R v Wadah Mohammed Abdulla Hassan [2025] EWCA Crim 1862

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[2025] EWCA Crim 1862

Venue Royal Courts of Justice

Strand

London

WC2A 2LL

Date Thursday 6 November 2025

Before

LORD JUSTICE GREEN

MR JUSTICE JOHNSON

MR JUSTICE BOURNE

Between

REXCrown

Between

WADAH MOHAMMED ABDULLA HASSAN

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Computer Aided Transcript of Epiq Europe Ltd,

Lower Ground, 46 Chancery Lane, London WC2A 1JE

Tel No: 020 7404 1400; Email: rcj@epiqglobal.co.uk (Official Shorthand Writers to the Court)

_________

MR J BARTON appeared for Appellant.

MS R RANDALL appeared for Crown.

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JUDGMENT

(Approved)

[1]On 12 June 2024 the appellant was convicted of conspiracy to supply Class A drugs, a co-accused was convicted in his absence and sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 42 months.

[2]The facts can be summarised as follows. Operation “Inner Kilo” was an investigation into Class A and Class B drug dealing on the Exeter Drive Estate in the Broomhall area of Sheffield. Police surveillance began in April 2019. Three drugs lines were linked to the conspiracy, the “MO” line, the “Pie” line and “Pie2” line. It was estimated that the combined daily value of the three lines was in the region of £4,000. The alleged conspiracy involved 16 defendants in total.

[3]During police observations occurring between May 2019 and July 2019, the appellant and the co-defendant Wassame were seen associating with others involved in the conspiracy at or near flats on the estate, said to be connected with the conspiracy. The evidence indicated that these flats were at the centre of the operation and were said to have been used to bag up and weigh the drugs and restock supplies. Drug dealing appears to have taken place on the stairwells of those flats or in close proximity thereto.

[4]On 23 July 2019, the police executed warrants at a number of addresses and various items were seized. Several arrests were made which included the arrest of the appellant's brothers. The appellant was arrested at his home address on 7 November 2019. He replied "no comment" to all questions during interview and he did not thereafter give evidence at trial. The prosecution case was that the appellant was involved in the conspiracy to sell drugs on the estate. The evidence against the appellant was circumstantial and relied on telephone and observation evidence and in particular, his close association with co-conspirators and defendants and his proximity to the relevant flats during police observations.

[5]In relation to the telephone evidence against the appellant, the prosecution was unable to identify a particular number which was being actively used by the appellant during the period of the conspiracy. Their case was that his observed use of the mobile phone on two occasions could be directly linked to activity on the MO drugs line. On 24 June 2019 at 14.13 hours, the appellant was seen using the phone when data showed that there was a 14-second incoming voice call on the MO line at 14.17. On 1 July 2019, when he was observed tapping on a phone, phone data showed an outgoing call from the MO line, following an incoming call to 2 minutes later.

[6]The prosecution case was that the appellant not only knew what was going on but was himself involved in the conspiracy. Given the arrest of his brother some months before his arrest, he could have had the opportunity to get rid of the phone and other evidence prior to arrest.

[7]To prove the case the prosecution relied upon the following: i. The evidence of the guilty pleas of the co-conspirators as evidence of the existence of the conspiracy. ii. Adverse inferences from the appellant's failure to give evidence. iii. The evidence relating to the drugs and paraphernalia found during the searches and arrests and the drugs seized from potential users in support of the existence and the scale of the conspiracies themselves. iv. The telephone evidence as evidence in support of the existence of the drugs lines and the attribution evidence linking the drugs lines to the conspirators. v. The telephone evidence against the appellant arising from the police observations on 24 June and 1 July 2019 said to link him to one of the drugs lines. vi. The police observation evidence on six occasions demonstrating the appellant's association with known conspirators and his proximity to the associated addresses. vii. On 8 June 2019 the appellant was seen with a co-defendant (Ibrahim) who pleaded guilty to each of three allegations of conspiracy. The appellant and Ibrahim were seen going into a flat together, just minutes before Wassame was also seen to go into the same flat. viii. On 18 June 2019, the appellant was seen on the stairwell of a relevant block along with two others who later admitted involvement in the conspiracies. Interactions between the four men demonstrated that they were well known to each other, and other defendants were seen around this time outside relevant flats. ix. On 24 June 2019, the appellant was seen in a relevant block with other defendants. There is record evidence of the appellant on a footbridge when it appears that a small package identified as cannabis is passed to him. Later that day he was seen leaving the orange block on a bike at a similar time as a suspected drug user is recorded as leaving the same block. x. On 1 July 2019 the appellant was in one of the stairwells with another defendant and could be seen on the phone. The observation of phone use was said to tie in with activity on the MO line. xi. On 9 July 2019 the appellant was again recorded along with various other defendants. xii. On 15 July the appellant and other defendants were outside the relevant flats.

