R v Paul Stuart Adams [2026] EWCA Crim 1047

WARNING: The provisions of the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1992 apply to these offences. Under those provisions, where an allegation has been made that a sexual offence has been committed against a person, no matter relating to that person shall be included in any publication if it is likely to lead members of the public to identify them as the victim of the offence. This prohibition applies throughout their lives unless it is waived or lifted in accordance with section 3 of the Act.

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Case Nos 2025/01893/B1 2026/00682/B1

Venue Royal Courts of Justice, Strand, London WC2A 2LL

Neutral Citation No [2026] EWCA (Crim) 1047

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL (CRIMINAL DIVISION)

Date Tuesday 21 July 2026

Between

R EXCrown

ON APPEAL FROM THE CROWN COURT AT CARLISLE

HIS HONOUR JUDGE ARCHER

T20210117 and T20210228

AND ON APPEAL FROM THE CROWN COURT AT CARLISLE

HIS HONOUR JUDGE MICHAEL FANNING

03WW0567422

B e f o r e:

LADY JUSTICE ANDREWS

SIR ROBIN SPENCER

HER HONOUR JUDGE KARU

(Sitting as a Judge of the Court of Appeal Criminal Division)

____________________

- v –

Between

PAUL STUART ADAMS

_____________

Computer Aided Transcription of Epiq Europe Ltd,

Lower Ground Floor, 46 Chancery Lane, London WC2A 1JE

Tel No: 020 7404 1400; Email: rcj@epiqglobal.co.uk (Official Shorthand Writers to the Court)

___________________

Mr M Barlow appeared for Appellant

___________________

J U D G M E NT

[1]The provisions of the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1992 apply to these offences. Under those provisions, where an allegation has been made that a sexual offence has been committed against a person, no matter relating to that person shall be included in any publication if it is likely to lead members of the public to identify them as the victim of the offence. This prohibition applies throughout their lives unless it is waived or lifted in accordance with section 3 of the Act. In this case there are multiple complainants and we shall refer to them by cyphers.

[2]The applications before the court are: a renewed application by Paul Adams (now aged 78) for:(1) an extension of time of 1,040 days in which to apply for leave to appeal against his conviction following a trial in the Crown Court at Carlisle in June 2022 for multiple sexual offences against two victims, "C5" and "C6", for which he was sentenced by His Honour Judge Archer in August 2022 to a total of seven years' imprisonment; and

(2) an appeal against a further total sentence of seven years' imprisonment imposed on him by His Honour Judge Fanning following a subsequent conviction after a trial in January 2026 in the Crown Court at Carlisle of sexual offences against four other victims, "C1", "C2", "C3" and "C4". The applications were refused by the single judge. The applicant also appeals against sentence by leave of the single judge.

[3]Although Mr Adams is both an applicant and an appellant, we will refer to him as the appellant for ease of reference.

[4]The prosecution case was that the appellant had over a period of many years – spanning five decades, and going back to 1977/78 – groomed and sexually exploited a number of teenage boys in respect of whom he was in a position of trust. They either attended a school at which he taught, or he had acted as a mentor to them in extra-curricular music and drama activities. Since the prospective appeal against conviction has a potential impact on the appeal against sentence, we will address the renewed application for leave to appeal first.

The application for leave to appeal against conviction

[5]As is noted in the Criminal Appeal Office Summary, no explanation has been given for a delay of almost four years in seeking leave to appeal against conviction. Mr Barlow, who appears on behalf of the appellant today, says that an explanation was offered, but that it had been downloaded on to the wrong part of the Digital Case System. It certainly had not been found by the time that the Respondent's Notice was served. Nor have we been able to locate it, as yet. When we asked what the explanation was, we were told by Mr Barlow that it was to do with the difficulty in obtaining transcripts and the consequential knock-on effect on providing instructions. That is not a particularly compelling explanation. It was confirmed in the Advice and Grounds that trial counsel gave negative advice. An appeal against sentence was lodged in time. Leave was refused by the single judge and the application was not renewed.

[6]When there is delay – particularly delay of this kind of magnitude – the court must be satisfied not only that the grounds of appeal have a real prospect of success, but that it is in the overarching interests of justice that the extension of time should be granted. That is not an easy test to meet in a case like this, where there is no good reason why any of the grounds which the appellant's freshly instructed counsel wishes to raise could not have been raised within the prescribed time for appealing, and where the delay is significant. Other relevant factors include consideration of whether there would ever be a retrial in such circumstances, and if there were to be a retrial, how that might affect the complainants.

