R v Shaan Bhatnagar [2026] EWCA Crim 817

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL

CRIMINAL DIVISION

Between

R E XCrown

London

WC2A 2LL

ON APPEAL FROM THE CROWN COURT AT ISLEWORTH

(MISS RECORDER NORMAN) [01MP1192023]

Case No 2026/01586/A2 Thursday 18 June 2026

Neutral Citation Number: [2026] EWCA Crim 817

B e f o r e:

THE VICE PRESIDENT OF THE COURT OF APPEAL CRIMINAL DIVISION

(Lord Justice Edis)

MR JUSTICE CHOUDHURY

MS JUSTICE NORTON DBE

____________________

- v -

Between

SHAAN BHATNAGAR

____________________

Computer Aided Transcription of Epiq Europe Ltd,

Lower Ground Floor, 46 Chancery Lane, London WC2A 1JE

Tel No: 020 7404 1400; Email: rcj@epiqglobal.co.uk (Official Shorthand Writers to the Court)

____________________

Mr N Corre appeared for Applicant

____________________

APPROVED J U D G M E N T

Date 2026-06-18

[1]On 9 September 2025, having pleaded guilty before the Uxbridge Magistrates' Court, the applicant (then aged 38) was committed to the Crown Court at Isleworth for sentence, pursuant to section 14 of the Sentencing Act 2020 in respect of three offences of fraud by abuse of position, contrary to sections 1 and 4 of the Fraud Act 2006.

[2]On 2 April 2026, he was sentenced to concurrent terms totalling 18 months' imprisonment.

[3]The applicant seeks leave to appeal against sentence, the application having been referred to the full court by the Registrar.

The Facts

[4]Between July 2021 and April 2022, the applicant, who held himself out to be a watch broker, gained the confidence of and entered into business agreements with three separate watch collectors who were introduced to him through mutual friends or family members. In each case the applicant led the victim to believe that he could procure high value, luxury brand wristwatches which they could then re-sell at a profit. In each case the applicant successfully delivered an initial order, thereby gaining the victim's trust. Each victim then placed a much larger order with the applicant for watches for which they paid significant sums of money in advance.

[5]The wife of victim 1 was a close friend of the applicant's aunt. The victim placed an order for two Patek Philippe watches for which he paid over £41,460.

[6]Victim 2 was a friend of the son of the applicant's aunt. He paid a total of £92,000 in two separate transfers of £60,000 and £32,000 for ten watches

[7]Victim 3 was a friend of the applicant's aunt. He paid a total of £140,297 for nine Rolex watches.

[8]None of the orders were fulfilled. Victims 1 and 3 made repeated attempts to contact the applicant to obtain either delivery of the watches or a refund of money, without success. The day after victim 2 had transferred payment to the applicant's bank account, he was contacted by the friend who had been the introducer, who told him that he believed that the applicant had been scamming people and to cancel whatever transaction he may have made. Victim 2 was able to stop one transfer of £60,000, but was unable to stop the second transfer of £32,000, which had been paid for on his behalf by his mother.

[9]Victim 2 contacted the applicant and told him that he wanted to cancel the order. The applicant agreed to do so and to refund the £32,000 that had been transferred, but failed to do so or to respond to all further attempts by victim 2 to contact him.

[10]The total loss across all three victims was therefore £213,757.

[11]Examination of the applicant's bank accounts showed that he had dispersed the funds variously to his own accounts, or as payment for his own gambling debts, or on occasion as purported payments to other clients. None of the money was repaid to any of the victims.

Victim Personal Statements

[12]Victim 1 stated that whilst the financial loss was significant, greater was the emotional damage – the betrayal, the shame and the erosion of his confidence. He believed that the scam was calculated and personal. The applicant had knowingly used personal relationships to gain his trust and had intentionally manipulated him.

[13]The mother of victim 2 stated that she had been overwhelmed by feelings of stress, anxiety, fear and distrust. Knowing that someone had deliberately chosen to take advantage of her and her son had left her feeling violated, and her savings had been entirely eroded.

