R v Javed Sheikh [2025] EWCA Crim 566

WARNING: reporting restrictions may apply to the contents transcribed in this document, particularly if the case concerned a sexual offence or involved a child. Reporting restrictions prohibit the publication of the applicable information to the public or any section of the public, in writing, in a broadcast or by means of the internet, including social media. Anyone who receives a copy of this transcript is responsible in law for making sure that applicable restrictions are not breached. A person who breaches a reporting restriction is liable to a fine and/or imprisonment. For guidance on whether reporting restrictions apply, and to what information, ask at the court office or take legal advice.This Transcript is Crown Copyright.  It may not be reproduced in whole or in part other than in accordance with relevant licence or with the express consent of the Authority.  All rights are reserved.[2025] EWCA Crim 566Swansea Crown CourtThe Law CourtsSt Helen’s RoadSwansea, SA1 4PFDate Wednesday 26 March 2025
Before
LADY JUSTICE MACURMRS JUSTICE CHEEMA-GRUBBMRS JUSTICE EADY
Between
REXCrownV
Between
JAVED SHEIKH__________Computer Aided Transcript of Epiq Europe Ltd,Lower Ground, 46 Chancery Lane, London WC2A 1JETel No: 020 7404 1400; Email: rcj@epiqglobal.co.uk (Official Shorthand Writers to the Court)_________NON-COUNSEL APPLICATION_________JUDGMENT
[1]On 29 January 2024, Javed Sheikh (“the applicant”) was convicted of stalking contrary to section 4A (1 )(a)(b)(ii) and (5) of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997. On 30 January 2024 he was sentenced to 8 years’ imprisonment. A restraining order was also imposed until further order pursuant to section 359 of the Sentencing Act 2020.[2]The applicant was represented throughout by solicitors and leading and junior counsel. He renews his application for leave to appeal against conviction and sentence following refusal by the Single Judge. The applicant is now unrepresented. He has been provided with the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) Office summary of the case and has made comments upon it and also raised additional points subsequent to the Single Judge’s decision, all of which we have read and considered in reaching our determination in this renewed application. The Facts in Summary[3]The applicant was an unsuccessful litigant in proceedings in the Administrative Appeals Chamber of the Upper Tribunal heard by HHJ Oliver sitting with two lay members. Those proceedings concluded some 10 years before trial, with the judgment critical of the applicant. Thereafter, a blog was created which was highly offensive and threatening in content directed towards the judge and his family. The alleged conduct at the heart of the subsequent civil and criminal proceedings was the applicant’s alleged creation and maintenance of that blog , the publication of the existence of the blog amongst those connected to the judge and also the applicant’s failure to remove comments made by third parties which the applicant had prompted.[4]The applicant denied that he was responsible for the blog but, in the alternative, asserted that acts of criticism of a practising judge are protected under Article 10 of ECHR as an exercise of free speech.[5]Prior to the criminal proceedings, harassment claims had been pursued in the civil courts and injunctions were made. The applicant was found to be in breach of those injunctions, contempt proceedings followed, and he was committed to prison.[6]At the criminal trial counsel for the defence applied to exclude evidence of the civil injunctions and contempt proceedings. He cited Hollington v Hewthorn [1943] KB 587 and R v Hogart [2007] EWCA Crim 338 as authority for the proposition that any findings made by a civil court are inadmissible in criminal proceedings. Alternatively, that the evidence should be excluded pursuant to section 78 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 as overly prejudicial. However, the judge found that since the principal issue at trial was the identity of the person who created and maintained and/or controlled the blog:
“That involves a chronology analysis of the blog which is the Crown is entitled to say developed in relation to matters occurring in the civil proceedings and allied to this is the issue of motive.”
[7]In the first of the grounds of appeal settled by counsel it is asserted that the trial judge was in error in allowing the admission of the civil judgments made against the applicant into the proceedings. Discussion[8]The judge addressed the case law in a conspicuously careful written judgment. We found no error in his analysis of the relevant authorities. That is Hollington v Hewthorn and Hogart are not authorities for the proposition that any findings made by a civil court are inadmissible in criminal proceedings. On the contrary, Hollington v Hewthorn specifically provides that:
“A judgment, however, is conclusive as against all persons of the existence of the state of things which it actually affects when the existence of that state is a fact in issue.”
[9]Hogart does not undermine this principle. This Court in Hogart found that findings in a civil judgment would be admissible pursuant to sections 117(1) and (2) of the Criminal Justice Act 2005. The question in that case was whether the judge had wrongly exercised his discretion in admitting the same. However:
“On the peculiar facts of this case, where precisely the same allegations were being made in the civil proceedings as in the criminal proceedings and a civil judge had made findings in respect of them…We have already observed that questions could be asked as of right in cross-examination as to whether or not such allegations were made. The jury would be mystified if they were told there were proceedings in which these allegations were made but they could not be told what the judge had found in relation to them.”