[7]The second trial took place very shortly after the appellant was released on licence, having served part of his sentence for the matters for which he now seeks, out of time, leave to appeal against conviction. Two separate indictments were the subject of the first trial: T20210117 relating to C5; and T20210228 relating to C6. The offending against C5 was alleged to have been committed between 2000 and 2003, and against C6 between 2016 and 2018. Neither victim knew the other.

[8]In relation to C5, the appellant was convicted of two counts of paying for the sexual services of a child, contrary to section 47(1) of the Sexual Offences Act 2003, namely spanking C5 when he was naked, on at least six occasions (counts 1 and 2); and of three counts of sexual assault, comprising masturbation (count 3) and groping C5's penis on at least six occasions (counts 5 and 6), when C5 was aged 16 or 17.

[9]In relation to C6, the appellant was convicted of four counts of indecent assault, namely: kissing him on at least six occasions when he was aged 15 or 16 (counts 17 and 18); and kissing and groping C6's penis over clothing when he was aged 18 (counts 15 and 16). He was acquitted on two other counts.

[10]As we have said, the appellant had been released on licence shortly before he was tried for the offences which led to his conviction in January 2026. The complainants in the second trial, “C1”, “C2”, “C3” and “C4” also did not know each other. It appears that one of them raised a complaint with the police during the course of the first trial, but it was in effect the publicity which surrounded that trial that impelled all these complainants to go to the police and make formal complaints of what had happened to them. Indeed, that factor formed a very substantial plank of the defence in the second trial, where it was alleged that the complainants had been prompted by the adverse publicity to make up allegations of a similar nature, albeit that the offending alleged in the second trial was not of the repetitive nature of the offending in the first.

[11]C5 was 16 years of age. He was vulnerable and had problems with drugs and alcohol abuse. The appellant offered C5 advice and help with his aspiration to pursue an acting career. The prosecution case was that on visits to the appellant, the appellant gave C5 whisky. He persuaded C5 to strip naked under the ruse that this might be required for an acting part in a play. He subsequently showed C5 pornography involving a male teacher caning a pupil. C5 was persuaded to strip naked and to allow the appellant to cane him whilst the appellant touched his naked genitalia and, on a single occasion, briefly masturbated him. Afterwards, the appellant hugged C5 for a prolonged period, during which the appellant became sexually aroused. On each occasion, and following the caning, he gave C5 money which C5 used to buy drugs. The sexual activity stopped when C turned 18 and moved from the area.

[12]When he was first arrested and interviewed by the police in 2019, the appellant accepted that he knew C5, who was a drug addict, and said that C5's parents had asked him to keep C5 out of prison. He said that he had been asked by C5 to spank him for being naughty, but denied that there was any sexual abuse. He said that it had been C5's decision to strip naked. He had occasionally lent C5 money.

[13]A computer seized at the time of the appellant's arrest showed that he had visited websites which were indicative of sexual interest in spanking and of men being beaten on their naked bottoms by a cane or whip. This was part of the evidence relied on by the Crown at trial. There was no mention of an explanation for this in the defence statement. However, at trial the appellant gave an explanation that the information had been sent to him on a link by a man whom he named for the first time in his evidence, and he said that he had visited it on a number of occasions since because he thought he may have able to derive some material from it for auditions in connection with his acting.

[14]C6, who was 15 years of age, likewise visited the appellant at his home to seek acting advice. The appellant talked to C6 about his sexuality. It was only subsequently that C5 came out as being gay. At the time of his visits to the appellant, this was not known beyond his immediate family. The appellant kissed C6 on several occasions and touched either his back or his penis over clothing. He showed C6 gay pornography and spanked him on the bottom. During a drive home from the theatre, the appellant pulled into a layby and kissed C6. He put his tongue into C6's mouth, whilst holding his neck and trying to put his hand into C6's trousers.

[15]When, following C6's disclosures to the police, the appellant was interviewed again, he declined to comment to questions asked. However, he gave a prepared statement in which he denied any sexual abuse.

