“1. Eleven proposed grounds of appeal are raised on your behalf. There is no merit in any of them. 2. First, as to your acquittal in 2016, I am quite clear that the judge was right to allow evidence concerning this to go before the jury at your trial. The similarities between the acquittal and the offences for which you were standing trial are striking. They include the targeting of the 2016 complainant and the 2022 complainant, having watched the 2016 complainant return from a shop and enter a block of flats and in relation to the 2022 complainant having watched her on the balcony of a block of flats. The location of the 2016 incident (the stairwell of a block of flats) matched the location of the incident, involving the 2022 complainant, and indeed the 2010 complainant was attacked in an electricity cupboard in a block of flats. There were also other similarities: engaging the complainants in conversation; moving them to a secluded area; becoming physical once they attempted to leave; and in the case of the 2016 complainant making contact which you also did in respect of the 2022 complainant and the 2017 complainant. 3. As to the point concerning the video recorded interview transcript, it is not suggested that the evidence given by the 2016 complainant at the first trial differed from the evidence given by her in the more recent trial. The submission that ‘considerable key evidence was missing’ is simply not borne out. 4. As to the suggestion that the judge should have recused herself because she stated that ‘if the exposure convictions had been in evidence, the jury would likely … convicted’, it appears from the recording that what the judge actually said regarding the convictions for indecent exposure was that ‘maybe had that evidence been adduced the verdict might have been different’. The judge was not here saying that there would have been a conviction but mainly alluding to the possibility which was obviously a possibility. 5. Nor, lastly, in relation to the first ground, is there any merit in the suggestion (if made) that the judge erred in the exercise of her statutory discretion. 6. Turning to the second proposed appeal again, I see no merit in this. The judge was entitled to take the view that your previous convictions for indecent exposure demonstrated a propensity to target lone females in public and subject them to a sexual act. The fact that those other offences did not involve physical contact does not matter. 7. As to the timing of the bad character application/the application for the judge to recuse herself, the former was made on28 March 2023 whilst the latter was made on4 April 2023 . It follows that there is no point here to be made. 8. The judge mentioning about the masturbation having taken place in a public park was a mistake which was corrected. No harm done. 9. As to the third ground of appeal again, there is no merit in this at all. There was an error on the part of the prosecution in that the officer did not mention masturbation. This was allowed to be corrected on a very narrow basis. Nothing turns on it. Indeed, if the defence had allowed the matter to be included in the agreed facts, then, there would have been less prominence to the point than having a witness attend to give evidence. 10. As to the fourth ground of appeal, the suggestion that there were ‘unseen legal directions given to the jury’ makes no sense. There was a technical glitch that is all. The judge provided her draft and her submissions from both sides, indicating that where appropriate she would amend her directions in accordance with those submissions. That she chose not to hear further submissions was a matter for her. It was not a decision directed at the defence specifically. 11. This brings me to the fifth ground of appeal concerning delay. The decision which you made not to give evidence. There is nothing at this point either. In fact, the direction given by the judge (as set out in the respondent’s notice at paragraph 5) was, if anything, generous to you. 12. As to the sixth ground of appeal concerning an alleged misdirection relating to bad character and exposure convictions, this has been addressed already. There is nothing in the point. 13. The seventh ground of appeal is also hopeless. The dates of the relevant offences and conviction were in evidence, and the judge reminded the jury of what the defence had to say concerning that offending, which was that the offences were very different in nature, there was no physical contact, and they took place many years ago. 14. As to the next ground, the ninth ground of appeal, the various complainants were not known to each other. There is nothing in this point as a result. 15. This brings me to the tenth ground of appeal concerning the alleged misdirection concerning reasonable belief. It is accepted on your behalf that your barrister did not cross-examine on this issue, but, in any event, the judge directed the jury that ‘all four elements of the offence must be proved’ and so there is no prejudice here. 16. As to the eleventh ground of appeal, there was no bias in the judge’s summing-up, and nor, as far as I can discern, were there any inaccuracies of any consequence. 17. As to the final ground of appeal, the suggestion that all applications made on your behalf were refused whilst all applications made by the prosecution were successful, I note from the respondent’s notice that that simply is not the case.”
“1. There is no merit in either of the two proposed grounds. 2. As to the first, it is accepted on your behalf that the judge was right to approach Count 5 on the basis that this was the lead offence and to impose an uplift in respect of that offence, whilst making the other sentences concurrent. The submission made is that an uplift of nine years was not just and proportionate. I do not agree. The judge explained in detail the facts relating to each of the offences. It is apparent from what she set out that you are (as, indeed, is accepted on your behalf) a very dangerous man who has committed appalling sex attacks over the course of a considerable number of years. The judge was fully justified in imposing the sentence which she did in view of those circumstances. 3. As to the second ground, it is, as I say, accepted on your behalf that you are dangerous. The only issue is as to whether the judge was right to impose an extended sentence. Plainly, she was right to do just this. Again, the facts speak for themselves, and I consider it not merely right, but also important, that the extended sentence provisions apply in a case such as yours. The fact that the judge ‘chose a low term of three years, when assessing risk and the extended part of the sentence’ (paragraph 13 of the Advice) is nothing to the point.”