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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL
Venue Royal Courts of JusticeDate Tuesday, 9 June 2026
Strand
London
WC2A 2LL
Before
LADY JUSTICE MAYMR JUSTICE SAINIHIS HONOUR JUDGE PICTON
Between
REXCrownv
Between
JAKE COLLINS__________THE PROVISIONS OF THE SEXUAL OFFENCES (AMENDMENT) ACT 1992 APPLYComputer Aided Transcript of Epiq Europe Ltd,Lower Ground Floor, 46 Chancery Lane, London, WC2A 1JETel No: 020 7404 1400; Email: rcj@epiqglobal.co.uk (Official Shorthand Writers to the Court)_________MR G BURROWS appeared for Crown.MS H HURLEY appeared for Appellant.._________APPROVED JUDGMENT
I. Overview
[1]The provisions of the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1992 apply to this case. Under those provisions, where an allegation has been made that a sexual offence has been committed against a person, no matter relating to that person shall during that person’s lifetime be included in any publication if it is likely to lead members of the public to identify that person as the victim of that offence. This prohibition applies unless waived or lifted in accordance with s.3 of the Act.[2]This is an appeal against conviction brought by Jake Collins, with the leave of the Single Judge. We will refer to the complainant as AB for the purposes of this judgment. Mr Collins ("the appellant") was tried at Hove Crown Court between 27May 2025 and 30 May 2025, before HHJ Gold KC and a jury on a four count indictment alleging two assaults against AB on 17 February 2022. The appellant was convicted solely in relation to count 1, which was sexual assault contrary to section 3 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003. The unusual feature of the case, and this appeal, is that this was a sexual assault in the form of administering a so-called "love bite" to AB during the course of consensual sex. Count 2, alleging that this act was ABH, contrary to section 47 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861, was an alternative to Count 1 (included in the indictment on the application on the first day of trial by the defence). The appellant was acquitted of a separate alleged sexual assault through another love bite later on that day (this was Count 3) and of its s.47 ABH alternative (which was Count 4).[3]Whilst the colloquial term for the form bruising to the neck in issue in this appeal is a “love bite” or “hickey”, the definition of this was understood by all at parties at trial to be as follows:(i) a temporary bruise or mark that appears on the skin after someone has sucked it with some force, typically during kissing or some other intimate activity; and(ii) the suction causes the capillaries under the skin to break, leading to a red/purple mark.[4]The evidence of AB at trial was that she had agreed to the appellant kissing her neck during sex, but had not consented to the making of a love bite on her neck, and she had in fact expressly informed the appellant, in advance of sex, that she did not want him to make any such marks.[5]Hanna Hurley of Counsel acted for the appellant below and has also appeared before us this morning. Before the judge, Ms Hurley made a submission of no case to answer at the close of the Prosecution case in respect of the sexual assault. The judge refused this submission. In his rather brief reasons for refusing the no case application, he said as follows: “… in the circumstances, I’m satisfied that the allegation as made is capable of constituting a sexual assault; and, despite your helpful submissions, there is a case to answer, in my view".[6]On 15 August 2025, the judge sentenced the appellant (then aged 28) to a Community Order for a period of 18 months. Having been convicted of an offence listed in Schedule 3 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003, the appellant was required to comply with the provisions of Part 2 of the Act (Notification to the police) for 5 years. Having been convicted of an offence specified in the schedule to the Safeguarding Vulnerable Groups Act 2006 (Prescribed Criteria and Miscellaneous Provisions) Regulations 2009 (SI 2009 no 37) the appellant will or may be included in the relevant list by the Disclosure and Barring Service.[7]Ms Hurley argues that the judge was in legal error in allowing the sexual assault counts to proceed. Mr Burrows for the Crown, who also appeared below, argued that on the evidence the judge was right to reject the no case submission. We turn to the facts.
