R v Paul Watson [2025] EWCA Crim 563

WARNING: reporting restrictions may apply to the contents transcribed in this document, particularly if the case concerned a sexual offence or involved a child. Reporting restrictions prohibit the publication of the applicable information to the public or any section of the public, in writing, in a broadcast or by means of the internet, including social media. Anyone who receives a copy of this transcript is responsible in law for making sure that applicable restrictions are not breached. A person who breaches a reporting restriction is liable to a fine and/or imprisonment. For guidance on whether reporting restrictions apply, and to what information, ask at the court office or take legal advice.This Transcript is Crown Copyright.  It may not be reproduced in whole or in part other than in accordance with relevant licence or with the express consent of the Authority.  All rights are reserved.[2025] EWCA Crim 563Venue Royal Courts of JusticeStrandLondonWC2A 2LLDate Thursday 3 April 2025
Before
LADY JUSTICE MACURMR JUSTICE LAVENDERMR JUSTICE BOURNEREFERENCE BY THE ATTORNEY GENERAL UNDER S.36 CRIMINAL JUSTICE ACT 1988
Between
REXCrownV
Between
PAUL WATSON__________Computer Aided Transcript of Epiq Europe Ltd,Lower Ground, 46 Chancery Lane, London WC2A 1JETel No: 020 7404 1400; Email: rcj@epiqglobal.co.uk (Official Shorthand Writers to the Court)_________MR B LLOYD appeared for Solicitor General.MR R ENGLISH KC appeared for Offender._________JUDGMENT
[1]On 14 October 2024, Paul Watson (“the offender”) pleaded guilty, on the first day of his listed trial, to three counts of rape, anal, vaginal and oral and one count of controlling or coercive behaviour. On 14 January 2025, he was sentenced to 17 years’ imprisonment, comprising 14 years’ custody and 3 years extended licence for the anal rape, with concurrent sentences of 10 years’ imprisonment for each of the other rapes and 2 years’ imprisonment concurrent for the controlling and coercive behaviour. This is an application by His Majesty’s Solicitor-General for leave, pursuant to section 36 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988, to refer a sentence which she regards as unduly lenient. We grant leave. The Facts[2]The victim (“C”) was in a relationship with the offender between January and April 2024. The offender was controlling and abusive throughout the relationship. He would assault C and threaten her and her children with violence as a means of control. The offender would become angry during arguments and C would ask him to leave. Twice during such arguments, the offender headbutted the victim, leaving red marks on her head. On one occasion he threatened to throw a brick through her window and to set her property on fire with her inside it. On occasions he attended at her address, shouting abuse at her, calling her a whore, slut and a prostitute. The offender would force-feed C, he would demand to know where she was and who she was with and what time she would be back. He would barge into C’s property to check for the presence of other men. He would threaten to stab her and any man he discovered had been to her home.[3]The offender anally raped C. As he started to insert his penis inside her anus, C told him that it was painful, but he continued and said, “You like it like this.” C objected and was crying but the offender continued to penetrate her and to continued until ejaculation, causing C to bleed anally. On another occasion C submitted to vaginal intercourse with the offender, through fear of physical violence. The offender also liked rough sex and wanted her to perform oral sex on him. The offender forced C’s head down, grabbed her head and forced his penis so far inside her mouth that it caused her to vomit.[4]C’s victim personal statement recorded that she now felt anxious whenever she left the house, fearing that she would encounter the offender even though she knew he was in prison. She had relocated to a new town which had the effect of distancing her from family and friends. She no longer socialised and had changed her phone number. She felt overwhelmed and drained by her emotions. Her whole life had been overshadowed by the offending against her.[5]The offender was born on 25 March 1979 and had 29 previous convictions for 79 offences committed between 21 August 1995 and 15 January 2024, including relevant convictions for violent sexual offending against ex-partners and violent physical assault against others. Significantly, on 11 May 2012, the offender was sentenced to a total of 10 years’ imprisonment for three counts of sexual assault by penetration and one count of attempted sexual assault against his then ex-partner. At the time of that offending the offender was on bail with conditions not to contact her. The offender had been drinking with the victim during the day. On returning to her home address, he began to demand money from the victim. He accused her of being unfaithful and threatened her with a screwdriver. He made her undress and performed oral sex upon her. He digitally penetrated her vagina and then took several implements, the first a Febreze bottle and twisted it to insert it into her vagina. Thereafter, as we note from the pre-sentence report before the court below, he penetrated her vagina with a vase and a can of air freshener ,which he moved up and down before holding it in place whilst he slept. The victim, who was afraid to move until the next morning, remained with the air freshener inserted inside her.[6]Further, on 23 May 2023, the offender was sentenced to a 2-year community order for intentional strangulation common assault. The offender attacked his then partner at his home address. He pulled her to the ground when she tried to leave the house, grabbed her hair and pulled her into the bedroom. He then put his hands around her neck and pressed until she struggled to breathe. He punched her numerous times to the face causing her face to bleed. He tied a wire around his hand and attached his hand to the door so he would know if she tried to leave the bedroom, keeping her there against her will. Earlier in the day he had smashed the window of her home address.[7]A pre-sentence report was prepared and dated 13 January 2025. The Probation Service assessed the offender as posing a high risk of reconviction and a high risk of serious harm. The author of the report noted that the offender continued to assert his innocence and said that he had pleaded guilty because he thought he was more likely to have been convicted after trial “based on his antecedent history”. The offender claimed that the victim had fabricated the allegations against him in order to gain support from Social Services to move to a different area. The offender said he was “okay” in terms of his behaviour towards C and denied any aggression, verbal, sexual or physical.[8]He showed no awareness of the physical and the psychological impact of his behaviour on C and portrayed himself as the victim, as he did in relation to the other convictions which we indicate above:
“What is clear is that the defendant has a history of abusive behaviour within relationships, where he has used violence, whether physical, sexual or emotional to meet his own needs.”
