R v Graham Ronald Head [2026] EWCA Crim 799

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Neutral Case Number: [2026] EWCA Crim 799

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL

CRIMINAL DIVISION

Between

R EXCrown

London

WC2A 2LL

ON APPEAL THE CROWN COURT AT LEWES

(HER HONOUR JUDGE LAING KC) [T20247014]

Case No 2025/03427/A4 Thursday 11 June 2026

B e f o r e:

LORD JUSTICE WARBY

MRS JUSTICE O'FARRELL DBE

MRS JUSTICE BRUNNER DBE

____________________

- v –

Between

GRAHAM RONALD HEAD

____________________

Computer Aided Transcription of Epiq Europe Ltd,

Lower Ground Floor, 46 Chancery Lane, London WC2A 1JE

Tel No: 020 7404 1400; Email: rcj@epiqglobal.co.uk (Official Shorthand Writers to the Court)

___________________

Miss F Levett appeared for Appellant

___________________

J U D G M E N T

Date 2026-06-11

[1]The provisions of the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1992 apply to these offences. Under those provisions, where an allegation has been made that a sexual offence has been committed against a person, no matter relating to that person shall during that person's lifetime be included in any publication if it is likely to lead members of the public to identify that person as the victim of the offence. This prohibition applies unless waived or lifted in accordance with section 3 of the Act. For the purposes of clarification, we do not lift the prohibition.

[2]On 19 June 2025, following a re-trial in the Crown Court at Lewes before Her Honour Judge Christine Laing KC, the appellant was convicted of kidnapping (count 1), attempted rape (count 2) and assault by penetration (count 4).

[3]On 29 August 2025, the appellant was sentenced to an extended sentence of 23 years, comprising a custodial term of 18 years and an extended licence period of five years on each of counts 1, 2 and 4, to run concurrently.

[4]The appellant appeals against his sentence by leave of the single judge.

[5]The material background facts are as follows. Count 4 relates to the first complainant, to whom we will refer as "C1", to protect her identity and the identity of her family and friends. On the evening of 18 August 2022, C1 was socialising with her friends in Brighton. She was drinking and became intoxicated. At around 3 am on 19 August 2022, C1 and a friend tried to get into a club opposite Brighton pier, but it was closing, and they were refused entry. They parted company and C1 started to walk home alone. The appellant's car pulled over to the side of the road ahead of her and the appellant offered C1 a lift. She got into the car, and they drove off. The appellant dropped C1 off at a park, where she remained, messaging her friend. The appellant returned and approached her on foot. He unzipped C1's shorts, put his hand into her underwear and inserted his fingers into her vagina. C1 stood up and tried to push the appellant away, shouting at him. The appellant responded by grabbing C1's right arm and dragging her about ten metres into the park and onto a grassy area. The appellant kicked C1's leg, forcing her to the ground. He lay on top of her, continuing to digitally penetrate her.

[6]C1 was able to get her phone and message the words "I am being raped" to a friend. Her friend called C1 back, which startled the appellant, who got up and ran off. C1 was able to get back to her feet, pull up her shorts up and walk out of the park. She hid in bushes until her friend arrived to collect her.

[7]Counts 1 and 2 relate to the second complainant, to whom we refer as "C2", to protect her identity and the identity of her family and friends. On the evening 17 November 2022, C2, a young woman, was out socialising with friends in Brighton. By the early hours of 18 November 2022 she was drunk and affected by cocaine, which she had taken during the evening. On a road near the seafront a car pulled up beside her. The driver was the appellant. The appellant said that he was an Uber driver and that he had just finished his shift. He asked her if she would like a free lift home. C2 accepted his offer and gave him her home address. She tried to get into the front passenger seat, but the appellant told her that she would have to sit in the back. C2 engaged the appellant in some small talk and then drifted off to sleep on the back seat. As she drifted in and out of consciousness, C2 realised that she had been in the car for longer than it should have taken if the appellant had driven directly to her home address.

