R v Raja Samil Khan [2025] EWCA Crim 1477

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[2025] EWCA Crim 1477

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL

CRIMINAL DIVISION

London

WC2A 2LL

Venue ON APPEAL FROM THE CROWN COURT AT BIRMINGHAM

Between

R E XCrown

(MR RECORDER JACK) [22GA1225620]

Case No 2025/01120/A1 Wednesday 29 October 2025

B e f o r e:

THE VICE PRESIDENT OF THE COURT OF APPEAL CRIMINAL DIVISION

(Lord Justice Edis)

MR JUSTICE MARTIN SPENCER

HER HONOUR JUDGE LEIGH

(Her Honour Judge Leigh)

(Sitting as a Judge of the Court of Appeal Criminal Division)

____________________

- v -

Between

RAJA SAMIL KHAN

____________________

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Tel No: 020 7404 1400; Email: rcj@epiqglobal.co.uk (Official Shorthand Writers to the Court)

___________________

Miss A Hale appeared for Applicant

Mr P Beardwell appeared for Crown

____________________

A P P R O V E D J U D G M E N T

Date 2025-10-29

[1]By this application, the applicant applies for leave to appeal against sentence following his plea of guilty in the Crown Court at Birmingham to an offence of possessing an offensive weapon and an offence of inflicting grievous bodily harm.

[2]On 3 March 2024, the applicant was sentenced by Mr Recorder Jack to a total sentence of ten months' imprisonment, suspended for two years, with an unpaid work requirement. He ordered the applicant to pay the victim surcharge in the sum of £156. He ordered the applicant to pay prosecution costs in the sum of £700, and he made a compensation order in the sum of £10,600. The latter two sums were ordered to be paid at the rate of £500 per month.

[3]The application is limited to an appeal against the compensation order, although we also take it to be an appeal against the costs order. The application has been referred to the full court by the Registrar, who has observed:

"The grounds of appeal concern the Compensation Order only: the correct procedure was not followed in that no submissions as to calculation of amount or means to pay were invited. In addition, the court should consider the inclusion of amounts for 'aggravating features' and delay."

[4]We grant leave and proceed to consider the merits of the appeal.

The Background Facts

[5]On 5 July 2020, at around 5.30 pm, the appellant had been driving his Audi motor vehicle when he was overtaken by the complainant, Andrew Lisseman, whilst they had been driving along the A442 road through Telford. Mr Lisseman had two young children, aged 7 and 2 respectively, in the rear of the car. Mr Lisseman subsequently had to stop his car as he had a puncture. Thereafter, the appellant stopped his car and there was a verbal exchange between them due to the fact that the appellant had been overtaken. The appellant thereafter returned to his car and Andrew Lisseman drove home. The appellant followed Mr Lisseman to his home, got out of his vehicle and struck Mr Lisseman with a metal bar in the presence of Mr Lisseman's wife. The offending left Mr Lisseman with injuries to his elbow and broken ribs.

[6]The appellant subsequently made off from the scene and changed the number plates on his vehicle in an attempt to avoid detection.

[7]An image of the appellant taken by Mr Lisseman was provided to the police and the appellant was subsequently arrested for the index offences. In interview the applicant answered "No comment" to questions asked by the police.

[8]The appellant is a man of previous good character. The pre-sentence report gave some indication as to his means. The author stated:

"[The appellant] has several good GCSE passes and a level 1 qualification in auto-mechanics. He has since shown a good work-ethic, moving from the repair, buying and selling of cars supplemented by working as a delivery driver in the evening to setting up and managing a restaurant. I understand that he now employs four others. The [appellant] told me that he borrowed £16,000 to set up his fledgling restaurant business, pays towards a mortgage and supports a wife and child. Whilst monies are currently 'tight', he was confident that his income would increase as his business became established. Finance did not contribute to offending. [The appellant] might reasonably be required to make regular payments towards a Compensation Order or other financial penalty."

[9]Miss Hale, who has represented the appellant before us, has updated us on the appellant's means. She has indicated that he receives universal credit and child benefit for both the child mentioned in the pre-sentence report and a further child who has since been born to the family. She indicates that, as yet, the restaurant business generates no profit.

[10]When the case came on for sentence, counsel for the prosecution stated, without demur from the learned Recorder:

"Your Honour, I cannot find any victim impact statement. Therefore there does not appear to be the need for any ancillary orders or consideration of ancillary orders."

The issue was not raised with defence counsel in mitigation.

