R v Sasha Kaydee Ball [2026] EWCA Crim 121

WARNING: reporting restrictions may apply to the contents transcribed in this document, particularly if the case concerned a sexual offence or involved a child. Reporting restrictions prohibit the publication of the applicable information to the public or any section of the public, in writing, in a broadcast or by means of the internet, including social media. Anyone who receives a copy of this transcript is responsible in law for making sure that applicable restrictions are not breached. A person who breaches a reporting restriction is liable to a fine and/or imprisonment. For guidance on whether reporting restrictions apply, and to what information, ask at the court office or take legal advice.This Transcript is Crown Copyright.  It may not be reproduced in whole or in part other than in accordance with relevant licence or with the express consent of the Authority.  All rights are reserved.[2026] EWCA Crim 121Venue Royal Courts of JusticeStrandLondonWC2A 2LLDate Thursday 29 January 2026
Before
LORD JUSTICE SINGHLORD JUSTICE DOVEMR JUSTICE GRIFFITHSReference by the Attorney General under s.36 Criminal Justice Act 1988
Between
REXCrownv
Between
SASHA KAYDEE BALL__________Computer Aided Transcript of Epiq Europe Ltd,Lower Ground, 46 Chancery Lane, London WC2A 1JETel No: 020 7404 1400; Email: rcj@epiqglobal.co.uk (Official Shorthand Writers to the Court)_________MS C HOLE appeared for Attorney GeneralMR R QUAIFE appeared for Offender________JUDGMENT(Approved)
[1]The respondent was born on 10 November 2000. On 2 September 2025 she pleaded guilty to two offences in the Crown Court at Truro. On 23 September 2025 she was sentenced by Ms Recorder Gates as follows: On count 1, an offence of possession of a controlled drug of Class A with intent, contrary to section 5(3) of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971, there was a sentence of 1041 days and, as we shall see, that was in effect 3 years' imprisonment but reduced by 54 days. On count 2, an offence of possessing criminal property, contrary to section 329(1) (c) of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, there was a concurrent sentence of 6 months' imprisonment. Accordingly the total sentence was 1041 days' imprisonment. A statutory surcharge order was imposed. An order was made for the forfeiture and destruction of the drugs and paraphernalia seized. An order for forfeiture of £3,510 in cash was made. There was a deprivation order of a mobile telephone and laptop seized unless PIN numbers were supplied to the police and no evidence of drug dealing was found. No evidence was offered against the respondent on count 3, which was an offence of possessing a controlled drug of Class B and a not guilty verdict was entered pursuant to section 17 of the Criminal Justice Act 1967.[2]His Majesty's Solicitor General now applies for leave to refer the sentences to this Court under section 36 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 ("the 1988 Act") on the ground that they were unduly lenient. The facts[3]The facts are not in dispute for present purposes and can be taken from the Final Reference. On 31 July 2025 the police attended the offender's home address to execute a warrant under section 23 of the 1971 Act. The property was shared accommodation with the offender and co-defendant (Aaron Evans) each renting a bedroom. The offender was inside. Evans was seen in the garden. Intelligence had suggested that drugs were being supplied from the premises using e-scooters. A search of the premises identified a plastic wrap in the garden near where Evans had been seen which contained 14.1 grams of cocaine, with a street value of £1,120 and two bags containing 14.52 grams of cocaine in a black suitcase in a shed in the garden with a street value of £1,180. These quantities of cocaine were the subject of count 1 on the indictment.[4]In the kitchen were two sets of scales covered in white powder, self-sealed bags and a tray with a large kitchen knife and clingfilm with traces of white powder. A press was found in the lounge. £3,510 of cash was recovered from the bedroom shared by the offender and Evans. That was the subject of count 2. A small quantity of cannabis resin was recovered which had been the subject of count 3 on which, as we have mentioned, the prosecution offered no evidence.