"12. The application for extension of time and the substantive grounds are linked. They both depend on the proposition that the applicant's mental health was not a matter known to the court in 2002. That proposition is misconceived. As we have indicated, the judge had a body of psychiatric evidence. He referred to it when he passed sentence. The applicant's reference to the Mental Health Act implies that this court should now consider that option, namely some form of order under the Mental Health Act. As the single judge observed, that is simply impossible. The jury convicted of murder. The only option open to the judge by law was life imprisonment. The fact that the applicant has spent considerable periods since 2002 in hospital rather than in prison takes him nowhere. As the single judge observed, many of those with mental health issues who are convicted of murder thereafter will spend much of their sentences in a secure hospital. That does not mean that there was anything wrong with the trial or sentencing process in the first instance, or that the person concerned has any ground of appeal."
"Your mental health problems in 2002 were well known to your lawyers and the Court. The Judge referred to them in his sentencing comments. It is possible that those who are treating you now may have a better insight into your current mental health; but there is nothing to suggest that, as a result of any aspect of your mental health or otherwise, your conviction is unsafe or that the procedure by which the verdict was made was procedurally unfair in any way."