ON APPEAL FROM THE CROWN COURT AT KINGSTON UPON HULL
Mr Recorder Ekins
T20057275 & T20067052
Venue Royal Courts of Justice, Strand, London, WC2A 2LLDate 21/08/2026
Before
THE VICE PRESIDENT OF THE COURT OF APPEAL CRIMINAL DIVISION(Lord Justice Edis)SIR GARY HICKINBOTTOMMRS JUSTICE ELLEBOGEN
Between
NIKI DEAN HAYCOCKAppellantTHE KINGRespondentStephen Knight (assigned by the Registrar) for AppellantHannah Squire (instructed by the Crown Prosecution Service) for RespondentHearing Hearing date : 21 August 2026Approved Judgment.............................WARNING: reporting restrictions may apply to the contents transcribed in this document, particularly if the case concerned a sexual offence or involved a child. Reporting restrictions prohibit the publication of the applicable information to the public or any section of the public, in writing, in a broadcast or by means of the internet, including social media. Anyone who receives a copy of this transcript is responsible in law for making sure that applicable restrictions are not breached. A person who breaches a reporting restriction is liable to a fine and/or imprisonment. For guidance on whether reporting restrictions apply, and to what information, ask at the court office or take legal advice.
The Vice-President:
[1]In the extraordinary circumstances described below, the Applicant applies for leave to appeal against sentence, and an extension of time of 7,291 days — being almost twenty years — in which to do so.[2]The applications have been referred to the full court by the Registrar of Criminal Appeals, who granted a representation order to the Applicant and directed that the Crown attend. They are not resisted. We are grateful to both counsel for their assistance. We give leave to appeal and grant the extension of time.[3]On 21 March 2006, in the Crown Court at Kingston upon Hull, the Appellant, then aged 27, pleaded guilty to three offences — controlling prostitution for gain, contrary to section 53 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (count one); and two counts of assault occasioning actual bodily harm (counts four and five). He was formally acquitted of count two (robbery) and count three (attempting to cause grievous bodily harm with intent), on each of which the Crown had offered no evidence.[4]On 27 April 2006, the matter came on for sentence. On count one, the Recorder imposed a sentence of imprisonment for public protection (‘IPP’), specifying a minimum term of 30 months, less 209 days spent on remand. He imposed a concurrent three-year custodial sentence on each of counts four and five. IPPs[5]As the law stood at the time of the sentencing hearing, section 225(1) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 (‘the 2003 Act’) provided that an IPP sentence could be imposed only where a person aged 18 or over had been ‘convicted of a serious offence committed after the commencement of this section’. Section 225 came into force on 4 April 2005. By section 224(2) of the 2003 Act, ‘serious offence’ was defined to mean an offence which was both a ‘specified offence’ and one punishable by imprisonment for life, or for a determinate period of ten or more years. Section 224(1) defined ‘specified offence’ to mean a ‘specified violent offence’ or a ‘specified sexual offence’, each such term being defined in section 224(3). Parallel provision was made by section 226 of the 2003 Act for a sentence of detention for public protection (‘DPP’) to be imposed on an offender who had been convicted of a serious offence when under the age of 18.
The offences of which the Appellant was convicted
[6]The offences of which the Appellant was convicted By paragraph 140 of Schedule 15 to the 2003 Act, the offence charged by count one was a specified sexual offence. It was not, however, a serious offence, as defined by section 224(2), because it carried a maximum sentence of seven years. For the sake of completeness, the offence charged by counts four and five was a specified violent offence, by virtue of paragraph 20 of Schedule 15 to the 2003 Act. That offence carried a maximum sentence of five years’ imprisonment, for which reason it, too, was not a serious offence as defined. It follows that, as a matter of law, it was not open to the court to impose an IPP sentence for any of the three offences of which the Appellant had been convicted in March 2006.
