R v Kieron Mead [2025] EWCA Crim 721

WARNING: reporting restrictions may apply to the contents transcribed in this document, particularly if the case concerned a sexual offence or involved a child. Reporting restrictions prohibit the publication of the applicable information to the public or any section of the public, in writing, in a broadcast or by means of the internet, including social media. Anyone who receives a copy of this transcript is responsible in law for making sure that applicable restrictions are not breached. A person who breaches a reporting restriction is liable to a fine and/or imprisonment. For guidance on whether reporting restrictions apply, and to what information, ask at the court office or take legal advice. This Transcript is Crown Copyright.  It is not to be reproduced in whole or in part other than in accordance with relevant licence or with the express consent of the Authority.  All rights are reserved.[2025] EWCA Crim 721
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL
CRIMINAL DIVISION
Case No 2025/00920/A4Date Friday 9 May 2025
Between
REXCrown
WC2A 2LL
ON APPEAL FROM THE CROWN COURT AT BRADFORD
(MR RECORDER HASLAM KC) [13CD0241723]
B e f o r e:
LORD JUSTICE GREEN
MR JUSTICE GOOSE
MRS JUSTICE YIP DBE
v
Between
KIERON MEAD____________________Computer Aided Transcription of Epiq Europe Ltd,Lower Ground Floor, 46 Chancery Lane, London WC2A 1JETel No: 020 7404 1400; Email: rcj@epiqglobal.co.uk (Official Shorthand Writers to the Court)_____________________Mr J Bottomley appeared for Appellant____________________Approved Judgment
[1]On 21 February 2025, in the Crown Court at Bradford, the appellant was sentenced to a total of two years six months' imprisonment for six counts of breach of a Sexual Harm Prevention Order ("SHPO").[2]He now appeals against that sentence with the leave of the single judge.[3]The SHPO was imposed on 15 June 2023 following the appellant's conviction for an offence of attempting to engage in sexual communication with a child. The order included prohibitions against using any social media or messaging platform without express permission, and against using any internet enabled device, or device capable of storing images, unless such device was made available for inspection on request.[4]On 21 August 2023, police officers visited the appellant's home for a routine check. They discovered that he had been using several social media platforms on his registered iPad. The device cameras were activated and webcams were in use. A chat function enabling text communication was enabled. The chats appeared to date back to 29 July 2023. The appellant's mobile phone was examined. It showed that he had been using a Harry Potter themed app to communicate with others. The appellant accepted that this was a form of social media. He was arrested and his devices were seized. The police found an additional smartphone which the appellant had not presented to the police in violation of the terms of the order. That phone showed evidence of Facebook activity dating back to 25 June 2023 – ten days after the SHPO was imposed.[5]On 23 June 2024 officers again attended the appellant's address. He was asked to provide his devices. He handed over a Nokia phone (which was not a smartphone) and a laptop. When asked if he had any more devices he said that he did not. The laptop contained numerous emails from a dating site, and the appellant's account was found to be logged in and had been used for messaging.[6]While the laptop was being examined, a notification sound alerted officers to a Samsung tablet under the appellant's bedcover. He had not presented that device for inspection. It was running a game with a messaging function. The appellant had previously been informed that such gaming platforms were considered unauthorised messaging platforms. The device had also made use of Snapchat accounts linked to the appellant, but which had not been registered with the police. Numerous chats had taken place.[7]When sentencing the appellant, the judge noted that the indictment covered a period of about 12 months, starting ten days after the imposition of the order, and that counts 4, 5 and 6 were committed after the appellant had been arrested and interviewed in relation to the earlier offences. He must therefore have bought another device to access messaging platforms and Snapchat after the police had seized his smartphone in August 2023.[8]The prosecution had contended that the offending was to be viewed as falling within category A3 within the sentencing guidelines. It was category A culpability, because it represented persistent breach. The harm, it was submitted, fell into category 3 as the breach caused little or no harm or distress.[9]The judge accepted that categorisation of harm. He said:
"It is agreed by both the prosecution and the defence that all of these offences are A3 offences. Your culpability is high, because they were persistent breaches. The harm is category 3 because the breaches caused little or risked little or no harm or distress."
