R v Kevin George March [2025] EWCA Crim 617

WARNING: reporting restrictions may apply to the contents transcribed in this document, particularly if the case concerned a sexual offence or involved a child. Reporting restrictions prohibit the publication of the applicable information to the public or any section of the public, in writing, in a broadcast or by means of the internet, including social media. Anyone who receives a copy of this transcript is responsible in law for making sure that applicable restrictions are not breached. A person who breaches a reporting restriction is liable to a fine and/or imprisonment. For guidance on whether reporting restrictions apply, and to what information, ask at the court office or take legal advice.This Transcript is Crown Copyright.  It may not be reproduced in whole or in part other than in accordance with relevant licence or with the express consent of the Authority.  All rights are reserved.[2025] EWCA Crim 617Swansea Crown CourtThe Law CourtsSt Helen’s RoadSwansea, SA1 4PFDate Thursday 27 March 2025
Before
LADY JUSTICE MACURMRS JUSTICE CHEEMA-GRUBBMRS JUSTICE EADY
Between
REXCrownV
Between
KEVIN GEORGE MARCH__________Computer Aided Transcript of Epiq Europe Ltd,Lower Ground, 46 Chancery Lane, London WC2A 1JETel No: 020 7404 1400; Email: rcj@epiqglobal.co.uk (Official Shorthand Writers to the Court)_________The Applicant appeared in Person. for in person_________JUDGMENT(Approved)
[1]Mr Kevin March (who is now aged 73) has attended today and explained his reasons for renewing applications for an extension of time of 1715 days, for leave to appeal against conviction and for a representation order following refusal, with reasons provided by the Single Judge.[2]On 15 May 2019, in the Crown Court at Cardiff, the applicant (then aged 67) pleaded guilty to count 2 on the indictment of an offence stated as “CONSENT, CONNIVANCE OR NEGLECT BY A DIRECTOR in the commission of an offence by a body corporate contrary to section 37(1) of the Health and Safety at Work etc Act 1974.” The Particulars of Offence to which the applicant pleaded guilty provide:
“… between the 5th October 2015 and 4th October 2016, in respect of construction work at West Aberthaw Farm Barns Project, Barrie, being a director of Pro’Conn Limited, a body corporate to which the provisions of the Health and Safety at Work etc Act 1974 apply and which had committed an offence contrary to Regulation 13(2) of the Construction (Design and Management) Regulations 2005, in that it failed to plan, manage and monitor the construction work to ensure, so far as was reasonably practicable, that the work carried out by it or under its control was carried out without risk to health and safety, including that of David White; that offence was committed with his consent or connivance or was attributable to neglect on his part.”
We emphasise the last seven words.[3]On 19 December 2019 the applicant applied to vacate his guilty plea. If that had been allowed the plea would revert to not guilty and the prosecution would have to prove the case against him at a trial. However, the application was refused by Jefford J, who gave a reasoned judgment which Mr March has in writing. The plea of guilty then remained in place. Sometime later, on 17 November 2020, the applicant was sentenced to 32 weeks’ imprisonment suspended for 12 months by HHJ P Thomas KC. He was ordered to pay costs of £20,000, a statutory surcharge was imposed and he was disqualified from being a company director for 5 years.[4]Mr March is well aware of the circumstances of the prosecution which arose from the death of David White, a 33-year-old labourer, working at a construction site where the applicant’s company Pro’Conn was converting barns into living accommodation. Mr White was not qualified to drive a dumper truck or other plant vehicles. But on 1 October 2016 he had agreed to do overtime working on the site on his own. The construction site had rough made-up roads and slopes constructed from the removal of spoil. These roads were temporary and in places the terrain was unsuitable for vehicular use because it exceeded the maximum machine operating slope of 14 degrees.[5]Although there was no eyewitness or CCTV evidence of the fatal accident, the investigation concluded that Mr White had been driving a dumper truck to move soil from one part of the site to another, and died when it overturned at or near a slope. The body of the deceased man was not discovered until 3 October 2016.[6]The applicant’s company went into liquidation shortly after Mr White’s death but following an investigation into the working practices on site, the applicant was prosecuted for failures in his company’s health and safety duties. In essence, the basis of the prosecution was that Pro’Conn’s inadequate procedures were a substantial cause of the fatal accident and where a offence is committed by a company and is proved to be attributable neglect on the part of any director of the company, then that individual is also guilty of an offence.