[8]The defence case was that this evidence did not prove the appellant's guilt. It was equally consistent with the appellant being a customer rather than a party to the conspiracy or simply a friend of the conspirators. The issue for the jury was whether there was a conspiracy and, if so, whether the appellant was party to it. An application of no case was made at half-time upon the basis that the evidence was so inherently weak that it ought to be withdrawn from the jury. The application was rejected.

[9]We can summarise the ruling of the judge as follows. The judge set out the test to be applied, then he summarised the evidence. He pointed out that upon a number of occasions the appellant was observed going to the landing where the relevant flats were located. He noted that the appellant spent a significant amount of time there and interacted, clearly on friendly terms, with defendants who admitted guilt. He said that in his view generally the mobile phone evidence was not meaningful. He rejected certain specific attempts to link the appellant to a phone call associated with the MO drugs line as requiring the jury to take a leap of faith which would be pure speculation on their part. With regard to the surveillance evidence the judge concluded that it showed a pattern of the appellant spending time on the balcony with others who were co-conspirators with whom he was on friendly terms. The judge held that the existence of the conspiracies was not in dispute, nor that the appellant was on friendly terms with certain of the conspirators. The judge also said this:

"On one occasion there can be seen to be an instance where he is passed a drug, which would appear from the photographs (as far as it is best able to see) to be cannabis, by a co-conspirator. There is another occasion when there is an interaction between Mr. Hassan(?) and Brendan Atkinson. Brendan Atkinson, who in certain other photographs is seen to have in his possession significant quantities of cash which the Crown would invite the jury and the jury properly directed could legitimately infer were the proceeds of the conspiracy."

[10]The issue for the jury was whether the evidence established that the appellant was party to the conspiracy or might be equally consistent with the appellant visiting friends or being only a customer of the conspiracy. The judge distinguished the appellant's position from that of the other known customers of the conspiracy, and he concluded that it would be a reasonable inference for a properly directed jury to draw, but the appellant must at least have been aware of the conspiracy. If they came to this conclusion, they would then have to go on to decide whether the only sensible explanation for the appellant's presence was that he played an active part in it. He concluded by holding that a properly directed jury could, looking at the evidence as a whole, come to the conclusion that they were sure on that evidence that the appellant was participant in the conspiracy and that therefore there was evidence on which the jury could properly convict him on the counts on the indictment.

[11]Mr Barton, on behalf of the appellant, has argued that the evidence against the appellant was so weak that the judge should have acceded to the submission of no case to answer, and the case should have been withdrawn from the jury. Accordingly, the convictions are unsafe. The evidence was purely circumstantial. There was no telephone evidence against the appellant, as the judge rightly found. The surveillance evidence showed no more than the appellant being present on a number of occasions with other defendants and behaving in a way that showed that he knew some of those present. On the occasion when the appellant can be seen to be handed cannabis that he placed in his pocket, this demonstrated no more than that the appellant was supplied with drugs and there was no evidence of onward supply. There was no other inculpatory evidence. The judge was wrong to conclude that evidence relating to co-accused’s possession of significant quantities of cash was capable of assisting the jury with the case against the appellant. Finally, the judge should have directed the jury to ignore the evidence he himself had found was inherently weak and not probative, namely the telephone evidence.

[12]Ms Randall, for the Crown, says that this was par excellence a matter for the jury. The evidence adduced was more than sufficient to meet the half-time threshold. It consisted of mobile phone evidence albeit largely discounted by the judge and observation evidence of association and connection to drug dealing, all of which was inconsistent with the appellant being nothing more than a customer. The Crown had always accepted that the case against the appellant was largely circumstantial. But reliance upon such evidence is common in conspiracy cases of this sort. The Crown's case for the jury was based upon different stands of evidence from which the jury was asked to draw common sense conclusions. The judge's reasons were full, balanced and measured and cannot sensibly be challenged. As trial judge he was best placed to form a considered view.

