"When he first slapped me I shouted at him. He then wanted to sleep with me but I refused"; "
"1. In my opinion, the Recorder’s rejection of the submission of no case to answer on the attempted rape count was justified. 2.The test, correctly applied by the Recorder, was whether, taking the prosecution evidence at its highest, a reasonable jury could properly convict. 3.Here, there were recorded statements of the applicant evidencing his intent to have sex with the complainant. He had initially approached her as self-evidently a lone and drunk female. They went not to her nearby hotel but to the back of his car. There was evidence that her trousers were removed there and her knickers partially so. There was evidence that a jury could conclude showed that she had physically resisted the applicant and had shouted out ('drama'), coupled with her statements to her friends. The evidential approach required on assessment of whether acts could properly be assessed as 'more than merely preparatory' for the commission of the offence is set out in the AG Reference (No,1 of 1992) case, duly referred to by the Recorder. 4. There certainly were points that could be made by the defence. But, in my view, the Recorder in evaluating the evidence was justified in ruling that, overall, these matters were matters for the jury and that a reasonable jury could properly convict, depending on the view of the evidence it took. 5. I therefore refuse leave to appeal."
"The prosecution case was based upon circumstantial evidence. There is no dispute between the appellant and the respondent as to the correct approach in law to a submission of no case to answer when all the critical evidence is indirect and inferential. The ultimate question for the trial judge is: Could a reasonable jury, properly directed, conclude so that it is sure that the defendant is guilty? It is agreed that in a circumstantial case it is a necessary step in the analysis of the evidence and its effect to ask: Could a reasonable jury, properly directed, exclude all realistic possibilities consistent with the defendant’s innocence? Matters of assessment and weight of the evidence are for the jury and not for the judge. Since the judge is concerned with the sufficiency of evidence and not with the ultimate decision the question is not whether all juries or any particular jury or the judge would draw the inference of guilt from the evidence adduced but whether a reasonable jury could draw the inference of guilt. These propositions are derived without contention from the decisions of this court in Galbraith[1981] 1 WLR 1039 , Jabber[2006] EWCA Crim 2694 (approved by the Privy Council in Goring[2008] UKPC 56 at paragraph 22), Hedgcock, Dyer and Mayers[2007] EWCA Crim 3486 ,… and G and F[2012] EWCA Crim 1756 ."