R v Dylan Kyle Cathrae [2026] EWCA Crim 1062

WARNING: reporting restrictions may apply to the contents transcribed in this document, particularly if the case concerned a sexual offence or involved a child. Reporting restrictions prohibit the publication of the applicable information to the public or any section of the public, in writing, in a broadcast or by means of the internet, including social media. Anyone who receives a copy of this transcript is responsible in law for making sure that applicable restrictions are not breached. A person who breaches a reporting restriction is liable to a fine and/or imprisonment. For guidance on whether reporting restrictions apply, and to what information, ask at the court office or take legal advice.This Transcript is Crown Copyright.  It may not be reproduced in whole or in part other than in accordance with relevant licence or with the express consent of the Authority.  All rights are reserved.[2026] EWCA Crim 1062Venue Royal Courts of JusticeStrandLondonWC2A 2LLDate Tuesday 23 June 2026
Before
LORD JUSTICE COULSONMRS JUSTICE FARBEYHIS HONOUR JUDGE LICKLEY KC(Sitting as a Judge of the CACD)
Between
REXCrownV
Between
DYLAN KYLE CATHRAE__________Computer Aided Transcript of Epiq Europe Ltd,Lower Ground, 46 Chancery Lane, London WC2A 1JETel No: 020 7404 1400; Email: rcj@epiqglobal.co.uk (Official Shorthand Writers to the Court)_________MR R QUAIFE appeared for Appellant_________JUDGMENT
[1]The provisions of the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1992 apply to these offences. Under those provisions, where a sexual offence has been committed against a person, no matter relating to that person shall, during that person's lifetime, be included in any publication if it is likely to lead to members of the public to identify that person as the victim of that offence. This prohibition applies unless waived or lifted in accordance with section 3 of the Act.[2]The appellant is now 21. He committed all the relevant offences between the ages of 17 and 20.[3]On 6 October 2025 in the Crown Court at Truro, before HHJ Simon Carr ("the judge"), the appellant (then aged 20) pleaded guilty to count 7, a count of putting a person in fear of violence by harassment. On 8 October 2025, before the same Tribunal, he was convicted of six other counts. They were one count of controlling or coercive behaviour (count 1), one count of rape (count 2), two counts of assault by penetration (counts 3 and 4), one count of suffocation (count 5) and one count of witness intimidation (count 6).[4]On 6 November 2025 he was sentenced by the judge to 10 years' detention in a young offender institution. He appeals against that sentence with leave of the single judge. The appeal has been argued this morning by Mr Quaife, who appeared for the appellant at the trial. We should say at the outset that we were particularly impressed with the careful and measured tone of Mr Quaife's written advice and his concise oral submissions this morning. The Facts of the Offending[5]This is an almost paradigm example of appalling offences committed during and as part of an abusive relationship. The victim ("C1") suffered grievously over a protracted period, and we must keep that in the forefront of our minds when considering the points raised by this appeal.[6]The appellant and C1 commenced a relationship in 2021 when they were both 15. They began living together almost immediately and midway through 2022 the appellant obtained his own flat in Camelford. Soon afterwards C1 moved in. At that stage she was 16 and the appellant was 17.[7]During the period that they lived together, the appellant committed a series of serious offences against C1. The controlling and coercive behaviour was evident throughout the relationship (count 1). Sometimes there were additional specific acts of violence. By way of example of the latter, during one argument the appellant grabbed C1 by the shoulder and threw her onto the bed. When C1 tried to get up the appellant pushed her back with sufficient force to break a bed panel. The appellant then called C1 "a fat bitch" and blamed her for breaking the bed. He then jabbed her in the throat so hard that she could not breathe. He later told C1 that, if she had been honest, he would not have to do that. This was count 5, the count of suffocation.[8]Although C1 left the home after that attack, she soon returned. The appellant then became convinced that C1 was lying to him. He knew the passcode to her mobile phone and checked her messages and logged on to her Snapchat and Facebook accounts. On one occasion he had a conversation with another male on Snapchat while pretending to be C1.[9]The appellant continued to be physically and verbally abusive. During arguments he would threaten to kill or rape C1. He told her that his violent behaviour was due to his autism and therefore not his fault. The violence was regular and would include kicking, punching C1 to the stomach, pulling her hair, bending her fingers and toes back, twisting her nipples, holding her against the wall and spitting in her face. He made C1 wear clothing to cover up any bruises and dictated what she should wear and how much makeup she could put on. He limited the time she could spend with her family. All of that offending was of course elements of the coercive and controlling behaviour which made up count 1.[10]On one occasion whilst C1 and the appellant were having sex, the appellant deliberately began calling C1 by the name of her female cousin. C1 then went to push the appellant away but the appellant continued to call C1 by her cousin's name while continuing to have sex with her. C1 lay on the floor, staring into the kitchen, whilst the appellant continued to have sex without her consent. That was count 2, the count of rape.[11]The appellant regularly examined C1's body for signs that she might have been unfaithful. He would make her strip and then search her for love bites. He made her sit or stand with her legs open so he could digitally penetrate her vagina in order to check for signs of sexual activity with someone else. He used a torch on his mobile phone to visually examine her. Those offences gave rise to counts 3 and 4 (the counts of assault by penetration). Count 4 was a multiple incident count.