"The [appellant] has pleaded guilty to wounding Gideon Tesfay (count 4) and Trevor McGuire (count 6) with intent to do grievous bodily harm to each of them. He accepts by his pleas that at the time of attacking each of them he meant to hurt them badly as he was emotionally distraught and affected by drugs he had consumed. However, he was aware of what he was doing and formed the intent for those offences he has pleaded guilty to."
"The [appellant] accepts that as Mark Quigley walked off, he moved towards him intending to hit him with the mattock. He was, however, able to stop himself and he did no more than raise the mattock for a moment before he was able to control himself and withdraw. He did not wish to cause any harm to Mark Quigley and he had no reason to intend to harm him. The [appellant] did not intend to kill and his actions were merely preparatory to causing injury to him."
"On this occasion, however, he was not able to control himself. He accepts that he took a scalpel from his pocket and caused the cut to Gideon Tesfay's throat. He accepts that he did so as he wanted to cause Gideon Tesfay some serious harm, but he did not intend to kill him. He is unable to explain why he acted the way he did. He did not believe that he was able to control his erratic behaviour."
"The [appellant] accepts that he assaulted Trevor McGuire with the mattock in an unprovoked attack. When he went in, Trevor McGuire was standing up with his back to him and he hit him from behind. His memory was that he only hit him once, but he accepts that he may have hit him more than once. The [appellant] cannot explain why he assaulted Trevor McGuire. He bore no malice against him and did not otherwise wish him any harm. The [appellant] simply found that he was overwhelmed by anger and wanted to hurt somebody. He believed that his work colleagues somehow know about the cameras in his ceiling and someone [was] watching what he was doing. The [appellant] accepts that in his assault upon Trevor McGuire he intended by his actions to cause Trevor McGuire really serious harm, but at not stage did he intend to kill him."
"It was the way Mr Tesfay looked. I thought they'd know I was doing drugs and I'll lose my job", and that he had tried to puncture Mr Tesfay. "
"Intention – how must you approach reaching a conclusion on what, if any, intention the [appellant] had? The defence has not made any substantial challenges to the prosecution evidence of what took place on 21 June of last year. However, it is submitted on behalf of the defence that the evidence does not prove the [appellant] had the intentions alleged by the prosecution. The prosecution relies on the totality of the evidence of the [appellant's] conduct before, during and after the attacks as demonstrating that the [appellant] knew what he was doing and what he intended to do at the time he carried out the attacks. It is the prosecution case that the irresistible inference from the totality of the evidence provides overwhelming proof that the [appellant] intended to kill or at least to cause grievous bodily harm to Mr Quigley and that he intended to kill Mr Tesfay and Mr McGuire. You must decide the [appellant's] intention in respect of each of the four counts you are considering in this trial. You must decide the [appellant's] intention at the time he was holding the raised mattock as he approached Mr Quigley from behind – did he intend to kill him; did he intend to cause him really serious bodily harm; or may he have had neither intention? You know that the [appellant] has pleaded guilty to having the intention to cause Mr Tesfay and Mr McGuire grievous bodily harm – that is really serious bodily harm. In his evidence to you he said he only had the intention to cause some harm. When he attacked and injured Mr Tesfay and Mr McGuire using weapons to do so the decision for you to make is whether it was his intention to go further and kill them or either of them; or may he only have intended to cause them grievous bodily harm or just some harm? It is agreed evidence that the [appellant] had voluntarily consumed drugs at some point on 21 June and before the events with which this trial was concerned, but this is not a case where the [appellant] can say, or even has said, that drugs made him incapable of making decisions because you know, on his own admissions, he has agreed that he intended to inflict harm on two of his colleagues. The law is clear – voluntarily consumed drugs does not provide the [appellant] with a defence. It is no defence for a defendant to say that he would not have acted in a particular way or he would not have formed an intention to kill or to cause really serious harm if he had not been under the influence of drugs. The law is that an intention to kill or to cause really serious harm is nevertheless an intention, even though a person would not or may not have formed that intention had he been sober and not under the influence of drugs. So you decide the [appellant's] intention by examining the whole of the evidence and that requires you to examine the [appellant's] behaviour and what he said and did, both before, during and after each incident; what weapons he used; the nature of any injuries he caused; the nature of any force he used to inflict those injuries. In any case where there is an issue as to what was the defendant's intention, it is likely that there will be no direct evidence such as a defendant announcing, for example, he intends to kill. Jurors are invited to draw an inference from the whole body of the evidence and this is just such a case. You examine the whole of the evidence and drawing the various pieces of evidence together you will be able to decide whether the prosecution has proved the intention alleged in the count on the indictment you are considering."
