R v Michael Haslam [2026] EWCA Crim 1125

[2026] EWCA Crim 1125Case No 202602517
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL (CRIMINAL DIVISION)
ON APPEAL FROM THE CROWN COURT AT DERBY
HHJ SHAUN SMITH KC (HONORARY RECORDER OF DERBY)
T20260002
Venue Royal Courts of Justice, Strand, London, WC2A 2LLDate 26/08/2026
Before
LADY JUSTICE WHIPPLEMRS JUSTICE MCGOWANMRS JUSTICE EADY
Between
Michael HaslamAppellant
Paul Stimson (instructed by Smith Partnership Solicitors) for AppellantTom Heath (instructed by Crown Prosecution Service) for CrownHearing Hearing date: 4 August 2026
Approved JudgmentThis judgment was handed down remotely at 10.30am on 26 August 2026 by circulation to the parties or their representatives by e-mail and by release to the National Archives..............................

Introduction

[1]On 15 May 2026, the appellant pleaded guilty to a single count of fraudulent trading. The particulars were that between 13 November 2020 and 16 November 2022 the appellant was knowingly party to the carrying on of a company called M and J Builders Ltd (the company) with intent to defraud creditors of that company. On 1 July 2026, the appellant was sentenced by HHJ Shaun Smith KC, the Honorary Recorder of Derby (the judge) to an immediate term of imprisonment of 28 months. The appellant now appeals against sentence. The judge granted the appellant a certificate of fitness to bring this appeal.

Facts

[2]Facts The appellant set up the company on 11 January 2016. The appellant was the sole director of the company. In July 2019 the company started to struggle financially. The company accrued liabilities to tax and national insurance and took out loans. The pandemic caused the company’s financial position to worsen and it accrued further liabilities. By November 2020 the company had stopped making repayments on its borrowings. In December 2020 the company hit the limit of its bank overdraft. Still, the company took on further loans. In April 2022 the appellant went to see an insolvency practitioner who told him that his company was insolvent, that his duty was to the company’s creditors at the point of insolvency, and that he should have stopped trading by now. In November 2022, a winding-up petition was issued in the High Court. Liquidators were subsequently appointed and the company was wound up with insufficient funds available to repay its creditors.[3]Despite the company continuing to struggle financially and being unable to pay its debts, the appellant kept trading through 2021 and 2022, even after he was advised not to do so in April 2022. The appellant carried on taking money from clients, who were not aware of the company’s financial situation. He required these customers to pay up front, in full or in part, for work that in most cases was not done or not done to an adequate standard or for materials that never arrived.[4]On 3 April 2024, the appellant attended a voluntary interview under caution. He said that he had taken loans to keep the company afloat and that monies paid into the business account would have been swallowed by the overdraft so he arranged for new client money to be paid into his and his wife’s personal accounts. He said customers were clearly told that payments were going into a personal account. He said that the company’s accountants had never raised any concerns with him about this.

