R v John Harris [2026] EWCA Crim 798

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Neutral Case Number: [2026] EWCA Crim 798

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL

CRIMINAL DIVISION

Between

R EXCrown

London

WC2A 2LL

ON APPEAL FROM THE CROWN COURT AT WOLVERHAMPTON

(HIS HONOUR JUDGE GRIMSHAW) [20WS1373522]

Case No 2025/02284/A4 Thursday 11 June 2026

B e f o r e:

LORD JUSTICE WARBY

MRS JUSTICE O'FARRELL DBE

MRS JUSTICE BRUNNER DBE

____________________

- v –

Between

JOHN HARRIS

____________________

Computer Aided Transcription of Epiq Europe Ltd,

Lower Ground Floor, 46 Chancery Lane, London WC2A 1JE

Tel No: 020 7404 1400; Email: rcj@epiqglobal.co.uk (Official Shorthand Writers to the Court)

___________________

Mr S Sullivan appeared for Appellant

___________________

J U D G M E N T

Date 2026-06-11

[1]On 10 February 2025, following a trial in the Crown Court at Wolverhampton before His Honour Judge Grimshaw, the appellant, John Harris, was convicted on nine counts of historic sexual offending.

[2]On 13 June 2025, the appellant was sentenced by the trial judge to an overall sentence of 12 years' imprisonment made up as follows: i). on count 2, Sexual intercourse with a girl under 13 years, contrary to section 5 of the Sexual Offences Act 1956, when the victim was aged 12 and the appellant was aged 14 to 15, four years' imprisonment; ii). on each of counts 3 and 4, Rape, contrary to section 1 of the Sexual Offences Act 1956, when the victim was aged 13 and the appellant was aged 15 to 16, three years and six months' imprisonment; iii). on each of counts 5 and 6, Rape, contrary to section 1 of the Sexual Offences Act 1956 when the victim was aged 14 and the appellant 16 to 17 years, four years' imprisonment; iv). on each of counts 7 and 8, Rape, when the victim was aged 15 and the appellant 17 to 18 years, four years and six months' imprisonment; v). on count 9, Rape, when the victim was aged 16 and the appellant 18 to 19 years, six years' imprisonment; and vi). on count 10, Rape, when the victim was aged 16 and the appellant was 18 to 19 years, 12 years' imprisonment. All of the sentences were ordered to run concurrently with each other. The total sentence was one of 12 yeas' imprisonment.

[3]The appellant appeals against his sentence by leave of the single judge.

[4]The victim in this case has taken the courageous decision to waive her entitlement to lifelong anonymity.

[5]The victim of the offending is Jill Harris. She and John Harris were brought up as brother and sister. They were both adopted into the same family, but they are not blood relations.

[6]The material background facts are as follows. Jill Harris was two years younger than the appellant. He raped his adoptive sister on a regular basis when she was between the ages of 12 and 16, and he was between the ages of 14 and 19. The sexual assaults would continue even when the victim was in pain, which required her to clench her fists in the region of her pelvis. The appellant's reaction to her obvious pain was to laugh. Jill concluded that she must be a prostitute, because the appellant would give her money or toys when he raped her.

[7]When she was aged 12 or 13, the appellant's attacks on Jill came to the attention of their parents, but they took no significant action. The rapes occurred generally in the victim's bedroom, although on occasion they also occurred in the appellant's bedroom, the living room and at the family holiday home.

[8]The Victim Personal Statements included the following extracts from Ms Harris' statements:

"From the beginning of the abuse I quickly lost my sense of safety and trust in my family and those around me, and became quite isolated and lonely, with few friends either in or out of school. I felt complicit in this abuse and in keeping it secret, and felt sure I would be blamed and punished. My fear of the consequences of disclosing led me to feel responsible for protecting John from the punishment he would likely face from our dad. Disassociation from feelings enabled me to cope with the ongoing anxiety, but caused physical manifestations such as eczema, nightmares and frequent nosebleeds. … From early on in secondary school I had identified university as the most socially acceptable way of leaving home, and once there, I barely returned home during the holidays, as the abuse was still continuing whenever I did go home. There was more than one occasion when I had no accommodation arranged to return to, so was choosing the risk of sleeping rough over staying in the family home. Again I was wary of making any close friendships while at university, and found considerable difficulty responding to the inevitable conversations about whether or not any of us were having sex. … I barely saw my parents or siblings as a young adult and had only superficial relationships with them. I stopped going to the family for birthdays and Christmas, and began to wear dark and baggy clothes in an attempt to be invisible and not draw any attention to my body. Certain circumstances were highly triggering to me, especially around my body being visible, and I had ongoing anxiety and occasional periods of repeated nightmares and disrupted sleep. I still struggled with boundaries, and would end up in relationships just because someone showed an interest in me, as I felt I might be less vulnerable than if I was considered single and 'available'. I found it difficult to understand how to decide whether I wanted to be sexually involved with someone or not, and would become very anxious on discovering someone was sexually interested in me…"

The Sentencing Exercise

[9]The appellant was born on 1 May 1961. At the time of sentencing he was 64 years old.