[8]The appellant parked the car close to C2's home address. He put on black or dark blue latex gloves and got into the back seat with her. He proceeded to lift up her top and bra while she was lying across the back seat. He touched her breasts more than once. C2 was drifting in and out of sleep at this time. C2's father sent her a WhatsApp message which she saw while the appellant was assaulting her, but was unable to respond to it. The appellant then drove C2 to her home address. The appellant got out of the car and pulled C2's jeans and knickers down to her ankles. C2 realised that he was about to rape her, and she fought the appellant off by kicking him hard in the crotch. The appellant ran to the driver's seat and drove away at speed. C2 was able to get out of the car before the appellant drove off.

[9]C2 had left her mobile telephone in the car, but as the car drove away she was able to see the number plate. She raised the alarm by running down the road and screaming. Two people stopped to help her. She was provided with a mobile phone with which she called 999.

[10]The police apprehended the appellant in is car. On searching the appellant the police found a pair of black plastic gloves in the pocket of his coat and a Viagra tablet in his jeans' pocket. Officers searched the appellant's car in which they found baby oil, condoms, masks, latex gloves and a business card displaying what appeared be an “N-Uber” logo. The officers arrested the appellant.

[11]On 19 June 2025, the appellant was convicted of assault by penetration (count 4) against C1, and kidnapping (count 1) and attempted rape (count 2) against C2.

[12]The Victim Personal Statements included the following statement by C1, who had been injured when the appellant attacked her, sustaining bruising and grazing. She stated:

"The offender's crime against me has affected all aspects of my life. Physically, I found walking painful for a few days, but overall the physical impacts were only temporary. On the other hand, the psychological impacts were not. I have found things a lot more overwhelming than I used to, meaning that I was unable to attend a significant portion of university, as well as struggling to meet deadlines. I had to begin psychotherapy in order to attempt to better manage my feelings regarding the attack, which was difficult and very expensive for my family. Most prominently, I really struggle to be outside by myself at night. I start to panic at every insignificant sound as I assume it must be someone who is coming to hurt and violate me. In general, I don't feel safe anymore knowing that there are people out there who want to do what has been done to me."

[13]C2's untimely death prevented her from producing a Victim Personal Statement, but a statement was provided by her mother. It includes the following:

"[C2] cannot be here to help the court understand the utterly devastating impact of your crimes against her in the early hours of November 18th 2022. That is because [C2], my only daughter, tragically died on 15th December, just a few days after the Crown Prosecution Service informed her that your appeal had been successful with all your convictions against her quashed. My fiercely intelligent daughter immediately understood that, to avoid your release from a 23 year prison sentence, she would have to face the gruelling ordeal of a second Crown Court hearing of the case against you. [C2's] last words to me on the morning of the day that she died were 'Help me PLEASE mum. I am in HELL, I CANNOT go through another horrendous trial again'. … I want you and the judge to understand a little of what [her] life was like before the night that she made the massive mistake of getting into your car, believing you were a 'kind old man and an Uber driver who just wanted to help people’. In November 2022, [C2] was studying at university whilst working as a freelance artist and poet. She had given up her job in a community arts centre to focus on her degree course in visual arts. She had a boyfriend, a huge group of new friends in her student home, a loving family and lots of lifelong friends back here in Brighton too. She had many people who loved her deeply for her creativity, her passion, her inspiring boldness, and her immense confidence in enjoying her own life to the max and encouraging others to do the same. [She] was also a mother with a young daughter of her own who was at that time just three years old. All that changed on 18th November 2022, the night that you kidnapped and sexually assaulted my daughter. Afterwards, I met [C2] at the hospital where the Sexual Offences Team Officers had taken her to be assessed because she was so traumatised and at risk of serious self-harm due to her terrifying experiences in the back seat of your car. It was on that day that the happy and promising life that [she] had been enjoying to the full was cruelly taken from her by your actions. [C2] was quaking with fear, terrified, and struggling to understand why an old man that she did not know could possibly have wanted to hurt her. Because she had regained her consciousness to find you wearing a surgical mask and black surgical gloves, removing her trousers and her underwear, [she] genuinely believed that she was about to be raped and killed by you. … After that night, C2 was diagnosed with complex PTSD and she developed agoraphobia, so severe that she struggled to leave the house, even with the support of her trusted friends. She could not work; she could not do any of her everyday things without fear. The independence, joy and freedom in life that all women are entitled at her age to enjoy had all been stripped away by you. Your crimes against my daughter impacted her physical wellbeing. She endured severe symptoms of trauma, including headaches, gastrointestinal symptoms requiring endoscopy for suspected malignancies, severe sleep disturbance, reliance upon alcohol and other substances, hypervigilance and a total inability to relax and settle, extreme exhaustion, severe pain and cardiac symptoms requiring hospital investigation. Your crimes transformed [C2] from a healthy young adult into a severely disabled person who was unable to function within her now very frightening and confusing world of terror. She experienced emotional symptoms of trauma, flashbacks, daily nightmares and panic attacks, cognitive and attentional difficulties, and an almost total inability to trust and depend upon others, including the people who she previously enjoyed loving and satisfying relationships with: her brother, her mother, her father, her grandmother, aunts, uncles, cousins and almost all of her many friends. Unable to work and study because she could not sleep at night, see other people or leave her home, [C2] experienced financial and emotional deprivation. She experienced a massive curtailment of the previously full and happy life that she had enjoyed as a young woman because of the serious crimes that you committed against her."