The facts in brief
[7]The facts in brief The only source of information regarding the Appellant’s offending now available is the Recorder’s sentencing remarks, which contain only a brief summary. Whilst we have been provided with the pre-sentence report to which he had regard, dated 10 April 2006, it contains no detail of the offending.[8]The Appellant was the partner of the complainant. Both of them were addicted to Heroin. The judge found that the Appellant had controlled not only the complainant’s prostitution but the complainant herself, by rationing her drugs; intimidation; and, as and when necessary, resorting to violence. He found the complainant to have been a vulnerable woman; particularly so by virtue of her addiction, and that the Appellant had used, intimidated, abused and assaulted her. Count one related to a period spanning 1March to 27 September 2005. During that same period, the Appellant had subjected his partner to two vicious assaults (counts four and five), including at a time when she had been pregnant and he had kicked her with very considerable force in her vagina, when, so the Recorder found, he must have known that she could easily have lost the baby. The Appellant had 27 prior convictions for 70 offences, acquired between 19 April 1991 and 5 December 2003. Five were for offences against the person, including three offences of assault occasioning actual bodily harm — one in 1998, and two in 2003 of which one of the victims had been the Appellant’s then wife, who had also been pregnant at the time and whom the Appellant had beaten with a chair leg, inflicting blows to her stomach, amongst other areas of her body.[9]The Recorder gave the following reasons for imposing a sentence of IPP: In explaining his calculation of the minimum term, the Recorder stated that, had he not been imposing a sentence of IPP, he would have considered the appropriate sentence on count one to have been one of five years’ imprisonment, after credit for the Appellant’s early guilty plea, and taking account of a course of conduct which had included the offences charged by counts four and five (hence his imposition of concurrent sentences on those counts). ‘Count one on this indictment is a serious specified offence within the meaning of the Criminal Justice Act 2003. You’re over 18, as I’ve said. You have previous convictions for offences of assault occasioning actual bodily harm and you, therefore, qualify for a sentence of imprisonment for public protection, unless I am satisfied that it would be unreasonable to conclude that you do not pose a significant risk of serious harm to members of the public. Unequivocally, I find it reasonable to reach that conclusion, that you do pose a significant risk of serious harm to members of the public and, indeed, your counsel, Mr. Garth, has conceded that that must be so in this case. I reach that conclusion for the following reasons: on what I’ve heard of the course of conduct that you exhibited towards the complainant in this case and the assaults to which you subjected her; on what I’ve heard of your previous convictions; and, in particular, because of what I’ve read about you in the pre-sentence report, which makes it clear that the probation officer feels that you do pose such a risk. I have no hesitation, therefore, in deciding that a sentence of imprisonment for public protection is appropriate in your case.’[10]Those now representing the Appellant are instructed that, at the time of his sentence, he was informed that there were no grounds for appeal, since which time he has not considered the possibility of seeking leave to appeal. The Appellant has provided a signed statement to that effect.
Events leading to the applications
[11]Events leading to the applications In April 2026, the solicitor representing the Appellant, Mr Baxter Jephcott, was preparing for the Appellant’s review hearing before the Parole Board and noted the error of law in the IPP sentence. He swiftly sought funding; made all necessary enquiries; and instructed counsel, Mr Stephen Knight, who appears today. In accordance with the guidance given by this court in R v McCook [2014] EWCA Crim 734 and associated authorities, contact was made with the Appellant’s former legal representatives. Through his clerks, counsel who had represented the Appellant at the sentencing hearing stated that he had no recollection or record of the case, and, therefore, that he could not help in any way. No response was received from the solicitor who is thought to have instructed him. Mr Knight produced a first draft of his advice and grounds of appeal against sentence on the day on which he had been instructed, finalising that document over the weekend.[12]We commend all members of the Appellant’s current legal team for the commitment and speed with which they have worked to identify and curtail an enduring serious injustice. Without their endeavours, it would not have been possible for this court to prevent the continuation of that injustice - indeed, it would never have come to light. We consider the implications of this state of affairs at the end of this judgment.
Discussion
[13]Discussion As the Crown correctly acknowledges, the IPP sentence was unlawful, the appeal is unanswerable, and we therefore allow it.[14]From the limited material now available, there can also be no doubt that the Appellant’s offending was extremely serious and aggravated by his antecedent convictions. A lengthy custodial sentence was inevitable. Having regard to the greater detail of which the Recorder would have been aware, we consider the appropriate custodial term on count one to be that which he stated that he would have imposed had he not passed an IPP sentence, being one of five years, after credit for the Appellant’s guilty plea.[15]Notwithstanding his error of law in passing an IPP sentence, on the information available to this court the Recorder was entitled to consider that the Appellant posed a significant risk to members of the public of serious harm occasioned by his commission of further specified offences. In such circumstances, at the relevant time section 227(2) of the 2003 Act obliged the court to impose an extended sentence of imprisonment the term of which was equal to the aggregate of:(a) the appropriate custodial term and(b) an extension period for which the offender was to be subject to a licence and which was of such length as the Court considered necessary for the purpose of protecting members of the public from serious harm occasioned by his commission of further specified offences. Per section 227(4), the extension period could not exceed five years, in the case of a specified violent offence, or eight years in the case of a specified sexual offence. Furthermore, section 227(5) provided that the term of an extended sentence of imprisonment could not exceed the maximum term permitted for the relevant offence.[16]Having regard to the Recorder’s findings, and everything then known about the offending and the offender, we consider that, in April 2006, the court was obliged to impose an extended sentence for public protection on count one, and that the appropriate extension period was two years — taking the extended term of imprisonment to the maximum term permissible for the relevant offence. Whilst that analysis applies equally to the sentences imposed on counts four and five, those sentences are not the subject of appeal; the sentence imposed on count one had regard to all of the offending for which the Appellant was being sentenced; and the imposition of an extension period (of a maximum duration of two years) on counts four and five would have made no difference to the Appellant’s total sentence. For all such reasons, we leave the sentence imposed on each of those counts undisturbed.
Conclusion
[17]Conclusion We quash the sentence imposed on count one. On that count, we substitute an extended sentence of imprisonment of seven years — comprising a custodial term of five years and an extension period of two years — with which the sentences imposed by the Recorder on counts four and five would run concurrently. Given the time served by the Appellant to date, the effect of that order is that he will now be released from the sentence. He has recently been released on licence by the Parole Board. He is now also free of that licence.