The author of the pre-sentence report went on:
“My assessment is that the defendant poses a high risk of causing serious harm to known adults, and the public namely future partners, high meaning that there are identifiable indicators of risk of serious harm. The potential event could happen at any time and the impact would be serious... This is not the first time he has committed such serious offences against a partner in similar setting within a domestic union. This is also coupled with his long standing history of violence within intimate unions against past partners as reflected in his police call outs and probation records.”
The Sentencing Hearing[9]In sentencing the offender the judge referred to the facts of the index offending, he continued: “You have an appalling record, including offences of sexual violence against a former partner for which you received 10 years, as well as assault and strangulation. In all the circumstances, I must first consider whether a sentence of life imprisonment under sections 273 and 283 of the Sentencing Code should, for these offences, be imposed. You amply qualify for such a sentence. You have been convicted of a relevant scheduled offence, the appropriate sentence is plainly more than 10 years’ imprisonment, and you have a previous conviction for a scheduled offence. That being the case, I must impose a life sentence unless I consider it would be unjust to do so. Alternatively, I must consider whether you are a significant risk of serious harm by the commission of further scheduled offences such that you are what we call a ‘dangerous offender’. I have considered all the circumstances in this case, and I do not believe that a life sentence in this case would be a just outcome, notwithstanding your previous convictions and the seriousness of the offences, because of your age and because there are other alternatives which would be sufficient to protect the public from you, given that the sentence of life imprisonment would be a sentence of last resort... Having discounted the need for a life sentence, I do consider however that you are a highly dangerous offender. You clearly present a significant risk of the causing harm to females by the commission of further specified offences. You have amply demonstrated that danger by your previous convictions and by these convictions, and that danger will remain for as long as you fail to recognise what you have done and how you behave towards women... “ The judge then went on to deal with the categorisation of the extant offences, credit for plea and the necessity for an extended sentence.

The application

[10]Mr Lloyd, on behalf of His Majesty’s Solicitor General, submits that the judge ought to have imposed a life sentence, either pursuant to section 285 of the Sentencing Act 2020, or alternatively pursuant to section 283 of the Act.[11]Mr Lloyd cites R v Burinskas [2014] EWCA Crim 334, which distinguished between section 224A and section 225 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, then in force, namely the imposition of a discretionary life sentence by reason of dangerousnessandthe imposition of a life sentence upon the commission of a second ‘schedule offence’; the former requiring the court to have regard to the principle that life imprisonment is the “sentence of last resort”. The distinction held good in the distinction between imposition of a life sentence pursuant to section 285 or section 283 of the Sentencing Act 2020.[12]The correct approach was for the judge to first consider the dangerousness provisions pursuant to section 285. There was an escalating pattern of sexual offending within a domestic context. The index offending had been committed during the currency of a community order. The offender had showed a complete lack of insight into any of his sexual offending and continued to portray himself as the victim, in both the index and previous offences. The seriousness of the lead offence together with the other offences associated with it, the offender’s previous convictions and the level of danger posed , with no reliable estimate of the length of time in which the offender would remain a danger to the public, meant that the necessary level of public protection could not be achieved by an extended sentence alone : there was no realistic alternative sentence to life imprisonment pursuant to section 285: (see R v A(A) [2014] EWCA Crim 2483 and R v Saunders [2013] EWCA Crim 1027).[13]Alternatively, the judge was required to go on to consider a life sentence, pursuant to section 283 of the Sentencing Act 2020. The offender had previously been convicted of an offence listed in Schedule 15, namely the previous convictions for assault by penetration, for which he had received 10 years’ imprisonment in 2012. There was no proper basis for the judge to conclude that such a sentence would be unjust because of the offender’s age and because there was an alternative sentence which would be sufficient to protect the public from the offender. It was irrelevant to have regard to the principle that the sentence of life imprisonment is a sentence of last resort (see paragraph 18 of Burinskas).