[16]The skeleton argument prepared by Mr Barlow in support of the renewed application for leave to appeal against conviction is not an easy document to follow. It makes a generalised complaint that the appellant did not have a fair trial. Insofar as a complaint is made of the directions given by the judge to the jury in his summing up, it has to be noted that all the directions were agreed with trial counsel at the time.

[17]However, in his oral submissions this morning, Mr Barlow has helpfully clarified the position. He submits that as a 74 year old defendant (as the appellant then was) facing trial for allegations of a historic sexual nature of this kind, his strongest point was that he was a man of good character. Indeed, it was described as "his only shield." Mr Barlow submitted that the trial was unfair for reasons that impacted upon the ability of the judge to give a full and unmodified good character direction.

[18]Grounds 1 and 3 of the proposed grounds of appeal are connected. They are essentially complaints about the adverse impact that the admission of bad character evidence had on the good character direction given by the judge.

[19]The defence at trial was one of denial. The defence called positive evidence of good character, including from the appellant's wife, from his son, and from people who had known the appellant as teenagers. There was at least one witness who confirmed that the appellant had always behaved in an exemplary fashion towards him when he visited the appellant in circumstances that were similar to those described by the two complainants C5 and C6.

[20]The prosecution applied to rely on evidence of bad character under section 101(1)(d) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, comprising a complaint of sexual abuse made to the police in 2015 by a man to whom we shall refer as "C7" who was a pupil at the school where the appellant then taught, and who was a schoolfriend of his son. The complaint was that in the period between 1995 and 1997, when C7 was aged 16 or 17, he had visited the appellant at home. Whilst he was there, the appellant persuaded him to “play a game" to show that he trusted the appellant and was confident in his heterosexuality. C7 was persuaded to remove his clothes, piece by piece, until he was naked. The appellant then proceeded to touch him on the leg, the stomach, and eventually on the penis. On the last occasion he kissed C7's penis and leg, which caused C7 quickly to dress and leave.

[21]The police had taken no further action in respect of C7's complaint at the time when it was made, because they had been unable to identify an offence. This remained the prosecution's view at the time of trial. The judge took the rather different view that there may well have been grounds for the behaviour described to form a criminal offence against C7, who was unable at the time, as a matter of law, to consent to homosexual acts within the meaning of the Sexual Offences Act 1967.

[22]The Crown also applied to rely on reprehensible behaviour of a similar nature to that charged which was made in statements given to the police by other men in 2021. The evidence of one such man, "C8", who was related to one of the two complainants, was admitted by agreement, after an initial objection. C8 described visiting the appellant in his music studio when he was aged 15 or 16 in order to seek help with his GCSE music project. He said that the appellant would turn the conversation from music to sex. He would talk to C8 about boys masturbating, and initiate discussions about whether paedophiles could help the way in which they behaved. At the time, C8 thought that this was rather cool and grown-up. It was only subsequently that he realised that there was something not quite right about it. Before C8 left the studio, the appellant would make a point of hugging him, but it was not suggested that there was any form of sexual touching.

[23]The admission of C7's evidence as bad character evidence was resisted on a number of grounds, including on the basis that it would unfairly lead to satellite litigation and that it would be unfairly prejudicial to the appellant. Trial counsel argued that if the Crown had sought to pursue the complaint as a separate count, it would have given rise to an abuse of process argument based on the delay since it was first investigated. It was alleged that it would likewise be an abuse of process to admit it under one of the bad character gateways.

[24]The bad character application was considered and ruled upon after the two complainants, C5 and C6, had given their evidence at the trial. The judge ruled that the evidence of C7 was admissible under gateway d) as evidence relevant to an important matter in issue, namely the appellant's propensity to engage in similar conduct with young men of a similar age to C5 and C6. He ruled that it was also relevant to the credibility of the complainants. The key issue was not whether the evidence was admissible, but whether it should be excluded because it would have an unduly adverse impact on the fairness of the proceedings, or because of the passage of time between those events and the matters on the indictment.

[25]After taking into account all of the defence objections, the judge properly concluded that he should not exercise his exclusionary discretion. He said that when he considered all matters together, including the complaints made by C5 and C6, the prosecution's evidence, taken together, was capable of demonstrating a prolonged period of offending, or at the very least reprehensible behaviour by the appellant. He ruled that the appellant was not so prejudiced by what the defence characterised as a lack of proper investigation, that the evidence ought to be excluded. He also ruled that the defence could not have reached the high bar of establishing that it would have been, or would ever have been, an abuse of the process to allow the C7 matter to continue, should it have formed the subject of a count on the indictment. He was satisfied that the appellant could have a fair trial, particularly when considered against the background in which he had presented his defence thus far.

