R v Adam Cheetham [2025] EWCA Crim 804

[2025] EWCA Crim 804Venue Royal Courts of Justice, Strand, London, WC2A 2LLDate 10 June 2025
Before
LORD JUSTICE STUART-SMITHMR JUSTICE CHOUDHURYMR JUSTICE BOURNE
Between
REXCrownADAM CHEETHAMDefendantREXADAM CHEETHAM
Mr D James appeared for Appellant
Approved Judgment
[1]On 17 January 2025 in the Crown Court at Minshull Street (Manchester), before HHJ Woodward, the appellant (then aged 26) pleaded guilty to three offences. The timing of his pleas led the sentencing judge to reduce the sentence she would otherwise have passed by some 13 per cent. No criticism is made of that aspect of the ultimate sentence. On 14 March, before the same judge, the appellant was sentenced as follows. On count 2 of the indictment, which was an offence of unlawful wounding contrary to section 20 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861, on his plea of guilty, he was sentenced to 26 months’ imprisonment. On count 4, which was an offence of putting a person in fear of violence by harassment contrary to section 4(1) of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997, upon his plea of guilty, he was sentenced to 10 months’ imprisonment consecutive. On count 6, which was an offence of having an article with a blade or point contrary to section 139(1) of the Criminal Justice Act 1988, upon his plea of guilty he was sentenced to 8 months’ imprisonment concurrent. The total sentence was therefore 36 months’ imprisonment. Various other orders were made to which we do not need to refer at all.[2]He now appeals against that sentence with the leave of the single judge, on the basis that the judge took too high a starting point for the offence of harassment and gave insufficient attention to the principle of totality.

The Facts

[3]The appellant and Ms Katherine Reeves had been in a 7-year relationship that ended in spring 2024, due to the appellant’s drug and alcohol use. She lived at an address with her adult daughter and her friend, Mr Steffan Allen. During June and July 2024 the appellant contacted Ms Reeves numerous times causing her distress. On 3 July the appellant was found outside Ms Reeves’s home. The two became involved in a dispute next to the Chapel House public house which was located across the road. The appellant sprayed an energy drink in Ms Reeves’s face stinging her eyes. He then tried to embrace her. When she pulled away the appellant grabbed her by the wrists, twisting and bending them back until she dropped to her knees. The appellant then ran away. Ms Reeves was left with bruises but did not report the incident to the police at that time.[4]At approximately 3 o’clock in the morning on 9 or 10 July, Ms Reeves was woken up by the Alexa device in her house playing music at very high volume. The Smart light bulb was also switched on. This caused her significant distress and anxiety. The appellant still had access to the Alexa link and was able to control the device and lights remotely.[5]In the early morning of 12 July the appellant attended Ms Reeves’s address again, this time intoxicated. He woke Ms Reeves up by throwing stones and throwing his lighter at her window. She opened the window and asked him to leave. The appellant cried and begged her to take him back. He then became agitated and began to head-butt the bonnet of her car. Ms Reeves closed the window and curtains in the hope that the appellant would go. When the appellant started throwing stones once more Ms Reeves told him she was going to film him. The appellant pulled down a television aerial from the outer wall of the house and hung it around his neck. Part of that incident was recorded by a neighbour.[6]On Sunday 14 July the appellant went back to Ms Reeves’s address. He threw stones at her window and demanded that the occupants should come outside. He also threatened to bring a gun and to shoot them. Eventually Mr Allen went outside and tried to move the appellant on. Ms Reeves saw that the appellant was holding a knife in his right hand. He entered Ms Reeves’s address, where he tried to attack Mr Allen with the knife. At some point in the altercation Mr Allen sustained an injury to his waist. Mr Allen struck the appellant in self-defence causing the appellant to hit his head against the wall. It was later established that the appellant had fractured his skull and required surgery. Ms Reeves threw a container of car oil at the appellant which he took with him as he left. Mr Allen then locked the door after him. Ms Reeves’ daughter was also home and witnessed part of the altercation, including her mother trying to prise the knife from the appellant’s hand. She called the police after being alerted by her mother that the appellant was pouring oil through the letter box. The appellant left before the police arrived. The knife was recovered.[7]The appellant was arrested. In his interview he denied any offending and claimed that he had been the victim of an attack.

Antecedents

[8]The appellant had nine convictions for 12 offences, spanning from 11 July 2014 to 25 February 2025. His relevant convictions included offences of battery in 2014 and assaulting a constable twice in 2014. Those were, as will immediately be apparent, some 10 years before the events with which we are concerned.[9]The judge had the benefit of a pre-sentence report as well as victim personal statements from Ms Reeves and Mr Allen, both of which were made on the night of the final incident. Ms Reeves spoke of her fear that the appellant would return and described herself as being sick with stress and anxiety. One of the things that affected her considerably was that her daughter had not felt safe in her home after the attack and had gone to stay with her boyfriend. Mr Allen spoke of his worry that there would be further repercussions and that his wound would stop him working. Ms Reeves’s daughter also gave a statement in which she described her extreme fear as the appellant’s attack unfolded.

Character Reference

[10]The appellant had the benefit of a supportive character reference from the man who had employed him for the past 2½ years. He described the appellant as trustworthy, hardworking and consciousness. His interactions with the business’s customers was exemplary and he had been complimented on his politeness and willingness to assist. The employer had given the appellant support and guidance in the past and declared himself to do so again where appropriate.