[11]In sentencing the appellant, the learned Recorder said this:

"I then turn to the question of compensation. The position here is that damages for personal injury are regulated by the Judicial Studies Guidelines or the Judicial College Guidelines as they are now [called]. There is not a guideline which directly applies to broken ribs. There are two, which [it] seems to me, are relevant here. Under chapter 14, minor injuries have a range up to £2,990. This is obviously not a minor injury. You caused grievous bodily harm to the man. I have taken some assistance from the guidance which is given in respect of less serious leg injuries. Here, the bottom range for simple fractures through the tibia or fibular or soft-tissue injuries are up to £14,450. That is slightly below the range for a simple fracture of a femur with no damage to the articular surfaces, which has a range of £11,120 up to £17,180. It seems to me that the injuries here are somewhat less serious than the £11,120 for a fracture of a femur. In my judgment, the basic damages which would be awarded here would be a sum of £7,000. In addition, there are aggravating features of this matter. You followed this man to his home. He was concerned about that. You beat him up in the presence of his wife and this was clearly an intentional assault. You had the intention of changing the number plates on your car to escape detection. Those aggravating features, in my judgment, justify a further £3,000 in compensation. In addition, there has been a substantial delay before this matter has been dealt with, which needs to be considered by way of a figure in interest. That is a further £600, in my judgment. So, the total compensation is going to be one of £10,600. In addition, you will pay £700 costs. I will order that all be paid at a rate of £500 per month."

[12]On behalf of the appellant, first Mr Henry in the written grounds of appeal, and now Miss Hale on the appellant's behalf and adopting Mr Henry's written grounds, submitted, by reference to sections 133 to 135 of the Sentencing Act 2020 and R v York

[2018] EWCA Crim 2754

, that the appropriate procedure for a lawfully imposed compensation order will take the following course:(i) The offender provides evidence of their means and the prosecution and defence make any representations;

(ii) The judge must (a) enquire about, and (b) make clear findings about, the offender's means;

(iii) The court must take into account the offender's means;

(iv) In calculating the level of a compensation order, it must be realistically capable of being paid within a reasonable time;

(v) It will be wrong to fix an amount of compensation without regard to the instalments capable of being paid and to the period of time over which they should be paid; and

(vi) An order should not be made on the assumption that it will be paid by another.

[13]Miss Hale summarised the legal principles as follows:(1) A sentencing judge must carry out a means enquiry (considering evidence and representations) and make findings as to the offender's means; and

(2) As to the quantum of the order, the order must be capable of being paid by the offender personally, and within a reasonable time.

[14]It is submitted on behalf of the appellant that the approach to the compensation order adopted by the Recorder in this case failed to adhere to each and every one of the applicable legal principles set out above, and that the resulting order was therefore wrong in principle. It is submitted that the Recorder gave no prior indication of his intention to impose a compensation order. Accordingly, he sought no information as to the appellant's means; he heard and considered no evidence nor representations, and carried out no enquiry. There were no findings about the appellant's means, let alone clear findings. This was a significant procedural irregularity in the making of a compensation order. It is further submitted that had the Recorder carried out a means enquiry, he would have arrived at a figure for compensation far lower than the £10,600 which he reached. Accordingly, it is submitted that the compensation order which was imposed was manifestly excessive.

[15]In addition, Miss Hale, for whose clear submissions we are very grateful, submits that the Recorder should not have added any sum for aggravated damages or for delay; there was no such power in the Crown Court to award compensation on those accounts.

[16]We agree with those submissions. Although the Recorder had some limited information from the pre-sentence report about the appellant's means, he should not have embarked upon the process of awarding compensation without giving an indication of his intention to do so, seeking representations from counsel, and obtaining appropriate information about the appellant's means. The course taken by the Recorder was particularly egregious when counsel for the prosecution had indicated in terms that there was no need for any ancillary orders or consideration of ancillary orders, which we take to include a compensation order.

[17]There may have been very good reasons for the victim not to seek a compensation order. For example, he may have made an application to the Criminal Injuries Compensation Authority and not wanted to have the process of obtaining compensation by that route interfered with. Furthermore, we are of the view that the Crown Court is not an appropriate venue to embark upon a process akin to the awarding of damages in a civil claim which the Recorder in any event got wrong: for example, he awarded the equivalent of aggravated damages for what were considered to be the aggravating factors and for delay.

[18]For these reasons, we take the view that the right course is to quash the compensation order in its entirety. We also quash the order for the payment of costs.

[19]Whilst we have considered whether we should substitute an alternative order in its place, having heard Miss Hale's submissions as to the appellant's means, we consider that we are not satisfied that his means and his ability to pay are such that it is appropriate for us to make any alternative order.

[20]In the circumstances, the order for compensation and the order for costs are both quashed. We make no alternative order in their place. ___________________________________ Epiq Europe Ltd hereby certify that the above is an accurate and complete record of the proceedings or part thereof. Lower Ground Floor, 46 Chancery Lane, London WC2A 1JE Tel No: 020 7404 1400 Email: rcj@epiqglobal.co.uk ______________________________