[10]The issue in the extant case before the civil court and the criminal court was the identity of the blogger. The finding in the civil court on this issue was admissible but not determinative in the criminal trial, which was subject to a different standard of proof and a different evidential basis. The evidence of the decision of the Tribunal rejecting the applicant’s appeal obviously went to motive.[11]Further, we find nothing to suggest that the judge was unreasonable or irrational in the exercise of his discretion in refusing to exclude the evidence pursuant to section 78 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984. In so far as the judge made the point that the evidence had not been obtained illegally, this may have referred to the criticism of the complainant in his application for injunctive relief, but the issue was not a live one and obviously was not central to the judge’s decision. It is apparent from his ruling that the judge determined that the potential prejudicial effect of the evidence clearly did not outweigh its probative value, and that any prejudicial impact was catered for in the firm direction to the jury which he gave to the jury and which we consider was favourable to the applicant. That direction was in terms:
“You have been told in the agreedfacts about certain parts of the civil proceedings between Simon Oliver SO, and the Defendant. These have been put before you to help you with the chronology of events, to describe what the Defendant said in those proceedings, to describe the orders made by certain judges, and as part of the background to the case. I must emphasise to you, and you must accept as a legal direction, that what was decided by judges in those cases, including as to responsibility for the blog, is not relevant to your task, and do not speculate about what they decided. They were not applying all the same legal rules you must apply. They were not applying the high standard of being required to be sure about findings, and they did not have the same evidence presented in this case. You have to decide independently whether the Prosecution has made you sure made you sure of the Defendant’s guilt, based only on the evidence you’ve been presented with in this case, applying the legal directions I give you in this document.”
[12]It follows that we consider that ground 1 is unarguable.[13]The second ground of appeal drafted by counsel is that the judge erred in ruling against the submission of no case to answer. The judge found however that there was ample circumstantial evidence upon which the jury properly directed could be satisfied so that it was sure that the applicant was the author and the controller of the blog. It mattered not that there were other possible perpetrators. The judge’s directions on the burden and standard of proof made clear that the jury should only convict if they were sure in identifying the applicant as the controller of the blog. We agree with the judge as any alleged failures in police investigation as alleged could not possibly support a submission of no case to answer. The judge had to determine the application on the evidence before the jury not what might have been. We have regard to the evidence. We find, as the judge did, that there was ample circumstantial evidence upon which the jury properly directed could be sure.[14]Consequently ground 2 is unarguable.[15]By letter dated 9 October 2024, the applicant added additional grounds of appeal. Most of the contents of the letter are repetitious of the grounds of appeal against conviction settled by counsel, otherwise confused by reference to the sentencing exercise, with which we deal below, and t not the safety of the conviction. These several repeated points do not need to be addressed by us further.[16]Of the ‘new’ points the applicant makes alleging a breach of his ECHR Article 10 rights to free speech, we note that the judge explicitly catered for this alternative ‘defence’ in the legal directions he gave to the jury viz:
“As one would expect, there are limits to freedom of speech, even as regards public officials. The Prosecution say that what the Defendant did went well beyond any proper exercise of free speech rights and was unreasonable and oppressive. The law recognises that all citizens including public figures like judges, have a right to private life. Like freedom of speech, it is an important right in our democracy and has high protection. The Prosecution argue that rather than exercising his free speech rights the Defendant conducted a harassment campaign over several years as a vindictive way of getting at SO, who had decided the case in the AAC against him. They say the communications were abusive and offensive relating to matters concerning the private life of SO and his family, as opposed to his role as a judge. As regards his role as a judge, the Prosecution say that the Defendant falsely accused SO of serious misconduct, including bribery and corruption and misconduct in hearings. The Prosecution say that both the references to personal matters about SO and his wife, and the false allegations of misconduct as a judge, all went beyond any legitimate exercise of free speech in relation to a public official. The law seeks to strike a fair balance between these two rights. That is free speech rights of the Defendant and the right to a private life of SO. In this case, you will be responsible for striking that balance. So, in deciding whether the Prosecution has made you sure that the Defendant’s conduct was oppressive and so unreasonable as to amount to harassment, you will need to consider the entirety of the evidence… referred to...”
