R v Kyle Joseph Peters [2025] EWCA Crim 1175

WARNING: reporting restrictions may apply to the contents transcribed in this document, particularly if the case concerned a sexual offence or involved a child. Reporting restrictions prohibit the publication of the applicable information to the public or any section of the public, in writing, in a broadcast or by means of the internet, including social media. Anyone who receives a copy of this transcript is responsible in law for making sure that applicable restrictions are not breached. A person who breaches a reporting restriction is liable to a fine and/or imprisonment. For guidance on whether reporting restrictions apply, and to what information, ask at the court office or take legal advice.This Transcript is Crown Copyright.  It may not be reproduced in whole or in part other than in accordance with relevant licence or with the express consent of the Authority.  All rights are reserved.[2025] EWCA Crim 1175Venue Royal Courts of JusticeStrandLondonWC2A 2LLDate Wednesday 27 August 2025
Before
LORD JUSTICE MALESMRS JUSTICE CUTTSMR JUSTICE FREEDMAN
Between
REXCrownV
Between
KYLE JOSEPH PETERS__________Computer Aided Transcript of Epiq Europe Ltd,Lower Ground, 46 Chancery Lane, London WC2A 1JETel No: 020 7404 1400; Email: rcj@epiqglobal.co.uk (Official Shorthand Writers to the Court)_________MR J MILNER appeared for Appellant._________JUDGMENTAPPROVED
[1]The appellant, Mr Kyle Joseph Peters, was sentenced on 14 March 2025 to 33 months' imprisonment by HHJ Dhir KC at the Central Criminal Court, in respect of a conviction of a single count against him of violent disorder, contrary to section 2(1) of the Public Order Act 1986. On a guilty plea on 1 March 2024 (being the morning of an intended Newton hearing) the appellant removed a basis of plea and pleaded guilty accepting the prosecution case against him. The appellant appeals with the leave of the Single Judge on the basis of a submission that the sentence was manifestly excessive. In particular, he points to what he says was an error in principle on the part of the judge in choosing too high a starting point. He also says that there was a disparity between the way in which he was treated relative to other defendants in respect of the public order offence.[2]The appellant was not involved in the killing of Givani Espuet on 30 October 2022 and he was not charged with an offence of homicide. Kadeem Hibbert and Sahid Kpaka were convicted of murder and Courtney Forrester was convicted of manslaughter. This was in respect of the death of Givani Espuet, who was killed on 30 October 2022, aged 21 years old. Hibbert, Kpaka and Forrester were also convicted of violent disorder for which they received concurrent sentences.[3]The appellant along with Bruce Hutchinson, Andre Brown-Watson, Firat Tato and Omari Knight, who had already been sentenced prior to the sentence of the appellant, participated in group violence outside the Aura Club on the Harrow Road. Those defendants, like the appellant, were convicted of violent disorder as a standalone offence without being convicted of an offence of homicide. We are aware of their sentences. The appellant does not rely on any argument of disparity as between those defendants in respect of their sentences and his own.[4]It must be stressed at the outset that it has never formed any part of the prosecution case that the appellant was guilty of participation in an offence of homicide in respect of Givani Espuet.[5]The prosecution prepared a written note to which it referred in the course of its oral opening. The prosecution case was accepted by the appellant upon the abandonment of a basis of plea rendering a Newton hearing unnecessary. Paragraph 10 of the note read as follows:
"The Prosecution submits that the Defendant should be sentenced on the basis that he jointly participated in the group violence outside the Aura Lounge Bar. In detail: The Defendant arrived at Aura Lounge at 00:31:10 hours; The Defendant is present inside the Aura Lounge when a dispute unfolds near the bar/door to the kitchen at 01:26:40 hours; Givani Espuet, Kai Lloyd and D’Neil Lloyd walks across the dance floor towards the toilets at 01:31:54 hours; Members of the defendant group move towards the toilet area. This includes the Defendant at 01:33:30 hours; Members of the defendant group move back inside the Aura Lounge by 01:39:46 hours; Members of the defendant group exit the Aura Lounge between 01:44:23 hours and 01:46:48 hours. This includes the Defendant; Once outside the Aura Lounge the Defendant jointly participated in the group violence; The Defendant was part of the group who chased Kai Lloyd along Harrow Road and onto the pavement area outside the Aura Lounge at 01:46:48 hours; The Defendant was part of the group that confronted Givani Espuet /Kai Lloyd and D’Neil Lloyd on the pavement outside Tops Pizza near the phone box at 01:47:07 hours; The Defendant was part of the group as they moved along Harrow Road attacking Givani Espuet in front of the Aura Lounge. As the Defendant moves along Harrow Road he punches D’Neil Lloyd in the entrance of Aura Lounge at 01:47:04 hours; The Defendant was part of the group who attacked Givani Espuet on Harrow Road outside Wenzels Bakery. By 01:47:39 hours, the Defendant is seen walking away from the group; The Defendant was not part of the group who attacked Givani Espuet outside AJ Mart. The Defendant is seen on Harrow Road in possession of a knife that he produced from the waistband of his clothing. At one point the tip of the knife was pointed towards Kai Lloyd."