[13]We turn to our conclusions on the submission of no case to answer. The starting point is that we view the ruling of the judge as fair and balanced. He addressed all of the relevant categories of evidence and he was careful in his own analysis to draw differences in the weight to be attached to each piece or category of evidence. This is not a case where, for example, it can be said that the judge omitted to address key facts, or gave a clearly skewed and erroneous account of some material piece of evidence. This means that we are at base reviewing an exercise of judgment. We must also bear in mind that a trial judge, having heard the prosecution case, is best placed to weigh the evidence and this must particularly be the case in relation to circumstantial evidence, which may have to be assessed in the context of the wider evidence as a whole which might, by way of illustration, shed light on whether customers normally frequented the locations in issue and/or met with groups of defendants.

[14]It is not the function of this Court to decide whether we would have taken a different decision to that of the judge. Our role is to decide whether the judge, who had knowledge of all the evidence tendered in the case as a whole, took a lawful decision acting within the discretion of a trial judge, bearing in mind the sort of case that this is. In considering this exercise of judgment, we must also accept that a case based wholly or even exclusively on circumstantial evidence can in principle remain a strong case. We can detect no error in the way in which the judge addressed the evidence and concluded that it revealed a proper case to go to the jury. The starting point is that it is common ground that there was a conspiracy to supply drugs. On the facts, there was evidence of multiple associations, six having been recorded by surveillance between the appellant and co-defendants, some of whom were later convicted or pleaded guilty to the conspiracy at locations known to be associated with drug dealing. There is evidence as to the nature of the association, namely that it was friendly. There was evidence that the appellant came into possession of drugs as a result of the association with the same co-defendants. At trial, there was therefore no material dispute as to the fact that there was a conspiracy, and that it did involve drug supply. The appellant had associated with the conspirators on a significant number of occasions at locations where it was known the conspirators operated from and that the association involved the physical transfer of drugs from a defendant to the appellant. The nub of the issue is whether all those facts were consistent with an innocent or an alternative explanation such as friendship or drug purchase. As to this there was evidence that when tested the appellant proved negative for drug consumption. Even setting aside the weakness of the telephone evidence, in our judgment, in such circumstances the judge was within his legitimate discretion to conclude that this was a case for the jury.

[15]We turn now to an alternative submission which proceeds upon the basis that the judge properly rejected the half-time submission. Mr Barton criticised pages 13H and 14A of the transcript of the summing-up. There the judge made clear to the jury that there was no relevant telephone evidence connecting the appellant to the conspiracy. The judge later said to the jury similar things in relation to the timing of photographic evidence by the surveillance team. However, later the judge refers to a particular call on 24 June. The judge proceeds to give the jury guidance on how to weigh this evidence, highlighting whether it has a probative value given the problems connected with identifying the timing and accuracy of the telephone data and its connection to the appellant. He implied that the jury would have to think very hard about the connection and he was clearly suggesting that this evidence carried little, if any, weight. Mr Barton says that this general approach of the judge to the telephone evidence demonstrates an inconsistency between the position he adopted in the judgment on no case, where he discounted the phone evidence altogether and his position in the summing-up.

[16]With respect, we disagree. The judge's analysis in the summing-up was more nuanced than that set out in the judgment on the half-time submission. He was entitled, in our view, to take account of the fact that the telephone evidence was before the jury and that a more detailed analysis of it was required. In summing-up, he addressed evidence relied upon by the prosecution, he addressed it in detail; he did not say it should be ignored altogether. He left the matter to the jury coupled to a strong indication that they should give it no or strictly limited weight. In our judgment, the judge was entitled not to instruct the jury in categorical terms but instead to place the evidence which was already before the jury into a broader context. This was a matter for the judge having considered all the evidence and the closing speeches of prosecution and defence counsel.

[17]For all of these reasons we dismiss the appeal. Epiq Europe Ltd hereby certify that the above is an accurate and complete record of the proceedings or part thereof. Lower Ground Floor, 46 Chancery Lane, London, WC2A 1JE Tel No: 020 7404 1400 Email: Rcj@epiqglobal.co.uk