R v Abdulrahman Al Magloub [2025] EWCA Crim 640

WARNING: reporting restrictions may apply to the contents transcribed in this document, particularly if the case concerned a sexual offence or involved a child. Reporting restrictions prohibit the publication of the applicable information to the public or any section of the public, in writing, in a broadcast or by means of the internet, including social media. Anyone who receives a copy of this transcript is responsible in law for making sure that applicable restrictions are not breached. A person who breaches a reporting restriction is liable to a fine and/or imprisonment. For guidance on whether reporting restrictions apply, and to what information, ask at the court office or take legal advice. This Transcript is Crown Copyright.  It is not to be reproduced in whole or in part other than in accordance with relevant licence or with the express consent of the Authority.  All rights are reserved.[2025] EWCA Crim 640
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL
CRIMINAL DIVISION
Between
R EXCrown
London
WC2A 2LL
ON APPEAL FROM THE CROWN COURT AT ISLEWORTH
(MR RECORDER SIMON DYER KC) [T20237039]
Case No 2024/03622/A3 Thursday 1 May 2025
B e f o r e:
LORD JUSTICE LEWIS
MRS JUSTICE CHEEMA-GRUBB DBE
MR JUSTICE SOOLE
____________________
- v -
Between
ABDULRAHMAN AL MAGLOUB____________________Computer Aided Transcription of Epiq Europe Ltd,Lower Ground Floor, 46 Chancery Lane, London WC2A 1JETel No: 020 7404 1400; Email: rcj@epiqglobal.co.uk (Official Shorthand Writers to the Court)_____________________Ms T Bajwa appeared for ApplicantMr V Scully appeared for Crown____________________J U D G M E N TDate Thursday 1 May 2025
[1]This application concerns a Criminal Behaviour order imposed on the appellant, Abdulrahman Al Magloub, who is now aged 23. On 11 October 2023, in the Crown Court at Isleworth the applicant was sentenced by Mr Recorder Simon Dyer KC to 27 months' imprisonment for one offence of robbery (count 1) and to a concurrent term of four months' imprisonment for an offence of fraud (count 2). No complaint is made about those sentences.[2]The appellant was also made the subject of a Criminal Behaviour Order for three years which imposed certain prohibitions, of which he seeks to challenge three. The time for appealing has passed and he seeks an extension of time of time of 337 days in which to apply for leave to appeal against it. The application has been referred to the full court by the single judge. We are satisfied that the delay is adequately explained. We therefore grant an extension of time and we grant leave to appeal.[3]The facts of the case may be stated shortly. On 31 January 2023, at approximately 6.30 am, the victim left his flat in the Westminster area of London in order to go to work. As he crossed the road, he was stopped by the appellant and the co-defendant, Mouhcine Farouqi. They grabbed the victim as he passed them. The victim was carrying a satchel and a large bag. The co-defendant took hold of the strap that was across the victim's chest and said, "Give me it, I want it". The victim refused to give him the items and resisted by pulling away. The appellant then shouted, "Show him the gun". The co-defendant told the victim that he had a gun on him and threatened to use it. He lifted up his jacket. He demanded that the victim hand over the bag. The victim did not see a firearm but he did see something in the co-defendant's waistband. He tried to pull away but the appellant and the co-defendant held on to him. All three moved from the pavement into the middle of the road. The co-defendant then pushed the victim to the ground and the victim's satchel was pulled from him. It contained various high value items, including a Louis Vuitton wallet, a Burberry beanie hat, prescription glasses and various other items. The total value of the items was approximately £3,684. The whole incident, which must have been very frightening for the victim, can be seen on CCTV footage, which we have viewed. That was the offence of robbery. The victim returned to his flat and called the police. Meanwhile, the appellant and the co-defendant went to a shop and used the victim's bank card to buy a drink. That was the offence of fraud.[4]The appellant had 11 previous convictions for 28 offences. They included four offences of theft and two offences of assaulting an emergency worker. In an updated pre-sentence report, the author noted that the appellant had responded badly to a previous sentence. It was noted that the risk that the appellant presented had escalated and that that risk could not be managed in the community. A psychiatric report assessed the appellant as suffering from post traumatic stress disorder which arose out of events connected with his travel as a young child from his home in Egypt. He also has drug addiction problems. In addition, there was a report from a psychologist. In a victim personal statement, the victim explained the impact that the robbery had had on him. He said that he felt unsafe, even at home, and he felt more unsafe when he left his flat to go to work.[5]The Recorder considered the relevant Sentencing Council Guidelines, the harm caused, and the appellant's culpability. He considered aggravating features, including the appellant's previous convictions and the fact that the appellant was on licence at the time that he committed this offence. He took into account the mitigating factors, including the appellant's psychiatric problems and his age (21 years old at the time of the offence). The Recorder concluded, having considered all of those matters, that the appropriate sentence for the robbery was one of three years' imprisonment, before any reduction to reflect the guilty plea. As the appellant had pleaded guilty, that sentence was reduced by 25 per cent, which resulted in the sentence of 27 months' imprisonment. The Recorder also imposed a concurrent term of four months' imprisonment for the offence of fraud. As we have said, no complaint is or could be made about those sentences for the robbery and the fraud.[6]The Crown had made an application for a Criminal Behaviour Order. The application requested that five prohibitions be imposed, namely that the appellant: 1. Not enter the Borough of Westminster; 2. Not to be in a group of two or more people in a public place, unless those people were a family member; 3. Not to be in possession of more than one mobile phone or SIM card which must be registered on Immobilise. 4. Not to have any knife whatsoever in any public place; and 5. Not to associate with the co-defendant, Mouhcine Farouqi.[7]The application was supported by a witness statement from Police Constable Ephraim. He stated that the appellant was a persistent offender; that his level of criminality and antisocial behaviour had escalated; and that he had become more dangerous and posed a high risk to the pubic. PC Ephraim noted that over the previous 12 months the police had had many calls in relation to violent robberies, antisocial behaviour, drugs and other street violence in Westminster, although they were not connected with the appellant. But that was a reflection on the character of Westminster, which had a vibrant 24 hours a day, seven days a week environment. PC Ephraim said that criminal and antisocial behaviour had a serious impact on local businesses, on staff and on members of the public. The appellant did not live, or work, or receive education in Westminster; he lived in Hertfordshire. He had gone to Westminster simply to commit crime and engage in antisocial behaviour. PC Ephraim detailed the many times that the appellant had been arrested for threatening and violent behaviour.[8]Counsel who represented the appellant in the court below said that he had no objections to the order that was being sought.[9]In his sentencing remarks, the Recorder said this:
"… what we are trying to achieve or what was agreed to be achieved was a three-year period where Westminster were free from these defendants. Now that is at least partly achieved by the prison sentence. I am not a fan of internal exile. It is not a concept that the English law has enjoyed in the past. I appreciate that it is available to us, and I appreciate that the criminal behaviour order is merited. But if the purpose of the Metropolitan Police is to ensure that, for at least three years, Westminster is free of these men, well, that is partly achieved by the prison sentence, and perhaps even fully achieved – no, it is not fully achieved by the prison sentence, is it – and partly achieved by the criminal behaviour order. I do not think it would be sensible to make five year, or four or five year criminal behaviour orders in the circumstances."

