“What that means then is that we are stuck between the high culpability category starting point, which is three and a half years after trial with a range of two and a half years up to six years' custody, and the starting point for medium culpability category 1 which is two years with a range up to three and a half years.”
“But today, I consider with all of the delays that I could not justify to the public a delay of over two years in each of your cases and then sending you to immediate custody given the way that you have lived your lives. So you are going to benefit, finally, to that extent, from Mr George's prevarication over that two-year period and I am going to suspend the sentence in respect of each of you.”
“[34] … a particular individual within a conspiracy may be shown only to have been involved for a particular period during the conspiracy, or to have been involved only in certain transactions within the conspiracy, or otherwise to have had an identifiably smaller part in the whole conspiracy. In such circumstances the judge should have regard to those factors which limit an individual's part, relative to the whole conspiracy. It will be appropriate for the judge to reflect that in sentence, perhaps by adjusting the category to one better reflecting the reality. [35] As a balancing factor, however, the court is entitled to reflect the fact that the offender has been part of a wider course of criminal activity. The fact of involvement in a conspiracy is an aggravating feature since each conspirator playing his part gives comfort and assistance to others knowing that he is doing so, and the greater his or her awareness of the scale of the enterprise in which he is assisting, the greater his culpability.”
“The rationale for any reduction in sentence because of delay is that the offender has been punished to a degree simply by having the matter hanging over him for an unreasonably long period of time, with the anxiety which this may cause. Here, the delays in prosecution and sentencing do not appear to have been of sufficient concern to the appellant to prevent him from becoming involved in the drug dealing which was the subject of the second, and then the third, convictions. Nor did he advance any evidence of any particular anxiety in this regard.”