gave her all possible assistance. The applicant's legal representatives ensured that she was medically examined to assess her ability to stand trial. We note in particular the report from Dr Watts, dated 24 February 2024, that she demonstrated no cognitive defects or reduction in functioning and was stable in mood. She had been prescribed antidepressant medication and was being managed on the normal prison wing.[29]We conclude that there is no arguable basis for the contention that the applicant's trial was unfair or that her conviction was unsafe.[30]The renewed application for leave to appeal against conviction is accordingly refused. __________________________ Epiq Europe Ltd hereby certify that the above is an accurate and complete record of the proceedings or part thereof. Lower Ground Floor, 46 Chancery Lane, London WC2A 1JE Tel No: 020 7404 1400 Email: rcj@epiqglobal.co.uk ______________________________