R v Simon Vickers [2025] EWCA Crim 740

[2025] EWCA Crim 740Venue Royal Courts of Justice, Strand, London, WC2A 2LLDate 15 May 2025
Before
LORD JUSTICE STUART-SMITHMR JUSTICE GOOSEMRS JUSTICE EADY
Between
REXCrownSIMON VICKERSDefendantREFERENCE BY THE SOLICITOR GENERAL UNDERS.36 OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE ACT 1988
REXSIMON VICKERS
Louise Oakle y appeared for Attorney GeneralNicholas Lumley KC appeared for Offender
Approved Judgment
[1]His Majesty's Solicitor General applies to the court for leave to refer a sentence which she regards as unduly lenient. The sentence was passed on the offender at the Crown Court at Teesside by Cotter J after the offender had been convicted by the jury of murdering his daughter. A sentence of life imprisonment was mandatory. The minimum term on which the judge settled was 15 years, from which days on remand fell to be deducted. The factual background[2]Scarlett Vickers, to whom we shall refer as Scarlett, lived with her parents, the offender (her father) and Sarah Hall (her mother). In July 2025 she was 14 years old. On the information that is available to this court they were a happy family who doted on each other. In particular, the offender doted on his "beloved daughter" and his daughter referred to him as her "hero". In July 2024 the offender was 49 years old. Their lives changed catastrophically on 5 July 2024 shortly before 11.00 pm.[3]The facts so far as they are known are not in dispute. The emergency services were called to the family home in Darlington. When they arrived, they found Scarlett on the kitchen floor with blood around her. She had sustained heavy blood loss. Her mother was on the phone to 999 and was attempting to perform cardiopulmonary resuscitation on her. Her father, the offender, was also in the property. Scarlett was not breathing and there was no pulse. The paramedics identified a single stab wound to the left side of Scarlett's chest.[4]When the police attended they spoke to Sarah Hall and to the offender. They were both visibly upset. The offender appeared to be under the influence of alcohol. Sarah Hall explained that she was cooking dinner and that she had a kitchen knife out to cut some garlic bread. She said:
"He's picked the spatula up and not realised the knife was with it at the same time"
. The offender stated:
"We were cooking tea. We were mucking about, playing around and started throwing objects at each other."
He also stated:
"We kinda intoxicated, we have been drinking wine having a nice day watching football, we were mucking about, what the fuck" and "
We were throwing stuff about, man, how the fuck has this happened?"[5]When asked how far the knife had entered Scarlett, both the defendant and Sarah Hall said they were not aware of how deep the knife had gone. Sarah Hall stated:
"The first thing we realised was when she shouted, ow ow."
The offender said:
"It wasn't even hard, it was nothing, I don't understand."
The offender demonstrated what he did, making a swiping motion with his arm, stating:
"There wasn't even any effort into it."
[6]The offender was arrested on suspicion of attempted murder. He was cautioned and made no reply. Following his arrest he was conveyed to Darlington Police Station where his detention was authorised. Despite the best efforts of the emergency services, Scarlett was declared dead at 23.52 hours. A bloodstained green and black coloured knife was located on the kitchen worktop.[7]When interviewed by the police the offender gave accounts which the jury must have rejected as untrue. He said they had been mucking about. Scarlett had been throwing grapes at him and as he went to get closer to her she pushed him away. He said he had grabbed a pair of tongs and had thrown them at her. He accepted that he must have picked up a knife rather than the tongs but that they were just horse playing. He said that it was only when a police officer or paramedic picked up the tongs that he realised he must have thrown the knife and not the tongs. He said that he and Scarlett's mother had shared two bottles of wine and that he had smoked a couple of joints after work. Consistently with all of the information that is available to the court, the offender said that Scarlett was his world, that he could not live without her and that he did not wish to be alive.[8]In a second police interview the offender said that he and Scarlett had been playing around, that he was not annoyed and that he had not deliberately stabbed her. He denied that he had said to the paramedics that he and Scarlett had been throwing knives and said that he would never do so.