[6]It should be added that the knife was about 10 centimetres in length. It was caught by a Ring Doorbell footage. The judge applied the sentencing guidelines for this category of violent disorder as culpability level A, that is to say the targeting of an individual or individuals by the group and participating in an incident which involved widespread and/or large-scale acts of violence on people and participating in an incident involving serious acts of violence. It did result in the death of one individual and serious fear and/or distress and/or disruption albeit that the appellant was not responsible for the unlawful killing nor was he ever prosecuted for it. Further, it was harm level 1 in that the case involved extreme category 2 factors in that the incident resulted in the death of one individual and/or serious fear and/or distress and/or disruption.[7]The judge applied the starting point of 4 years for a category 1A offence with a range of 3 - 4.5 year years' custody. The judge identified aggravating factors that(i) the appellant took a knife to the scene and produced it, and further(ii) he acted under the influence of alcohol. The judge identified mitigating factors, namely that (i) the appellant had no relevant previous conviction; (ii) he is a family man with a young daughter;(iii) he did not commit any offences while on bail for this matter and while awaiting sentence;(iv) he had a full-time responsible and well-paid job and(v) after being initially involved in the violence he walked away before the fatal stabbing occurred.[8]The judge ordered that the sentence was 3 years before allowing a reduction of 3 months for the plea just before the commencement of the Newton hearing. In other words, the judge sentenced at the bottom of the range for a category 1A offence, thereby giving a very substantial reduction for mitigating factors.[9]In his submissions on behalf of the appellant Mr Milner submitted as follows. Firstly, the judge erred in selecting too high a starting point and should have sentenced by reference to category 2A or 1B, either of which would have been a starting point of 3 years' custody with ranges of 2 to 4 years. On this basis the reduction for mitigation circumstances could have taken the sentence down towards 2 years. Second, the sentence for violent disorder in respect of the appellant was greater than the sentence for the same offence in respect of the defendants Hibbert, Kpaka and Forrester but they were not so in charged with violent disorder. Kadeem Hibbert and Sahid Kpaka were convicted of murder, life sentences with a minimum term to serve of 22 years and 17 years respectively and Courtney Forrester was convicted of manslaughter as determinate sentence of 10 years. Their respective sentences had starting points of 3 years in respect of violent disorder and not 4 years as in the case of the appellant.[10]The lack of consistency was said to be that they were each sentenced concurrently on violent disorder on the bases of the same characterisation of the nature of the offence and a starting point of 3 years. There were allowances for reduction for guilty pleas of 10 per cent in respect of Hibbert, 25 per cent in respect of Kpaka and 25 per cent in respect of Forrester. The sentences for violent disorder, after the reductions, were 2 years 6 months. Hibbert after a reduction for mitigation 10 per cent for a late guilty plea, 2 years 3 months for Kpaka after reduction for 25 per cent for a guilty plea and 1 year 10 months for Forrester after reduction for mitigation and 25 per cent for a guilty plea. They were all less than that for the appellant, who was sentenced to 2 years 9 months after reduction from 3 years for a guilty plea. The judge gave a higher sentence for violent disorder to the appellant despite his mitigation which, it was submitted by Mr Milner, was in some respects greater than that of the other defendants particularly in that he had no relevant convictions.[11]Having considered these arguments carefully we are satisfied that the sentence was not manifestly excessive nor was it wrong in principle for the following reasons. First, the judge selected the correct starting point of a category 1A offence and the reasons given characterised it as such. Second, the judge allowed very significantly for mitigation by coming down to the lowest part of the range to take into account all of the mitigating factors.[12]The comparison with the other defendants who were sentenced in respect of homicide offences, as well as violent disorder, did not provide any disparity argument for the following reasons, namely:(i) As the judge said when sentencing the other defendants, the sentence for violent disorder was in their cases "academic" because the sentence would be concurrent with the homicide offences, in that the violent disorder was part of circumstances of the homicide offences for which they were convicted;(ii) In any event it was not comparing like with like, in that the case of the appellant but not in the case of Hibbert, Kpaka, and Forrester the violent disorder charge was a standalone offence. The Prosecution Sentencing Note at paragraph 48 in respect of the defendants other than the appellant recognised that category 1A was the appropriate category for a standalone offence of violent disorder. Where it is charged alongside more grave offences there are other considerations of totality which mean that there is no proper or reliable comparison with a "standalone offence".(iii) The effect of the reduction to the bottom of the scale is that the appellant's sentence on violent disorder was very little different from that of Hibbert and Kpaka, in other words being sentenced at the bottom of the range for category 1A was almost the equivalent as being sentenced in the middle of the range for category 1B or 2A.(iv) The judge in sentencing the other defendants may have erred in identifying the starting point as 3 years instead of 4 years but that was immaterial because of the three factors set out above. The important point is that the judge was correct when she identified and applied a 4-year starting point in the case of the appellant.[13]We have no doubt that the court adopted a proper starting point for a standalone offence. The court adopted a proper approach identifying and taking into account aggravating and mitigating factors. The court allowed a very substantial reduction for mitigation. The effect is that there was no error in principle. It was a correct sentencing exercise. It was undertaken by a judge who was extremely familiar with the facts, having tried two cases arising out of the incidents in question. She therefore had a feel for the relevant facts and the culpability of the participants and the nature of the harm. The judge was particularly familiar with the numerous CCTV recordings and with those involving the appellant, of which the judge was reminded in the presentation by the prosecution on the plea of guilty.[14]In all the circumstances, the sentence was not manifestly excessive. Accordingly the appeal is dismissed.