R v Jack Taylor [2025] EWCA Crim 514

[2025] EWCA Crim 514

Venue Royal Courts of Justice, Strand, London, WC2A 2LL

Date 8 April 2025

Before

LORD JUSTICE STUART-SMITH

MR JUSTICE BRYAN

HIS HONOUR JUDGE MANSELL KC

(Sitting as a Judge of the CACD)

Between

REXCrown

-v-

Between

JACK TAYLOR

__________

Ms E Kehoe appeared for Appellant.

_________

Approved Judgment

[1]On 10 October 2023 in the Crown Court at Burnley before HHJ Prowse, the appellant pleaded guilty to an offence of attempted robbery contrary to section 1(1) of the Criminal Attempts Act 1981. On 15 March 2024, in the same court but this time before HHJ Sarah Dodd, the appellant was sentenced to an extended sentence of 9 years comprising of a custodial term of 6 years and an extended period of licence of 3 years. Other ancillary orders were made which we do not need to deal with. The sentence imposed by HHJ Dodd was imposed after allowing a 25 per cent reduction for the appellant’s guilty plea.

[2]The appellant now appeals against that sentence with the leave of the Single Judge who granted a short extension of 4 days for the bringing of the appeal. The Facts

[3]On 2 September 2023, the complainant, Mr Mahmood, who was 30 years of age, had been driving his taxi in Accrington. Mr Mahmood had been approaching a Premier shop in Marlborough Road and pulled his taxi over to the left-hand side of the road. CCTV footage, which we have seen, showed the appellant standing on the side of the road. Once Mr Mahmood’s vehicle had stopped, the appellant opened the passenger door and leaned into the vehicle. The appellant could thereafter be heard to say “Give me all your stuff” and Mr Mahmood described a knife being held against his throat. Mr Mahmood tried to defend himself by grabbing the arm of the appellant and as the appellant pulled away, he stabbed Mr Mahmood in the left arm. The appellant then fled the scene.

[4]Mr Mahmood drove to Accrington Hospital where he told medical staff that he had fallen. He was initially sent home and advised to go to the Royal Blackburn Hospital later that day. Mr Mahmood was subsequently taken to the Royal Blackburn Hospital by a family member and told the staff there that he had fallen on some glass. When his wound was being treated and Mr Mahmood was being given antibiotics, he indicated to staff that the wound had been caused by a knife. His wound required an operation to repair nerve damage and the prognosis was that it would be 3 to 6 months for the wound to recover fully.

[5]The appellant was arrested. In interview, he remained silent when asked questions by the police. The appellant had been released from prison just two days before the present offence was committed, having been sentenced in May 2023 to 3 months’ imprisonment for an offence of common assault.

[6]The appellant pleaded guilty on a basis as follows:

“JT pleads guilty to attempt robbery on the following basis. He travelled the short distance to the Accrington area to purchase drugs together with a friend who took no part in the robbery. The complainant was contacted and agreed to supply drugs and travelled in his vehicle to Marlborough Road to supply drugs to JT. JT had been drinking alcohol, and a short time before the arrival of the complainant, decided he would try to steal drugs from him. He accepts thereafter that his actions were as depicted on the CCTV footage.”

We have seen the CCTV footage to which the appellant referred in his basis of plea. It shows the appellant waiting for the arrival of Mr Mahmood. It does not show in any detail the actual incident, save that the appellant was only in Mr Mahmood’s car for about 5 to 10 seconds before running off. Antecedents

[7]The appellant was aged 32 on the date that he was sentenced. He had 20 convictions for 30 offences spanning from 2 September 2011 to 11 May 2023. His relevant convictions included seven offences against the person and one of theft and kindred offences. The Pre-sentence Report

[8]The appellant told the writer of the pre-sentence report that he had intended to purchase cocaine from Mr Mahmood, for his use and for use by the friend. He said that the friend had given him the knife “just in case”. When in Mr Mahmood’s car, he admitted taking out the knife and holding it in a threatening way. He said that he had stabbed Mr Mahmood when Mr Mahmood had lunged at him. Having identified the prevalent use of cocaine as a contributor to his offending, the writer identified an established pattern of indiscriminate violence and aggression from the appellant, directed at strangers, acquaintances and partners combined with reckless and impulsive reactions to the situations he faces. The writer assessed that he posed a high risk of harm to the public and known adults. He had a poor history of supervision. Victim Personal Statements

[9]There were victim personal statements from Mr Mahmood but the prosecution was wary of relying on them because of his perceived unreliability as a witness. The Sentencing Hearing

[10]The judge considered that the offence involved high culpability because of the production of the knife and using it to inflict injury. She took the view that this was a serious injury, justifying inclusion in harm category 1, because the injury involved nerve damage that required surgical intervention and consequences for 3 to 6 months. On that basis she correctly identified the starting point under the Robbery Guideline for Street Robberies as being 8 years with a category range of 7 to 12 years. She recognised that she was dealing with an attempted robbery but regarded it as “not far from a full robbery”. The attempt was short lived. She therefore adopted an adjusted starting point of 7 years. She then identified as aggravating features the appellant’s previous convictions, two for section 20, four for common assaults or battery, one for theft and common assault and one for section 47.

