R v Istvan Szobollodi [2025] EWCA Crim 1204

WARNING: reporting restrictions may apply to the contents transcribed in this document, particularly if the case concerned a sexual offence or involved a child. Reporting restrictions prohibit the publication of the applicable information to the public or any section of the public, in writing, in a broadcast or by means of the internet, including social media. Anyone who receives a copy of this transcript is responsible in law for making sure that applicable restrictions are not breached. A person who breaches a reporting restriction is liable to a fine and/or imprisonment. For guidance on whether reporting restrictions apply, and to what information, ask at the court office or take legal advice.This Transcript is Crown Copyright.  It may not be reproduced in whole or in part other than in accordance with relevant licence or with the express consent of the Authority.  All rights are reserved.[2025] EWCA Crim 1204Venue Royal Courts of JusticeStrandLondonWC2A 2LLDate Thursday 22 May 2025
Before
THE VICE-PRESIDENT OF THE COURT OF APPEAL, CRIMINAL DIVISION(LORD JUSTICE HOLROYDE)MR JUSTICE GOSSMRS JUSTICE CHEEMA-GRUBBAppeal under s.13 Administration of Justice Act 1960
Between
REXCrownv
Between
ISTVAN SZOBOLLODI__________Computer Aided Transcript of Epiq Europe Ltd,Lower Ground, 46 Chancery Lane, London WC2A 1JETel No: 020 7404 1400; Email: rcj@epiqglobal.co.uk (Official Shorthand Writers to the Court)_________MR TOM WAINWRIGHT appeared for AppellantMR JAMES ROBOTTOM appeared as an Advocate to the Court_________JUDGMENT
[1]On 22 April 2024, in the Crown Court at Bristol, Mr Szobollodi was found to be in contempt of court and ordered to pay a financial penalty of £700. He now applies for an extension of time of four days to apply for leave to appeal against that finding and that sanction.[2]Summarising the facts briefly, Mr Szobollodi was summonsed to attend court for jury service. He was unwilling to act in that role. He was one of a panel of prospective jurors who were required to go to a particular courtroom for the purposes of a ballot of the jury to hear a sexual offence trial. The trial was listed before a recorder. Before the process of empanelling the jury began, Mr Szobollodi sent a note to the recorder which said:
"I personally don't believe the jury system, and I will not participate on any decision making, and I can't read the affirmation in the courtroom. In my country, we never practise this system, so it's just strange, alien to me."
Mr Szobollodi was later to explain that when he said in that note, "I can't read the affirmation", he was not referring to any linguistic inability: he was simply emphasising that his principles would not allow him to make the necessary affirmation.[3]Arrangements were made for Mr Szobollodi to appear before the recorder so that this matter could be investigated. The recorder considered whether he should deal with the matter himself or refer it to a superior judge. In reflecting upon this, the recorder considered section 20 of the Juries Act 1974 (to which we shall return) and also the common law offence of contempt of court.[4]The recorder expressed the initial view that Mr Szobollodi was not yet in breach of section 20 of the 1974 Act, because he had answered the jury summons and had attended the court. In the event, the recorder felt it best to refer the matter to a senior judge, namely the resident judge at Bristol, and the recorder himself continued with his scheduled trial.[5]Later that day Mr Szobollodi appeared before the resident judge (to whom we shall refer for convenience as "the judge"). Mr Szobollodi was not represented.[6]After a discussion in which Mr Szobollodi explained that in his native Hungary there was no equivalent of the jury system, and that he did not believe in the system as operated in this country, the judge explained to him that jury service was an obligation of persons resident in this country, who may be punished by way of a financial penalty for refusing to do what was required of them. He asked Mr Szobollodi, "Is that something that you want to put yourself at risk of or do you want to just think about it and perhaps be prepared to change your mind?" Mr Szobollodi made plain that whilst he understood what was being said to him, he was taking a principled stance and would not alter his view.