[17]This direction is unassailable. The additional proposed draft ground is therefore unarguable.[18]By a further letter dated 18 October the applicant added further “additional information” in which he takes issue with aspects of civil proceedings and reiterates that his defence was prejudiced by the judge identifying the complainant as a judicial post holder. This Court is not a Court of Appeal sitting in civil proceedings and we do not address the deficiencies which the applicant alleges to have occurred in the civil proceedings. The identity of the complainant as a judicial office holder was inevitable from the circumstances of the case. However, the judge was astute to direct the jury to determine the case on the evidence and put aside prejudice. He did so in terms:
“... Judge Oliver appears before you as a witness of fact. He’s like anyone who gives evidence in a, in a court, he doesn’t have any special status, and it’s really for you to assess his evidence, and you’ve got to assess whether his evidence about how he felt about the contents of both the blog, its various iterations, the kind of distribution it had to people he had professional associations with, as well as the comments, whether or not you’re satisfied so that you are sure that you can answer the questions in the route to verdict in favour of the Prosecution. But that’s ultimately a matter for you to assess, having seen him, him give evidence and having seen the documents that are before you.”
[19]This direction too is unassailable. This additional proposed ground is unarguable.[20]Finally, the applicant also asserts that the trial judge failed to adequately direct the jury on the different standard of proof between civil and criminal cases. Whilst it is correct that the judge did not do so in terms, he did direct the jury that the civil courts:
“... were not applying all the same legal rules you must apply. They were not applying the high standard of being required to be sure about findings.”
[21]This was a sufficient and straightforward direction which differentiated between the standard of proof between civil and criminal litigation. This additional proposed ground is unarguable.[22]The conviction is not arguably unsafe and the renewed application for permission to appeal is dismissed. Sentence[23]A transcript of the judge’s cogent and considered sentencing remarks is available to the applicant. Significantly the trial

judge found that the sentencing remarks could not:

“... within a reasonable length, capture the horrendous nature of what he [the applicant] said in the blog about [the complainant] and his family, or the nature of the personal threats they faced as a result of [the applicant’s] conduct.”
He went on to summarise some of the material to explain the basis of his sentence. Specifically, finding:
“I note that in order to give your false and abusive allegations against Judge Oliver maximum oxygen, you adopted a tactic of undertaking widescale distribution of the blog to court staff solicitors and professional associations of which Judge Oliver was a member. The associations sought then to distance Judge Oliver. You also encouraged followers of the blog to undertake widespread circulation. Your aim was to encourage disgruntled litigants who had appeared before Judge Oliver to join your army of hate. Those people posted material which you controlled as webmaster of the blog. There were threats of appalling acts of sexual violence against Judge Oliver’s former wife, physical attacks on his home and on his children and grandchildren, posting of where Judge Oliver was due to appear and clear monitoring of his movements. When Judge Oliver was sitting in the RCJ you posted the room number where he could be found. The purpose of this was to encourage physical confrontation or attacks on the judge. I find that you adopted a particularly cynical approach of recruiting persons who had been unsuccessful litigants in family proceedings, particularly those in proceedings concerning young children in custody. Although your own case was not heard by Judge Oliver as a family judge, you calculated, rightly, that there was an audience for your bile amongst those who Judge Oliver may have come across in family care proceedings. The comments on the blog, which exceed 2,000 posts, show that this was a willing and gullible audience for your conspiracy theories about Judge Oliver. Their comments show they were ready to be persuaded that a judge who may have decided cases about their children against them was a vile and corrupt criminal. All of your allegations about misconduct and crimes by Judge Oliver were totally false. No attempt was made to justify them at trial. Online stalkers like you have the ability to recruit an army of followers whose conduct massively expands the effect of your stalking. The multiplication effect of your stalking by online media meant in many respects your conduct was more serious than that of a conventional stalker.”