[26]It is not suggested, nor could it be suggested, that the judge's ruling was wrong in law. The evidence was plainly admissible under the gateway identified by the judge for the reasons that he gave. Rather, the complaint is about the impact that the admission of the bad character evidence of C7 had on the good character direction that the jury were given. That point was not raised by defence counsel at the time.

[27]The good character direction was always going to have to be modified because of the evidence of C8, even if C7's evidence had been excluded. In his oral submissions, Mr Barlow made the point that there was a difference in kind between the evidence of C8 and that of C7. He submitted that the jury would not have been directed that C7's evidence, if they accepted it and were sure that it was true, would allow them to disregard the good character direction altogether.

[28]This court gave guidance as to how a judge should deal with a situation in which there is both good character and bad character evidence in R v Hunter (Nigel)

[2015] EWCA Crim 631

. As Hallett LJ (the then Vice-President of the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division)) pointed out at [83]:

"Where the defendant has no previous convictions or cautions, but evidence is admitted and relied upon by the Crown of other misconduct, the judge is obliged to give a bad character direction. [The judge] may consider that as a matter of fairness they should weave into their remarks a modified good character direction. However, there will be occasions when this will undoubtedly offend Lord Steyn's absurdity principle. This must therefore be left to the good sense of trial judges. This too is a broad discretion. Where a judge has declined to give a direction or has given a modified good character direction to a defendant in this category, this court should have proper regard to the exercise of discretion by the judge who has presided over the trial."

[29]In the present case, both limbs of the good character direction were given, with appropriate modification, in line with that guidance. We agree with the single judge that it is not realistically arguable that the judge was wrong to allow the evidence of C7 to be admitted; once it was, the good character direction was inevitably going to be modified. We are satisfied too that there was nothing wrong with the direction that the judge gave, and indeed that it was fairer and neater to approach the matter in the way that the judge approached it than to try to give separate bad character and good character directions which would be likely to confuse the jury. As the prosecution pointed out in the Respondent's Notice, the good character direction given by the judge properly incorporated the evidence relating to both C7 and C8. The judge carefully directed the jury that they could only rely on the evidence of bad character if they were sure that it was correct.

[30]The focus of complaint appears to be that the prosecution did not include C7's allegations as a separate charge on the indictment, as the trial judge appears to have thought they could have done, despite the fact that the prosecution did not believe that to be the case. This is described in paragraph 39 of the Advice and Grounds as a "cynical ploy". That, in our judgment, is a highly inappropriate way of ascribing bad motivation to the Crown. There is no reason to doubt that the prosecution genuinely considered at the time that they could not charge the appellant with an offence against C7, even if they were wrong. The fact that C7 was not included on the indictment does not matter anyway, since the jury were directed by the judge in terms to treat the allegations of C7 as if they did form counts on the indictment. In any event, to have included C7 on the indictment would have made little or no difference. This evidence would still have featured, but only as a matter of cross-admissibility, whereas C8's evidence would have been considered within the context of bad character.

[31]Mr Barlow submitted that had the count been included on the indictment, there would not have been the same modification to the good character direction. But as the passage in Hunter to which we have referred makes clear, the modification would have been the same regardless of which way the evidence came to be admitted at the trial. The direction given by the judge in relation to cross-admissibility was exemplary. The jury were told in terms that the same principles applied to the allegations made by C7 and C8. For those reasons, we are satisfied that there is no substance whatsoever in either ground 1 or ground 3.

[32]Ground 2 is a related complaint about the judge's direction to the jury on the prejudice to the appellant from delay. It is said that the direction was weak and that it failed to covey the real challenges created to the appellant. However, those challenges were not clearly identified. This was not a case in which the appellant was complaining that he was unable to put forward an alibi, or that vital records had been destroyed, although we were told in the course of oral submissions this morning that in relation to the allegations of C6 (which related to a period that was later in time than the period concerning C5, and therefore closer to the date of the trial), there were messages which were accepted to have passed between C6 and the appellant, which could not be retrieved from any computer or mobile phone, and which would have put their relationship into context.