The judge said this:

"Is that your decision that you simply will not participate if you’re required to be on a jury here? That is a contempt of the English court and that I should fine you. Do you want to say anything more to try and persuade me why I shouldn’t make you pay a financial penalty?"
[8]Mr Szobollodi gave further explanations as to why he did not believe in the system of jury trial and that there was then discussion as to his financial means.[9]The judge gave a ruling, in which he referred to Mr Szobollodi having been discharged from the panel which had been brought before the recorder earlier that day, and referred to his own hearing that afternoon.

The judge ruled:

"... it is clear that as a matter of principle, which he stands by, the juror indicates that, even if he were forced to remain at court for five or ten days, he simply would not participate in decision making. That is something that I have invited himto reflect upon, and have indicated that I can deal with him by way of a financial penalty for a contempt of court, which he has understood, and I do exactly that, because whatever nationality he is, if he was an English person who was expressing the same views, the result would be exactly the same."

The judge then imposed a fine of £700 and gave directions as to time for payment.

[12]At the conclusion of that hearing Mr Szobollodi was discharged from further attendance at the court and therefore did not take part in any further proceedings.[13]Unhappily, the court office wrongly recorded the judge's decision as a conviction and sentence. In a further error, it recorded the decision as a finding of contempt of court by breach of section 17 of the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996, a statutory provision which is wholly irrelevant to this case. We emphasise that those errors were made in the court office and do not reflect the decision which the judge had pronounced in court.[14]When Mr Szobollodi learned that the court record showed a criminal conviction, which he feared would result in his being unable to renew his licence as a door supervisor, he commenced this appeal. That was four days after the time limit for an appeal had expired. Had he been in time, he would have been entitled to appeal as of right.[15]The very unfortunate consequence of the incorrect manner in which the decision had been recorded was that Mr Szobollodi did in fact lose his job. We are told today by counsel that it may be that under the rules of the relevant supervising body, even a correct recording of a finding of contempt would have been an impediment to the renewal of the necessary licence; but be that as it may, it appears that the incorrect recording of a conviction was the decisive factor.[16]Mr Szobollodi now has the benefit of representation by Mr Wainwright. The Crown Prosecution Service is not a party to this appeal, but the court is grateful to His Majesty's Attorney General for instructing Mr Robottom to make written submissions and to appear before us today. The court has been assisted by the submissions of both counsel.[17]The grounds of appeal, briefly summarised, are that:• First, the matter was dealt with as a contempt of court, it being not entirely clear whether that was under the court's inherent jurisdiction or under section 20 of the Juries Act 1974, and should not have been recorded as a criminal offence.• Secondly, it is submitted that the conduct of Mr Szobollodi did not amount to a contempt under section 20 of the 1974 Act, and that the court should be slow to expand the common law provisions so as to use the inherent jurisdiction to address a matter not covered by express statutory provision.• Thirdly, that in any event there were fundamental procedural errors in the hearing, which had the result that Mr Szobollodi did not receive a fair hearing, and on that basis the finding of contempt should be set aside.[18]Summarising very briefly the relevant legal framework, we note that the law relating to contempt of court, which has developed in a piecemeal fashion over very many years, is the subject of a recent Consultation Paper by the Law Commission. In the context of criminal proceedings, it is the subject of guidance quite recently given to judges and magistrates by the Senior Presiding Judge. The Crown Court has an inherent power to deal with contempts of court. We agree with counsel that if a contempt is proved and a sanction is imposed for it, the court record should not refer to a conviction or a sentence. The court's decision should be recorded as a finding of contempt: see R v Yaxley-Lennon [2018] 2 Cr App R 30.[19]Specific powers in relation to jurors are conferred by section 20 of the 1974 Act, which, so far as relevant for present purposes, provides:
"20. Offences: failure to attend, serving while disqualified etc (1) Subject to the provisions of subsections (2) to (4) below— (a) if a person duly summoned under this Act fails to attend (on the first or on any subsequent day on which he is required to attend by the summons or by the appropriate officer) in compliance with the summons, or (b) if a person, after attending in pursuance of a summons, is not available when called on to serve as a juror, or is unfit for service by reason of drink or drugs, . he shall be liable to a fine not exceeding level 3 on the standard scale (2) An offence under subsection (1) above shall be punishable either on summary conviction or as if it were criminal contempt of court committed in the face of the court. ... (4) A person shall not be liable to be punished under the preceding provisions of this section if he can show some reasonable cause for his failure to comply with the summons, or for not being available when called on to serve, and those provisions have effect subject to the provisions of this Act about the withdrawal or alteration of a summons and about the granting of any excusal or deferral."
[20]Contempt proceedings in the criminal courts are also the subject of provisions of the Criminal Procedure Rules. Rule 48.5 (so far as material for present purposes) provides:
"(1) This rule applies where the court observes, or someone reports to the court— … (b) In the Crown Court, a contravention of— ... (ii) section 20 of the Juries Act 1974(2) (disobeying a jury summons); ... (f) any other conduct with which the court can deal as, or as if it were, a criminal contempt of court, except failure to surrender to bail under section 6 of the Bail Act 1976. (2) Unless the respondent’s behaviour makes it impracticable to do so, the court must— (a) explain, in terms the respondent can understand (with help, if necessary)— (i) the conduct that is in question, (ii) that the court can impose imprisonment, or a fine, or both, for such conduct, (iii) (where relevant) that the court has power to order the respondent’s immediate temporary detention, if in the court’s opinion that is required, (iv) that the respondent may explain the conduct, (v) that the respondent may apologise, if he or she so wishes, and that this may persuade the court to take no further action, and (vi) that the respondent may take legal advice; and (b) allow the respondent a reasonable opportunity to reflect, take advice, explain and, if he or she so wishes, apologise. (3) After allowing that opportunity – a. the court may enquire into the conduct at once; b. the court may postpone the enquiry … c. … d. the court may take no further action in respect of the conduct.” Further relevant provision is made in rule 48.8 as follows: "(1) At an enquiry, the court must— (a) ensure that the respondent understands (with help, if necessary) what is alleged, if the enquiry has been postponed from a previous occasion; (b) explain what the procedure at the enquiry will be; and (c) ask whether the respondent admits the conduct in question. (2) If the respondent admits the conduct, the court need not receive evidence. (3) If the respondent does not admit the conduct, the court must consider— (a) any statement served under rule 48.7; (b) any other evidence of the conduct served under that rule; (c) any evidence introduced by the respondent; and (d) any representations by the respondent about the conduct. (4) If the respondent admits the conduct, or the court finds it proved, the court must— (a) before imposing any punishment for contempt of court, give the respondent an opportunity to make representations relevant to punishment and a final opportunity to apologise; (b) in deciding how to deal with the respondent take into account— (i) the gravity of the contempt (ii) the extent of any admission of the conduct and the stage at which that admission was made (iii) any apology and the stage at which that apology was offered, and (iv) any period during which the respondent was detained pending the enquiry; … (d) explain, in terms the respondent can understand (with help, if necessary)— (i)The reasons for its decision, including its findings of fact, and (ii) The punishment it imposes, and its effect ..."
[21]In the transcript of the brief hearing before the judge, no reference was made to section 20 of the 1974 Act. Mr Wainwright submits that it can nonetheless be inferred from reading the transcript that the judge was exercising his power under section 20 to deal with the matter as a contempt of court rather than as a summary offence, the contempt consisting of a breach of the provisions of section 20.[22]We regard this as a difficult point, and listening to the submissions of both Mr Wainwright and Mr Robottom, it appears to us that a number of legal issues are raised by the facts which we have briefly summarised.[23]The issues are these:• First, was the conduct of Mr Szobollodi conduct which fell within the ambit of section 20 of the 1974 Act? In this regard, submissions have focused on the statutory language "is not available" when "called on to serve as a juror". We have heard submissions as to whether those provisions are fulfilled only when the prospective juror has been required to take his place in the jury box and called upon to take his oath or affirmation, or whether it might be considered at an earlier stage, for example when the panel (conventionally of about fifteen prospective jurors) is sent to a particular court for the purposes of a particular trial.