Complaints

[5]Complaints There were eight complainants in all. The complainant Alison Cowburn met the appellant in November 2020. He provided her with a quote for building works worth £233,000 plus VAT. On 4 January 2021, he started work. Ms Cowburn made payments of £150,000 between January and June 2021. She repeatedly raised concerns with the company that so many costs were being front-loaded. The work got slower and by July 2021 had stopped. In August she paid more money to try and get the incomplete works restarted but that did not happen. By early 2022 it was clear that the company would not return to finish the work. She engaged a new builder who charged substantially more than the appellant had quoted to finish the work. It turned out that the value of the work done by the company was only around £40,000. In addition, she had to pay £12,000 to remove waste from the site which should have been removed by the company. Ms Cowburn was left significantly out of pocket and the additional cost impacted her financial position in retirement. There were also ongoing faults with the company’s work and Ms Cowburn was concerned about the eventual saleability of the house. She was put under substantial psychological and emotional strain by this experience.[6]The complainant Lauren Baker wanted to extend her family home in the summer of 2021 and engaged the appellant. She lived in that home with her partner and baby. In March 2022 the company started work. She paid the appellant £47,760 in advance between March and May. The account number she was given for payments was the personal bank account of the appellant, rather than the company’s account. Work stopped by 1 June 2022, when the appellant said he needed a crane to continue. The property was left unsafe and without running water. On 18 July 2022 the appellant returned to the site to say that there were cashflow issues but work could get started again if Ms Baker paid him another £6,600 in advance. Desperate as she was to get things moving, she paid it, but no work started. On 30 August, four months after being advised his company was insolvent, the appellant told Ms Baker the company was likely to go into liquidation. On 2 September 2022 he told Ms Baker that he had never ordered windows that she had paid for. She contracted another builder to come and finish the work. In doing that, she incurred additional cost. She borrowed money from her family. Her mental health suffered significantly during this time.[7]The complainant Sacha Cudworth obtained a quote from the appellant for just over £11,500 for a loft conversation in October 2021. A further £3,840 was quoted for some ceiling work as well. She had used the company before in 2016 without encountering any problems. Work started on 31 January 2022. Payments were made fortnightly in advance to the appellant’s personal bank account. During the period, she kept raising complaints that she was paying for materials and items which never seemed to appear. On 31 March 2022 work stopped. No windows and no staircase were installed. The staircase had been paid for but it turned out the appellant had never ordered it. In July 2022 Ms Cudworth issued a claim in the county court, but that claim ended up failing because the company was in liquidation by that point.[8]Another complainant, Julia Hague, obtained a quote for renovations in January 2023. The quote was for £18,300 for a house for her family including two adult children with special needs. Work started on 28 March 2022 and stopped in August 2022. Payments were made to a personal bank account for work which was never completed and materials which were never ordered. She paid all but the last £660 of the quote. She was later told by the local council that the work done by the appellant’s company was such that she would be better having it demolished and rebuilt rather than trying to fix it. She has not yet been able to raise sufficient funds to do that. Her husband works weekends to save for the necessary work. Both she and her husband have had mental health issues as a result of all the worry. Her sons have struggled to manage and their mental health has deteriorated too.[9]In early 2022 the complainant Sheridan Harries engaged the company to carry out renovations to her kitchen. She was told that the company could work at a discounted rate if she paid cash up front to the appellant’s wife’s personal account. She did not do that (having consulted building control), but she did make payments of just over £12,000 in advance. The company started work on 25 May 2022. Workers arrived who did not have their own tools and had to borrow tools from Ms Harries. Two months later, work stopped. Windows and doors which had been paid for did not arrive. The kitchen which had arrived was never assembled. The work was done to such a poor standard that Ms Harries had to instruct a new builder and pay for the work (through further borrowings) a second time. The whole episode has lasted around 18 months. She shares the house with her husband and 8-year-old daughter.[10]The complainant Paula Irvine agreed to pay the company £32,100 for an extension to her house. He visited her to quote for the work on 23 March 2022. Her payments were made to a personal bank account. She was told if they were made weekly, then more men would be provided and the job would be completed faster. In total, she paid £35,880. On 22 July the work ended without core materials ever having been delivered and without the work being completed. She borrowed money to complete the job and engaged a different builder. She had to pay that builder to undo much of the work done by the company because it was not done to a proper standard and then redo it to a satisfactory standard to complete the project. The family were left without a kitchen for a long period which adversely impacted on her child who suffers from an auto-immune deficiency.[11]Another complainant, Jacqueline Szrejder, agreed to pay £16,000 to the appellant in fortnightly instalments from 22 August 2022 for works to her house. She made payments in advance to the appellant’s personal account. On 30 August, three days after he had told her that the company was in liquidation, the appellant started work at that property. She paid a total of £17,640 in payments, which were still being taken by the appellant, even after the winding-up petition had been presented to the High Court. On 23 November 2022, the appellant’s workers disappeared and never came back.[12]This Court has been given no information about the eighth complainant.