[5]On 1 August 2025 the offender first appeared in the Magistrates' Court and the case was sent to the Crown Court. At that stage she indicated not guilty pleas. On 2 September 2025, at the plea and trial preparation hearing, the offender entered guilty pleas to counts 1 and 2. The case was adjourned for sentence. The sentencing framework[6]The maximum sentence for the offence the subject of count 1 is life imprisonment. The Sentencing Council has issued a Definitive Guideline on supplying or offering to supply a controlled drug/possession of a controlled drug with intent to supply. Culpability is categorised according to the role played by the offender. There was no dispute that in this case the offender played a significant role. So far as harm is concerned, again there was no dispute that this was a category 3 harm case because there was supply of drugs directly to users. The guideline recommends for a category 3 significant role offence a starting point of 4 years 6 months' custody with a category range of 3 years 6 months up to 7 years' custody.[7]The maximum sentence for the offence the subject of count 2 is 14 years' imprisonment. The Sentencing Council has issued a Definitive Guideline on money laundering offences. It is unnecessary to dwell on this in detail. Suffice it to say that this was an offence which fell into category 6 culpability B. The guideline recommends for such a case a starting point of a high-level community order with a range from a low-level community order up to 1 year's custody. The sentencing process[8]The offender had convictions for seven offences. These included being concerned in supplying a Class B drug (amphetamine) between 2018 and 2019 and being concerned in the supply of Class A drugs (cocaine) and Class B drugs (cannabis) in 2021, for which she was sentenced to 2 years' imprisonment on 14 October 2024. She had been released from that sentence on 3 June 2025.[9]There were no victim personal statements in this case. There was a supervision report prepared in respect of the offender. This noted that she had been sentenced on 14 October 2024 to 2 years' imprisonment for an offence of being concerned in the supply of cocaine and had been released on home detention curfew on 3 June 2025. It noted that there had been a high level of compliance. She had developed a good rapport with prison staff and been cleared by security to work as a visits orderly. The report assessed that the offender could be safely managed in the community and was assessed as posing a medium risk of harm to the public. The sentencing court could also see a pre-sentence report dated 7 June 2021, when the offender had been 20. This noted that she was a care leaver having had a difficult childhood during which she had witnessed domestic violence in her mother's relationships resulting her becoming homeless at the age of 16 after her relationship with her mother broke down. There were two later reports. The first dated 26 July 2023 was of limited assistance as she had declined to engage with the officer. An addendum report dated 15 January 2024, when the offender was 23, focused on her positive progress in custody.[10]It was agreed before the sentencing court that the sentence imposed could only be concurrent to the term of imprisonment for which the offender had been recalled. It was also a matter of agreement that the offender was entitled to a reduction of 25 per cent for the guilty pleas because of a stage at which they were entered that is the PTPH.[11]In her sentencing remarks the judge decided to structure the sentence by making count 1 the lead offence and imposing a concurrent term for count 2. Further, the sentences were to run concurrently to the sentence for which the offender had been recalled to custody. It is common ground that that was in accordance with the relevant legislation as interpreted by this Court.[12]The Recorder placed both offenders into category 3 harm because of the supply to street users and their culpability was to play a significant role in the offending. The Recorder noted that the starting point was therefore 4 years and 6 months' custody with a range of 3 years 6 months to 7 years. The Recorder said that there were aggravating features: exposing others living at the address to the risks associated with drug dealing; the refusal to provide PINs for digital devices and previous convictions, with the Recorder noting that there was a distinction between the two offenders, with Evans being more lightly convicted although he was on police bail at the time of his offending for an offence which was not proceeded with.[13]Turning to mitigation, the Recorder noted the offender was relatively young and immature in other ways and noted her positive response to the supervision report including her having attained employment whilst on release. The Recorder said that the notional sentence after trial for count 1 would have been 4 years' imprisonment. After making a 25 per cent reduction for guilty pleas, that would lead to a sentence of 3 years. The Recorder then considered the 54 days spent subject to recall should be deducted from the sentence. The total sentence was therefore reduced to 1041 days. In respect of count 2, as we have mentioned, she imposed a concurrent sentence of 6 months. Submissions on behalf of the Solicitor General[14]On behalf of the Solicitor