R v Paul Thomas Shingleton [2025] EWCA Crim 557

WARNING: reporting restrictions may apply to the contents transcribed in this document, particularly if the case concerned a sexual offence or involved a child. Reporting restrictions prohibit the publication of the applicable information to the public or any section of the public, in writing, in a broadcast or by means of the internet, including social media. Anyone who receives a copy of this transcript is responsible in law for making sure that applicable restrictions are not breached. A person who breaches a reporting restriction is liable to a fine and/or imprisonment. For guidance on whether reporting restrictions apply, and to what information, ask at the court office or take legal advice.This Transcript is Crown Copyright.  It may not be reproduced in whole or in part other than in accordance with relevant licence or with the express consent of the Authority.  All rights are reserved.[2025] EWCA Crim 557Venue Royal Courts of JusticeStrandLondonWC2A 2LLDate Wednesday 2 April 2025
Before
LADY JUSTICE MACURMR JUSTICE LAVENDERMR JUSTICE MARTIN SPENCER
Between
REXCrownV
Between
PAUL THOMAS SHINGLETON__________Computer Aided Transcript of Epiq Europe Ltd,Lower Ground, 46 Chancery Lane, London WC2A 1JETel No: 020 7404 1400; Email: rcj@epiqglobal.co.uk (Official Shorthand Writers to the Court)_________MS F EDINGTON appeared for Appellant.LT COL J CARMICHAEL appeared for Service Prosecuting Authority._________JUDGMENT
[1]The provisions of the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1992 apply to the index offence. No matter relating to the victim shall, during their lifetime, be included in any publication if it is likely to lead members of the public to identify them as a victim of the offence. This prohibition will apply unless waived or lifted in accordance with section 3 of the Act.[2]On 6 June 2024, Paul Shingleton (“the appellant”) appeared before a Military Court and pleaded guilty to an offence of sexual assault, contrary to section 3(1) of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 and two offences of disobedience to a lawful command, contrary to section 12(1) of the Armed Forces Act 2006. He appeals by limited leave of the Single Judge against the sentence of 4 months’ imprisonment imposed in relation to the offences of disobedience to a lawful command which were made concurrent inter se but consecutive to the 28-month sentence imposed in respect of the sexual assault on 17 July 2024. The Relevant Facts[3]The sexual assault took place on 11 September 2022. It is unnecessary to descend into the details of the assault, save to say that the victim (a serving sailor) was younger in age and junior in rank to the appellant. A complaint was made on the same day as the assault by the complainant. The appellant was ordered by his commanding officer to have no contact with the victim. But he disobeyed the order and texted his victim that day. Further complaint was made and referred to the Service Police who ordered the appellant to have no contact with the victim, but he telephoned the victim on a number of occasions and approached him in person outside a restaurant.[4]In interview, the appellant maintained that he had been drinking very heavily and that he had no recollection of the sexual assault or the first order from his commanding officer.[5]The appellant was medically discharged from service on 6 June 2024. Sentencing the appellant, the Judge Advocate General noted the appellant’s 23-year tenure before medical discharge and that he had no similar convictions, although there was a history of service offending involving alcohol. As regards the offences of disobedience, the Judge Advocate General said the court had regard to Version 6 of the Service Court Sentencing Guideline (Disciplinary Offences) applicable to all sentences passed on or after 1 June 2023, which states in general terms:
“The integrity and effectiveness of the Armed Forces rely on obedience to commands. Disobedience undermines the chain of command and can seriously affect operational effectiveness, especially while on operations. The authority of superior officers must be upheld and those who flout that authority must be dealt with quickly and proportionately but firmly.”

The Judge Advocate General went on:

“At the time the two orders were given to you, you were a mature and experienced petty officer. The orders were important. They were designed to prevent further contact between you and the victim of your offending. You chose to ignore them on two occasions knowing that there would be serious consequences. In terms of culpability this is certainly high culpability deliberate disobedience which was premeditated. As for harm arguably it could be incategory 1, but we accept it is in category 2 because it did not quite put the safety of individuals at risk, but it certainly affected the welfare of [C]. The starting point is one of six months imprisonment with a range of a high community order of 30 weeks’ detention to 12 months. We consider the appropriate sentence for each of these offences is 6 months reduced to 4 months for your guilty pleas. In order to reflect the principle of totality those two sentences will run concurrently but consecutively to the sentence of 28 months making a total sentence of 32 months.”
[6]The grounds of appeal against those sentences may be summarised to be:(1) The court-martial was wrong to impose a period of “imprisonment” as opposed to service detention because (a) the relevant start point of the guidelines refers to 30 weeks’ service detention and makes no mention of imprisonment; (b) there was no consideration of whether a sentence of imprisonment was appropriate and service detention could have been awarded despite the appellant having been medically discharged before the sentencing hearing; (c) service disciplinary offences are not recorded on the Police National Computer, therefore to award a sentence of imprisonment for service disciplinary offences, which does not manifest themselves on PNC checks is manifestly excessive.(2) Four months’ imprisonment for the two disciplinary offences is manifestly excessive. The starting point of 6 months’ imprisonment was too high and more reflection of the previous guidance in force at the time the offence was committed should have been made. Discussion[7]The guidance on sentencing in a Service Court is modelled upon the same sentencing principles incorporated in the Definitive Sentencing Guidelines applicable in civilian courts but also acknowledges the requirement for the maintenance of discipline which “often makes the sentencing exercise different from that in the civilian courts.” (see paragraph 3.1.2).[8]The Armed Forces Act 2006 requires the Service Courts to “have regard to” any guidelines issued by the Sentencing Council that are relevant to the offender’s case. Where there are no Sentencing Council Guidelines in relation to disciplinary offences, the Service Court should consider the Service Court Sentencing Guideline (Disciplinary Offences). Paragraph 4.6.1 of the guidance provides that:
“If an offender appearing in a civilian criminal court, in the same circumstances and with the same characteristics as the defendant, would have received an immediate prison sentence, an immediate prison sentence is also likely to be appropriate in the Court Martial. However, where it is in the Service interest and the interests of justice to do so, the court may consider imposing an immediate sentence of Service detention as a direct alternative to an immediate prison sentence.”
[9]The circumstances in which the appellant committed the offences of disobedience to a lawful command were intrinsically linked with those of the sexual assault. It would be entirely unrealistic to suggest that the extant offence of sexual assault did not cross the custody threshold or that, having done so, a period of service detention was appropriate in all the circumstances. In these circumstances, we consider that it is unrealistic for Ms Edington to submit that the Military Court should contemplate a sentence of service detention for the disciplinary offences consecutive to an immediate term of imprisonment: she is unable to idnetify any part of the Service Court Sentencing Guideline (Disciplinary Offences) or Armed Forces Act 2006 which would permit this impracticable solution. Further, and in any event, we agree with the Respondent’s Notice, that the service offences were akin to a breach of bail conditions imposed upon an accused not to approach a complainant or witness. A consecutive sentence was undoubtedly called for. The only issue in this appeal is whether the term of imprisonment imposed was manifestly excessive.[10]The Judge Advocate General Sentencing Guidelines specifies that the level of culpability is to be determined by weighing all the factors of the case. What is more:
“A case of particular gravity, reflected by multiple features of culpability in step one, could merit upward adjustment from the starting point before further adjustment for aggravating or mitigating features, set out below.”
High culpability includes deliberate or intentional disobedience, premeditated and prolonged persistence disobedience. All three factors were identified in the Judge Advocate General’s sentencing remarks.[11]The level of harm is to be determined by “weighing up all the factors of the case to determine the harm that has been caused or was at risk of being caused.” The Judge Advocate General indicated that this case fell within category 2 harm, which applies to cases falling between categories 1 and 3. Category 1 arises from disobedience which has: caused a security risk or put the safety of individuals at risk; or, had a significant deleterious effect on discipline and/or unit cohesion; or, it has endangered the safe performance of a duty; or, has had a significant effect on operational effectiveness. Category 3 applies to minor or momentary disobedience with no harm or risk of harm as a result and limited impact upon the unit or others.[12]We can see no legitimate criticism for placing the two service offences into category 2A. The starting point for category 2A is Service community (high)/30 weeks’ Service detention. The category range is Service community order (low)/10 weeks’ detention to 6 months’ imprisonment.[13]As the Single Judge noted, the sentencing remarks do incorporate an error as to the starting point and range which was applicable to category 2A cases. That is, whilst the Judge Advocate General categorises the offences as 2A, he refers to the starting point and range of sentences applicable to category 1B offences.[14]Whatever the reason for this mistake, we are not persuaded that the sentence of 4 months’ imprisonment concurrent inter se but consecutive to the 28 months imposed for the sexual assault was manifestly excessive nor failed to take into account the principle of totality. The 6-month sentence, prior to credit for plea, was at the top of the range for category 2A offences but did reflect the number of culpability factors and the degree of harm caused to the victim which the Judge Advocate General said was “arguably in category 1”. Although not specifically referred to, there were also several specified aggravating features, namely deliberate targeting of the subordinate victim by the appellant, who acknowledged himself to be under the influence of alcohol at the time.[15]The available personnel mitigation was scant, but the Judge Advocate General did acknowledged the 23 years’ service albeit dogged by issues of alcohol abuse and with concomitant disciplinary record. Full credit was given for plea and the Judge Advocate General indicated that he had regard to the impact of imprisonment upon someone who had the mental disorder and disability indicated in the available psychiatric report.[16]The two grounds of appeal amount to the same issue. The question for us is whether the sentence imposed was either manifestly excessive or wrong in principle and not whether the Judge Advocate General sentencing remarks contained an error in that it related the starting point and range for a different category of offence.[17]We have applied the relevant Sentencing Guidelines to the facts of the case before us. Having done so, as we are sure did the Judge Advocate General, we conclude the sentence was neither manifestly excessive nor wrong in principle. The appeal against sentence is dismissed. Epiq Europe Ltd hereby certify that the above is an accurate and complete record of the proceedings or part thereof. Lower Ground, 46 Chancery Lane, London WC2A 1JE Tel No: 020 7404 1400 18. Email: rcj@epiqglobal.co.uk