"… first, to warn them that the mere fact that the [appellant's] mind was affected by drink so that he acted in a way in which he would not have done had he been sober does not assist him at all, provided that the necessary intention was there. A drunken intent is nevertheless an intent. Secondly, and subject to this, the jury should merely be instructed to have regard to all the evidence, including that relating to intoxication, to draw such inferences as they think proper from the evidence and on that basis to ask themselves whether they feel sure that at the material time the [appellant] had the requisite intent."
"… drunkenness is only a defence to an act which would otherwise be criminal if a person has drunk so much that he is incapable, not nearly, but incapable of forming the intention to do the particular act."
"Indeed, in cases where drunkenness and its possible effect upon the defendant's mens rea is an issue, we think that the proper direction to a jury is, first, to warn them that the mere fact that the defendant's mind was affected by drink so that he acted in a way in which he would not have done had he been sober does not assist him at all, provided that the necessary intention was there. A drunken intent is nevertheless an intent. Secondly, and subject to this, the jury should merely be instructed to have regard to all the evidence, including that relating to drink, to draw such inferences as they think proper from the evidence, and on that basis to ask themselves whether they feel sure that at the material time the defendant had the requisite intent."
"… The position is straightforward if the accused's case is that he or she was too drunk to know what he or she was doing and had not formed the necessary intent. A direction is then clearly necessary. …"
"88. Juries in criminal cases are not limited in their consideration of the evidence to the arguments advanced by the prosecution and the defence. They are the finders of fact and it is open to them to reach conclusions that do not match the particular contentions advanced by the parties. They are free, for instance, to reject an accused's account but nonetheless to acquit him or her (or convict of a lesser charge) because they conclude that they are unsure that one or more of the ingredients of the offence of specific intent have been made out. A defendant, for instance, who had been drinking heavily may have advanced a case that he or she knew exactly what was happening when the victim was killed, and that they had acted in lawful self-defence. If the jury reject self-defence, they would still need to consider whether they were sure he or she had the intent to kill or to cause really serious bodily harm, notwithstanding the consumption of alcohol or drugs. The judge must avoid conjuring fanciful factual scenarios, but if there is sufficient evidence as to the consumption of alcohol or drugs such as to make it, viewed realistically, a potential issue as regards intent, then regardless of the nature of the accused's defence, in our judgment the correct position was described by Waller LJ in Groark: 'if there is evidence of drunkenness which might give rise to an issue as to whether specific intention could be formed by the accused, a direction should normally be given to the jury that a drunken intent was nevertheless an intent, but that they had to feel sure, having regard to all the evidence, that the defendant had had the intent'. Or as the court observed in Bennett, 'voluntary intoxication had to be treated like any other evidence which tended to show the defendant may have lacked the state of mind necessary to support the offence'. 89. It follows that that we reject the prosecution's contention that a direction as to the effect of drunkenness on intention was unnecessary in the present case."
"In addition to pleading guilty to the offences of wounding Mr Tesfay and Mr McGuire with the intention to cause each grievous bodily harm, the [appellant] repeated those admissions in his signed defence statement dated 19 January of this year. In that defence statement he said that he intended to cause Mr Tesfay serious harm and intended to cause Mr McGuire really serious harm. However, when the [appellant] was giving evidence he appeared to be putting forward a different account, only admitting to an intention to cause the two men some harm, not serious harm."
"The Third Question: what are the consequences of not giving a direction when one is considered to have been necessary? 93. For the third question, it is important immediately to emphasise that in Sheehan and Moore the appellants' convictions for murder were quashed and convictions for manslaughter substituted, not because of a failure to direct the jury on the relevance of drunkenness to intention but because the judge had positively and fundamentally misdirected the jury on that question. Similarly, in Brown and Stratton the judge had misdirected the jury on the issue of alcohol by suggesting it was irrelevant to intent. There is nothing in either of these judgments to suggest that an omission to give a direction of the kind recommended by the court would, by itself, have been sufficient to render the convictions in those cases unsafe. …"