The Recorder therefore made the order in the terms sought for three years.

[10]Ms Bajwa, who appears on behalf of the appellant, challenges three of the five prohibitions imposed upon the appellant. Ground 1 concerns the condition that the appellant is not to be in a group of two or more people in a public place, unless the person is a family member. Ms Bajwa submitted that the appellant does not have a history of engaging in antisocial behaviour or suspected criminal activity in a group with other individuals. The only evidence of group activity was the current robbery. It was submitted that there is no rational connection with any risk that the appellant presents and that the condition was not properly tailored to his specific circumstances. Further, she submitted that the appellant cannot meet Social Services' professionals, as he is entitled to do, in the ordinary council offices. Arrangements have had to be made for him to see staff in a private area where members of the public do not have access. We are also told the police have said that they would not bring a prosecution if the appellant was meeting professionals, even if that was in a public place. Ms Bajwa submitted that the prohibition went far beyond what was necessary to achieve the outcome sought. It involved a total prohibition on any interaction with any other individual, bar family, in a public place. Ms Bajwa submitted that that did not meet the statutory test and, further, was an intrusion into the appellant's private life under Article 8 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, which was not justified under Article 8(2). She also submitted that because of the lack of clarity, it might result in the appellant's arrest and imprisonment in circumstances that she submitted might amount to a breach of Articles 5 and 7 of the Convention.[11]Ground 2 concerns the prohibition that the appellant does not have more than one mobile phone. Miss Bajwa submitted that this was an unjustified restriction. She submitted that there was no evidence to suggest that the appellant was engaged in the sort of activity such as drug dealing, nor sexual offending, in respect of which such orders are normally imposed. She submitted that such a prohibition would not help the appellant from engaging in antisocial behaviour, and was not tailored to his circumstances.[12]Ground 3 concerns the prohibition on the appellant entering the Borough of Westminster. Ms Bajwa submitted that this again was not tailored to the appellant's circumstances. She accepted that there had been at least ten incidents of antisocial behaviour of different types in the Borough of Westminster area.[13]Shortly before this hearing, Mr Scully for the prosecution provided a Respondent's Revised Position Statement in which it was indicated that the prosecution accepted that ground 1 should succeed as the prohibition of the appellant not being in a group of two or more people in a public place did not satisfy the statutory test in the circumstances of this particular case. Mr Scully made submissions supporting the other two conditions. He drew attention to the fact that in relation to the prohibition about mobile phone usage there was intelligence from 2020 where the appellant had told police officers that he was a drug dealer, and that the possession of more than one mobile phone is a common characteristic of those who engage in drug dealing. In addition, he submitted that other acquisitive offences had been also committed by the appellant.