[14]Victim 3 stated that he had used a large portion of his savings, which was money he had built up over many years through hard work and discipline to invest in what he believed was a legitimate opportunity. Losing the money had left him financially vulnerable. He felt deceived, embarrassed and angry. He now finds it difficult to trust people and has lost confidence in his own judgment and decision making skills. He stated that the crime had not just taken his money, but had taken a part of his peace of mind, confidence and sense of security.

Antecedents

[15]The applicant had no previous convictions. He had one caution for harassment in 2015.

The Sentencing Guidelines

[16]The prosecution contended that each fraud fell into category A3 of the relevant sentencing guidelines, with a potential to move up into category A2, due to the high impact upon each of the victims.

[17]The defence submitted that before taking account of mitigating factors relevant to culpability, this was category B, as there were no category A factors, other than inherent in the nature of the offence. But it was accepted that, overall, this was harm category 2.

[18]The starting point for a category A2 offence is five years' imprisonment, with a range of between three and six years; and for a category B2 offence, the starting point is three years' imprisonment, with a range between 18 months and four years' imprisonment.

[19]There were no aggravating factors.

[20]The mitigating factors contended for were the applicant's lack of previous convictions, remorse, the lapse of time that had evolved since apprehension, and the fact that the activity was originally legitimate. Significant weight was placed on the applicant's gambling addiction and the actions taken by him to address it. In this regard, reliance was placed on a psychological assessment report, dated 16 January 2026, by Dr Matthew Gaskell, which concluded that at the time of the offences the applicant was suffering from a severe psychiatric disorder, namely gambling disorder, without which it was Dr Gaskell's opinion that these offences would not have occurred. Dr Gaskell explained that a gambling disorder is characterised by impaired control and a significant alternation in brain function, decision making and personality in favour of persistent gambling against the gambler's own best interests. What was once a behaviour under volition or control, he explained, becomes compulsive, habitual and free choice is increasing corroded. Dr Gaskell noted that the applicant reported that by the date of the report in January 2026, he had been abstinent from gambling for eleven weeks and had sought, and was receiving, additional support from an addiction recovery coach, as well as peer support from the charity "GamLEARN", to both of which he had self-referred in September 2025. Statements confirming the applicant's engagement with both organisations were before the court.

[21]In addition, shortly before the sentencing hearing, the applicant had been referred to, and accepted for, NHS treatment for his addiction.

[22]There was no pre-sentence report. Whether a report was required was considered by two judges in advance of the sentencing date. Both determined that as the starting point for a category A2 offence, which was the category proposed by the prosecution, was five years' imprisonment, there would be no purpose in a pre-sentence report. In any event, a considerable amount of information was available to the Recorder, all of which she took into consideration.

[23]We have had the advantage of seeing a pre-appeal report, which sets out potential community based disposals.

The Sentencing Exercise

[24]In determining the appropriate sentence, the Recorder took a stepped approach. She carefully applied all relevant guidelines to the material that had been placed before her. She agreed with the prosecution's submission that the offences fell within category A2. She was satisfied from the evidence of Dr Gaskell that the applicant was suffering from a relevant mental disorder, namely a gambling disorder, as a result of which his ability to make decisions and control impulsive behaviour was reduced. However, she noted that it was not suggested that the applicant did not know what he was doing was wrong; and whilst she accepted that his control was impaired, it was not absent. He knew where and how to access help, and had previously been able to stop gambling.

[25]Taking all these matters together, and having regard to the Overarching Guideline on Sentencing Offenders with Mental Disorders or Neurological Impairments, she found that, whilst culpability was reduced, the reduction was moderate. Nevertheless, she found that the reduced culpability moved the offence from A2 to B2 on the Fraud Guidelines, with a starting point of three years' imprisonment.

The Recorder found that there were no aggravating factors.

[27]She accepted the mitigating factors, including the applicant's lack of previous convictions, the delay between offence and sentence, the fact that the activity was originally legitimate, and the steps taken to address his addictive behaviours. She took into account the applicant's mental disorder, to the extent that she had not already taken it into account when determining culpability. The combination of mitigating factors reduced the sentence from the starting point of three years' imprisonment to one of 27 months. As the applicant had pleaded guilty at the first opportunity, the sentence was further reduced by one third to 18 months' imprisonment.