General, Ms Hole submits that the total sentence imposed in this case was unduly lenient. It is acknowledged that the Recorder was entitled to treat count 1 as the lead offence and so impose a concurrent term for count 2 and that she correctly categorised the offences and identified an appropriate starting point in respect of count 1. However, Ms Hole submits that the judge failed to pass a sentence that reflected the true criminality of this case for four main reasons. First, the Recorder erred by placing the case at the lower end of the sentencing range for a category 3 significant role offence. Secondly, she did not make sufficient upward adjustment to account for the aggravating features particularly the previous convictions for similar offending. Thirdly, she allowed too great a reduction for the offender's age and mitigation, and fourthly, she erred by applying an additional reduction to account for the time spent recalled after licence for another offence.[15]Ms Hole submits that was, in truth, a straightforward case of supplying Class A drugs directly to users and fell squarely within category 3 with the offender playing a significant role. There plainly had been some significant financial gain. There was evidence of the drugs being prepared for supply. It was the offender's own operation for significant financial advantage and there was no basis on which to place the offending below the applicable guideline range. Furthermore, Ms Hole submits the offender had relevant previous convictions for the supply of drugs, including Class A drugs of the same type, that is cocaine, for which she had been released on licence less than 2 months before her arrest in this case. These previous convictions and the fact the offences were committed while the offender was on licence were significant factors in this case and so there should have been a commensurate uplift to reflect this.[16]Ms Hole submits that the mitigation in this case was, in truth, minimal. Although the offender is relatively young, she was 24 at the date of sentence towards the top of the range of 18 to 25 (now recognised to be when adults continue to develop) and although there were references to her immaturity, this had not been further explained and appeared to relate to her chronological age rather than any developmental issues. Her progress on licence had apparently been positive but this was for a relatively short period of just over 8 weeks and she had committed these offences during that period. While Ms Hole concedes that there is a judicial discretion to reduce a sentence to take account of time spent subject to recall for another offence, that discretion should be exercised in order to do justice in particular cases, for example, where there has been excessive delay (see R v Kerrigan [2014] EWCA Crim 2348; [2015] 1 Cr App R(S) 29).[17]As this Court said in Attorney-General's Reference (Sked) [2025] EWCA Crim 351; [2025] 2 Cr App R(S) 21, at [27], the exercise of that discretion should not subvert the policy decision which has been made by Parliament, that time served on recall does not count automatically towards the new sentence. A measured approach is required and there is no arithmetical formula that can be applied generally. The objective will always be to find a sentence which is just and proportionate on the particular facts of the case.[18]Turning to the facts of this case, Ms Hole submits that a reduction of 54 days to count for time subject to recall was not appropriate. The offending had occurred very soon after the offender's release from the previous custodial sentence and there was no material delay in the disposal of the new offending. Accordingly, she submits the reduction had the effect of further reducing a sentence which was already lenient. In her oral submissions before this Court, Ms Hole has fairly accepted that if this point stood in isolation, she would not be making the submission that she otherwise does that the sentence was unduly lenient. Submissions on behalf of the respondent[19]On behalf of the respondent Mr Quaife submits that was not an unduly lenient sentence but was just and proportionate in all the circumstances having been passed by a very experienced Recorder. He reminds this Court of what has been said ever since the reference procedure was created by the 1988 Act as to the proper role of this Court. For example, in R v BRJ [2023] EWCA Crim 351 at [28] Holroyde LJ said that:
"It may well be that the offender could not have brought any successful appeal if the judge had taken a slightly longer notional determinate sentence than she did; but that is not the test."
Rather the test is:
"… that a sentence would only be unduly lenient 'where it falls outside the range of sentences which the judge, applying his mind to all the relevant factors, could reasonably consider appropriate.'"