[10]Category A3 gives a starting point of one year's custody, and a range between a high level community order and two years' custody. The judge said that the breaches were aggravated by the fact that the first breach was committed a matter of days after the order was made. He said that the guidelines applied to a single offence and that the appellant's offending reflected six breaches over a period of 12 months. The judge took account of the appellant's mitigation, including the fact that he had suffered with emotional development issues, and had epilepsy. He allowed credit for the guilty pleas of 17 per cent, about which no complaint is made.[11]The judge passed sentences of 12 months' imprisonment on each of counts 1 to 5, and imposed two years six months' imprisonment for count 6 (the non-production of the Samsung tablet). All sentences were ordered to be served concurrently.[12]By his grounds of appeal, the appellant contends that the judge erred in his approach by treating each of the six breaches as falling within culpability A. It is contended that the offending as a whole falls into the culpability category A bracket because of the repeated nature of the breaches. It is therefore accepted that, had he taken a global approach, the judge was entitled to say that this was culpability A. However, if each offence was considered individually, it would fall into a lower culpability category. It is argued that the judge's approach in elevating every breach to culpability category A produced a disproportionate final sentence which did not reflect the nature of the offending and which was manifestly excessive.[13]While we do not accept that each breach is to be regarded as only minor, we do acknowledge that any one offence, had it stood alone, would not have been placed into culpability category A. We consider that it was sensible to look at the overall pattern of offending and to make an assessment of the appellant's culpability on that basis. As is acknowledged on his behalf, that plainly brought him into category A. The breaches did, of course, risk some harm. The appellant's flagrant breach of the order, which commenced soon after it was imposed and persisted even after his arrest and the seizure of his devices in August 2023, is extremely troubling. However, there was no evidence of any attempt to make contact with children. We consider that it was appropriate for the judge to accept the agreed position of the prosecution and the defence that harm was to be viewed as falling into category 3, albeit we wish to make it clear that we are not minimising the seriousness of what the appellant did, and he should be left with no misunderstanding about that.[14]In adopting a global approach to categorisation, the judge had, at least to some extent, already reflected the fact that the appellant was to be sentenced for multiple breaches, rather than a single offence. He was plainly entitled to treat one offence as a lead offence and to impose a sentence that reflected the totality of the offending, as he appears to have done with count 6, and then to make the other sentences concurrent.[15]However, we consider that, in arriving at a sentence of two years six months' imprisonment, the judge double counted the persistent nature of the offending. He used this both as a reason to move into the category 3A range and then to uplift the sentence on count 3 to reflect totality. This produced a sentence on count 6 that was manifestly excessive.[16]Standing back and looking at the nature and circumstances of the offending as a whole, we consider that an overall sentence within the category 3A range was appropriate. The sentence had to reflect not only the persistent nature of the breaches, but also the fact that they began very soon after the order was imposed and continued even after the first arrest.[17]Even allowing for the appellant's mitigation and the fact that this was his first custodial sentence, it was necessary to move up from the category 3A starting point towards the upper end of that bracket. We consider that an appropriate total sentence before credit for the guilty plea was one of 21 months' imprisonment. After allowing the same discount for the guilty plea as the judge applied, with some rounding we reduce that to 17 months' imprisonment.[18]Adopting the same structure as the sentencing judge, the required adjustment is to be made to count 6. The other sentences will remain 12 months' imprisonment to run concurrently on each of counts 1 to 5.[19]Although the reduction that we consider appropriate brings the sentence to a level where suspension would have been a possibility, we take the view that this was a case which could only be met by the imposition of an immediate sentence of imprisonment. The circumstances of the offending displayed a complete disregard for court orders, and appropriate punishment required that the sentence was immediate.[20]We therefore allow the appeal to the extent only of reducing the sentence on count 6 to one of 17 months' imprisonment. The sentences on the other counts, which are to be served concurrently, and any ancillary orders will remain unchanged. __________________________________ Epiq Europe Ltd hereby certify that the above is an accurate and complete record of the proceedings or part thereof. Lower Ground Floor, 46 Chancery Lane, London WC2A 1JE Tel No: 020 7404 1400 Email: rcj@epiqglobal.co.uk ______________________________