The Sentencing Exercise

[14]Following his initial trial, the appellant was found guilty and sentenced on each count to an extended sentence of 23 years, comprising a custodial term of 18 years and an extended licence period of five years, to run concurrently.

[15]The appellant's conviction was quashed on appeal, and a retrial took place, the outcome of which was that the appellant was again found guilty on each count. As a consequence, although the judge presiding over the retrial was required to carry out a fresh sentencing exercise, she could impose a reduced sentence, but not impose a sentence that was greater than the sentence that the first trial judge imposed.

[16]The appellant was born on 4 May 1957. At the time of sentencing, following his re-trial, he was 68 years old.

[17]He had four previous convictions for 14 offences, spanning from 1976 to 1988, mainly for offences of theft, driving and criminal damage. Therefore, he was treated as having no relevant previous convictions for sentencing purposes.

[18]As there were two different victims, the court would have been entitled to impose consecutive sentences in respect of each incident. However, the court adopted the approach of determining the appropriate sentence to encompass the totality of the offending and then to impose that sentence in respect of each count, all three terms to run concurrently. No objection is taken to that approach.

[19]The judge fixed a custodial term of 18 years to reflect the overall offending. She made a finding of dangerousness, which she considered could not be dealt with by a determinate term, and imposed an extended licence period of five years in respect of each count.

The Grounds of Appeal

[20]The ground of appeal for which leave was granted is that the sentence was manifestly excessive on the grounds:(i) first, that the extended sentence of 23 years, comprising a custodial element of 18 years and an extended licence period of five years, was manifestly excessive in light of the sentencing guidelines for offences of rape and assault by penetration, and having regard to the principles of totality; and

(ii) second, that the judge erred in exercising her discretion in favour of an extended sentence, given the appellant's age and ill-health, and the fact that upon release the appellant's risk of re-offending would be significantly reduced because of those factors.

The Attempted Rape (Counts 1 and 2)

[21]Miss Levett, counsel for the appellant, submits that it was common ground between counsel that the attempted rape against C2 was a category 2 harm offence. The judge made no challenge of counsel in this regard. However, within her sentencing remarks the judge concluded that, having heard the very distressing personal statement from the mother of C2 who has since died, she was satisfied that the psychological impact on C2 was such that it approached category 1, rather than category 2 of the sentencing guidelines. It is said that forming this conclusion, without giving either counsel the opportunity to address it, led to unfairness and an incorrect characterisation.

[22]Count 2 (the attempted rape) was category 2 harm, based on the severe psychological impact of the offence on C2 and the fact that the appellant abducted her, which reflected the aggravating feature of count 1 (the kidnapping). The combination of category 2 factors would have justified an adjustment upwards from the starting point for this category. The guidelines recognise that the categories are not set in stone. An adjustment may need to be made to reflect particular features of culpability and/or harm. Contrary to Miss Levett's submission, the judge did not place the offending in category 1, but was entitled to find that the extreme psychological impact on the victim was such that this approached category 1. We acknowledge that C2's mental health history demonstrated that she was already a fragile individual. But a sexual predator who deliberately seeks out vulnerable victims is not entitled to complain when the vulnerability of their victims leads to increased harm.

