R v Michael Stephen Brown [2026] EWCA Crim 330

WARNING: reporting restrictions may apply to the contents transcribed in this document, particularly if the case concerned a sexual offence or involved a child. Reporting restrictions prohibit the publication of the applicable information to the public or any section of the public, in writing, in a broadcast or by means of the internet, including social media. Anyone who receives a copy of this transcript is responsible in law for making sure that applicable restrictions are not breached. A person who breaches a reporting restriction is liable to a fine and/or imprisonment. For guidance on whether reporting restrictions apply, and to what information, ask at the court office or take legal advice.This Transcript is Crown Copyright.  It may not be reproduced in whole or in part other than in accordance with relevant licence or with the express consent of the Authority.  All rights are reserved.[2026] EWCA Crim 330Venue Royal Courts of JusticeStrandLondonWC2A 2LLDate Thursday, 26 February 2026
Before
LORD JUSTICE FRASERMRS JUSTICE CHEEMA-GRUBB DBEHIS HONOUR JUDGE LEONARD KC
Between
REXCrownV
Between
MICHAEL STEPHEN BROWN__________Computer Aided Transcript of Epiq Europe Ltd,Lower Ground Floor, 46 Chancery Lane, London, WC2A 1JETel No: 020 7404 1400; Email: rcj@epiqglobal.co.uk (Official Shorthand Writers to the Court)_________NON-COUNSEL APPLICATION_________J U D G M E N T
[1]MRS JUSTICE CHEEMA-GRUBB: The court has considered the position under section 45 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999. The complainants were under 18 at the material time and should have been protected by that statutory provision. It is not clear from the papers we have seen whether an order was made in the Crown Court and so, for the avoidance of doubt, we make the order and direct that none may be identified while they remain under 18 as victims of these offences and nothing may be published which could lead to their identification. We do not intend in any event to give the names of the complainants in this short decision.[2]This is a renewed application for(1) an extension of time of some 3,665 days (approximately 10 years) in which to apply for leave to appeal against conviction and(2) leave to appeal against conviction.[3]The applicant, who is now 39 years old, pleaded guilty on 25 July 2014 to two counts of child cruelty and one count of assault, with a fourth count ordered to lie on the file. He was sentenced on 29 August 2014 to a suspended sentence of six months' imprisonment with concurrent terms on the remaining counts.[4]It is not necessary to set out the circumstances of the offences beyond noting that the applicant was in the habit of physically abusing and humiliating children in his family, including his stepson aged between six and eight, a daughter between the ages of three and five and a son aged two. The applicant was of good character at the time of his conviction. Extension of time[5]The delay is extraordinary. An extension of roughly 10 years requires the applicant to demonstrate a compelling justification. He does not. The only explanation given in section 2 of the Form NG is that he was not informed he could appeal and that he has been fighting since 2016. The Criminal Appeals office sought further particulars but no further reasons were provided.[6]The single

judge expressed the matter with clarity:

"A delay of over 10 years in seeking to appeal cannot be accepted. No sufficient explanation is given and the applicant in fact says he has been fighting for justice since 2016. It would be wholly wrong to grant the extension of time required."
We agree. Nothing in the renewed submissions improves the position. The absence of a coherent evidenced explanation renders the application hopeless. Even were the proposed grounds arguable (they are not), this delay is wholly unjustifiable. The application for an extension of time is therefore refused. Leave to appeal against conviction[7]Although the extension is refused, we have nevertheless considered the proposed grounds. Each lacks merit. None raises any arguable basis on which the conviction could be considered unsafe.[8]We have ordered them into four grounds. Ground 1: Alleged pressure to plead guilty The applicant contends he was "forced" to plead guilty due to an incorrect Police National Computer print-out, said to have been provided during earlier family proceedings. The Respondent's Notice correctly observes that this is a bare assertion, unsupported by evidence. The applicant "has not identified the individual he says misled him and explained how he was forced to plead guilty" and, critically, "there is no evidence that any incorrect PNC was provided to the court.”[9]The single

judge dealt with this squarely:

"The applicant in fact pleaded guilty. His claim that he was 'forced' to is baseless. His lawyers gave their advice: but the ultimate actual decision was that of the applicant himself. Further, counsel has confirmed that such advice would have been focused on the evidence, not previous convictions. He also signed the Basis of Plea that was put in. The applicant cannot now disassociate himself from his Basis of Plea."
This reasoning is unanswerable. The applicant entered a deliberate, unambiguous plea, supported by a signed basis of plea. We have reminded ourselves of the authorities. Nothing suggests any improper pressure narrowing the ambit of free choice. This proposed ground is without substance. Ground 2: Allegation that the police persuaded the applicant's partner to amend her statement[10]The applicant asserts that an officer caused his then partner to amend the written statement adversely to him. As the respondent notes:
"There is no evidence that the police caused the applicant's partner to amend her witness statement, nor does the applicant explain what that amendment was or what impact it had on the case against him."
[11]The single

judge reached the same conclusion, adding:

"The assertions, without evidence ... are hard to follow or accept; in any event, then cannot be right, in that in these criminal proceedings the applicant was accepted to be of good character."
There is nothing before us which could possibly render the convictions unsafe on this basis. Ground 3: The judge did not sentence in accordance with the basis of plea[12]This ground is founded on a misunderstanding. The sentencing remarks show the judge expressly respected the agreed basis of plea, stating that he would summarise the facts only briefly because there was an agreed basis of plea. The respondents are correct when it is pointed out that the sentencing remarks made clear the applicant was sentenced in accordance with the facts accepted by him in his basis. There is no arguable error. Ground 4: The judge failed to take account of the applicant's good character This is plainly incorrect. The sentencing judge stated explicitly:
"You are of good character. You have never been in trouble with the police and I take that very much into account."
[13]The single judge described this part of the application as resting on a complete misapprehension of the true position. We agree. The applicant's plea was unequivocal and deliberate and the case against him was, as the respondent puts it, overwhelming. There is nothing to the suggestion that the judge failed to appreciate the applicant's previous good conduct.[14]Having considered the entirety of this renewed application independently for ourselves, we find no arguable basis on which this conviction, founded, as we have repeated, on a voluntary guilty plea and supported by an agreed factual basis could be considered unsafe. Accordingly, the application for an extension of time is refused and the renewed application for leave to appeal must also be refused. Epiq Europe Ltd hereby certify that the above is an accurate and complete record of the proceedings or part thereof. Lower Ground Floor, 46 Chancery Lane, London, WC2A 1JE15. Tel No: 020 7404 140016. Email: rcj@epiqglobal.co.uk