[9]Forensic evidence derived from the knife suggested that Scarlett had been injured in a stabbing type of action. The post mortem investigation disclosed that she had sustained a stab wound to the left side of her chest. This had breached the chest wall, going through the lowermost point of the upper lobe of the left lung, before passing into the left ventricle of the heart where it ended. This had been associated with blood loss into the left chest cavity and it was this blood loss which had ultimately resulted in her death. The stab wound track passed inwards, a little downwards and backwards, breaching the chest wall through the intercostal muscle between the fifth and sixth ribs. The wound track was about 110 mm long. The defect to the heart measured 15 mm in length.[10]At trial, the prosecution case was that the offender had stabbed his daughter deliberately when he picked up the knife and stabbed her in the chest with the knife. The prosecution's case was that the stab wound could not have been caused by him throwing the knife and that it was too deep to have been caused accidentally. So it was submitted that the offender must have held the knife firmly in his hand at the time he stabbed his daughter and that the offender must then have pulled the knife out of his daughter's chest and placed it back on the kitchen work surface after he had stabbed her.[11]The defence case was that Scarlett had been killed accidentally. The offender had been messing around with her in the kitchen when the offender's partner had waved a pair of tongs playfully in his direction and had inadvertently "nipped" his finger. The offender was mucking about and had complained of pain. Scarlett referred to him as a "wimp" in jest. The offender had then picked up what he believed was the tongs and "swiped them" along the worktop causing them to "fly over" towards Sarah and Scarlett. The defence case was that the offender did not knowingly pick up a kitchen knife, he did not see the knife, he did not see any object hit Scarlett and he was not looking at what he was doing. It was said that the offender saw Scarlett trying to duck to avoid the tongs. The offender had then heard Scarlett cry out in pain and observed blood coming through her clothing. There was no knife in his hand or in Scarlett's chest. The defence case was that the offender did not deliberately stab his daughter and that he had no reason to want to hurt his daughter. Antecedents[12]The offender had five convictions recorded against him for six offences. His first conviction was on 14 March 1991. His last conviction had been on 1 July 1999, 25 years before. On 19 October 1993, when the offender was 19 years of age, he was convicted of wounding with intent, contrary to section 18 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1981. That offending had involved the offender stabbing another male, who was an adult, in the face with a Stanley knife. The offender had been sentenced to two years in a young offender institution. Victim personal statements[13]Most unusually, particularly in relation to an offence involving the death or injury of a child, there were no victim personal statements before the judge. Despite his conviction for murder, the offender has been and is to this day resolutely supported by Scarlett's mother and wider family. We return to this below. The sentencing hearing[14]The prosecution submitted that schedule 21 paragraph 5 applied so that the starting point was 15 years' imprisonment. No statutory aggravating factors were identified. Other aggravating factors included use of a weapon, death of a child and the previous very old conviction. Statutory mitigating factors included an intention to cause serious bodily harm rather than to kill and a lack of premeditation. No other mitigating factors were identified.[15]With one exception the defence agreed this analysis. The exception was that the defence submitted that the offender's previous convictions, including the section 18 in 1993, were too old to be of any relevance. As additional mitigating features the defence submitted that whatever happened in the kitchen happened in a moment. Emergency medical assistance had been sought immediately and attempts had been made to save Scarlett's life. The offender had a perfect history as a father, son, friend, employee and citizen. There was remorse. The sentencing remarks

