R v Aaron Huntley & Anor [2026] EWCA Crim 739

"Pull it again and I'm going to lick you straight in your head"

"If [E] does become a child in care again, the Local Authority would need to explore adoption as an outcome for her due to her age as per our protocols to provide children with permanency without delay."

"17. We do think however that we ought to say these brief things by way of general observation. First, the sentencing of a defendant inevitably engages not only her own article 8 family life but also that of her family and that includes (but is not limited to) any dependent child or children. The same will apply in some cases to an adult for whom a male or female defendant is a carer and whether there is a marital or parental link or not. Almost by definition, imprisonment interferes with, and often severely, the family life not only of the defendant but of those with whom the defendant normally lives and often with others as well. Even without the potentially heart-rending effects on children or other dependents, a family is likely to be deprived of its breadwinner, the family home not infrequently has to go, schools may have to be changed. Lives may be turned upside down by crime. 18. Second, the right approach in all article 8 cases is to ask these questions: A. Is there an interference with family life? B. Is it in accordance with law and in pursuit of a legitimate aim within article 8.2? C. Is the interference proportionate given the balance between the various factors? That is carefully set out by Lady Hale in her speech in HH. Although she was in the minority as to the outcome in relation to one of the persons sought for extradition, she gave at paragraph [30] this analysis with which there was general agreement. That approach is as true of sentencing as of any other kind of case in which family life is in question. Of course in sentencing, the first two questions will usually be straightforward. There will almost always be some interference with family life and it will be in accordance with law and due to legitimate aims. It is the third question which may call for careful judgment. 19. Third, long before any question of article 8 or of the Human Rights Act 1998 was thought of, sentencing practice in England and Wales recognised that where there are dependent children that is a relevant factor to sentencing. That is most conveniently to be extracted from the careful words of Lord Judge, CJ, in HH at paragraphs 126 to 130, to which reference should be made if this point is taken. In particular, at paragraphs 128 and 129 he said: '128. The continuing responsibility of the sentencing court to consider the interests of children of a criminal defendant was endorsed time without number over the following years. Examples include Franklyn (1981) 3 Cr App R(S) 65. Vaughan (1982) 4 Cr App R(S) 83, Mills [2002] 2 Cr App R (S) 229, and more recently Bishop [2011] EWCA Crim 1446 and, perhaps most recently in Kayani; Solliman [2011] EWCA Crim 2871, [2012] 1 Cr App R 197 where, in the context of child abduction, the court identified "… a distinct consideration to which full weight must be given. It has long been recognised that the plight of children, particularly very young children, and the impact on them if the person best able to care for them (and in particular if that person is the only person able to do so) is a major feature for consideration in any sentencing decision." 129. Recent definitive guidelines issued by the Sentencing Council in accordance with the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 are entirely consistent. Thus, in the Assault Guideline, taking effect on 13 June 2011, and again in the Drug Offences Guideline, taking effect on 29 February 2012, among other features the defendant's responsibility as the sole or primary carer for a dependant or dependants is expressly included as potential mitigation.' 20. Fourth, it follows that a criminal court ought to be informed about the domestic circumstances of the defendant and where the family life of others, especially children, will be affected it will take it into consideration. It will ask whether the sentence contemplated is or is not a proportionate way of balancing such effect with the legitimate aims that sentencing must serve. 21. Fifth, in a criminal sentencing exercise the legitimate aims of sentencing which have to be balanced against the effect of a sentence often inevitably has on the family life of others, include the need of society to punish serious crime, the interest of victims that punishment should constitute just desserts, the needs of society for appropriate deterrence (see section 142 Criminal Justice Act 2003) and the requirement that there ought not to be unjustified disparity between different defendants convicted of similar crimes. Moreover, as Sachs J pointed out in the South African Constitutional Court in N v The State [2007] ZACC 18, in a case in which there was under consideration a specific provision in the Constitution which required the interests of an affected child to be 'the paramount consideration', not only society but also children have a direct interest in society's climate being one of moral accountability for wrongdoing. It also needs to be remembered that just as a sentence may affect the family life of the defendant and of his/her innocent family, so the crime will very often have involved the infringement of other people's family life. There is a good example afforded by the striking facts of the second defendant Solliman in Kayani and Solliman [2011] EWCA Crim 2871 at paragraph 54. He, by his crime of abduction of children, had utterly destroyed the abducted children's relationship with their mother and his well-deserved imprisonment was now to punish them again by depriving them of his own care as their otherwise unexceptional remaining parent. This present case is also one in which article 8 rights are affected not only in the defendant and her child but in the deceased and his family. 22. Sixth, it will be especially where the case stands on the cusp of custody that the balance is likely to be a fine one. In that kind of case the interference with the family life of one or more entirely innocent children can sometimes tip the scales and means that a custodial sentence otherwise proportionate may become disproportionate. 23. Seventh, the likelihood, however, of the interference with family life which is inherent in a sentence of imprisonment being disproportionate is inevitably progressively reduced as the offence is the graver and M v South Africa is again a good example. Even with the express Constitutional provision there mentioned, the South African Constitutional Court approved the result in which in one of the cases a sentence of four years was necessary upon a fraudulent mother, despite the fact that she was the sole carer for a number of children who were likely to have to be taken into care during her imprisonment – see paragraphs 43 to 44. Likewise, in HH, the majority of the Supreme Court was satisfied that there was no basis on which the extradition to Italy could be prevented of a father who was in effect the sole carer for three young children, but who had been a party to professional cross border drug smuggling. His extradition of course meant not only his imprisonment, but his imprisonment too far away from the children's home for there to be more than the most rare of contact. 24. Eighth, in a case where custody cannot proportionately be avoided, the effect on children or other family members might (our emphasis) afford grounds for mitigating the length of sentence, but it may not do so. If it does, it is quite clear that there can be no standard or normative adjustment or conventional reduction by way of percentage or otherwise. It is a factor which is infinitely variable in nature and must be trusted to the judgment of experienced judges. 25. Ninth, those briefly stated principles are we think sufficient to guide sentencing judges and do no more than reflect what has been the practice of the criminal courts since long before arguments were habitually couched in terms of article 8 or human rights generally. We add that we do not think that those principles are affected by the question which is sometimes raised and which has been adverted to in Miss Russell's written submissions, namely whether article 3 of the United Nation's Convention on the Rights of Children and the similarly expressed article 24.2 of the European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights, do or do not apply to the sentencing of adults. As to that, on the one hand it is difficult to imagine that the framers of those conventions can have meant to include the sentencing of adults as decisions 'concerning children', any more than they meant to include other decisions such as, for example, the enforcement of judgment debts against parents or the termination of the employment of parents within that expression. If they did, that would involve a requirement that the effect on a child of such a decision should be 'a primary consideration'. Moreover, article 9 of the same convention makes clear that the separation of a child from parent may occur as the result of imprisonment which it clearly contemplates. As Lady Hale observed in ZH (Tanzania) it clearly distinguishes between the separation of a child and parent as a consequence of a decision as to the child's upbringing on the one hand and separation as a consequence of detention or imprisonment on the other. As against that, there are passages in HH where it appears to have been assumed, though without argument to the contrary, that article 3 at least does apply – see passing references at paragraphs [16], [98], [143] and [155]. The reason why we say that it is not necessary to resolve that question in the sentencing in the Crown Courts is because it is clear from HH that even on that assumption and even if those provisions of those conventions applied, it is the balancing which is required by article 8 in the form that we have endeavoured to set it out which is the effective test for sentencing."