[28]The Recorder then considered whether or not that sentence should be one of immediate imprisonment or whether it could be suspended. Referring to the guideline on the imposition of custodial sentences, she acknowledged that the prospects of rehabilitation and the risk of re-offending were both strongly linked to his gambling addiction, for which the applicant had previously sought, and was seeking, to address. However, given the seriousness of the offences and the impact on the victims, she concluded that only an immediate custodial sentence could be justified. Taking into account totality, the Recorder selected one offence as the lead offence, to which was attached the sentence of 18 months' imprisonment, and passed concurrent sentences of 12 months' imprisonment for each of the two remaining charges.

The Submissions on the Application

[29]Mr Corre, on the applicant's behalf, does not seek to challenge the categorisation of the offences as category 2B, the sentence of 18 months' imprisonment, or the imposition of an immediate, rather than a suspended, sentence. He accepts that a sentence of 18 months is not arguably manifestly excessive, and concedes that there was no error of principle in imposing an immediate sentence of custody. Rather, he makes a somewhat unusual submission, given these concessions, that the Recorder should have deferred sentence.

[30]We observe that the defence sentencing note placed before the Recorder contained no reference to the possibility of a deferred sentence. However, we are informed by Mr Corre that he raised whether sentence could and should be deferred in oral submissions at the sentencing hearing.

The Recorder dealt with that suggestion as follows:

"I have considered the requirements for a deferment order. Having regard to the nature of the offence, the character and circumstances of the offender, I must be satisfied that it is in the interests of justice to make the order. I do not feel that this is an appropriate case for deferment. I cannot see realistic and sensible requirements set out that could be put in place to monitor gambling, and I also note the report of Dr Gaskell, that even after two spells in residential treatment previously, [the applicant] has been unable to resist a return to gambling. He has not begun to repay the money to the victims, and it seems to me that if I were to defer sentence, there is little prospect that he would be able to begin to, so I am not going to defer the sentence."

[32]Mr Corre, whilst accepting that whether or not to defer sentence was a matter within the discretion of the Recorder is critical of the rationale applied – specifically her conclusion that there were no realistic requirements that could be put in place to monitor gambling. Mr Corre submits that she should have sought the assistance of the Probation Service or counsel before reaching this conclusion and that, had she done so, Mr Corre would have been able to make suggestions based upon a previous case in which he had been involved, in which conditions had been imposed to abide by self-exclusion and to continue to receive support from both Gamblers Anonymous and GamLEARN. Mr Corre submits that by failing to seek assistance as to the possible conditions, the Recorder failed to have regard to section 3(1)(a) and (b) of the Sentencing Act 2020, and that accordingly, although the sentence ultimately passed was not in itself wrong in principle, the Recorder's reasoning, by which she rejected the possibility of deferring sentence, was.

Discussion and Conclusion

[33]The power to defer sentence is provided for by section 3 of the Sentencing Act 2020, which states as follows:

"Deferment order (1) In this Code 'deferment order' means an order deferring passing sentence on an offender in respect of one or more offences until the date specified in the order, to enable a court, in dealing with the offender, to have regard to — (a) the offender's conduct after conviction (including, where appropriate, the offender's making reparation for the offence), or (b) any change in the offender's circumstances. (2) A deferment order may impose requirements ('deferment requirements') as to the offender's conduct during the period of deferment. (3) Deferment requirements may include — (a) requirements as to the residence of the offender during all or part of the period of deferment; (b) restorative justice requirements."

[34]The effect of a deferment order is to delay the passing of a sentence until a date specified by the court, which must be within six months if the offender was convicted of any of the offences before 22 March 2026, or 12 months if the offender was convicted of all of the offences on or after that date. As this applicant was convicted by his guilty plea on 9 September 2025, it follows that the maximum period by which a sentence could have been deferred was six months.

[35]Where a sentence is deferred, the court may impose such conditions during the period of deferment that it considers appropriate. Any requirements or conditions imposed should be specific and measurable. In addition, the offender must consent (and in the case of restorative justice activities the other participants must also consent). The offender must undertake to comply with the requirements imposed by the court, and the court must be satisfied that deferment is in the interests of justice.