[33]The issue in the case throughout was whether the complainants were making up false allegations, and that messaging may have had some impact on the appellant's position in relation to the position of trust that he had in relation to the complainant. But there is nothing that has been specifically identified that has been lost. Material of that kind can frequently go missing in a much closer period of time to the trial than the six years or so in this case.

[34]The purpose of warning the jury about the potential prejudice that may be caused by a delayed complaint is obviously to ensure fairness to the defendant. However, it has been said time and time again that the precise terms of the warning can be left to the good sense of trial judges. The judge's direction was succinct, but it focused appropriately on the appellant. In our judgment, it was adequate. As we have already mentioned, all directions were discussed and agreed with trial counsel. The judge told the jury to be aware that the passage of time may have put the appellant at a serious disadvantage and that he may not have been able to remember details which could have helped him, or to rely on documents or witnesses that may have assisted his case. Whilst there was no mention of any specific prejudice, there is no suggestion that any was identified by defence counsel at this trial, as compared to what happened at the second trial, where a more specific delay direction with targeted reference to prejudice was given by the second trial judge.

[35]We note that in the first trial the appellant was able to give a fairly detailed account of events from the relevant times in his defence statements. In the defence statement regarding C5, the appellant even refers to his own “documentary records”. Nor had he any difficulty in suggesting that he had not even met C7 at the time when C7 alleged that he had behaved inappropriately towards him.

[36]Taking all of these matters in the round, therefore, we are satisfied that there was nothing unfair about the first trial, either for the reasons that have been raised by way of belated complaint or for any other reasons. Whenever a man in the position of the appellant, who was of good character at the time of the first trial, faces historic sexual allegations, and bad character evidence is properly admitted, there will inevitably be a detrimental effect on the good character direction by reason of a modification; and in some cases a good character direction may not be given at all because it would offend Lord Steyn's absurdity principle. In this case the appellant had the benefit of an appropriately tailored, modified good character direction. There is nothing in any of the proposed grounds of appeal. There is no reason to doubt the safety of the convictions. In any event, there is no excuse for a delay of this magnitude.

[37]For those reasons the renewed application for leave to appeal against conviction is refused.

The appeal against sentence

[38]We turn to the appeal against sentence. The offending against the four complainants who gave evidence at the second trial can be summarised very briefly as follows. In relation to C1, it was a single incident count which took place at the school at which the appellant taught, between April 1977 and April 1979, when C1 was between 13 and 15 years. It was alleged that the appellant placed his hand down the trousers of the complainant, touched his penis and testicles, and remarked "You are not even a man yet" Count 2 was similarly a single count of indecent assault, C2 was aged 15 when the offending took place between 1987 and 1988. The allegation was that the appellant struck C2's bottom three times with a Dunlop trainer shoe, inflicting pain and causing the appellant to have an erection.

[39]Count 4, committed against C3, was again a single incident of indecent assault. Again, the complainant was aged 15. It was a more recent offence; it occurred between July 1993 and July 1994. The appellant pretended to prepare to strike the complainant's bottom with a metre ruler, but stopped at the last moment. He touched his bottom with the ruler and placed his hand over underwear in the area of his bottom. Counts 5 and 6 related to C4. Count 5 was a single incident of paying for sexual services. It involved a payment of £200 to the 16 year old complainant between April 2012 and April 2013, in order to allow the appellant to strike C4's bottom with his hand. Count 6 was a sexual assault which took place at the recording studio in 2013, by which time C4 was 17 years old. The complainant removed his clothing whilst the appellant watched and then approached him and gave him a prolonged hug. On that occasion there was no touching of genitals or any other form of sexual activity.

[40]In detailed sentencing remarks, the judge identified the relevant category for each of the counts The only category with which Mr Barlow takes issue was that for count 1, which the judge placed into category 2A within the relevant equivalent modern sentencing guidelines for sexual activity with a child, or causing or inciting a child to engage in sexual activity, under sections 9 and 10 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003. Mr Barlow submitted that it had been revealed that that particular complainant was very vulnerable and that his mental health had been impacted by a totally unrelated incident of sexual assault which was far more serious in nature and which had occurred on a different occasion, after the matter of which the appellant was convicted. It was said that it was unfair to the appellant to load all of the harm that was caused to the mental health of this particular victim on to the offence so as to put it into category 2A.

