“6. Approaching or communicating with ·any child under the age of 16, directly· or indirectly. This excludes contact, that is inadvertent and not reasonably avoidable in the course of lawful daily life. This communication includes but is not exhaustive of communications: in person, through another, in writing, by telephone, by email, via a social networking site, internet chat room or forum. 7. Forming or continuing any friendships with adults who you know or believe to have control or parental responsibility, whether temporarily or permanently, to any child under the age of 16 without disclosing their details to the monitoring Public Protection Unit within 24 hours.”
“The Appellant was aware of the restrictions under his Order, breached these, and accordingly entered guilty pleas in the magistrates’ court. The Appellant was aware of the prosecution case and substance of the allegations... In the Appellant’s mind, it was the terms of the Order that were key, rather than its title, or the legislation under which his Order was made, and breaches charged. Further, the sentencing regime for breaches under SOPOs and SHPOs is identical. Had the Appellant been charged under the correct legislation, there would have been no practical difference - the case would have been committed for sentence, and counsel would have made identical submissions on the same sentencing guidelines, which in turn were those considered by the sentencing judge.”
“In every material respect beyond the identified drafting errors, the charge was sufficiently clear. The correct SOPO was an exhibit in the case. The correct date of the imposition of the SOPO was used, as was the correct name of the imposing court. The correct prohibitions were opened. The judge referred to the correct sentencing framework. The offence charged, although erroneous, was one known to law. The error in the charge thus did not mean that the charge could be described as a ‘nullity’.” not mean that the charge could be described as a ‘nullity’.”
“42. In our judgment, there is a clear judicial and legislative steer away from quashing an indictment and allowing appeals on the basis of a purely technical defect. The overriding objective of the Criminal Justice System is to do justice- to ensure the acquittal of the innocent and the conviction of the guilty. To that end, procedural and technical points should be taken at the time of the trial when they can be properly and fairly addressed. 43. However, the question for us is whether this is a purely technical defect or whether the count itself was fundamentally flawed.”
“16. In those circumstances the potential difficulties which are created by the statutory provisions amending section 5A of the 1997 Act, which were drawn to the court’s attention by the Criminal Appeal Office do not fall for consideration. We consider that Miss Scott [counsel] is entirely right in the approach that she has taken to the consequences of the technical error. We are concerned with whether these convictions are a nullity or whether they are unsafe and if they are neither then we do not need to search for any technical solution to overcome problems which do not arise.”
“It is rightly said on your behalf that I must have regard to the principle of totality and I make it absolutely clear that I have that principle very much in mind when I arrive at the sentence I am bound to do and about to impose upon you; but I take the view that for offending of this kind it doesn’t get much more serious than this. The total sentence I impose upon you is one of six years’ imprisonment…”