Progress of case in Crown Court

[13]Progress of case in Crown Court The PTPH was held on 31 March 2026 before the judge. Mr Heath appeared for the prosecution and Mr Stimson appeared for the defendants. Neither defendant was arraigned, at the Crown’s request, because discussions were ongoing about whether the appellant’s wife should face charges. The judge raised the issue of likely sentence. Mr Heath referred the judge to the fraud guidelines issued by the Sentencing Council, suggesting that this was a B2 offence (value defrauded of around £210,000) which had a starting point of 3 years in custody. The judge indicated that he was thinking about imposing a fine (“the only place I could hit him would be his pocket”) and disqualifying him from being a company director; and that he would “just do a standalone … with no requirements”. It is clear that the judge wanted to sentence that day if possible; but the Crown were not ready, so the judge adjourned the PTPH until 15 May 2026 and continued the appellant’s bail in the meanwhile. In adjourning, he said this (emphasis added):
“Even though there isn't any money to give back and even though because of the age of the offence and how long it's taken the police to investigate it, it's a case in which you would not be being sent to prison. All that being said, it's not a tick box exercise, it's something that has to be done properly and there will be a full hearing when I will hear what -- if there are guilty pleas -- I will hear what it is that you have done and then I will hear how it has affected your victims if they are victims. Then I will hear on your behalf from the advocate that represents you and then I will pass sentence. So, it's far from a tick box exercise but, given the guidelines, given the recent legislation which makes it harder for courts to send people to prison, then I've already said what's likely to happen, or what's going to happen actually, if there are guilty pleas.”
[14]The adjourned PTPH came back before the judge on 15 May 2026. On this occasion, Mr James-Moore appeared for the prosecution and Mr Stimson for the defence. The appellant entered a guilty plea. His wife entered a not guilty plea and the Crown indicated that it would offer no evidence against her. The judge referred to the victim personal statements noting that there were eight victims which he said was not, in a case of this kind, a large number. The judge discussed sentence with counsel, referring to the fraud guideline and suggesting that it was category 2 harm with a value below the starting point in that category so that he would start somewhere between 18 months and 3 years before aggravation and mitigation; he referred to the impact of this offence at which point Mr James-Moore said that there was “quite a lot of evidence of it being high impact”. The judge noted that the appellant was a man of good character and directed a pre-sentence report; the judge said “he’s pleaded after 22 March, of course” (a reference to the possibility of suspending a custodial sentence of up to three years for convictions after that date). The judge adjourned for sentence.[15]The sentencing hearing took place before the judge on 1 July 2026. The Crown was represented by Mr Heath and the appellant by Mr Stimson. Mr Heath had prepared a sentencing note in advance. The Crown offered no evidence against the appellant’s wife and a not guilty verdict was entered. The Crown opened the case against the appellant who was by now 74 years old with no previous convictions. The Crown invited the Court to view this as offending in the upper end of category B2. The Court had before it a number of character references attesting to the appellant’s good character. The pre-sentence report dated 26 June 2026 noted that the appellant’s business had been started in 2016 and had originally gone well; but the Covid pandemic had caused the business to shut temporarily; the appellant’s wife’s health was poor and there were other family issues at that time. The author recounted how the appellant focussed on the impact of this offending on him personally and there was some concern that the appellant had not acted with due diligence once the business got into difficulty. The Court also had a number of victim personal statements. Two victims, Lauren Baker and Alison Cowburn, read their victim personal statements to the Court.[16]After a short adjournment, the judge sentenced. He noted that the appellant was 74 and of positive good character. He said that the business was not fraudulent from the outset. The appellant was now living in a council flat and his wife was ill and in need of care. He was not at risk of future offending. The problem came in 2019 when the company started taking on loans and accruing unpaid liabilities for tax. Even after an insolvency practitioner told him it was all over the appellant carried on, closing his eyes to the inevitable. He took money from these eight families. The impact on them had been devastating - financially, emotionally and psychologically; personal relationships within those families had been damaged and the victims had lost trust in professionals. The offending was in category B2 with a starting point of three years’ custody in a range of 18 months to four years. But because the impact was high, the judge went up to the next category, B1, which had a starting point of 5 years imprisonment in a range of three to six years. There was no further aggravation to take into account. But a downwards adjustment was needed to reflect the amount of money defrauded which was lower that the guideline amount; and to reflect the appellant’s good character, delay and other personal mitigation. The judge gave one third credit for the guilty plea. His final sentence was 28 months’ imprisonment.[17]The judge turned to the question of suspension. He thought there was a realistic prospect of rehabilitation and agreed that the appellant did not present a high risk of reoffending. He had good personal mitigation. There was no history of poor compliance with court orders and no suggestion that the appellant would not comply. The judge treated the impact on the appellant’s wife of a custodial sentence as a neutral factor. The judge concluded that the seriousness of this offending meant that appropriate punishment could only be achieved by immediate custody.[18]On 3 July 2026, a “slip rule” hearing took place Under section 385 of the Sentencing Act 2020 . Ms Barrowcliffe appeared for the Crown and Mr Stimson appeared for the appellant. By the time of the hearing, the judge had consulted the court log of the earlier hearings in March and May and had listened to the DARTS audio of the hearing in May. He expressed some frustration that counsel had not, despite his asking, reminded him of what he had indicated at the PTPH hearings when he came to sentence. Mr Stimson invited the judge to amend the sentence by suspending it on the basis of his earlier indications. He submitted that there was no new information before the judge at sentence which had not been before him at the May 2026 hearing, and that the judge was not in those circumstances entitled to depart from his earlier position. The judge refused to alter the sentence. He explained his position in this way:
“For my part on reflection, I consider that I was too quick to conclude that the matter would not result in immediate custody. Hindsight is a wonderful thing. Clearly following consideration of the impact factor, which nobody including me had addressed their mind to at the initial hearing, this was a far more serious matter than I had been led to believe or indeed led myself to believe … It was also the overall impact factor which caused me, having considered the imposition guidelines, to determine that custody was the only appropriate sentence. I am, of course, allowed to change my mind. But to be fair to the defendant, I was strident and he was left in [no] doubt what I said the outcome was meant to be.”
[19]The judge agreed to Mr Stimson’s application to certify the case as fit for an appeal pursuant to section 11(1A) of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968 and CrimPR 39.4. The judge granted the appellant bail, with a condition of residence pending this appeal.