The Pre-sentence Report

[11]The writer recorded that the appellant used blaming strategies to try to justify and minimise his offending behaviour. At that stage he was denying having threatened to shoot the victim although his plea on a full-facts basis accepted that he had done so. It was plain from his antecedents and from inquiries made of the police that the appellant had grown up in a troubled home environment. He had left school with no educational qualifications having been educated at a specialist behavioural school. He was left with significant deficits in his thinking, particularly in relation to intimate relationships. His risk of committing a serious violent offence in the next 2 years was assessed as being low but he was assessed as posing as a high risk of harm to Ms Reeves and Mr Allen and a medium risk of serious harm to the general public and intimate partners.

The Sentencing Hearing

[12]It was accepted that the unlawful wounding fell within category A3. That gave a starting point of 2 years with a category range from 1 to 3 years. The prosecution submitted that the harassment offence came between categories B2 and C2. The culpability was submitted to be persistent, albeit over a limited period of 2 weeks hence having features of both categories B and category C. Harm was submitted to be category 2 because significant distress was caused. Category B2 would have a starting point of 36 weeks, with a category range of 12 weeks to 1 year and 6 months. Category C2 would have a starting point of 12 weeks and a category range from a high-level community order to 35 weeks in custody.[13]The defence submitted that culpability for the harassment offence had features of category C and D on the basis that he intended to cause a lesser degree of fear and distress really amounting to no more than annoyance or irritation. If it were properly to be categorised as a B2 offence it was not a serious example and the starting point should be adjusted downwards for that reason.

The Sentencing Remarks

[14]The sentencing remarks are concise and clear. After providing a suitable summary of the facts, the judge highlighted the fear experienced by Ms Reeves’s daughter, who saw her mother trying to get the knife out of his hand in a struggle downstairs and the appellant subsequently pouring liquid through the letter box which she thought might be flammable. The judge found that she was extremely fearful and did not subsequently feel safe in her own home.[15]The judge then referred appropriately to the victim statements from Ms Reeves and Mr Allen. She accepted that the appellant had a disruptive youth but did not accept that his upbringing provided any excuse for his behaviour. On the plus side, she accepted that the appellant was now more remorseful, had undertaken an anger management course while on remand, had a trusted job and intended to continue his rehabilitation during his inevitable period in custody.[16]Turning to the guidelines, she resolved the dispute about the categorisation of the harassment offence by holding that it was a category B2 case because:
“It was ... conduct that was intended over the period of this offence, to maximise the alarm and distress felt by Miss Reeves and the other occupants of the property in which she lived. I am also satisfied that it does amount to persistent action. It is a category 2 case because the victim personal statements describe significant distress but not, in the absence of a more recent victim personal statement or further detail, a category 1 case.”
[17]The bladed article offence she held to be a category A2 case but decided to impose a concurrent sentence to avoid double counting, stating that the serious harm and distress was reflected in the sentence she imposed for the offence of harassment. Having previously stated that his previous convictions were of limited relevance other than meaning that he was not to be treated as being of previous good character,

the judge identified as aggravating features that:

“[They were] committed in a domestic context and … in respect of at least some of the offences or actions that amount or form part of the offences, you were under the influence of alcohol.”
The judge then passed sentence explaining that, after a trial, the sentence for the offence of wounding would have been 30 months, which she reduced to 26 months. The sentence for the offence of harassment after a trial would have been 12 months’ custody which she reduced to 10 months consecutive. She passed a concurrent sentence of 8 months for the bladed article offence for the reasons she had explained. She then concluded by saying that the total sentence of 36 months represented the shortest term commensurate with the seriousness of the overall offending behaviour.

Discussion and Resolution

[18]Both in writing and orally Mr James has been concise and clear in his grounds and submissions in support of this appeal. No criticism is made of the sentence of 26 months for the section 20 offence when viewed in isolation: nor could there be. The appellant has instead concentrated on the detail of the harassment sentence and the question of totality. We are satisfied that the judge was entitled to place the offence in category B2. Her finding that significant distress was caused was not merely justified but clearly right. Though occurring during a relatively short period for such offences between 3 and 14 July 2024, the appellant’s conduct escalated during that period. The most that can be said in his favour about the seriousness of his conduct is that he did not resort to brandishing or carrying a knife or threatening to bring a gun and shoot the occupants until the last incident. That was however an extremely serious incident, including the witness struggle as Ms Reeves attempted to get the knife off the appellant. The judge was also right to identify the domestic context of the offending and the fact that on at least one occasion he was under the influence of alcohol as significantly aggravating features.[19]Turning to his personal mitigation, the judge recognised that he had a difficult upbringing but she was fully justified in saying that his upbringing provided no excuse for his conduct. The most that could be said about his previous record is that he was only lightly convicted before the events with which we are concerned. It is clear from the employer’s reference that there is another better side to him than he showed when committing these serious offences. The judge did not overtly refer to the fact that the appellant’s attack left him with a fractured skull. That was a consequence of his criminal attack on Mr Allen and Ms Reeves and affords little, if any, mitigation.[20]On a standalone basis, for the reasons we have given, we conclude that the judge was entitled to adjust the starting point of 9 months for the harassment offence upwards as she did to 12 months. She was entitled to take the view that the aggravating features outweighed his personal mitigation and the relatively short period of persistence.[21]The only matter that has given us cause for concern is that the judge made no further adjustment to the length of the consecutive sentences for totality. She was undoubtedly entitled to impose consecutive sentences, and she was correct to make the sentence for the bladed article offence concurrent for the reasons she gave. We think it possible that some judges might have shaded the total sentence slightly to reflect the fact that the section 20 offence and the final incident of harassment took place on the same occasion. However, we are not satisfied that a failure to do so was wrong in principle given the separate nature of the two offences in respect of which she was imposing consecutive sentences. Nor having stood back and looked at the case overall are we persuaded that the total sentence of 36 months can properly be described as manifestly excessive. The appeal must therefore be dismissed.