[20]Addressing the specific grounds advanced by the Solicitor General, Mr Quaife submits first, that the judge was entitled to come to the conclusion that the offender's role had been towards the lower end of a significant role in this case and this was consistent with how the prosecution had put its case before the Recorder. Secondly, he submits that the judge did have sufficient regard to the aggravating features in this case, for example, she mentioned the previous convictions at page 10H of the sentencing remarks and factors indicating seriousness at page 22D. Thirdly, he submits that the judge was entitled to have regard to the offender's age, maturity and other matters of mitigation set out in the reports before her and conclude that they balanced out the aggravating factors. In particular, he reminds this Court of what has been said in Attorney-General's Reference (Clarke) [2018] EWCA Crim 185; [2018] 1 Cr App R(S) 52 at [5], that reaching the age of 18 does not represent a "cliff edge" for the purposes of sentencing. Fourthly, Mr Quaife submits that the judge was entitled in the exercise of her discretion to reduce the sentence to take into account time spent on remand subject to recall. That reduction of 54 days does not make a sentence that was already lenient unduly so, as has been suggested on behalf of the Solicitor General. Our assessment[21]The principles which govern the reference procedure under section 36 of the 1988 Act are well established and were summarised, for example, in Attorney-General's Reference (Egan) [2022] EWCA Crim 1751; [2023] 2 Cr App R(S) 16 at [3 - 6] in particular:
"(1) The judge at first instance is particularly well placed to assess the weight to be given to competing factors in considering sentence. (2) A sentence is only unduly lenient where it falls outside the range of sentences which the judge at first instance might reasonably consider appropriate. (3) Leave to refer a sentence should only be granted by this Court in exceptional circumstances and not in borderline cases. (4) Section 36 of the 1988 Act is designed to deal with cases where judges have fallen into gross error..."
[22]We remind ourselves that the Reference system is not designed to provide an opportunity for this Court to resentence an offender. As Lord Lane CJ said in the seminal case of Attorney-General's Reference No 4 of 1989 (1990) 90 Cr App R(S) 366, the question is not what one or more members of this Court would have done had they been sentencing at first instance. Nor as Holroyde LJ explained in BRJ is the test what would be the approach of this Court if a higher sentence had been passed and there was an appeal against sentence on the ground that it was manifestly excessive. There is clearly a range of reasonable sentences available to a court of first instance, which falls between the minimum that must properly be imposed and the maximum beyond which a sentence becomes manifestly excessive. It is primarily for the sentencing court to exercise its judgment as to where in that reasonable range the just and proportionate sentence falls on the particular facts of the case before it. The role of this Court, under section 36 of the 1988 Act, is to correct that exercise of judgment where the sentence is unduly lenient because it falls below that reasonable range. Applying those principles to the present case, we are not persuaded by Ms Hole's able submissions that this is a case in which this Court can or should intervene. The Recorder had to make a number of assessments, for example, as to the role played by the respondent, her maturity and the weight to be given to mitigating factors. These were primarily matters for the Recorder's judgment.[23]In our view, the strongest argument made by the Solicitor General relates to the reduction of 54 days which were spent in custody for another offence because the respondent had been recalled to prison. But we recognise this was a matter for the discretion of the sentencing court. In any event, as Ms Hole fairly acknowledges, the reduction would not make the total sentence unduly lenient or warrant intervention by this Court on that ground alone.[24]Accordingly, we have reached the conclusion that while the total sentence can be viewed as lenient, it was not in our judgment unduly so. Conclusion[25]For the reasons we have given, we refuse the Solicitor General's application for leave to refer these sentences to this Court under section 36 of the 1988 Act. Epiq Europe Ltd hereby certify that the above is an accurate and complete record of the proceedings or part thereof. Lower Ground Floor, 46 Chancery Lane, London, WC2A 1JE Tel No: 020 7404 1400 Email: Rcj@epiqglobal.co.uk