Grounds of Appeal and Respondent’s Notice

[20]Grounds of Appeal and Respondent’s Notice By his grounds of appeal and oral submissions, Mr Stimson argues that the sentence imposed by the judge is manifestly excessive, alternatively wrong in principle. He argues that there was strong mitigation so that the sentence could properly be suspended; he also relies on the judge’s earlier indication that the sentence would not be one of immediate custody.[21]Mr Heath represented the Crown. He filed a Respondent’s Notice resisting this appeal. Mr Heath submits that the judge’s indications at the March and May hearings were informal and outside the Goodyear [2005] EWCA Crim 888 process; these were unsolicited comments which are not binding on the judge or on this Court. Further, the judge’s comments in March 2026 were made at a time when full details of the impact on victims were not available (at that stage, the Crown could not confirm the precise figure involved and there were more victim personal statements to come). Once the judge had the full picture, he simply changed his mind, as he was entitled to do. His decision not to suspend was an exercise of discretion with which this Court should not interfere.[22]Both counsel were present at the sentencing hearing on 1 July. Both were aware of the judge’s earlier indications of sentence. Neither of them reminded the judge of those indications. It is not necessary to go into their reasons for not doing so and they both accept some responsibility for the difficulties which have arisen following the sentencing hearing.[23]We are grateful to both counsel for their helpful submissions on this appeal.

