“I have considered the papers in your case and your grounds of appeal with care. The reasons you give for the length of time taken to advance an appeal do not amount to a good reason. Nevertheless, I have considered the substance of your appeal and do not consider that it is reasonably arguable. In these circumstances, I refuse the extension of time. You pleaded guilty to one count of stalking involving serious harm or distress, pursuant to section 4A(1) of the Protection fromHarassment Act 1997 . You say that you accept that you are guilty of an offence of harassment (under section 2 of the PfHA) but that your plea of guilty was on the basis of incorrect advice, and that you were not told that the test was ‘A ought to know that A's course of conduct will cause B serious alarm or distress which has a substantial adverse effect on B's usual day-to-day activities if a reasonable person in possession of the same information would think the course of conduct would cause B such alarm or distress.’ In coming to your decision, you say that you were specifically advised that in pleading not guilty to the more serious offence, you could not have been found guilty of the lesser offence as it was not on the indictment. You say therefore that the advice you received was incorrect as a matter of law. You also say that at your first hearing at the Crown Court when your counsel requested an adjournment ‘the judge…pretty much pressured me that I should be pleading guilty to this charge’. Your grounds of appeal are not reasonably arguable. The starting point is that a defendant who has admitted facts which constitute an offence by an unambiguously and deliberately intended plea of guilty cannot ordinarily appeal against conviction, since there is nothing unsafe about a conviction based upon his own voluntary confession in open court. However, it is right that as a matter of principle, incorrect legal advice and/or pressure from a judge may constitute a valid basis of appeal. As to incorrect legal advice, your counsel has responded that he advised that you would likely be convicted, and that his advice was to plead guilty in order to ensure an appropriate credit. He explained that a plea to the lesser offence (plain harassment) was not acceptable to the prosecution. He denies that he did not explain that the alternative verdict was not open. He also denies that any pressure was put on you by him or the judge. Together with his lengthy comments, counsel attached a number of email exchanges containing the advice he gave. In that advice to you, he says in terms that harassment is an alternative verdict that is available to the jury. It is not reasonably arguable, therefore, that the incorrect legal advice you assert was given. It was not: the correct legal advice was given. Moreover, having read the witness evidence from the complainant, Katie Nash, setting out (a) the nature and extent of your communications to her and (b) the impact your behaviour was having on her day-to-day, including fear and extreme anxiety affecting her working and personal life, the measured and sensible advice given to you by your counsel is entirely unsurprising. It is not reasonably arguable that your plea was predicated on incorrect legal advice, and it is likely that you obtained a better outcome by way of sentence than you would have done had you pleaded not guilty but were, as was likely, found guilty. I have also read the transcript of the PTPH hearing at which you say you were pressured by the judge. This is a hopeless complaint. The only arguably relevant exchange was when the judge said as follows: “OK. Right. Read nothing into this, Paul Relton. This is the time for you to consider your position and to have time and facilities for the preparation of your defence. If there is something on offer, get it on the table as soon as possible, and that puts you in the best possible position for credit for plea. More than that I can’t say….Work through the detail of this because if you don’t go through the detail of it, you’re the one that risks the injustice, not me”
“I have considered the papers in your case and your grounds of appeal. On12th December 2023 , you pleaded guilty to one count of Stalking involving serious harm or distress (s4A(1) Protection fromHarassment Act 1997 (‘PHA 1997’)). This involved the complainant, Katie Nash. You were sentenced to a Suspended Sentence Order, 15 weeks imprisonment suspended for 18 months (with requirements to complete 75 hours of Unpaid Work and to complete the Building Better Relationships programme). On16th July 2024 , you pleaded guilty to one charge of Stalking causing serious harm or distress (s4A(1) PHA 1997) – the complainant being Jessica Tucker - and one charge of Stalking without serious harm or distress (s2A(1) PHA 1997) – the complainant being Louise Mascall. On25th November 2024 , you were sentenced to 10 months imprisonment (re Tucker) and 4 months’ imprisonment, concurrent (re Mascall). Having committed an offence during the operational period of the suspended sentence imposed on13th February 2024 at Bristol Crown Court, the suspended sentence was activated in part, with a reduced term of imprisonment of 3 months, consecutive to the 10 months imprisonment (total sentence – 13 months’ imprisonment). You assert in relation to the Tucker offending: (1) An error in offence category. You say it was C2 not B2, because the offending was not ‘persistent’ and/or was not ‘intended to maximise fear or distress’. Having read not only the sentencing remarks but the witness evidence of Ms Tucker, this is not reasonably arguable. The description of your conduct as persistent was entirely justified by the sentencing judge, and he was, on the basis of the evidence, entitled to conclude that it was intended to maximise fear and distress. Moreover, in reaching his conclusion as to the application of guidelines, the judge was taking into account the totality of offending (both victims) in sentencing on the s4 count as the lead offence. It is not reasonably arguable that the judge erred. (2) You say insufficient regard was had to mitigation. As part of the overall assessment, the judge was entitled to conclude that weighing such limited mitigation as there was against the aggravating factors (previous convictions, commission whilst on bail and in breach of suspended sentence for similar conduct), overall, the appropriate sentence was towards the top of the overall category range; (3) You say you were ‘overcharged’. In circumstances where you pleaded guilty, this is not relevant. You were sentenced, as set out above, for the appropriate charge and your conduct was not reasonably arguable wrongly categorised. You complain in relation to the Mascall offending: (4) that the sentencing procedure was flawed, because there was not a full explanation of where the offending sat in respect of the guidelines. As you rightly identify, the judge focussed less on the precise analysis in light of his decision that this offending would be concurrent. That absence of explanation does not mean of itself that the sentence is manifestly excessive. Overall, 10 months for the totality of offending was not arguably manifestly excessive. You also complain that the 10 year restraining order was disproportionate. It is not reasonably arguable in light of your overall, and in particular, repeat offending and the distress caused to the victims together with the judge’s view that the imposition of the lengthy period was part of the overall sentencing structure that the period was manifestly excessive. Moreover, the power of the Court to vary or discharge the order by further order under s5(4) is an important safeguard, and the Court of Appeal is unlikely to interfere with the terms of a restraining order where, if and when it is appropriate to do so, it is open to make an application to vary or discharge the order (see R v Debnath[2005] EWCA Crim 3472 and paragraph 20(5)).”