The judge made the following factual findings in his sentencing remarks:

[16]i) Scarlett lived with her father and mother in a normal loving family. She was a normal healthy 14-year-old with a long life ahead of her. ii) On 5 July 2024 Scarlett came home and was in her bedroom. She joined her mother and father in the family kitchen during which an evening meal was being prepared. iii) Scarlett and her mother started throwing grapes at each other. The offender wanted them to stop. iv) Sarah Hall pinched the offender on the bottom with some cooking tongs. As she did, she caught the offender's finger with them. The offender complained as if in pain. Scarlett then said the words:
"Dad, don't be a wimp." v) Sarah Hall then had her back to the offender as she resumed cooking and heard the offender say: "
How would you like it?" vi) The offender picked up a knife on the spur of the moment and stabbed Scarlett to the left side of her chest. He must have been close to Scarlett when he stabbed her. vii) Scarlett died in the kitchen of her home within minutes of having been stabbed. It went from an ordinary, happy family Friday to tragedy within seconds due to what must have been the offender's loss of temper. There is, said the judge, no other plausible explanation. viii) The offender was immediately devastated by what he had done and is now a broken man.[17]The judge took the agreed starting point of 15 years and then detailed the factors that he regarded as significant for the fixing of the minimum term as follows:
"In coming to the minimum term I must decide where this case falls within schedule 21. The starting point here is 15 years. The knife was not taken to the scene. It was picked up whilst you were in the kitchen on the spur of the moment. However the starting point is not necessarily the end point and I must weigh up aggravating and mitigating factors. As for aggravating factors the obvious and seriously aggravating factor is that Scarlett was 14 years old and a child in her own home. Although your father and daughter relationship does not fall within the scope of the Domestic Abuse Act 2021 as Scarlett was not 16, the principles in the domestic violence guideline apply as you were living in the same household, and your relationship involved an expectation of mutual trust and security. Scarlett's age and the domestic context of the offending behaviour make this offence all the more serious because it represents a violation of that trust and security that normally exists between a child and parent. Domestic abuse offences of all forms are regarded as particularly serious within the criminal justice system. This factor warrants a significant increase from the starting point. You have previous convictions. You are now aged 50 and in 1993 when you were aged 19, you were convicted of wounding with intent using a knife on the face of an adult male. You received two years detention. But that conviction was over 30 years ago. You also have some more recent minor convictions for dishonesty, the last conviction being in 1999. I accept Mr Lumley's submission and given the age and lack of relevance these convictions they have not increased the sentence imposed. I have thought anxiously about the role of alcohol in this offence. As I have set out you were under the influence of alcohol. I am not sure the cannabis had any material effect on you. The fact that an offender is voluntarily intoxicated at the time of the offence will tend to increase the seriousness of the offence, provided that the intoxication has contributed to the offending. However I am not sure applying the criminal standard that alcohol did contribute to the offence, which I am driven to conclude was a flash of anger. As for mitigating factors, I accept the factors outlined by Mr Lumley. I accept that immediately after you stabbed Scarlett you were devastated by what you had done and have since been a broken man. You have lost your only child at your own hand and will always live with that awful fact. I also accept that this was a momentary act of anger and there was no premeditation. I am also not sure that there was an intention to kill and sentence on the basis that there was an intention to cause really serious harm."
[18]With one exception, namely the offender's previous convictions, it is not submitted on either side that the judge omitted any factor that he should have taken into account or took into account any factor that he should have left out.[19]He then passed the sentence to which we have already referred, saying in the course of doing so:
"It was a momentary but devastating act of anger. It stole one young precious life, ruined your life, your wife's life and Scarlett's relatives and friends will never ever recover entirely from it. The clock cannot be turned back, you must face the consequences that the law dictates."

The Solicitor General's submissions

[20]The Solicitor General starts by acknowledging, correctly in our judgment, that this was an extremely difficult sentencing task. The real question is said to be "whether the judge failed in his final analysis when identifying and weighing the aggravating and mitigating factors set out in schedule 21."[21]In summary, the Solicitor General submits that Scarlett's age and the domestic context of the offender's behaviour made the offence more serious as it represented a violation of the trust and security that normally exists between a child and parent. These factors are said to warrant a significant increase from the starting point of 15 years.[22]Second, the judge is said to have erred in "completely disregarding" the offender's previous conviction for wounding with intent which should, in the Solicitor General's submission, have been treated as "an aggravating factor, albeit tempered by the passage of time".[23]Third, it is submitted that the judge erred in not expressly treating the use of a knife that was picked up and used to inflict fatal injury in a domestic context as an additional aggravating factor.[24]On the other hand, the Solicitor General acknowledges that the judge had to consider a number of mitigating features, including a lack of premeditation and the absence of an intention to kill. Referring to Peters [2005] EWCA Crim 605, the Solicitor General accepts that where the violence resulting in death erupted suddenly and unexpectedly, the absence of an intention to kill will probably provide material mitigation. In the present case the Solicitor General accepts that the judge's finding of a momentary but devastating act or flash of anger should result in a reduction of the minimum term, although not as great as if no weapon had been taken up.[25]Pausing there, the Solicitor General submits that any downward adjustment for lack of premeditation and the absence of an intention to kill were balanced out "either entirely or significantly" by the use of a knife to cause fatal injury.[26]Finally, it is submitted that the offender's accepted devastation for his acts had to be balanced against his failure to properly accept responsibility for what he had done.[27]On the basis of this approach, the Solicitor General submits that a proper analysis of the aggravating and mitigating factors should have resulted in a minimum term above the starting point of 15 years.