Authorities

[24]Authorities In advance of the hearing, we asked the parties whether there were any authorities which might be relevant to this appeal, none having been cited by either party in their skeleton arguments (Goodyear apart). In the event, with the benefit of counsel’s research and the Court’s own endeavours, a number of relevant authorities surfaced. Many of these are cited in Blackstone’s Criminal Practice 2026 at D20.63-68.[25]The earliest is R v Gillam 2 Cr App R (S) 267 on 15 July 1980. In that case the judge had adjourned sentence for a pre-sentence report specifically to determine whether community service would be available for the appellant. The pre-sentence report when received was favourable. The judge imposed a sentence of immediate custody. The appellant appealed. In giving the judgment of the Court, Watkins LJ held that an important principle of sentencing was involved in this case; and that by directing a pre-sentence report to look at community punishment (emphasis added): The Court quashed the appellant’s custodial sentence ordered him to perform one hundred hours' community service instead. “There was, therefore, created in the appellant's mind an expectation, not unnaturally, of performing that service if the probation officer and others who were called upon to assist in the production of the report were disposed to recommend such a course to the court. It was recommended. When a judge in these circumstances purposely postpones sentence so that an alternative to prison can be examined and that alternative is found to be a satisfactory one in all respects the court ought to adopt the alternative. A feeling of injustice is otherwise aroused.” (p 269)[26]In R v CD [2018] EWCA Crim 571, the defendant had pleaded guilty and the matter had been listed for sentence. The sentencing judge asked the probation officer who was in court whether there was any reason “why I couldn’t make a community order today?”. Probation wanted more time to consider that question and the judge adjourned, saying: The appellant cooperated with probation and the resulting report was favourable. When the matter came back before the same judge, he imposed an immediate custodial sentence. The appellant appealed. In giving the judgment of the Court, Goss J cited Gillam and said that “a legitimate sense of injustice” was aroused by the sentence of immediate imprisonment (see [13]). Although the appellant’s offending merited a sentence of 2 years immediate imprisonment, the Court suspended that term for 2 years ([14]). “… at the moment I am minded to think that this case could be dealt with in a way that would mean that you would not lose your liberty, at least not immediately. However, I am simply going to adjourn, without any promises…”[27]In AG’s Ref (R v AB, CD, EF and GH) [2021] EWCA Crim 1959, [2022] 2 Cr App R (S) 17, the judge had volunteered to counsel during a conversation in his chambers that if guilty pleas were entered suspended sentences would be imposed. In due course, the defendants pleaded guilty and the judge imposed suspended sentences. The Attorney General sought leave for a reference on grounds that the sentences were unduly lenient. In giving the judgment of the Court, Edis LJ granted leave and quashed the sentences as unduly lenient, substituting sentences of immediate custody. Edis LJ said that the law in this area was “definitively stated” in Goodyear (paras 89). He explained: The reference in that citation is to R v Turner [1970] 2 QB 321. In that case, the Court held (per Lord Parker CJ at p 327) that it was permissible for a judge to say, if it be the case, that whatever happens, whether the accused pleads guilty or not guilty, the sentence will or will not take a particular form eg, a non-custodial or a custodial sentence. “100. … the decision in Goodyear extended the power to give an indication as to sentence to include an indication as to what the sentence will be if a guilty plea is entered at that stage of the proceedings. That was done on strict conditions, for the reasons stated in the judgment. The then existing power, to give an indication in the form permitted by Turner … continues to exist. If a judge wishes to be pro-active there may be some cases where a Turner indication will be useful, but it is not lawful to give any other kind of indication otherwise than in accordance with Goodyear and the CrimPD.”[28]Of particular interest to us in the context of this appeal are passages at the start of the judgment in AB where Edis LJ recognised that there was an unfairness to the defendants in inducing guilty pleas by offering unduly lenient sentences and then increasing those sentences after the event ([2]). He suggested that that unfairness was a matter to be addressed by the sentencing judge in due course, if the present convictions were quashed as unsafe and there were then convictions following a trial ([3]). In the event, the Court went on to quash the same defendants’ convictions (see [2021] EWCA Crim 2003, [2022] 2 Cr App R 10).[29]In R v Keeling, the judge had indicated that if the defendant pleaded guilty, he would get a suspended sentence. The defendant pleaded guilty and was given a suspended sentence. The Solicitor General sought leave to refer that sentence as unduly lenient. Unlike the defendants in AB, the defendant in Keeling did not seek to appeal against conviction. Giving the judgment of the Court, Edis LJ said: Edis LJ recognised that the appellant would be left with a sense of unfairness because he had pleaded guilty and received the sentence which he was promised and was now looking at receiving a very much more onerous sentence ([34]). To address that unfairness, the Court applied a more generous discount to that sentence than it might otherwise have done, reasoning that (emphasis added):
“31. We make it clear that for the reasons explained in the conviction appeal judgment … in the AB case, had Mr Keeling sought to appeal against his conviction on the basis that it was unsafe because of the conduct of the judge, that appeal would have succeeded. That in truth was the remedy available to him to cure the adverse impact on him of the judge's conduct. We therefore put out of our mind that conduct when deciding whether we should quash the sentence imposed by the judge and substitute for it the appropriate sentence.” “35. … These factors, taken together, seem to us to require a more significant reduction in the sentence than the 15 per cent which the judge allowed for the plea alone. We emphasise this is not a double jeopardy discount neither is it any form of precedent for any more general proposition about how the guideline on reductions for guilty plea might in other circumstances be applied. It is an effort by the court to do justice, as best it can, in the circumstances with which it is confronted.”