[7]The applicant pleaded guilty, as it is said, and at that time he was legally represented. As is frequently the case, especially concerning health and safety prosecutions there was a limited basis of plea. That basis was reduced to writing. In summary, the applicant stated that the company of which he was sole director at the relevant time had subcontracted with another body (the TSD Group) of which a man, Graham Kuhlmann, was project manager. The contract was to the effect that TSD group was to manage all the health and safety on site and, as far as the applicant was aware, it was doing so. He was not wilfully blind but, in his role as a director, he neglected to maintain control of managing and monitoring the site. This latter admission amounted to an acceptance of the allegation.[8]Mr Kuhlmann in turn accepted his responsibility for the accident and pleaded guilty on 4 March 2020 to count 1, an offence of failing to conduct an undertaking so as to ensure no exposure to risk to health and safety contrary to section 3(2) of the Act.[9]When Mr March applied to vacate his plea on 19 December 2019, having dispensed with the services of his legal team, the judge checked, on the record, that he understood, when he entered the plea, what the necessary elements of the offence were and, it was clear that at both the time of plea and the time of the application, he maintained he had been guilty of a degree of neglect.[10]We have read the transcript of the whole hearing which clearly demonstrates this. In those circumstances, the grounds that Mr March put forward for vacating his plea were bound to fail. Essentially these were that the prosecution had not complied fully with its disclosure duties in place before the plea was entered, complaints about the investigation itself and the impact of poor representation. The alleged dilatory process of disclosure which continued after the plea had been entered, and failures therein, deprived the applicant of material upon which to challenge the prosecution case. The omissions alleged in the investigation included not pursuing others who may have been at fault.[11]In an email to the Court of Appeal Office on 25 March 2025, Mr March stated that the point he has been trying to make is that the evidence which would have assisted him in a defence to the charge of negligence was not disclosed until after the application to vacate his plea. To this Court he has repeated his firmly held views that the investigation did not question the right people and allowed itself to be misled. The prosecution focused on his company rather than the project manager’s organisation which had volunteered to manage health and safety on the site with a specific adviser in that field, Mr Bee who should have been more rigorously pursued and found culpable. He also believed others had conspired to hide the truth and cover up what happened on the site and he argued that he did not make a fully informed plea.[12]The difficulty he faces is that although the court has a discretion to allow a defendant to vacate a guilty plea, the way in which that discretion may be exercised is well established. A simple change of mind because others might also be responsible is insufficient as are deficiencies in the disclosure process. If a plea is equivocal then it will not be a true plea of guilty. Even if not equivocal the court may allow a change of plea on other grounds where it is necessary for justice to be done. In R v Dodd (1981) 74 Cr App R 50, this Court confirmed that the Crown Court has a discretion to allow a defendant to change a plea of guilty to one of not guilty at any time up until sentence. There remains the residual discretion even if the plea of guilty was unequivocal; that discretion must be exercised judicially. Undue pressure to plead guilty, deficient legal advice or some other good reason may be sufficient grounds but the onus is on the party seeking to vacate the guilty plea to demonstrate that justice requires that this should be committed.[13]It is not necessary to recite the details of Mr March’s complaint in this short judgment or set out the exhaustive responses of the Crown, which again the applicant has in writing. But we have examined Mr March’s allegations and the history of the case. We are not persuaded that any shortcomings in the investigation or disclosure process at any stage were of such materiality that this applicant’s plea of guilty was undermined. The judge who considered the application to vacate the plea explored the extent to which the applicant claimed to have been ignorant of relevant material. Similarly, we have examined the claims of poor representation by Mr March’s legal team and found them equally lacking in cogency.[14]None of the matters raised in this renewed application are fresh topics. None of them are capable, in our judgment, of clearing the central hurdle, namely the limited circumstances in which the defendant in criminal proceedings is entitled to vacate every entered guilty plea. The ruling refusing the application was grounded in the relevant law and demonstrated a conspicuously fair examination of the circumstances.[15]Having considered these applications independently for ourselves, we find ourselves in agreement with the Single Judge. We recognise that adverse advice on appeal and the applicant’s own medical diagnosis in 2021 have caused some delay in submitting the proposed grounds of appeal. Having found no merit in them it is not necessary to explore further why the appeal was lodged so late. The applications must be refused. Epiq Europe Ltd hereby certify that the above is an accurate and complete record of the proceedings or part thereof. Lower Ground, 46 Chancery Lane, London WC2A 1JE Tel No: 020 7404 1400 16. Email: rcj@epiqglobal.co.uk