[12]C1's social worker and the appellant's social worker visited the couple on 28 October 2022. During that interview the appellant called C1 a "dog" and accused her of smoking crack cocaine. C1 became upset and the social worker took her outside to talk to her, but she denied that the appellant had been violent towards her. The following day when the police attended, they saw that C1 had bruising to her face, but she told the officers that the injuries had been caused during consensual "rough sex". The appellant was arrested on suspicion of assault occasioning actual bodily harm but C1 made no complaint against him and so no charges were brought. Bail conditions were however imposed prohibiting contact between the appellant and C1. Despite that they continued to message each other every day.[13]On 17 December 2022 the appellant was arrested on suspicion of engaging in controlling and coercive behaviour. C1 ended the relationship on 14 February 2023. The appellant denied abusive behaviour and was released on bail with condition not to contact C1.[14]In March and April 2023, in breach of those bail conditions, the appellant telephoned C1 repeatedly and then she received intimidating messages from a mobile phone registered to the appellant (count 6).[15]In addition, the appellant was aggressive and threatening to other members of C1's family. In particular he was involved in assaults on C1's 14-year-old brother ("C2"), and in January 2023 he sent C1 a message on Snapchat intimating that he could pay someone to assault C2. That gave rise to count 7, the subject of the guilty plea at trial. The Sentencing Exercise[16]There were various sources of information available to the judge for the sentencing exercise. As to antecedents, the appellant had three convictions for eight offences all committed over the same period as the offences against C1. Those included two offences of battery, one common assault and one affray.[17]The Pre-Sentence Report assessed the appellant as presenting a high risk of general offending with a 71 per cent likelihood of reoffending within 24 months of his sentence. He was of medium risk of reconviction of a seriously harmful offence. In addition he was assessed as posing a high risk of harm to known adults and a medium risk of harm to individuals known to him with whom he perceived conflict, as well as members of the public. As to the risk of serious harm the pre-sentence report concluded:
"This evidence-based clinical checklist indicates a high likelihood of imminent violent offending towards intimate partners and potentially the wider public."
In short, the appellant was assessed as dangerous.[18]In addition, his response to previous supervision was described in the report as "poor". It was noted that he had returned to custody on his previous sentence due to non-compliance. The report concluded that his history demonstrated a clear escalation in severity, and that he demonstrated limited insight into the nature and impact of his behaviour. The writer noted that the appellant was aware that he was facing a lengthy custodial sentence.[19]There were a number of expert reports, including in particular a psychiatric report from Dr Sandbrook. Dr Sandbrook identified various mental health conditions from which the appellant suffers. These include behaviour problems, Autistic Spectrum Disorder, ADHD and mental and behaviour disorders due to multiple drug use. Dr Sandbrook concluded that in the past the appellant had been identified as experiencing attachment disorder and some evidence of psychosis, although at the time of his assessment he did not believe that a psychotic disorder was a current relevant diagnosis. Dr Sandbrook also said that the appellant was showing evidence of developing a personality disorder.[20]It should however be noted that only at paragraphs 4.62 and 4.68 of his report does Dr Sandbrook link these conditions to the appellant's offending and, even then, it is done in very general terms.[21]Lastly but by no means least, the judge had a victim personal statement from C1. It is unnecessary for the purposes of this judgment for us to read that statement into this judgment. The judge however described what the statement contained as evidencing "the devastating psychological effect… of what you did, which will be with her, I have no doubt, for the rest of her life." We consider that that is a fair summary of C1’s statement.[22]In his sentencing remarks, the judge began by stressing that this was "one of the worst cases of controlling and coercive behaviour I have [ever] seen." The judge took the rape as the lead offence. He found that the rape fell within category 2A of the relevant Sentencing Guidelines. It was category 2 because of the severe psychological harm, the additional degradation and humiliation and the violence or threats of violence. It was category A because it was an abuse of trust and because of the previous violence against C1. For that offence in the guidelines, the recommended starting point for an adult is 10 years' custody with a range from 9 to 13 years' custody.[23]The judge said that the appellant could not complain if consecutive sentences had been passed for the other offences, including in particular the witness intimidation and the harassment of C2. But the judge said that he decided that "given your age, this is best a case where I step back and decide what is an appropriate overall sentence for your offending."[24]Having identified mitigating factors the judge said that he would reduce the sentence recommended in the guidelines "by between a half and a third" to reflect the appellant's age. The judge then said:
"Having seen all those factors and having regard, as I say, to your age at the time, the appropriate sentences are as follows. I lead with the most serious offences under Counts 2, 3 and 4 of the indictment. Sentence will be one of 10 years in a young offenders institution. For controlling and coercive behaviour, a sentence of 2 years. For suffocation, a sentence of 18 months. For witness intimidation, a sentence of 12 months. And for harassment, a sentence of 6 months, those will all be concurrent. A total sentence of 10 years. You will serve two thirds of that sentence before you are eligible for release on licence. I give you credit for all the time you have spent on remand."