[10]The judge recognised that this was a difficult sentencing exercise, given the historic nature of the offender and the relatively young age of the appellant at the time of the offending. He correctly noted the guidance in the relevant sentencing guidelines on historic offences. The appellant fell to be sentenced in accordance with the sentencing regime applicable at the date of sentence but the sentence was limited to the maximum sentence available at the date of the commission of the offence. The court should sentence by measured reference to any applicable sentencing guidelines for equivalent offences under the Sexual Offences Act 2003 and, where applicable, other parts of the Sentencing Code.

[11]It was common ground that the equivalent offences for counts 3 to 10 would be rape, contrary to section 1 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003. Each pair of counts – that is 3 and 4, 5 and 6, 7 and 8, and 9 and 10 – was referred to on the indictment as a single rape and at least one additional rape during that year of Ms Harris' life. Accordingly, the judge sentenced on the basis of two rapes per year during the periods referred to in those counts.

[12]There was a dispute as to the equivalent offence for count 2, which was sexual intercourse with a girl under 13 years. The judge, correctly in our view, rejected the submission by prosecuting counsel that the equivalent offence was rape of a child under 13, because count 2 had not been charged as rape, and he was required to sentence the appellant on the basis of the counts on the indictment on which he was convicted. However, again correctly in our view, the judge concluded that it would make no practical difference to the outcome of the sentencing exercise, given the approach which we set out below.

[13]The judge adopted the submission by defence counsel that the proper approach to sentencing an adult for offences, some of which were committed when he was a child and others when an adult, was as set out in R v Ahmed

[2023] EWCA Crim 281

, at [30]:

"… where the offender has committed offences both as a child and as an adult, it will commonly be the case that the later offending is the most serious aspect of the overall criminality and can be taken as the lead offence(s), with concurrent sentences imposed for the earlier offences. In such circumstances the key considerations for the court are likely to be an assessment of the extent to which the offending as a child aggravates the offending as an adult, and the application of the principle of totality."

[14]No complaint is made as to the approach adopted by the judge, namely, taking count 10 as the lead offence, when the appellant was at least 18 years old, fixing the term on count 10 to reflect overall criminality, and imposing concurrent sentences on the other counts.

[15]Count 10 was rape under section 1(1) of the Sexual Offences Act 1956. Having regard to the current sentencing guidelines for rape, the judge accepted the defence argument that culpability should be category B. He rejected the prosecution's submission that the sibling relationship gave rise to abuse of trust. Clearly this was correct on the facts of this case, as the appellant did not have significant responsibility for Ms Harris: see R v Forbes

[2016] EWCA Crim 1388

[16]The judge determined that harm was category 2, based on severe psychological harm to the victim, as set out in her Victim Impact Statements.

[17]A category 2B offence for the rape counts gave a starting point of eight years' custody, with a range of seven to nine years, for each count.

[18]Aggravating factors were the targeting of Ms Harris by the appellant; the vulnerability of the victim due to her age; the fact that the appellant ejaculated; and the location of the offending, in Ms Harris' bedroom or elsewhere in the family home or holiday home – places where she should have felt safe.

[19]The judge recognised that there was significant personal mitigation. The appellant's young age and immaturity at the time of the offending were material factors, including not using 18 years of age as the cliff edge for maturity. The appellant had no previous convictions. The judge expressly referred to the sentencing guideline which provides that where there is an absence of offending over a long period of time, especially combined with evidence of good character, this may be treated by the court as a mitigating factor. It was so treated in this case but tempered by the additional guidance that the more serious the offence, the less weight which should normally be attributed to that factor. There were also a number of character and other references to which the judge had regard. He particularly noted the appellant's caring responsibilities for his wife and other family members. He also took into account the appellant's age and physical and mental health issues that would give rise to additional difficulties in the context of a custodial sentence.