[23]The judge found that culpability on count 2 was category A, because there was a significant degree of planning involved in the commission of the offence. Miss Levett concedes that there was planning by the use of latex gloves and a surgical mask, but submits that this could not be considered significant planning; rather, it was opportunistic. We disagree. The police found black plastic gloves and a Viagra tablet on the appellant, and they found baby oil, condoms, masks, latex gloves and the Uber business card in his car, all of which indicated significant planning on his part. As the judge noted, the items in the car were indicative of an intention to commit a serious sexual assault, including rape. The business card was to lure people into the car on the pretext that the appellant was a taxi driver. We do not accept that these items were simply a red herring just because there was no forensic evidence that they had in fact been used.

[24]A category 2A offence has a starting point of ten years' custody, with a range of nine to 13 years. As stated above, the court was entitled to adjust upwards from the starting point to reflect the multiple harm factors.

[25]The count 2 offence was attempted rape. While the lower clothing of C2 had been pulled down, the appellant remained fully clothed. Miss Levett submits that there was no evidence that Viagra had been taken or that a condom had been used, or was about to be used. The incident occurred in a residential street outside C2's home address. It is submitted by Miss Levett that there should have been a reduction to reflect the fact that this was an attempted rape in accordance with Attorney General's Reference (R v Zaheer)

[2018] EWCA Crim 1708

, at [19]:

"It is a general principle that a sentence for an attempted offence will ordinarily be less than a sentence for the substantive offence itself. But the degree of reduction which is appropriate will depend on the circumstances, including the stage at which the attempt failed and the reason for non-completion. …"

[26]We do not consider that Miss Levett's argument is persuasive on the facts of this case. There was significant sexual touching. When C2 regained consciousness, she found that the appellant had pulled down her jeans and knickers to her ankles and was standing over her. He had a Viagra pill in his pocket. It was only when C2 fought him off and kicked him in the crotch that the appellant retreated from what was clearly an intended rape. Further, the severity of the harm suffered by C2 was such that the violation could not be said to be less traumatic. In those circumstances, the failure to succeed in carrying out the rape resulted in a minimal reduction in seriousness of the offence.

[27]There were a significant number of aggravating factors, namely: the timing and location of the offence – outside C2's home, on a quiet street, in the early hours of the morning; the fact that the appellant specifically targeted C2 because of her vulnerability; and his attempt to dispose of her mobile telephone – evidence which connected him to the offence.

[28]There were mitigating factors, namely, the appellant's lack of relevant previous convictions. Further, the appellant had significant personal mitigation by reason of his age and comorbidities, which would create particular difficulties for him in a prison setting. The appellant is now 69 years of age, with a history of recurrent meningitis, myocarditis and congestive cardiac failure. He also has a brain aneurism which had increased in size between his scans of 2020 and 2024. These and other medical issues were detailed in a medical report from Professor Payne-James, dated June 2024, that was before the court when sentencing.

[29]Miss Levett submits that the judge appeared to make no reduction to take account of the appellant's mitigation, including his serious and enduring health difficulties that have been exacerbated whilst in custody. However, whilst the judge did not identify any specific calculated reduction for personal mitigation, she expressly stated that she had taken into account the character and other references, together with the appellant's health issues.

Assault by penetration (Count 4)

[30]We turn to the offence of assault by penetration (count 4). It is not disputed that count 4 (assault by penetration of C1) fell into category 2 of the relevant sentencing guideline. C1 was particularly vulnerable owing to her state of intoxication. There was an element of abduction – not in the car, so as to give rise to a kidnapping charge, but the appellant dragged her into a bush; and there was violence – he kicked her legs, causing bruising and grazing. Unsurprisingly, she thought that she was going to be raped.

[31]Miss Levett submits that there was no significant planning which would take the offence into culpability A. For the reasons already given in respect of count 2, we are satisfied that there was a significant degree of planning involved in the commission of this offence. Further, the judge noted that the CCTV footage indicated that the appellant was lying in wait for a victim before he picked C1 up in his car.

[32]A category 2A offence has a starting point of eight years' custody, with a range of five to 13 years.

[33]There were a number of significant aggravating factors, namely: the timing and location of the offence – in a park, in the early hours of the morning; and the fact that the appellant specifically targeted C1 because of her vulnerability. These entitled the judge to make a significant upwards adjustment from the starting point.

[34]As we have already stated, the judge expressly stated that she had taken account of the appellant's personal mitigation.