The offender's submissions

[28]The Respondent's Notice was marginally out of time through no fault of the offender. We give the necessary leave for late service. The offender is represented by Mr Lumley KC, as he was at trial. He submits that the judge weighed all matters appropriately and came to a conclusion that was reasonably open to him for the reasons he gave. He submits that the judge had presided over a very highly charged trial and was uniquely placed to assess the culpability, the remorse and the punishment already inflicted on the offender and those left behind by Scarlett's death. The sentence may be described as merciful but in his submission it is not unduly lenient.[29]In support of his submissions, Mr Lumley refers to the very public continued support given by Sarah Hall, her sister and the offender's parents, each of whom has provided a statement for the use of this court. Sarah Hall has gone further, giving an interview on BBC television (which we have not seen) and providing the basis for an article supportive of the offender (which we have). We have read these materials but, while not doubting their heartfelt integrity, we treat them with extreme caution. It is well established and has recently been reaffirmed that:
"There is guidance as to how a sentencing judge should approach the views of a complainant on the proper disposal of a case."
That guidance is to be found in the Criminal Practice Directions 2023 at 9.5.8:
"The opinions of the victim or the victim's relatives as to what the sentence should be are not relevant, unlike the consequences of the offence on them, and should therefore not be included in the statement. If opinions as to sentence are included in the statement, then it is inappropriate for them to be referred to, and the court should have no regard to them."
The rationale underlying that principal is explained by Judge J (as he then was) in the case of Nunn [1996] 2 Cr.App.R (S) 136: "It is for the court, not complainants, to decide on the proper sentence. It will be no more proper to decrease the punishment imposed at the request of the complainants in one case, than it would be to increase it to meet the desires of the complainants in another.": see Mortazavi [2024] EWCA Crim 1662, at [19].[30]We cannot let the strongly expressed conviction of Sarah Hall and the other victim members of the family that the offender did not intend and could never have intended to harm their daughter to affect our review of the sentence passed upon the offender's conviction for murder. The conviction necessarily involves the finding by the jury that he did intend at least really serious harm, even if only for an instant. We must respect the verdict of the jury, and we do.[31]What we can properly take from the witness statements is that the offender's actions were completely out of character for the man he had become and who was now Scarlett's devoted father. We can also gain further understanding of the depth of remorse that he experiences. Both of these are factors that are capable of affecting the determination of the minimum term.

Discussion and resolution

[32]It is agreed on all sides that this was an exceptionally, if not uniquely, difficult sentencing exercise. Having presided over the trial, the judge was in a far better position than this court to balance the various features and reach a just conclusion. That does not, of course, mean that his decision is inviolate. The principles are not in doubt. Schedule 21 is not a straitjacket. It is to be applied flexibly with a view to the sentencing judge achieving a just result: see Height [2008] EWCA Crim 2500 at [29].[33]The first point to note is that with the possible exception of the weight to be attributed to the offender's section 18 conviction, the judge's sentencing remarks accurately and thoroughly, if concisely, identified all relevant aggravating and mitigating features now relied on by the Solicitor General.[34]Dealing specifically with the features highlighted by the Solicitor General, as summarised above, the judge expressly identified that "Scarlett's age and the domestic context of the offending behaviour make this offence all the more serious because it represents a violation of that trust and security that normally exists between a child and parents".[35]Second, where the Solicitor General submits that the old section 18 offence should have been treated as "an aggravating factor, albeit tempered by the passage of time",

the judge addressed the convictions in not dissimilar terms, namely that:

"Given the age and lack of relevance of these convictions, they have not increased the sentence imposed."
This embodies acceptance that their aggravating effect was tempered by the passage of time. It did not involve "completely disregarding" the previous convictions. Rather, it was a statement that they did not cause an increase in the sentence, which is different.[36]Third, the judge clearly had in mind that the offender picked up the knife and used it on the spur of the moment in a domestic context as he stated these aspects expressly. Nor can there be any real criticism of the judge's summary of the mitigating features of the case. He was not merely justified but clearly right in his description of the offender being immediately devastated by what he had done and that he has since been a broken man.[37]Once it is accepted that the judge correctly identified the relevant features of this difficult case, the task of showing that the weight he attached to them is outside what was reasonably open to him is extremely difficult. In our judgment, the quasi-mathematical approach adopted by the Solicitor General in the written Final Reference in this case is inapposite. On any view of the facts of this case there was substantial mitigation available to the offender. The Solicitor General's submission that the downward adjustment for these mitigating features balanced out the use of the knife "either entirely or significantly", itself makes the point that views can reasonably differ about the relative weight to be given to different factors.[38]In our judgment, once one reads the judge's sentencing remarks with a view to identifying the coherence in them, rather than subjecting them to a quasi-mathematical balancing exercise with a view to identifying relatively marginal perceived imbalances, it becomes clear that this was a justifiable and humane resolution of the very difficult sentencing exercise that the judge faced. It is properly to be described as merciful but it is none the worse for that. For these reasons we refuse leave.