A flaw in the system
[18]A flaw in the system For offenders convicted on or after 3 December 2012, IPP and DPP sentences were abolished by section 123 of the Legal Aid Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012, which did not operate retrospectively (see Articles 2 and 6 of The Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 (Commencement No. 4 and Saving Provisions) Order 2012 SI 2012/2906). According to accredited official statistics published by the Ministry of Justice and HM Prison and Probation Service on 30 July 2026 https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/offender-management-statistics-quarterly-january-to-march-2026/offender-management-statistics-quarterly-january-to-march-2026, accessed on 20 August 2026 , the number of ‘unreleased’ IPP prisoners in England and Wales as at 30 June 2026 was 856. The number of ‘recalled’ IPP prisoners as at the same date was 1,415, yielding a total IPP prison population of 2,271. The latest official figure for the combined number of IPP and DPP offenders in the community as at 31 December 2025, was published on 30 April 2026 https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/offender-management-statistics-quarterly-october-to-december-2025/offender-management-statistics-quarterly-october-to-december-2025#releases, accessed on 20 August 2026 . That figure was 891. According to Ministry of Justice figures provided in answer to a Parliamentary question tabled by Lord Blunkett on 11 January 2024, ‘As of 30 June 2023, 99 offenders are serving a DPP sentence on licence in the community’ https://questions-statements.parliament.uk/written-questions/detail/2024-01-11/HL1503/, accessed on 20 August 2026 . Thus, the overwhelming majority of the combined cohort will be offenders serving an IPP sentence.[19]This case highlights a profound limitation in the system as it currently operates in relation to those offenders who remain subject to an IPP or DPP sentence. The case of R v Pymont which will be dealt with next in our list is another case where no appeal has ever been brought. He was sentenced at the same time and in the same way as a man named Linton who, as far as our enquiries reveal, has not even now ever appealed. Three of the cases dealt with in the decision known as R v Davis and other cases [2026] EWCA Crim 743, handed down on 12 June 2026, were cases where no appeal had ever been brought. they were the cases of Tolbert, McLaren and Webster.[20]Under the release provisions then in place, had the sentence which this court has substituted on count one been imposed on the Appellant in April 2006, he would have been eligible for parole at the halfway point of the custodial period — that is after two and a half years, and, if released at that stage, would then have been on licence for the balance of that custodial period, plus the extension period. If the Parole Board had declined to release him at the earliest stage, he would have been reviewed every year, and, at the latest, released automatically at the end of his custodial term, following which he would have remained on licence throughout the extension period.[21]Thus, save for a short period between late December 2023 and March 2024, when he was released on licence before being recalled to prison, the Appellant has been incarcerated for a period:• almost triple the length of the maximum determinate sentence which lawfully could have been imposed for the relevant offence;• four times the length of the period after which he would automatically have been released on licence, had he not been considered suitable for release at an earlier stage; and• eight times the length of the period after which, on the sentence which this court has substituted, he would first have become eligible for release on licence. The Appellant’s detention has extended beyond that date by a period approaching 18 years.[22]Where an appeal against the imposition of an IPP or DPP sentence has been made to this Court, and where an application for a review has been made to the Criminal Cases Review Commission (‘CCRC’), there is a mechanism through which the existence of the sentence is apparent and its lawfulness may be considered, if and as appropriate. The three referrals in R v Davis show that this is now happening. But this court has no means of identifying — or, thus, considering the lawfulness of — those sentences which have never been the subject of an application for leave to appeal, with the potential consequences of which this case provides a stark and disturbing example. The case of Tolbert, see paragraphs [126]-[129] of the judgment in R v Davis, is another. We have no way of knowing whether there are other such cases, or what proportion of the current IPP/DPP population they may represent if there are.[23]The CCRC is, as we have said, undertaking very valuable work which is producing a significant number of referrals of these cases, but its statutory remit is to address cases where there has been an unsuccessful appeal process. Cases such as the present are beyond its powers. It is, nevertheless, carrying out effective outreach work within the prisons system to inform people who have not appealed of the possibility that they may still be able to do so and to address the cases they see where there has been no appeal. It is the view of this court that there is a clear and urgent need for a system to be put in place by which all cases in which those who remain subject to an IPP or DPP sentence and who have not appealed, should be identified and made aware of the availability of advice.[24]We would not wish to give the impression that the court will allow appeals in all cases where such sentences were passed. In many of them there will have been no error, and the law may have permitted or even required, an indeterminate sentence to be passed. In some of the cases, a discretionary life sentence would have been imposed if the IPP/DPP had not existed, see the discussion of the relationship between these different sentences in AG’s Ref No 43 of 2009 (Craig Joseph Bennett); R v Wilkinson [2009] EWCA Crim 1925; [2010] 1 Cr. App. R. (S.) 100. While hoping that consideration of potential appeals will take place we wish to avoid giving rise to false hopes in cases where appeals cannot succeed.