• Secondly, if the conduct was not within the scope of section 20, is it nonetheless within the inherent jurisdiction of the court to treat the conduct such as that of Mr Szobollodi as a contempt of court? On the face of it, we can see no reason of principle why it should not be capable of being so treated. Mr Wainwright, however, has vigorously argued against that proposition.[24]These difficult and interesting legal points were not considered by the judge. No submissions were made to him about them, and he therefore gave no considered ruling upon them. This court, as a court of review, is therefore put into a difficult position, as there is no ruling by the judge specifically addressing jurisdictional points of this nature.[25]What is, however, clear is that the reason why the judge did not hear any submissions about these matters was that Mr Szobollodi was not legally represented and did not himself make any submissions to the judge about these matters. That then brings us to the submissions made by Mr Wainwright as to procedural failures in the course of the hearing.[26]Summarising the submissions of counsel, Mr Wainwright's reasons for contending that Mr Szobollodi did not receive a fair hearing are as follows.• First, and in Mr Wainwright's submission most importantly, it was not explained to Mr Szobollodi that he could seek legal advice, for which Legal Aid would have been available. Mr Wainwright relies on the decision in R v Crown Court at Guildford ex parte Siderfin (1990) 90 Cr App R 192 in support of his submission that there would have been no reason why Mr Szobollodi could not have been granted an adjournment if he did wish to take advice.• Secondly, although the judge stated what Mr Szobollodi had done, and Mr Szobollodi did not dispute it, Mr Wainwright points out that the judge did not explain the precise basis on which Mr Szobollodi's actions were said to amount to contempt.• Thirdly, Mr Wainwright submits that Mr Szobollodi was not given an opportunity to apologise, or a final opportunity to apologise, prior to punishment.[27]Mr Robottom submits that strict compliance with the provisions of rule 48 is not an essential prerequisite of a fair hearing. Minor departures from the provisions of the rule may occur but the hearing may nonetheless be fair. Mr Robottom accepts that the judge did not specifically ask Mr Szobollodi if he admitted the relevant conduct and did not specifically tell Mr Szobollodi that he could apologise. Nonetheless the relevant conduct was substantially set out and was not disputed, and the judge twice gave Mr Szobollodi the opportunity to think about what the judge had said and to put forward any reason why he should not be ordered to pay a financial penalty.[28]Mr Robottom acknowledges, however, that this court may regard as a more significant feature the fact that Mr Szobollodi was not told that he may take legal advice, and was not told that he may wish to take advice as to whether he may have a defence in law to the allegation of contempt.[29]With all respect to the judge, we are satisfied that he fell into error in failing at the first stage of the proceedings to explain to Mr Szobollodi that he could take legal advice and that a reasonable opportunity would be given for him to do so if he wished (rule 48.5(2)(a)(vi) and (b)), and in later failing to explain what the procedure at the enquiry would be (rule 48.8(1)(b). If it were not for those serious procedural errors, we would agree with Mr Robottom that the judge had in substance taken the steps required by rule 48, and, if Mr Szobollodi had been represented or had been given an express opportunity to seek legal advice, this court could have been satisfied that he was not prejudiced by those departures from the precise terms of the rule.[30]But in the absence of a clear explanation to Mr Szobollodi that he could seek legal advice if he wished ,and a clear explanation of what exactly was being alleged against him and what the procedure would entail, the judge was deprived of the opportunity to hear submissions on the important matters which we have mentioned; and Mr Szobollodi was deprived of safeguards which should have been afforded to him before a serious finding was made against him and a significant financial penalty imposed. The finding and penalty therefore cannot stand.[31]The errors which we have identified were not of Mr Szobollodi's making. He has paid the financial penalty in full, a payment which he will now be able to recover. As we have noted, he has also suffered the loss of his employment. In those circumstances it would be unjust to require him to face a rehearing of the issue of contempt.[32]For those reasons, we grant the necessary short extension of time. We allow the appeal, and we quash the finding of contempt of court and the imposition of a financial penalty. Mr Wainwright, Mr Robottom, thank you both very much. Is there any other matter which we need to address which we have not covered? MR WAINWRIGHT: No, thank you. MR ROBOTTOM: No, my Lord. THE VICE PRESIDENT: Thank you both very much indeed. Epiq Europe Ltd hereby certify that the above is an accurate and complete record of the proceedings or part thereof. 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