[41]However, in the guideline, category 2 harm involves the touching or exposing of naked genitalia by or of the victim. That has nothing to do with the impact upon the victim. Culpability involves a number of matters, including (as the judge put it) a significant degree of planning, abuse of trust, a significant disparity in age, and, the judge said, arguably the vulnerability of the victim. Any one of those factors on their own would have put this offending into category 2A in the guidelines. Taken together, the matter is put beyond argument. The complaint might have been made that ascribing to this particular incident all the harm that was caused to the victim was wrong in principle as a justification for elevating from the starting point in that category from three years' imprisonment to four. But not only is that not the way in which it is advanced in the grounds of appeal, in our judgment there was ample justification for the judge to have elevated to four years in any event by reason of other aggravating features.

[42]There is no quarrel with the categorisation of the remaining offences which were all placed into category 3A. The judge then indicated that if all of the matters had been heard at the same time as the allegations in the first trial, a sentence in the region of ten years' imprisonment for the offences against these four additional complainants would be appropriate, making a just and proportionate sentence for all matters of 17 years' imprisonment (seven years for the first set of offending and ten years for the other offending). However, after making adjustments for totality, the judge considered that an overall sentence of 14 years' imprisonment would be appropriate, and therefore the sentence imposed for these matters would be seven years' imprisonment. The judge structured the sentence as follows: on count 1, three years' imprisonment; on count 2, a consecutive term of 18 months' imprisonment; on count 4, a consecutive term of 12 months' imprisonment; on count 5, a concurrent term of 12 months' imprisonment; and on count 6, a consecutive term of 18 months' imprisonment.

[43]The sentences were appropriately ordered to run consecutively to reflect the fact that there were different victims and different occasions, and also to reflect the fact that the offending took place over a very significant period of time.

[44]Mr Barlow submits that, standing back and looking at the sentencing, the further 7 years was manifestly excessive, even taking into account the adjustment that the judge made for totality. He points to the fact that although all sexual offending is serious, these offences were of a less serious character than the offending that took place and was the subject of the first trial which had led to a sentence of seven years' imprisonment. He points out that most were isolated incidents and that there was none of the touching that went on in relation to C5 and C6, save in the case of the first vulnerable complainant.

[45]We can see nothing wrong in the way in which the trial judge approached these matters. He categorised each of the offences in an appropriate manner. He approached the matter in principle correctly by looking at the position which would have occurred if all of the offences had been sentenced at the same time. He took into account all aggravating and mitigating features.

[46]It is suggested that the judge should have made an adjustment for the delay in the second case coming to trial. It had originally been put into the list for June or July of the previous year, which would have been at a time when the appellant was still serving the custodial element of his sentence for the first case; but it was taken out of the list because of the unavailability of the court or a judge, which was not the appellant's fault. Mr Barlow submitted that in effect the appellant was being penalised for having a trial.

[47]The appellant was of course entitled to have a trial. He was not penalised for the fact that he chose to do so. We are not satisfied that there was anything wrong in the way in which the judge approached the question of delay. In the overall scheme of things, it was not that prejudicial to the appellant’s position, and, as we have said, when it came to sentencing the judge looked at the matter as if all of these offences had been tried at the same time and sentenced at the same time. Accordingly, the delay is unlikely to have had any material impact.

[48]The offending admittedly was of a more sporadic character, and there were isolated incidents. But if a judge had been sentencing for all of these offences taken together, it is quite clear that the offending took place over a very considerable period of time and there was a striking similarity between the types of offending that occurred. The mitigation of good character which was deployed in the first trial was not available to the appellant at the time of the second trial, by which time he had been convicted of similar offending.

[49]Standing back, we take the view that, however the sentence was constructed, the offending proved at the second trial did merit a further term of seven years' imprisonment. The sentence was not manifestly excessive.

[50]Accordingly, for those reasons, and with our thanks to Mr Barlow for his helpful submissions this morning, we dismiss the appeal against sentence. ___________________________________ Epiq Europe Ltd hereby certify that the above is an accurate and complete record of the proceedings or part thereof. Lower Ground Floor, 46 Chancery Lane, London WC2A 1JE Tel No: 020 7404 1400 Email: rcj@epiqglobal.co.uk ______________________________