Overview of custodial element of sentence

[35]Turning to an overview of the custodial element of the sentence, we consider that it would have been helpful for the judge to set out in her sentencing remarks the categorisation, starting points and adjustments for aggravating and mitigating factors. However, sentencing is not a mechanical exercise. The judge had the benefit of hearing the evidence at trial, and she also had the benefit of the earlier sentencing remarks from the previous judge. In those circumstances, we have considered whether the overall custodial term of 18 years could be said to be manifestly excessive.

[36]In our judgment, the judge was entitled to increase the starting point on count 2 to reflect the extreme psychological harm suffered by C1, and then to adjust upwards within the range for aggravating factors. Balancing those against the mitigating factors, including a minimal reduction to reflect the attempted, but incomplete, rape would give a custodial term of 12 to 13 years on counts 1 and 2.

[37]On count 4, the judge was entitled to balance the aggravating and mitigating factors, to arrive at a custodial term of eight years. That would give a total of 20 to 21 years, if implemented on a consecutive basis.

[38]We consider that the custodial term of 18 years would reflect a modest reduction for totality appropriate where there were two separate victims and incidents. This could be seen as a harsh sentence for an offender in his late 60s with health issues. But it is not, in our view, manifestly excessive.

Dangerousness

[39]The authors of the pre-sentence reports assessed the appellant as presenting a very high risk of further offending and posing a very high risk of serious harm to young women by sexual attack and the use of violence. Although Miss Levett has properly identified some erroneous assumptions made in both the first and addendum reports, there was ample evidence at trial as to the circumstances of the convictions for two serious sexual offences just three months apart from which the court was entitled to conclude that the appellant met the test of dangerousness, as properly accepted by Miss Levett.

[40]The judge found that there was evidence that the appellant was in the habit of driving around in the early hours of the morning looking for vulnerable, intoxicated young women, with a view to posing as a good Samaritan, intending to give them a lift home. In fact, this was a ploy to seek out such women whom he could then sexually assault in circumstances where they were so disorientated by their intoxication that they would be unlikely to be able to give a coherent account, even if they realised what he had done.

[41]All three convictions were specified violent or sexual offences for the purpose of the Sentencing Code. Where, as in this case, the court proposes to pass a custodial sentence on any count of four years or more, and the court is satisfied that it is not required to impose a life sentence, and the court considers that there is a significant risk to members of the public of serious harm occasioned by the commission of further specified offences, then the court can impose an extended sentence.

[42]Miss Levett submits that the appellant's age and health problems, when considered against the obvious decline in his health since being held in custody, are such that the appellant would most likely be physically unable to commit further offences in the future. It is said that his physical capability of committing further offences should be taken into consideration in determining whether there was a significant risk of the appellant committing further specified offences in the future.

[43]It is said that a lengthy sentence would have a far more significant impact on the appellant than on a defendant who was much younger. Upon release, the appellant is likely to be in his late 70s or early 80s, and much less likely to be in a position to commit further offences of a significant nature. His lack of relevant previous convictions demonstrated that this was not entrenched behaviour, notwithstanding that two incidents occurred within three months of each other. There were a number of character references uploaded to the Digital Case System on behalf of the appellant.

[44]We acknowledge that it was open to the judge, when exercising her discretion, if of the view that the appellant was at significant risk of causing serious harm by the commission of further specified offences, to pass a determinate sentence to reflect the fact that upon release the appellant's capability and opportunity to commit further offences would be reduced as a result of his age and ill-health.

[45]We do not consider that it would be appropriate to interfere with the judge's exercise of her discretion in this case to impose an extended sentence. Notwithstanding the age and infirmity of the appellant, now and on release, his failure to accept responsibility for his offending, his deliberate targeting of young women who are vulnerable due to intoxication, his use of Viagra and his pretence of being a kind, elderly taxi driver to lure his victims are firm indicators that his risk could only be safely managed by the imposition of an extended sentence.

[46]For those reasons, we do not consider that the sentence was manifestly excessive.

[47]Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed. _______________________________ Epiq Europe Ltd hereby certify that the above is an accurate and complete record of the proceedings or part thereof. Lower Ground Floor, 46 Chancery Lane, London WC2A 1JE Tel No: 020 7404 1400 Email: rcj@epiqglobal.co.uk 48. ______________________________