[11]As mitigation, she was told that for the first time the appellant had started to ask for help in respect of matters that had happened during his childhood. Balancing those aggravating and mitigating features, she concluded that the sentence after trial would have been 8 years which, allowing 25 per cent for his plea, she reduced to 6 years.

[12]Turning to the question of dangerousness the judge identified that before his release two days before, the appellant had done courses while in custody, he had a job and accommodation to go to and a new relationship; and yet she had to deal with him for an offence that represented a serious escalation in his offending. She made the finding of dangerousnessand imposed the extended sentence of 9 years with a custodial term of 6 years and extended licence period of 3 years to which we have already referred. The Grounds of Appeal

[13]Ms Kehoe submits that the sentence imposed by the judge was manifestly excessive for two main reasons. First, she submits that the judge was wrong to treat the offence as falling within category A1 - it should have been category A2. Second, she submits that the judge gave insufficient weight to the appellant’s personal mitigation. Ms Kehoe relies upon the fact that the Crown had submitted to the judge at first that the offence fell within category A2 and then during oral opening that it fell between categories A1 and A2. She submits that an injury that required surgical intervention but which then resolved within 3 to 6 months should not be regarded as serious physical harm in the context of the Street Robbery Guideline.

[14]Turning to mitigation, Ms Kehoe is not able to identify any particular feature of personal mitigation that the judge could be said to have omitted. Her submission is that the judge placed too much weight on the victim impact statements and too little weight upon the steps that the appellant had already taken to address his difficulties in relationships and ongoing issues from his childhood that he was now beginning to address. Discussion and Resolution

[15]We accept that the criteria for a finding that a physical injury is “serious” for the purposes of the Street Robbery Guidelines are not the same as the criteria for a finding that an injury is “grave” for the purposes of the guideline applicable to offences contrary to section 18 of the Offences Against the Person Act. We are not aware of any authoritative consideration of the differences but it seems to us that the question to be asked in a case such as this should follow closely the wording of the guideline: is this a case where serious physical harm within themeaning of the guideline was caused to the victim? The guideline distinguishes between cases where there is no or minimal physical harm, where the starting point for a category 3A offence is 4 years, through a case where there is some physical harm but it is not to be regarded as serious within the meaning of the guideline, where the starting point is 5 years, to a case where serious physical harm was caused where the starting point is 8 years. In the absence of authoritative guidance, there are otherwise no fixed criteria for deciding whether a case falls within harm that is serious or harm that is not.

[16]Our instinct is that the prosecution was justified in suggesting that the present case fell between harm categories 1 and 2. Had there been reliable evidence of long-term consequences, we would not have hesitated to uphold the judge’s finding that it was a category 1 case. As it was, we consider that this case can properly be described as “borderline”. However, that is not the end of the matter. If the case were to be considered to be a category 1 case, it is arguable that it is less serious than suggested by a starting point of 8 years. Conversely, if it is to be regarded as falling within category 2, it is a serious case of its kind, which suggests that the starting point should be adjusted upwards towards the top of the range. Bearing in mind that the appellant fell to be sentenced for an attempt, though not far from a full robbery, the judge’s adoption of an adjusted starting point of 7 years is fully justifiable, whether by reference to category 1A or category 2A or treating the offence as “between the categories”. We therefore reject the submission that mis-categorisation led to an inappropriate starting point being adopted.

[17]Turning to Ms Kehoe’s second submission. The appellant’s offending was seriously aggravated by his previous record and in particular by the fact that he committed this serious offence involving the use of a knife within two days of his release in the circumstances to which we have referred. As against that, Ms Kehoe submitted to the judge, and submits to us, that he had turned a corner when recalled to prison, in that he had begun to open up to difficulties experienced in childhood. Ms Kehoe submits that this was a major step for someone who is still a relatively young man to take.

[18]The judge evidently had in mind the appellant’s personal difficulties because she referred to them expressly. That said, even accepting that there may be prospects for reducing the danger he poses in the future, the escalation in seriousness of his offending amply justified a finding that he was a dangerousoffender when sentenced. In our judgment, when the aggravating and mitigating features of the case are brought into account an upwards adjustment from 7 years to 8 cannot properly be criticised.

[19]Given that the submission is still made, albeit faintly, that the finding of dangerousness should not have been made or that an extended licence period should not have been imposed, we should say that we unequivocally reject that submission. There was ample evidence to support the judge’s finding of dangerousness and she was right to make it and to impose the extended licence period of 3 years for the reasons she gave.

[20]This review of the imposed sentence is not a mechanical or mathematical exercise. We have stood back and considered whether viewed overall the sentence can be said to be either manifestly excessive or wrong in principle. In our judgment, it was neither of these things. Rather, the judge imposed a sentence that was well within the bounds of reasonable sentences that were open to her. We therefore dismiss this appeal.