[14]Mr English KC, on behalf of the offender, submits in writing, that the judge carefully considered all the material available to him in deciding whether a life sentence was justified and, having concluded that it was not, consequently it would be unjust to impose such a sentence. A lengthy extended sentence of 17 years was appropriate and not unduly lenient; it fairly met the gravity of the offence. However, in his oral submissions, he acknowledges the offender’s position to be perilous. Nevertheless, he argues that whilst the sentencing judge was required to consider the imposition of a life sentence, it was appropriate for him to consider the alternative sentences, most particularly bearing in mind that the offender had pleaded guilty at the outset of the trial, and thereby saved court time and vindicated the victim in her allegations. He submits that, if we do determine the sentence to be unduly lenient, it would be appropriate to increase the extended licence for an additional 5 years. Discussion[15]We note that the judge mistakenly referred to section 273 of the Sentencing Act 2020, which applies to offenders under the age of 21, instead of section 285 therein. Section 285(1) provides:
“This section applies where a court is dealing with an offender for an offence where— (a)the offender is aged 21 or over at the time of conviction (b)the offence is a Schedule 19 offence (see section 307) (c)the offence was committed on or after 4 April 2005, and (d)the court is of the opinion that there is a significant risk to members of the public of serious harm occasioned by the commission by the offender of further specified offences (see sections 306(1) and 308) ... (3) If the court considers that the seriousness of— (a)the offence, or (b)the offence and one or more offences associated with it is such as to justify the imposition of a sentence of imprisonment for life, the court must impose a sentence of imprisonment for life.”
Section 308(2) of the Sentencing Act 2020 provides that the court:
“(a)must take into account all the information that is available to it about the nature and circumstances of the offence (b)may take into account all the information that is available to it about the nature and circumstances of any other offences of which the offender has been convicted by a court anywhere… (c)may take into account any information which is before it about any pattern of behaviour of which any of the offences mentioned in paragraph (a) or (b) forms part, and (d)may take into account any information about the offender which is before it.”
[16]Subject to the offender fulfilling the requirements of section 285 (1), the question whether the circumstances are so serious to justify a life sentence may legitimately have regard to alternative sentences that meet the gravity of the case. However, on the facts of the index offending as identified by the judge in his sentencing remarks, seen in the context of the offender’s previous convictions for serious sexual violence committed against previous partners in a domestic setting, and in the face of opinion of the author of the pre-sentence report, who had made a cogent and explicit analysis of the offender’s continuing dangerousness, we are somewhat non-plussed to read the judge’s sentencing remarks which dismiss the imposition of a life sentence so hastily. Nevertheless, if only section 285 was engaged, we would have at least hesitated to interfere with the sentence imposed. However, as the judge correctly identified, the requirements of section 283(1) of the Sentencing Act 2020 were also fulfilled in this case.[17]That is, the offender had committed a previous offence listed in Schedule 15 of the 2020 Act, for which he had received a sentence of 10 years’ imprisonment. In those circumstances, by virtue of section 283 (3):
“The court must impose a sentence of imprisonment for life unless the court is of the opinion that there are particular circumstances which— (a)relate to— (i)the index offence (ii)the previous offence referred to in subsection (5), or (iii)the offender, and (b)would make it unjust to do so in all the circumstances.”
[18]In this latter regard the judge identified the age of the offender, but did not explain why this was a particular circumstance, which would make it unjust to impose the life sentence otherwise mandated by Parliament.[19]The impression we receive from the judge’s sentencing remarks is that he did regard the imposition of a sentence pursuant to section 283 as discretionary, rather than as mandatory unless unjust in the relevant particular circumstances. If he had identified such “particular circumstances” then it was necessary for him to articulate the reasons why, in his opinion, this would render the imposition of a life sentence unjust. We cannot discern any such reasoning in the sentencing remarks or identify any relevant “particular circumstances” from an independent examination of the facts of the index or previous offending or related to the offender; most certainly not by reason of the fact that the offender pleaded guilty.[20]Consequently, we quash the extended sentence of 17 years imprisonment and resentence the offender to life imprisonment. Section 323 of the Sentencing Act applies. The notional determined sentence we take to be one of 14 years. The relevant portion of two-thirds of the term would be 9 years and 4 months but must be reduced to reflect the offender’s remand in custody prior to sentencing. Therefore, the minimum term is 8 years and 220 days. To that extent, this application succeeds. Epiq Europe Ltd hereby certify that the above is an accurate and complete record of the proceedings or part thereof. Lower Ground, 46 Chancery Lane, London WC2A 1JE Tel No: 020 7404 1400 21. Email: rcj@epiqglobal.co.uk