R v Ashley Boyce [2026] EWCA Crim 256

[2026] EWCA Crim 256Venue Royal Courts of Justice, Strand, London, WC2A 2LLDate 19 February 2026
Before
LORD JUSTICE STUART-SMITHMR JUSTICE ANDREW BAKERHER HONOUR JUDGE MORELAND(Sitting as a Judge of the CACD)
Between
REXRespondentASHLEY BOYCEApplicant
Mr J Cross and Mr G Payne appeared for Applicant. for The Crown were not represented. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -The provisions of the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1992 apply to these offences. Under those provisions, where a sexual offence has been committed against a person, no matter relating to that person shall during that person’s lifetime be included in any publication if it is likely to lead members of the public to identify that person as the victim of that offence.
Approved Judgment
[1]The provisions of the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1992 apply to this offence. Under those provisions, where an allegation has been made that a sexual offence has been committed against a person, no matter relating to that person shall during that person's lifetime be included in any publication if it is likely to lead members of the public to identify that person as the victim of that offence. This prohibition applies unless waived or lifted in accordance with section 3 of the Act. For the avoidance of any doubt, we do not waive or lift the prohibition.[2]On 18 August 2023 in the Crown Court at Snaresbrook before Her Honour Judge Kamill, the applicant, who was then aged 29, was convicted of one count of rape (count 3), three counts of causing a person to engage in sexual activity without content (counts 5,8 and 9), one count of assault occasioning actual bodily harm (count 11), one count of possessing a firearm when prohibited (count 12), one count of possessing a firearm with intent to cause fear of violence (count 13), one count of threats to kill (count 14), and one count of controlling a child aged 13 to 17, subject to sexual exploitation (count 15). He was acquitted of false imprisonment (count 2) and causing a person to engage in sexual activity without consent (count 10). The jury could not agree a verdict on three counts of rape, which were counts 4, 6 and 7, and those counts were ordered to lie on the file. The aggregate sentence imposed by the Judge was an extended sentence of 23 years comprising a custodial term of 18 years and an extension period of five years. Other ancillary orders were made to which we do not need to refer.[3]The applicant now renews his applications for extensions of time and for leave to appeal against conviction and sentence. The period of the requested extensions of time are short and are not in any way the fault of the applicant. We therefore extend time as requested and as necessary.[4]It is not necessary to say anything more about the facts of the case at this stage. We therefore turn to the proposed grounds of appeal against conviction. As set out in the advice, there are five grounds: i) Ground 1 is that the learned Judge misdirected herself on how she ought to have dealt with a serious irregularity, namely an alarming and continuing altercation between certain jurors during deliberations, and withholding a jury note of those events, which she later claimed had led her to the conclusion that the jury was unable to function. ii) Ground 2 is that this followed the learned Judge's earlier refusal to direct an appropriate investigation of the irregularity due to "a lack of time", following disclosure of a note from the clerk and usher. iii) Ground 3 is that the decision of the Judge to allow the detail of all the defendant's previous convictions to go before the jury on the grounds of propensity was an error. iv) Ground 4 is that permitting the jury to return the verdict on count 15 despite it being a cumulative alternative to counts 5, 8, 9 and 10 was an error by the learned Judge. v) Ground 5 is that the learned Judge misdirected herself in placing undue pressure on the applicant's co-defendant, and "advising" her that she should reconsider her decision to sack her counsel. This happened after the co-defendant had complained, alleging a fundamental failure on her counsel's behalf to follow her instructions on the main evidence against the appellant. This was said to have resulted in cross-examination wholly adverse to the appellant's interests. This conduct was said to be particularly serious where the applicant’s co-defendant complained of having had very little involvement in the preparation of her defence statement or with previously served evidence that she complained she had only very recently become aware of and of which she was not fully appraised.[5]Grounds 1 and 2. We have very considerable sympathy with the Judge who was confronted by a difficult situation arising out of disagreements in the jury room. However, we consider that grounds 1 and 2 are arguable. We therefore give leave on those two grounds.[6]Ground 3. The prosecution were permitted to adduce evidence of the applicant's bad character, including in the following terms:
"On 30 October 2009 Mr Boyce was convicted of two offences of causing/inciting a boy under 13 years to engage in sexual activity. The date range of the offences is 18 April 2006 to 20 April 2008. The victim was Mr Boyce's 7-year-old step-brother. The offences occurred when Mr Boyce's step-brother stayed at Mr Boyce's home address. The offences involved Mr Ashley Boyce forcing his step-brother to watch porn DVD's whilst Ashley Boyce would perform oral sex on his step-brother. Mr Boyce pleaded guilty to these offences. On 28 March 2012 Mr Boyce was convicted of two offences of robbery. The first robbery was committed on 6 November 2011 and related to Mr Boyce attacking a male with a broken bottle and stealing his phone, jacket and £90.The second robbery was committed on 13 November 2011 and was a knife-point robbery of a pizza delivery man's motorbike. Mr Boyce pleaded guilty to both offences of robbery. On 21 January 2017 Mr Boyce was convicted of being in possession of an offensive weapon whilst in prison, … .The facts are that Mr Boyce was in possession of a piece of wood with a screw attached to it. Mr Boyce pleaded guilty to this offence. On 26 December 2018 Mr Boyce was convicted of assaulting three police officers. The facts are that on 25 November 2018 at 0336 hours the police attended an incident at McDonald’s in Romford. When the police attended, Mr Boyce put his hands around the throat of PC Goldman. Mr Boyce grabbed PC Horton around the neck, putting him in a headlock and Mr Boyce head butted PC Khan. Mr Boyce pleaded guilty to these offences."
There were other elements of bad character which we do not need to set out in detail here.[7]The applicant accepts that the Judge was clearly entitled to the view that gateway G was engaged, but submits that she fell into error in permitting the facts of the convictions and, in particular, the first of them to go before the jury on the grounds of propensity or under gateway G, and in any event, erred in not excluding his conviction from 2009. Apart from the age of the 2009 conviction, the applicant relies upon his age at the time and that the eventual pleas differed markedly from the reporting and development of the allegations both during investigation and followingcharge, which suggested that there was a basis of plea that is now no longer available. The applicant also relies upon the unsavoury nature of the 2009 offending, which he submits would have been unduly prejudicial and should have been excluded on that ground. As we have said, it involved the applicant performing oral sex on his much younger brother.[8]The defence asked the Judge to rule on the admission of the applicant's character and she did so. Specifically in relation to the 2009 offence, she ruled it to be clearly relevant as it was:
"[…] a sexual offence, a similar sexual offence performed in the home or in a place from which the victim could not leave, in exactly the same way as we have here in this case and therefore it appears that that can be trimmed to reflect those features and he was so much younger than the defendant at the time."
In the light of the Judge's ruling, the evidence of his bad character, including the 2009 conviction, was admitted by way of agreed facts.[9]In due course, the Judge gave a conventional and correct ruling, explaining that the jury had heard about these convictions because the applicant had attacked the prosecution witnesses and, "as a result, you are entitled to know about the character of the person who makes allegations, when you are deciding whether they are true." The Judge went on to give a conventional and correct direction on propensity.[10]In our judgment, it is plain beyond argument that the applicant's bad character was admissible by gateway G. It was also admissible by gateway D, but in any event, it is well established that once bad character evidence is admitted through any gateway, it can be used for any purpose for which it is relevant. Whether or not the Judge was separately asked to exclude the 2009 convictions, we are satisfied that she was entitled to rule that it was admissible and could be admitted for the reasons she gave. Different considerations might have prevailed if the 2009 conviction had been the applicant's only one, but it was not, and it was rightly admitted as(a) relevant and(b) the first in a sequence of convictions, all of which were rightly put before the jury.[11]Ground 3 is not arguable. Leave to appeal on ground 3 is therefore refused.[12]Ground 4: count 15. We accept that there was a degree of imprecision in the approach to count 15 during the course of the trial. In the course of submissions today the court, with the assistance of Mr Cross, went through the stages by which the approach to count 15 was outlined to the jury, and they were given directions on the law to apply. The end result was that after the jury had retired and after guilty verdicts on counts 5, 8 and 9 had been returned but before verdicts on counts 10 and 15 had been returned, the jury asked whether a not guilty verdict on count 10 alone would mean count 15 came into play.