[36]The imposition guideline states that the purpose of a deferment order is to enable the court to have regard to the offender's conduct after conviction, or any change in their circumstances, including the extent to which the offender has complied with any requirements imposed by the court. Deferring sentencing may therefore be particularly appropriate for young adults typically 18 to 25 years of age, or those who are in transitional life circumstances. When deferring a sentence the court should specify to the offender what type of sentence will be imposed if the offender complies, or fails to comply, with all of the requirements and/or conditions attached to the period of deferment.

[37]In R v Swinbourne (Dean Anthony)

[2023] EWCA Crim 906

– a case decided before the imposition guideline was published – the court considered the circumstances in which it was likely to be appropriate to defer sentence. Giving the judgment of the court, William Davis LJ stated:

"21. … There is no Sentencing Council Guideline currently in relation to deferred sentences, though that may change shortly with the introduction of the new Imposition guideline. However, the Sentencing Guidelines Council New Sentences Definitive Guideline still applies. As the judge noted, that provides that sentence should be deferred in a small group of cases, at either the custody threshold or the community sentence threshold, where the court may be prepared to impose a lesser sentence provided the defendant is prepared to adapt his behaviour in a way clearly specified by the court. When passing sentence, the court should indicate the type of sentence it would be minded to impose if the defendant does not comply. Deferment can only be appropriate if a sentence other than one of immediate custody will follow in the event of compliance."

He went on to state: 38. "… deferment is an option that is to be sparingly used. In most cases the court should consider a community order other non-custodial disposal is appropriate rather than deferment of sentence. …"

He went on to state:

[38]These remarks are echoed in the current Imposition Guideline in which it is stated that:

"Deferring sentencing will be appropriate only in limited circumstances. A deferment order should only be made if the court considers that a specified period (which enables the court to have regard to the offender’s conduct or any change in the offender’s circumstances) will allow for a different sentence to that which would otherwise be imposed on that day. A deferment order is likely to be relevant predominantly in a small group of cases close to either the community or custodial sentence threshold."

[39]Applying these principles, the key question for the Recorder or any sentencing judge will therefore be whether successful compliance with any conditions imposed for the duration of the deferral will allow for a different and non-custodial sentence to be passed. That is a question that will always be fact specific and will require the court to decide as a preliminary issue whether a sentence other than immediate custody could be justified.

[40]In this case the Recorder clearly carefully considered whether it would be appropriate to suspend the sentence of imprisonment. She said this:

"The custody threshold is very plainly crossed in this case. This is not one in which a community order would be appropriate. I have gone on to consider whether this is one in which a suspended sentence would be appropriate. I have looked at the factors set out within [the Imposition] Guideline. Realistic prospect of rehabilitation and risk of re-offending in my view, are both very strongly linked to your gambling addiction. In respect of those, I do consider that there have been previous attempts for you to break free of that addiction, some longer lasting than others, and that at present, it is relatively early days in that your treatment has only recently begun. I treat those as neutral even on the relatively low threshold of a realistic prospect of rehabilitation, and I do bear in mind the amount of personal mitigation here, which is again, largely bound up with the report from Dr Gaskell. On the other side of those factors within suspending sentences, is the seriousness of the offence and whether or not appropriate punishment can only be achieved by immediate custody and I am afraid that bearing in mind the impact on the victims and the seriousness of the offending, appropriate punishment here can only be achieved, in my judgment, by immediate custody."

[41]We consider that the Recorder was entitled to reach that conclusion. Having determined that an immediate sentence of custody was necessary, it would have been inappropriate to defer sentence which would not have been in the interests of justice on the facts of this specific case.

[42]Accordingly, the application for leave to appeal against sentence is refused. ___________________________________ Epiq Europe Ltd hereby certify that the above is an accurate and complete record of the proceedings or part thereof. Lower Ground Floor, 46 Chancery Lane, London WC2A 1JE Tel No: 020 7404 1400 Email: rcj@epiqglobal.co.uk 44. ______________________________