[25]In addition, the judge imposed restraining orders prohibiting the appellant from contacting C1 and C2. Those orders were indefinite.

The Grounds of Appeal

[26]In his grounds of appeal, Mr Quaife expressly accepted that the judge had regard in his sentencing remarks to the appellant's age and immaturity, his mental disorders, his difficult and deprived background and the fact that a significant reduction from the sentences appropriate for an adult would be required. But Mr Quaife then submits that, because the judge did not identify the notional sentence that he arrived at before applying the necessary reduction for those matters, it was impossible to say what weight he gave to them and what reduction, if any, had been made. It was therefore impossible to say how the judge had arrived at his 10 year term. Mr Quaife also said that, however he had arrived at it, given those mitigating factors, the term was manifestly excessive.[27]Mr Quaife submitted that, given the sort of reduction that the judge had indicated, the judge's notional starting point for an adult for the offences must have been in excess of 20 years, which again he said must be manifestly excessive. His final submission was that the restraining orders should have been imposed for a specific period and not made indefinite. Discussion[28]We consider that the judge was quite entitled to take count 2 (the conviction of rape) as the lead offence and then to uplift the notional sentence to take into account the appellant's other criminality. The judge was also entitled, and indeed it was generous to the appellant, to make the sentences on all the other counts concurrent.[29]The principal difficulty with the sentence of 10 years for all these offences is not necessarily the length of the term but the absence of any explanation of how it was made up. We agree with Mr Quaife that it is impossible to know from the sentencing remarks how the 10 years was calculated, and what reduction the judge made for the age of the appellant and his mental health disorders. That is unsatisfactory. It is an obvious omission which has in turn given rise to this appeal. It has meant that this Court must embark on a limited resentencing exercise.[30]If the appellant had been an adult at the time of the offending, we consider that the appropriate sentence on count 2 was one of 10 years. That is the recommended starting point in the Sentencing Guidelines for a category 2A offence. We consider that that sentence would fall to be increased significantly by the controlling and coercive behaviour which was extensive and persistent, together with the assaults by penetration, the suffocation and the witness intimidation and harassment counts. In our view, again for an adult, those would have increased the notional sentence by at least a further 5 years, if not more. We note that 15 years is the recommended starting point for the next category up in the Sentencing Guidelines for Rape, so that was an uplift that the judge was quite entitled to make in all the circumstances of this case.[31]The critical next step, of course, is the reduction for the appellant's age and his other mitigation. As the judge said, there is a good deal of authority to support the proposition that an appropriate reduction for age is between one-third and one-half. The question is: what is the reduction to apply here?[32]In our view, taking the appellant's age and the other mitigating factors into account, we consider that they should lead to a 33 per cent reduction in the term appropriate for an adult. That would give rise to a term of 10 years' detention in a young offender institution, which was of course the term imposed by the judge.[33]It might be said that this gives insufficient weight to the appellant's mental health issues. We disagree. That is partly because many of those conditions are bound up with the appellant's age, so to make a further reduction would involve double counting. It is partly because the papers create the overriding impression that the appellant has to some extent deliberately used those difficulties as an excuse for his treatment of C1. His comment to her that his violence was due to his autism and therefore not his fault is just one indication of that. And it is partly because the offending was so serious and so persistent that any further reduction would, in our view, lead to a sentence that was too lenient.[34]As an example of this, we record that we are not in a position to pass an extended sentence because no such sentence was passed below. But given the contents of the Pre-Sentence Report, the appellant was fortunate that no such extended sentence was passed upon him. The contents of the report make clear beyond doubt that the appellant is dangerous.[35]Accordingly, for all these reasons, we do not accept Mr Quaife's careful submission that the 10 year term was too long. It was neither wrong in principle nor manifestly excessive. It was just not properly explained.[36]That leaves the restraining orders. We do not accept the submission that the restraining orders should have been for a specific period. That is because nobody can say what the specific period should be. The appellant was assessed as posing a high risk of violence to both C1 and C2. It is impossible to know when or if that risk will be dissipated. Until that changes, the order should not be limited in time. If and when it does the appellant can apply for a variation or a discharge of the order. Disposal[37]So in those circumstances, whilst again paying tribute to Mr Quaife's submissions, this appeal against sentence is dismissed. Epiq Europe Ltd hereby certify that the above is an accurate and complete record of the proceedings or part thereof. Lower Ground Floor, 46 Chancery Lane, London, WC2A 1JE Tel No: 020 7404 1400 Email: Rcj@epiqglobal.co.uk