The Judge answered in the affirmative in the following passage:

"Prosecution: [...] in going through the route to verdict and being faithful to the route to verdict, if they are not sure in relation to count 10, then they are entitled to go on to count 15. Judge: Exactly. They do not have to find 4 out of 4 before they turn to 15."
The Judge asserted that she was sure that Mr Payne, who appeared then, as he does before us today, for Mr Boyce, agreed. His response was merely to say "Thank you", without any indication of disagreement. The jury was therefore directed by way of clarification in accordance with that correct ruling. That is to be found at pages Y117F to 118B of the summing-up hearing. That was done a little under two hours before verdicts were then taken on counts 10 and count 15, the verdict on count 10 being a verdict of not guilty and the verdict on count 15 being a verdict of guilty.[13]In our judgment, although there were undoubtedly passages which taken on their own might indicate confusion, it is plain that the meaning of the route to verdict and the oral direction ultimately given by the Judge was that, in the Judge's phrase, "it did not have to be 4 out of 4 acquittals on counts 5, 8, 9 and 10 before count 15 came into play." Count 15 was to be considered if there was an acquittal on any one or more of those four counts. It is plain that that is what ultimately happened. There was ample evidence to support the jury's conclusion on count 15, and we can detect no arguable unfairness or reasons to suspect that the verdict on count 15 is unsafe. Though not determinative, we are encouraged in our view by the fact that Mr Payne raised no objection either to the original route to verdict or the oral summing-up or the clarification that was subsequently given to the jury.[14]Mr Cross submits that count 15 was intended to be an alternative that came into play only if the applicant was acquitted of all of counts 5, 8, 9 and 10. Whatever the intention, there is no technical objection to the approach that was adopted, namely that the separate and distinct offence alleged under count 15 came into play if the applicant was acquitted on any one or more of counts 5, 8, 9 and 10. The upshot is that, ultimately, despite conviction on counts 5, 8 and 9, a legally permissible option of conviction on count 15 as alternative to count 10 only was left to the jury and was specifically clarified and confirmed as a proper verdict for the jury to consider when the point was raised. On that basis there is no reason to consider the jury's verdict on count 15 is either irregular or unsafe.[15]For these reasons ground 4 is unarguable and leave is refused. We note in passing that ground 4 is something of a storm of in a teacup, since the Judge ultimately imposed no separate penalty on count 15.[16]Ground 5. At one point the applicant's co-defendant Ms Bailey threatened to sack her counsel on the grounds that she was not following her instructions and not acting in accordance with the evidence. The Judge spoke directly to Ms Bailey and made clear the difficulties that might flow if she went ahead and sacked her counsel. In doing so she suggested that Ms Bailey should speak to her instructing solicitor and said that, "It would be a great shame if Miss Bailey was not represented", and that it could not be guaranteed that a substitute counsel would be able to take over. She observed that defending oneself is not easy, but she considered that Ms Bailey would be able to do that. The end result was that Ms Bailey recanted and counsel continued to represent her until the end of the trial.[17]We have reviewed the transcript of the Judge's remarks. We are unable to find any evidence of undue pressure being brought to bear on Ms Bailey. To the contrary, the Judge's treatment of the episode seems to us to have been impeccable. Furthermore, we are quite unable to discern any unfair disadvantage to the applicant flowing from Miss Bailey's expression of concern about her counsel or her ultimate decision to continue to be represented by her. There is no merit in this ground of appeal. Permission to appeal on ground 5 is therefore refused.[18]We reach this conclusion without reference to the information at paragraph 5(v) of the Respondent's Notice, which strongly suggests that Miss Bailey's complaints about her counsel were entirely synthetic and that the whole episode was performed by Ms Bailey at the applicant's request. That may or may not be true. It does not affect our decision.

Conclusion on the application to appeal against conviction

[19]For these reasons, the renewed application for leave to appeal against conviction is allowed on grounds 1 and 2, concerning the possible jury irregularity, but refused on all other grounds. We grant leave limited to grounds 1 and 2, and a representation order for junior counsel for the appeal. We will hear counsel about any other directions in due course.

The grounds of appeal against sentence

The Judge sentenced the applicant as follows:

[20]on count 3 of the indictment, which was an offence of rape, on his conviction the Judge imposed an extended sentence of 23 years, comprising a custodial term of 18 years and an extension period of 5 years. On counts 5, 8 and 9, which were offences of causing a person to engage in sexual activity without consent, the Judge imposed sentences of 10 years' imprisonment on counts 5 and 9, and 9 years' imprisonment on count 9, all concurrent. On count 11, which was the offence of assault occasioning actual bodily harm, the Judge imposed a sentence of 4 years, 6 months, concurrent. On count 12, which was an offence of possessing a firearm when prohibited, the Judge imposed a sentence of 1 year, concurrent. On count 13, which was an offence of possessing a firearm with intent to cause fear of violence, the Judge imposed a sentence of 5 years' imprisonment, concurrent. On count 14, making a threat to kill, the Judge imposed a sentence of 3 years' imprisonment, concurrent, and on count 15, the offence of controlling a child prostitute, the Judge imposed no separate penalty.[21]It is at this stage necessary to outline briefly the facts of the offences of which the applicant was convicted. They all occurred in a relatively short period in October 2022. C1 was a vulnerable girl, aged 17 years at the time of the offending. She met Ms Bailey's son in Romford and ended up at her house, where Ms Bailey was living with the applicant. Count 3 was an offence of rape. As summarised by

the Judge in her sentencing remarks:

“There was an expedition during the course of the evening to a shop. [The applicant] gave [C1] Fanta which had been spiked with MDMA and some cannabis or some sort of drug before [he] then took her to ˗˗ from the bedroom up to an empty corridor, put her coat on floor and let her sit. She sat there, and then you [that is the applicant] seeing a girl who was out of control of her own body as a result of the MDMA and cannabis, you raped her, placing your penis in her mouth, and then told her to go back to bed." On about 11 October 2022, C1 was taken to a BMW at 10 o'clock at night. The applicant sat in the back and told C1 to "Give Sunny head'. The man called Sunny used his hand at the back of C1's head to force her mouth on to his exposed penis. C1 bit the penis and the applicant shouted at her. The applicant knew she was not consenting but took £20 from Sunny anyway. The applicant denied involvement in these events and said that if C1 engaged in any sexual activity, she did so voluntarily of her own free will. That was count 5. Counts 8 and 9 occurred on the same date and involved C1 being raped orally and vaginally. C1 was taken by Ms Bailey and the applicant to a hotel. After speaking with a man, the applicant beckoned C1 over and told her "to do as he asks". In a room the man pulled C1's head on to his penis. That was count 8. The male then told C1 to lay down and he pushed her onto the bed where she lay with her legs crossed to prevent him taking down her trousers. Her hands were pushing unsuccessfully against his chest. He inserted his penis into her vagina and ejaculated inside her. That was count 9. As the Judge found in her sentencing remarks, meanwhile C1 was being made to sell drugs and was under the applicant's control. At some point C1 spoke to Ms Bailey who was carrying the applicant's child at the time and told her that the applicant had raped her. Ms Bailey confronted the applicant, which led to the offence of assault causing actual bodily harm, count 11.”
[22]As found by the Judge:
"You became very angry, pulled C1 into an alley and attacked her violently, injuring her face, first of all, so that she fell to the floor, and when on the floor, you kicked her to her face with your shod foot. She was in and out of consciousness, and of course, could not go to the party as a prostitute, so you took C2 instead, while C1 faded in and out of consciousness. She had a swollen eye which she was unable to open for a couple of days, and when you came back to find her on the ground in the care of Miss Bailey and C2, you refused any treatment in hospital and she was taken straight home and C2 was made to wash her in the bath. Miss Bailey said that she could not leave until those injuries had healed, but they have not healed. We have heard that there is a requirement for some facial alteration with a doctor."
[23]As found by the Judge, counts 12, 13 and 14 occurred soon after. "Meanwhile, you went out and became extremely high. When you returned, you got out your gun which you had purchased [...] It was purchased for [you], and kept in a safe in your bedroom. You got it out, you of course, having been in prison recently, you were not permitted to have such a weapon, but you had it. That is count 12. Count 13, you waved it about, high as [...] and intending to maximise the fear and distress for C2. You held it to her head and you made threats. Clearly, that was a deliberate, terrifying event for her. The threats to kill were made that you would cause her father to be accused of an offence falsely, cause the social services to take [away] her sisters and to find her and kill her. Of course, C2 was terrified, particularly with the weapon in your hand, and the weapon which had already made marks, bullet marks throughout the flat. She knew very well that you were capable of using that gun."[24]As we have said, the Judge imposed no separate penalty on count 15. The Judge determined the sentences for all those offences other than count 3 first, having said that she would treat count 3 as the lead offence, with all other offences to run concurrently. She was fully entitled to adopt that course, which meant that the sentence on count 3 would have to reflect the overall criminality of the applicant's conduct.[25]In relation to count 3, the Judge held that the offence of rape was "pure power and control", and that was the purpose of the offence [...] because thereafter she was under your thumb, terrified of you [...] and you simply used her." The Judge regarded the offence of rape as aggravated by the applicant's previous convictions and his subsequent treatment of C1.[26]The Judge sentenced the applicant with the benefit of a Pre-sentence Report, which assessed the risk of serious harm posed by the applicant towards both victims, partners, the general public and children to be high. The Judge made a finding of dangerousness, and having earlier said that the starting point for count 3 was 10 years, imposed the extended sentence with a custodial element of 18 years and an extended licence period of 5 years.

The proposed grounds of appeal

[27]The grounds may be summarised as: i) the finding of dangerousness was not justified, and ii) the sentence of 18 years' custody imposed on count 3 was, in any event, manifestly excessive.[28]There was ample evidence to support the finding of dangerousness. The combined effect of his previous convictions, the facts of the present offending and the terms of the PSR were such that it would have been very surprising if this experienced Judge had not made a finding of dangerousness. The first ground of appeal has no merit.[29]Similarly, we are not persuaded that a custodial element of 18 years was arguably manifestly excessive or wrong in principle. As we have said, the sentence on count 3 had to reflect the overall criminality of the applicant's behaviour. That included: i) counts 5, 8 and 9, each of which fully merited the concurrent sentences of 10 years (count 5 and 8), and 9 years (count 9); ii) the ABH, which fully merited the concurrent sentence of 4 years, 6 months; iii) the firearms offences, which fully merited the sentences of 1 year (count 12) and 5 years (count 13), and the threats to kill, which fully merited the sentence of 3 years. In our judgment, those other offences fully justified the uplift on count 3 from 10 to 18 years even before taking into account his antecedents.[30]For these reasons the renewed application for leave to appeal against sentence is refused.