II. The Facts
[8]The appellant and AB lived in different parts of the country and met online. They had been ‘talking’ for a number of weeks and agreed that they would meet up in Brighton on 17 February 2022. AB met the appellant from the train at approximately 1.00 p.m. He said he wanted to book accommodation for himself overnight. AB said in evidence that whilst walking to the hotel, she told the appellant that they could hold hands and kiss, but expressly said that she did not want him to give her love bites. She said this was because she did not want to be asked difficult questions by her little brother as he has "special needs" and she had recently split up with an ex-partner and her brother did not yet know this.[9]AB had a return ticket home for herself later that evening and did not intend to stay at a hotel with the appellant. She went with him to The Royal Albion Hotel while he booked himself a room. They then went up to his room where they had consensual sexual intercourse. At trial, AB described having sexual intercourse with the appellant in his hotel room, and said that she pushed him away when he tried to bite her neck, and she repeated to him again that she did not want love bites. She said she tried to block his attempts to bite her neck by pulling her shoulders up to her ears when he tried to bite her neck.[10]After the sexual intercourse in the hotel, AB discovered the mark on her neck and was very cross with the appellant. She said she complained to the appellant that he had given her a love bite contrary to her expressed wishes. Later, when they were in a pub, she said she put ice in a napkin and held it to her neck. Before they left the pub, AB said the appellant gave her another love bite on the right side of her neck (that was the subject of Counts 3 and 4, where the appellant was acquitted and we say nothing further about that).[11]In his prepared statement following arrest, the appellant said that he had given AB love bites, that she had never indicated that he should not do this, and she had in fact told him to "keep going" when he was giving her love bites.[12]The appellant's evidence at trial was also to the effect that no conversations about love bites not being permitted had taken place. He said AB did not at any time block her neck from him or push him away from doing so when they were having sex.[13]As we have already described, the judge refused Ms Hurley’s no case submission. In short, Ms Hurley argued before the judge that while it was not in dispute that the kissing or sucking or caressing surrounding the achievement of a love bite form of bruise was sexual touching for the purposes of section 3 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003, it was not the sexual element of the act that the AB did not consent to. Ms Hurley relied on the fact that AB was asked at the end of cross examination ‘Would you accept that it wasn’t the mechanism or what he did to cause the bruise that bothered you, but it was the bruise itself?’ AB agreed with this. Ms Hurley emphasized that AB and Mr Collins had consensual sex and she agreed that he had permission to kiss her neck. It was said that AB had consented to the sexual touching but not the result of it and her objection was not to the act but to the outcome. We turn to the arguments on appeal.
III. The Grounds of Appeal
[14]In her focused and well-structured submissions, Ms Hurley argued that there was an error of law in the judge's refusal to accede to the no case submission. In summary, she relies on the same core point she made before the judge, and which we have summarized earlier. She submitted that if the jury found the love bite occurred in the hotel room without consent, then the offence committed was an ABH rather than a sexual assault. It was argued that the infliction of a love bite without consent is tantamount to cases involving the transmission of sexual diseases during intercourse; and the issue of consent to risk of the transmission goes to whether a physical assault took place, rather than a sexual one. Reliance was placed by Ms Hurley on Regina v Dica [2004] 3 WLR 213. Ms Hurley also underlined this morning, by reference to AB’s evidence in cross-examination, that the concern of AB was not to the act of kissing itself, but to the result of it. This, it was said, could not amount to a sexual assault because AB had no concern about any sexual elements of the appellant’s actions.[15]For the Crown, Mr Burrows underlined the evidence of AB at trial that while she agreed that the appellant could kiss her neck, she did not agree to, and indeed repeatedly said that she did not want love bites. Mr Burrows referred to the oral evidence of AB at trial about lack of consent to those actions. We have already summarized that evidence earlier in this judgment.[16]Before we turn to our conclusions, we should record a matter in relation to the Route to Verdict, but which is not the subject of any complaint on this appeal.[17]The original Route to Verdict on Count 1 asked the jury:
"Are you sure Jake Collins intentionally touched [AB's] neck in the hotel room? If no, the defendant is not guilty. If yes, go to question 2"
. As the transcript of the summing-up shows, the jury were understandably confused by this question. In a note to the judge they asked: "Does count 1 refer to the touching of [AB's] neck generally (as per the judge's legal directions document) or does it refer to the act of giving the love bite?".[18]This was a sensible request for clarification in circumstances where AB's evidence was, as we have recorded, that she consented to her neck being kissed. Following discussion with counsel, the judge rephrased the first question in the Route to Verdict to insert the words "i.e. gave her a love bite" after the words "touched". We consider this correctly identified the question for the jury, and as we have said, no complaint was made by Ms Hurley in her grounds or in her submissions this morning about the judge's directions.[19]We turn to our conclusions. IV. Conclusions[20]In our judgment, the judge was right to leave the sexual assault count to the jury on the basis of the evidence of AB. Her evidence was to the effect that sucking her neck (an act which would cause the bruising which she feared) was not consented to, even though kissing of her neck during sex was consensual. It is common ground that sucking of this nature was sexual, and in our judgment it was for the jury then to decide whether it took place, and whether the prosecution had made them sure of the other elements of the section 3 offence.[21]We consider that the act of giving a love bite is indivisible from the mark that is left. AB's objection was to the act that caused the mark and she did not give the appellant permission to suck her neck in a way which would cause that form of injury. As we have noted, her evidence was specifically that she shrugged him off when she thought he was sucking her neck such as to cause a love bite. It was for the jury to decide whether the appellant's conduct in undertaking that action was intentional and they were sure that it was (based on the modified Route to Verdict which we have described). There was a proper evidential basis for that conclusion, and the conviction is not unsafe. The act of giving a love bite (with its forcible nature) was plainly of a different nature to merely kissing or caressing AB’s neck.[22]We also agree with the Crown that the case of Dica does not assist in this appeal. The court in that case was considering whether a complainant who consented to sexual intercourse could be said to also be consenting to the transmission of HIV and whether knowledge of the person having HIV was material to that issue. That is not relevant to the issues before us.[23]For these reasons, we dismiss the appeal. __________