The judge also noted that the blog was maintained in defiance of the civil court orders. was more serious than that of a conventional stalker.”[24]The applicant’s culpability level was found to be very high and falling into Definitive Sentencing Guideline for intimidatory offences as category A because of the combination of culpability B factors namely: the length of time over which the blog was created and maintained and intended to maximise distress to the complainant; the high degree of planning;that the offending was sophisticated by use of additional media to avoid detection; that the offending persisted over a long period and also demonstrated hostility based on sexual orientation. That the blog was used as a foundation to deploy offensive homophobic tropes which were hostile, derogatory and grossly offensive fell within section 66 of the Sentencing Act 2020. Harm fell within category 1 due to very serious distress caused to the complainant which caused him to make considerable changes to his lifestyle. Avoiding any double counting, the statutory aggravating factors included the impact of the offence on the complainant and his children, the offence being committed against a person providing a public service, breach of the High Court orders and direction that the applicant to others for the blog to be reproduced when he discovered it was to be taken down by reason of the civil proceedings.[25]A pre-sentence report was not sought by the court and we agree it was not necessary to obtain one in the circumstances of this case. Nor do we deem one necessary for the purpose of determining this application.[26]In the grounds of appeal settled by counsel it is averred that the sentence was manifestly excessive since the judge(1) took too high a start beyond range of category 1A;(2) the sentence did not take into account the false sentence on committal for contempt of court which offended against the principle of totality which meant the applicant was being punished twice for the same criminality and(3) the judge failed to take into account the applicant’s mental disorder which ought to have been treated as a mitigating factor.[27]As to (1), we reject the argument that this was other than a high culpability greater harm case of a most extreme nature. The judge’s findings were explicit. There was every justification for the judge to reach a sentence outside the top of the range and close to the maximum sentence. As to (2), whilst the applicant was sentenced to serve 16 months’ imprisonment for his contempt of the Civil Court and served a sentence between March and November 2022, the rationale of the sentence was not the same. The imprisonment in respect of the civil proceedings necessarily related and marked the applicant’s disobedience of the civil court order. The sentence in the criminal proceedings was to penalise him for the offence he had committed against the complainant and in relation to that facts that were not before the Civil Court.[28]The judge specifically did take into account the fact the applicant had already served a term of imprisonment for his civil contempt. The judge was not obliged to give credit for the 16 months’ sentence which had been imposed in the contempt proceedings, and he did not disregard the principle of totality. The judge’s decision to deduct 6 months from the sentence fairly represented the degree of overlap between the two proceedings. The deduction does not arguably render the sentence wrong in principle or manifestly excessive.[29]As to 3, a psychological and psychiatric report were available to the judge. The psychological report made a provisional diagnosis of personality impairments. The judge patently did consider the contents of the psychological report (which is referred to at some length and relied upon by Dr Nimmagadda, the psychiatrist who prepared the report for the court). The judge did not consider that the provisional diagnosis made by the psychologist explained or mitigated the applicant’s culpability.[30]Although the applicant rightly asserts that the judge did not refer to the psychiatric report from Dr Nimmagaadda in his sentencing remarks, in reality the report which we have read takes the matter a no further forward. Dr Nimmagadda considered it likely that the applicant was suffering from a schizoid-type of disorder and had paranoid views regarding the complainant but there is nothing in the report to indicate that this was causative of the offence. The report does not appear to address the applicant’s targeting of other members of the complainant’s families. Further, Dr Nimmagadda considered but did not make a diagnosis of ‘delusional disorder’, which disorder would fall within Schedule 1 of the Overarching Guideline on Sentencing a defendant with mental impairments, developmental impairments and neurological conditions and therefore be recognised as a disorder potentially reducing culpability for the offence. Nor did the possible diagnosis afford the applicant any sufficient mitigation for commission of the offence, for there was nothing in the report to suggest that at the time of the offence the applicant’s impairment or disorder impaired his ability to exercise appropriate judgment, to make rational choices or to understand the nature and consequence of his actions.[31]The Overarching Sentencing Guidelines on sentencing defendants with mental impairments, developmental impairment and neurological condition makes clear that:
“The fact that an offender has an impairment or disorder should always be considered by the court, but it will not necessarily have an impact on sentencing.”
As we have indicated, the judge did consider the fact of the offender’s provisional diagnoses of an impairment, but we agree with him that it had no impact on the sentencing exercise that he had to conduct.[32]This ground is therefore unarguable in its constituent parts.[33]In the letters referred above, the applicant contends that he should have been sentenced under the previous sentencing regime that was applicable up to 2017 and provided for a maximum sentence of 5 years’ imprisonment. The applicant’s indictment period was between 1 January 2016 and 9 June 2021. The judge was satisfied that the evidence revealed that the offence continued from before 3 April 2017 to 8 June 2021. From 3 April 2017 the maximum sentence for stalking contrary to section 4A of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 was increased to 10 years’ imprisonment by virtue of section 175 of the Police and Crime Act 2017 and Regulation 2 and paragraph 35 of Schedule 1 of the Statutory Instrument 2017/399. Where the course of conduct occurred over two or more days the offences were taken to have been committed on the last of those days. As it was, the judge found that most of the offending took place after 3 April 2017.[34]This additional draft ground is unarguable.[35]It follows from the above that the sentence imposed was not arguably wrong in principle nor manifestly excessive. The renewed application for permission to appeal sentence is also refused. Epiq Europe Ltd hereby certify that the above is an accurate and complete record of the proceedings or part thereof. Lower Ground, 46 Chancery Lane, London WC2A 1JE. Tel No: 020 7404 1400 Email: rcj@epiqglobal.co.uk

Cited in 1 later judgment