"Making a deferment order (1) A court may make a deferment order in respect of an offence only if — (a) the offender consents, (b) the offender undertakes to comply with any deferment requirements the court proposes to impose, (c) if those requirements include a restorative justice requirement, section 7(2) (consent of participants in restorative justice activity) is satisfied, and (d) the court is satisfied, having regard to the nature of the offence and the character and circumstances of the offender, that it would be in the interests of justice to make the order."

"Deferring sentencing will be appropriate only in limited circumstances. A deferment order should only be made if the court considers that a specified period (which enables the court to have regard to the offender's conduct or any change in the offender's circumstances) will allow for a different sentence to that which would otherwise be imposed on that day. A deferment order is likely to be relevant predominantly in a small group of cases close to either the community or custodial sentence threshold. When deferring a sentence, the court should specify to the offender what type of sentence will be imposed: • if the offender complies with all the requirements and/or conditions attached to the period of deferment; and • if the offender does not comply with all the requirements and/or conditions attached to the period of deferment. If the offender does comply with the requirements and/or conditions of the deferment, the sentencing court should impose the sentence specified for successful compliance with the requirements and/or conditions of the deferment. If the offender does not comply with the requirements and/or conditions of the deferment, they can be brought back to court before the end of the deferment period and the sentencing court can impose any sentence that could have been imposed on the date of deferment."

"35. The effect of that guidance, and the principles well established by case law, were considered by this court in July 2023 in R v Swinbourne [2023] EWCA Crim 906, [2024] 1 Cr App R(S) 8 – a case regrettably not cited either to the judge or to this court. The court there emphasised that deferment should be sparingly used. At [21] of the judgment of the court, William Davis LJ said that the guideline provides that sentence should be deferred ' … in a small group of cases, at either the custody threshold or the community sentence threshold, where the court may be prepared to impose a lesser sentence provided the defendant is prepared to adapt his behaviour in a way clearly specified by the court. When passing sentence, the court should indicate the type of sentence it would be minded to impose if the defendant does not comply. Deferment can only be appropriate if a sentence other than one of immediate custody will follow in the event of compliance.' At [22], William Davis LJ went on to say: ''… Deferment of sentence is not to be used where the court cannot state in clear terms what the sentence will be if the defendant complies. …' 36. We respectfully agree with and endorse that statement of the applicable principles. We would add that in order to give effect to them, the judge who defers sentence should, save in exceptional circumstances, also conduct the sentencing hearing at the end of the deferment period, even if that involves practical and listing difficulties. 37. In their commentary on Swinbourne, the learned authors of Harris and Walker's Sentencing Principles, Procedure and Practice 2024 suggest that in the light of that decision it is vital for sentencers to consider whether the lesser sentence, which is expressly or implicitly offered as an alternative disposal, is in fact a realistic possibility. They suggest, accordingly, that if a custodial sentence of two years or less could never be justified for the offending, and the sentence therefore could not be suspended, a decision to impose a deferred sentence will always be improper. We respectfully agree, and endorse those observations."