“On07/02/2019 the Court ordered that computers, hard drives and cameras shall be forfeited and destroyed underS143 Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000 .”
“18. As to substance: i) A deprivation order will only be available if the requirements in section 153(3) are met, namely that the property has been used for the purpose of committing, or facilitating the commission of, any offence, or was intended by the offender to be used for that purpose; ii) If available, when considering whether or not to make a deprivation order, a court must have regard to the factors identified in section 155(1), namely the value of the property and the likely financial and other effects of making the Order; iii) Proportionality is a relevant and important factor. The effect of a deprivation order should be considered as part of the total penalty imposed; iv) Deprivation orders should not be made unless they are simple and there are no complicating factors such as the existence of innocent co-owners. 19. As to procedure: i) It is for the prosecution to justify an application for a deprivation order. The burden lies on the prosecution to satisfy the court to the criminal standard of proof that such an Order is available; ii) There needs to be a sufficient evidential basis for a deprivation order to be sought and made, so that full and proper investigation of the basis for the Order can take place; iii) The court must make a proper enquiry into the circumstances of the property which is the subject of the application for deprivation and, where necessary, make a formal finding. Where appropriate this may take the form of a Newton hearing; iv) The prosecution and defence should be invited to make submissions as to the appropriateness of the proposed order.”
“9. We cannot accept Mr Temple’s submission that the deprivation order should be limited to the unlawful material on the devices. In principle that gives rise to conceptual difficulties. In any event, an order in these terms could require the public to bear the cost of removing the lawful material. It is therefore appropriate to consider Mr Temple’s alternative submission which has far greater attraction. He, in the context of that alternative submission, does not contest the making of a deprivation order provided that a period of time is available during the course of which the relevant lawful material may be extracted. In all the circumstances of this case, we are satisfied that it would be fair and proportionate to make such a deprivation order bearing in mind a number of factors including the appellant’s circumstances and the leniency of the suspended sentence order. A mechanism does exist to ensure that material of sentimental value, either to the appellant or his family can be removed. 10. It is not necessary to consider whether the appropriate application is under the 1897 Act or by the appellant himself because these issues are avoided by Mr Temple's pragmatic solution, namely that there be an interregnum before the deprivation order takes effect. During oral argument, a period of 3 months was proposed. An expert, which has already been identified, would have the opportunity to attend at the relevant premises, remove from the machines the lawful items, and then, for good order, prepare a relevant schedule which would be signed off by the police, to avoid any future difficulty. We understand that a memorandum of understanding has been prepared by the parties which would ensure this process proceeds smoothly. In the circumstances of this case, we would invite counsel to prepare a draft of the appropriate order by 4.00 pm on Monday next, and the Court will then consider its terms to ensure that no practical difficulties arise and during the period of 3 months that we have referred to.”