[20]Weighing up the aggravating and mitigating factors, the judge indicated that each of counts 9 and 10 would attract a sentence of seven years' custody for an adult. However, in this case there were eight counts of rape and one count of sexual intercourse with a girl under 13; and the duration of the offending on the indictment was over a period of more than four years. The judge determined that a sentence of 12 years' imprisonment on count 10 would reflect the overall criminality.

[21]On the other counts of rape, the judge took the term of seven years' imprisonment on each, reduced to reflect the appellant's age and personal mitigation on a sliding scale, from a discount of 50 per cent on counts 3 and 4, through to a discount of about 15 per cent on count 9, and made the resulting sentences concurrent.

[22]A separate assessment was made by the judge on count 2, making a significant reduction to the sentence for the appellant's young age at the time of that offending.

[23]The overall sentence, as we have said, was one of 12 years' imprisonment.

The Grounds of Appeal

[24]The ground of appeal for which leave has been granted is that the approach adopted by the sentencing judge involved one or more of the following:(i) incorrect categorisation of the offending;

(ii) taking insufficient account of totality; and

(iii) taking insufficient account of personal mitigation, as a result of which the sentence was manifestly excessive.

Categorisation

[25]Mr Sullivan, counsel for the appellant, submits that the judge was wrong to find that there was severe psychological harm giving rise to category 2 harm. Whilst accepting that expert evidence is not a necessary precondition for a finding of severe psychological harm, he submits that the evidence before the court, deriving as it did from the victim's two Victim Impact Statements, did not demonstrate harm significantly greater than what is typically expected from the offence, or that any psychological harm was severe, rather than being present at some lesser level.

[26]We are unable to accept that submission. We accept that it is necessary to ensure that the material in the Victim Impact Statements is considered only to the extent that it relates to the impact of the offending on which the appellant was convicted. In this case the appellant was convicted on a substantial number of counts relating to the rape of Ms Harris when she was a child. Her Victim Impact Statements are painfully detailed in setting out the devastating effect that the offending had on her childhood, her relationship with her parents and her wider family, her early relationships and her physical and mental health. This provided ample evidence from which the judge was entitled to conclude that there was serious psychological harm.

[27]Mr Sullivan further submits that the offending in relation to count 2 was placed within a higher category due to a finding of grooming behaviour towards the victim, which was not supported by the evidence. We deal with this submission briefly, because the concurrent sentence on count 2 has no impact on the overall term of imprisonment. Having presided over the trial, the judge was well placed to assess the power dynamic between the appellant and his victim, to reject the appellant's evidence on this issue, and to find that he targeted the victim from when she was prepubescent.

Totality

[28]It is submitted by Mr Sullivan that insufficient weight was given to totality to ensure that the overall sentence was just and proportionate in the circumstances of the case. Totality was not only relevant, due to the number of offences involved, but also because of the decision of the judge to identify the same starting point of seven years' imprisonment for all the rape offences. That starting point was based upon the finding of severe psychological harm. Without substantial weight being given to totality, it is submitted that there is a risk of that finding having too great an impact on the overall sentence and being counted a number of times over.

[29]We reject this criticism of the sentencing exercise. The judge's task was to consider an appropriate sentence for the overall offending. In this case the overall offending justified a term of 12 years' imprisonment on count 10. The judge expressly had regard to the principle of totality when making the sentence on each of the other counts concurrent, despite the fact that each count concerned a separate incident of sexual assault.

Personal Mitigation

[30]Mr Sullivan submits that there appears to have been insufficient marking of the appellant's personal mitigation as part of the sentencing exercise.

[31]We reject that criticism. The judge expressly took into account the appellant's personal circumstances, including all material in the mitigation bundle before the court, but that had to be balanced against the very serious nature of the offending against a young girl over a long period of time.

[32]This was, in our view, a careful and thoughtful sentencing exercise by the trial judge.

[33]For the above reasons, we do not consider that the overall sentence of 12 years' imprisonment was manifestly excessive.

Correction

[34]It has been brought to our attention that the victim surcharge was imposed in this case. However, noting the date of the commission of the earliest offence for which the appellant was convicted, the offences predated section 161A of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, and therefore the provisions do not apply. It appears that this may have been identified following the sentence hearing, as the Record Sheet records: "No Surcharge. Reason: age of offence committed".

[35]The court therefore quashes the surcharge order imposed by the sentencing judge.

[36]Accordingly, save for the above matter, this appeal against sentence is dismissed. ________________________ Epiq Europe Ltd hereby certify that the above is an accurate and complete record of the proceedings or part thereof. Lower Ground Floor, 46 Chancery Lane, London WC2A 1JE Tel No: 020 7404 1400 Email: rcj@epiqglobal.co.uk ______________________________