Discussion

[30]The cases in the Goodyear line (AB and Keeling) are cases where the judge had given an indication of sentence as an inducement to the defendant to plead guilty. Since Goodyear, the criminal procedure rules have codified the approach in such cases (see Crim PR 3.31 which applies “where a defendant wants the Crown Court to give an indication of the maximum sentence that would be passed if a guilty plea were entered when the indication is sought”) and, as observed in AB (see [100]), it is not lawful to give an indication of sentence in that sort of case otherwise than in accordance with Goodyear and the rules.[31]In this case, however, there is no suggestion that the appellant entered his guilty plea as a result of the judge’s indication of sentence. The appellant had delayed entering his guilty plea while discussions were ongoing about whether his wife would face prosecution; once the Crown agreed to offer no evidence against her, he pleaded. This case is more like CD (where the judge’s indication of sentence post-dated the guilty plea). In cases where the indication of sentence has nothing to do with the guilty plea, the strict approach in Goodyear and the associated Crim PR does not apply. It follows that the judge here did nothing wrong, in principle, when he discussed with Counsel in the defendant’s presence what the sentence might be. The problem in this case came about because the judge expressed firm views about the sentence he would impose and then departed from those views. As the judge recognised at the hearing on 3 July 2026, with the benefit of hindsight, he might have been a bit too quick to reach his conclusion on sentence. We respectfully agree with that observation. We might add that, with the benefit of hindsight, it might have been better if he had been less definite in expressing his views and instead had left himself room to adjust – without risking any unfairness to the defendant - in the event that his views changed.[32]Mr Stimson’s first challenge is on grounds that the decision not to suspend this sentence has led to an overall sentence that was manifestly excessive. He refers to the Sentencing Council’s guideline on imposition of community and custodial sentences. He notes that the appellant meets all of the criteria for suspension: the appellant has a realistic prospect of rehabilitation into the community; he does not present a high risk of reoffending; he has strong personal mitigation; and his imprisonment will result in significant harmful impact on his wife who needs his support and care. Further, he argues that there are no strong factors favouring immediate custody: the appellant does not present a risk; he has no history of failing to comply with court orders; and appropriate punishment for his offending can be achieved by means of a sentence other than immediate custody.[33]We accept that there are a number of features of this case which tend towards suspension by reference to the imposition guideline. Indeed, we think that some Crown Court judges might have suspended this sentence, and that it would have been proper for them to do so. That is not to diminish the seriousness of this appellant’s offending or the devastating impact his actions have had on the victims of his fraudulent trading, but simply to acknowledge that this sentencing exercise called for a judgment, and on that matter of judgment there was and is room for different views.[34]Even so, the sentence of immediate custody was not manifestly excessive. The conclusion that appropriate punishment could only be achieved by immediate custody was properly open to the judge. We are not with Mr Stimson on his first argument.[35]Mr Stimson’s other point is that the sentence was unfair (and for that reason wrong in principle). He argues that the judge went back on the clear indication that he had given and in that way created unfairness which this Court should remedy by reducing the sentence.