Discussion

[14]Section 330 of the Sentencing Act 2020 defines a Criminal Behaviour Order as:
"… an order which, for the purpose of preventing an offender from engaging in behaviour that is likely to cause harassment, alarm or distress to any person — (a) prohibits the offender from doing anything described in the order; (b) requires the offender to do anything described in the order."
[15]Section 331(2) provides:
"The court may make a criminal behaviour order against the offender if it — (a) is satisfied that the offender has engaged in behaviour that caused or was likely to cause harassment, alarm or distress to any person, and (b) considers that making the order will help in preventing the offender from engaging in such behaviour."
[16]The court is entitled to have regard to evidence adduced by the prosecution or the offender, even if the evidence would not have been admissible in criminal proceedings. There is also provision for the person concerned to apply to vary the order. A breach of the order is a criminal offence and can lead to a sentence of imprisonment of up to five years.[17]This court considered the provisions of the predecessor to section 331 in R v Khan [2018] EWCA Crim 1472, [2018] 1 WLR 5419. Among other requirements the court noted at [14] of its judgment that the "terms of the order must be precise and capable of being understood by the offender". At [15] the court said this:
"Because an order must be precise and capable of being understood by the offender, a court should ask itself before making an order 'are the terms of this order clear so that the offender will know precisely what it is that he is prohibited from doing?' Prohibitions should be reasonable and proportionate; realistic and practical; and be in terms which make it easy to determine and prosecute a breach. …"
Further, at [20] the Court of Appeal said this: 18. "We do not believe that it was the intention of Parliament that criminal behaviour orders should become a mere matter of box-ticking routine. As Beatson LJ said, such orders are not lightly to be imposed; the court should proceed with a proper degree of caution and circumspection; the order must be tailored to the specific circumstances of the person on whom it is to be imposed; and assessments of proportionality are intensively fact sensitive."

Further, at [20] the Court of Appeal said this:

[18]Finally, it must be borne in mind that this is an appeal. We can only intervene if the Recorder erred in imposing one or more of the prohibitions. The fact that a different judge might not have chosen to make a Criminal Behaviour Order in this case would not be sufficient. It must be demonstrated that the judge who made the order erred when doing so.[19]We have no doubt that the requirement of section 331(2)(a) is satisfied. The appellant has engaged in behaviour that has caused harassment, alarm and distress to his victim. That emerges clearly from the facts of the robbery and from the victim impact statement. We have no doubt that the Recorder was entitled to conclude that a Criminal Behaviour Order with some prohibitions would help in preventing the appellant from engaging in such criminal behaviour. Condition 4, prohibiting the appellant from having a knife in a public place, and condition 5, prohibiting him from associating with his co-accused, with whom he carried out the street robbery, are examples of appropriate prohibitions. No complaint is or could be made about those prohibitions.[20]We turn to the three prohibitions which are the subject of this appeal. We deal, first, with the prohibition that the appellant cannot be in a group of two or more people in a public place, unless they are family members. There are difficulties in relation to this prohibition in terms of its width, its lack of clarity, and the difficulty in enforcing such a prohibition. In terms of width, the appellant is prevented from being with any other person, save a family member, in any public place. It would stop him being with anyone else, in a street or a supermarket, with a friend or an acquaintance.[21]There are difficulties about the lack of clarity in relation to this prohibition. There is concern that the appellant is prevented from accessing support from Social Services, because, on one reading, that would involve him being in a group of two or more people in a public place – for example, Social Services offices where the public are allowed to come and go. The difficulties over the precise boundaries of the order are reflected in the fact that Social Services have had to arrange for meetings to take place in private rooms in council offices to which the public do not have access. We are told that the police have said that they will not enforce the condition if the appellant is meeting professionals. The problem with the prohibition, however, cannot be solved by the use of discretion on the part of the police. Rather, the need for the prohibition to be interpreted, or for bodies such as Social Services or the police to take action to prevent the prohibition having an unreasonable and undesirable effect, reflects the fundamental problem that the prohibition is not precise and clear. Furthermore, there is no explanation in the Recorder's sentencing remarks as to why it was considered that this particular prohibition was appropriate.[22]For all those reasons, we consider that the imposition of this particular prohibition was not a proper exercised of the discretion conferred by section 331 of the Sentencing Act 2020. We therefore quash prohibition 2. In those circumstances it is not necessary to consider any argument about the Convention. The prohibition is simply not a lawful exercise of the power to impose a Criminal Behaviour Order.[23]We next consider ground 3 of the appeal, which relates to prohibition 1, that the appellant must not enter the Borough of Westminster. The area is defined by reference to a map. That is a clear and precise prohibition. We consider that the Recorder was entitled to conclude that to impose such a condition would help in preventing the appellant from engaging in antisocial behaviour. There is evidence that on at least ten occasions the appellant has engaged in antisocial behaviour within the Borough of Westminster. That takes place against the background of the nature of the Borough of Westminster. The evidence of PC Ephraim explains that Westminster has a unique character, with an environment which attracts those who wish to engage in antisocial behaviour and to commit violent crime against others. Preventing the appellant from entering that environment – an environment where he has already engaged in antisocial behaviour – would help in preventing the appellant from engaging in further antisocial behaviour. It would keep him out of the area. The prohibition is proportionate. It is limited to a period of three years. The appellant does not live, or work, or receive education in the Borough of Westminster. The prohibition does not restrict any of his current lawful activities. If circumstances change and he needs to go to Westminster, he can apply to vary the order. The Recorder was, in our judgment, entitled to impose this prohibition. We would not allow the appeal on ground 3.[24]We deal next with ground 2, which relates to the prohibition on having more than one mobile phone. On balance, we are satisfied that the Recorder was entitled to impose this prohibition. The evidence was that the appellant's criminal behaviour had escalated and worsened. That clearly emerges from the updated pre-sentence report. It also clearly emerges from the evidence of PC Ephraim. The fact is that the appellant had travelled to Westminster and had carried out a violent street robbery in which he stole the possessions of an innocent victim. There is clearly a high risk of him again stealing from persons in the street. Secondly, there is intelligence that the appellant has told the police that he is a drug dealer, and we recognise that the possession or availability of more than one mobile phone is a common feature of drug dealing. In those circumstances we are satisfied that the Recorder was entitled to conclude that a prohibition limiting the appellant to having one mobile phone (and that mobile phone has to be registered) could help prevent him committing further offences. The prohibition is clear and precise. It is capable of enforcement. Were the appellant to be in possession of more than one mobile phone, or if he has one phone which is not registered, he would be committing an offence. The prohibition is limited to three years. We would not allow the appeal on ground 2.[25]Before outlining our final conclusions on this appeal, the court would like to thank both counsel for their very helpful written and oral submissions and for their very realistic appraisal of the circumstances of this case. The court has been considerably assisted by both Ms Bajwa and Mr Scully. We are very grateful to them.[26]In summary, therefore, we grant an extension of time for appealing and we grant leave to appeal. We allow the appeal on ground 1 only. We quash prohibition 2 of the Criminal Behaviour Order. We dismiss the appeal on the other grounds. The Criminal Behaviour Order continues in force with prohibitions 1, 3, 4 and 5 in place. Only prohibition 2 is quashed. _________________________ Epiq Europe Ltd hereby certify that the above is an accurate and complete record of the proceedings or part thereof. Lower Ground Floor, 46 Chancery Lane, London WC2A 1JE Tel No: 020 7404 1400 Email: rcj@epiqglobal.co.uk ______________________________