[36]We consider first of all the nature of the indication that was given. On 31 March 2026, the judge said twice, in different ways, that the appellant was not going to prison. The judge also said that he wanted to hear about how this offending had affected the victims and that sentencing was not a “tick box exercise”, so in that way he did leave himself some room for manoeuvre. At the hearing on 15 May 2026, the judge suggested this offending fell in category 2 harm and referred to the appellant having pleaded after 22 March, which supported his earlier indication that the sentence would be non-custodial; here, too, there were elements going the other way because prosecuting counsel indicated that there would be evidence to come on the high impact and the judge directed an “all options” PSR. However, standing back, the message to the appellant from these two hearings was that his sentence, whatever it might be, would not be one of immediate custody. We think that the judge’s indications did create an expectation on the appellant’s part that he would not be going to prison. That expectation lasted for three months, from the first PTPH hearing to the point of sentence, and was more than merely momentary.[37]By 1 July 2026, the judge had fully read into the case and got to grips with the impact of this offending on the victims (with the benefit of victim personal statements, live evidence from two victims, and counsels’ submissions). He recognised that this was high impact offending, and that in consequence the harm categorisation needed to increase. He also came to the view that the offending was so serious that appropriate punishment could only be achieved by a sentence of immediate custody. His views changed not because there was new or different information before him, because all the victim personal statements had been available on or before 15 May 2026, and many of them had been available on 31 March 2026 too; and at both hearings, the Crown had put an approximate value on the losses. Rather, he came to a different view with the benefit of hearing evidence, receiving submissions and having more time for reflection. Judges are entitled to change their minds and we entirely follow the judge’s reasons for doing so in this case.[38]However, the resulting custodial sentence does leave us with a sense of injustice, because it did not match the appellant’s expectation, which expectation had been created by the judge at the earlier hearings.[39]As CD and Keeling show, the Court has a discretion about whether, and if so, how, to address unfairness resulting from a sentence which is more onerous than the sentence indication at an earlier stage. In CD, the Court imposed the sentence originally indicated. In Keeling, the Court modestly increased the credit for guilty plea to reflect the fact that the defendant had been promised a lesser sentence than was being imposed. The appropriate answer will depend on the circumstances.[40]This is an unusual case, in that the sentence originally indicated would have been, as we have noted above, within the range of options properly open to the judge, even after he had fully got to grips with the case. The case was on the borderline between suspension and immediate custody and the judge could properly have gone either way.[41]In those circumstances, and to do justice as best we can (see Keeling at [35]), we consider the appropriate course is to suspend the sentence of 28 months’ imprisonment, attaching requirements to the order. The PSR had recommended two requirements with a view to ensuring that the appellant did not re-offend, that he recognised the impact of his actions, and that he gave something back to society. We agree with the recommendation of sessions aimed at rehabilitation. We also agree that the appellant should do unpaid work, but we increase the hours above those recommended in the PSR. In our view, appropriate punishment for these serious offences can and will be achieved through such an order.

Conclusion

[42]Conclusion We quash the sentence of 28 months imprisonment to be served immediately and we substitute a suspended sentence order comprising the same custodial term of 28 months suspended for 2 years with the following activity requirements:(i) a rehabilitation activity requirement for 10 days, and(ii) an unpaid work requirement of 160 hours. If the appellant breaches these requirements or commits any further offence during the term of this order, the order can be made more onerous and/or the custodial term may be activated in whole or part.[43]This appeal is allowed.