R v Adam Anthony Fletcher [2023] EWCA Crim 910

WARNING: reporting restrictions may apply to the contents transcribed in this document, particularly if the case concerned a sexual offence or involved a child. Reporting restrictions prohibit the publication of the applicable information to the public or any section of the public, in writing, in a broadcast or by means of the internet, including social media. Anyone who receives a copy of this transcript is responsible in law for making are that applicable restrictions are not breached. A person who breaches a reporting restriction is liable to a fine and/or imprisonment. For guidance on whether reporting restrictions apply, and to what information, ask at the court office or take legal advice.This Transcript is Crown Copyright.  It may not be reproduced in whole or in part other than in accordance with relevant licence or with the express consent of the Authority.  All rights are reserved.[2023] EWCA Crim 910Venue Royal Courts of JusticeThe StrandLondonWC2A 2LLDate Tuesday 11 th July 2023B e f o r e:LADY JUSTICE MACUR DBEMR JUSTICE GOOSESIR ROBIN SPENCER
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ADAM ANTHONY FLETCHER____________________Computer Aided Transcription of Epiq Europe Ltd,Lower Ground, 18-22 Furnival Street, London EC4A 1JSTel No: 020 7404 1400; Email: rcj@epiqglobal.co.uk (Official Shorthand Writers to the Court)_____________________Mr P A Finnigan KC appeared for AppellantMr R J Pratt KC and Mr J K Baxter appeared for Crown____________________J U D G M E N T
[1]In this appeal against sentence, for which leave was granted by the single judge, Adam Anthony Fletcher appeals against the sentence imposed upon him in the Crown Court at Liverpool by His Honour Judge Cummings KC on 21st September 2022.[2]The appellant (who is now aged 29 but was 28 at the date of the offence) was sentenced to Imprisonment for Life, with a minimum term of 22 years (less 269 days spent on remand). He was convicted after trial on 25th July 2022 of Murder. The appellant contends that the sentence was either wrong in principle or excessive.[3]Two other offenders were convicted and sentenced for offences of assisting an offender which related to the appellant's offence. This appeal is not concerned with their cases.

The Offence

[4]On 18th December 2021 a party was held in the Brambles Public House, Old Swan, Liverpool, which later moved on to a house in Princess Drive, Liverpool. A number of those who attended the public house joined the owner of the property, Nicola Morrison, in the continuing celebrations. Others were also invited. Amongst those were Paul Stenson, who was aged 30 and who later became the victim of the offence with which this appeal is concerned. He attended the party with his girlfriend. The appellant and his girlfriend also attended the party.[5]In the early hours of the following morning, whilst the party continued, Mr Stenson's partner was outside in the garden of the property, having a cigarette, when she was approached by a man she did not know. This was the appellant. She believed that the appellant was "coming on" to her, which made her uncomfortable. She reported the incident to Mr Stenson. A short time later she returned to see the appellant and Mr Stenson together, apparently in normal conversation which ended when the two men appeared to make up and hug. She was annoyed that Mr Stenson had apparently not believed her account and left the party.[6]According to a number of witnesses called at trial, the atmosphere changed quickly whilst the two men were in the kitchen of the property: there was an exchange of blows, with punches each to the other. The owner of the property required everyone to leave her home. At the same time the appellant asked Mr Stenson to continue the dispute outside. Both men left the kitchen, walked along the hallway and out to the front of the property. However, the appellant picked up a large knife in the kitchen as he did so. He did not raise the knife or make it obvious to others that he had taken it with him. One witness described the appellant as hiding the knife behind his back.[7]Once outside the property, Mr Stenson appeared to thrown a punch. The appellant produced the knife and, whilst putting an arm around Mr Stenson's back in order to draw him closer in, plunged the knife into his chest. He then ran away, taking the knife with him. Mr Stenson stumbled and shouted "I've been stabbed". He collapsed shortly afterwards.[8]Paramedics arrived after being called to the scene by witnesses. Mr Stenson was taken to hospital but was pronounced to have died by seven o'clock in the morning.[9]On post-mortem examination some relatively minor injuries to the face and head could be seen; they were consistent with the fight or scuffle which had taken place inside the house. A single stab wound to the left chest area, caused by a bladed weapon with a single cutting edge, was found. It had penetrated through the chest wall and transected the heart, before puncturing the lower lobe of the right lung. It had caused substantial internal bleeding and a rapid death. The pathologist expressed the opinion that the thrust was at lease of moderate force, and possibly more, to have caused such an injury.[10]The appellant was not arrested until 23rd December 2021. When he was interviewed he declined to answer any questions. He provided a prepared statement in which he stated that he had been challenged by the deceased who had accused him of misbehaving towards his girlfriend. He said that the matter was settled and they shook hands, but shortly afterwards he was attacked by the deceased and others kicking him to the body whilst he was in the kitchen. He believed that he was threatened by being "poked up", which he took to being a reference to stabbing. He was worried that the deceased and his friends would do so and therefore he armed himself with a knife, which he took to show them in the hope that they would leave him alone. Outside he said that he was the subject of a further attack and acted in self-defence.[11]The appellant was convicted by the jury who rejected his defence.

The Sentence

[12]The judge was required to impose a sentence of imprisonment for life and proceeded to determine the minimum term to be served in custody. He concluded that this offence of murder fell within the circumstances encompassed within paragraph 4 of Schedule 21 of the Sentencing Act 2020. Having done so, the starting point in assessing the minimum term of custody was 25 years, which he reduced to 22 years to reflect the relatively short time that the appellant had possessed the knife and the small distance he had carried it to the front of the property.[13]In fixing the minimum term at 22 years, the judge also took into account the relevant aggravating and mitigating factors.

The Grounds of Appeal

[14]On behalf of the appellant, Mr Finnigan KC, for whose submissions we are grateful, relies on three grounds:(1) The judge wrongly construed the terms of paragraph 4 of Schedule 21 when he determined that the appellant had taken the knife to the scene, given its closeness to the kitchen from which it had been taken. Accordingly, it is argued that the starting point should not have been 25 years, but 15 years, with any necessary adjustment to reflect the use of the knife.(2) The judge was wrong to conclude on the evidence that the appellant had picked up the knife as a "weapon of surprise" to aggravate the seriousness of the offence. The judge appeared to be unsure as to whether the appellant had hidden the knife behind his back or down by his side.(3) The judge gave insufficient weight to mitigation given the apparent spontaneity of the offence after the punching attack. It is also argued that further weight should have been given for personal mitigation. In addition, and for the purposes of this appeal, the appellant has provided a further letter to this Court in which he expresses his remorse.[15]In the course of argument, Mr Finnigan has advanced an alternative: that even if this sentence did fall within paragraph 4, it should have been reduced substantially from the starting point of 25 years.

The Respondent's Reply

[16]On behalf of the prosecution Mr Pratt KC, again for whose submissions we are grateful, submits that the judge was entitled to conclude that this offence of murder fell within paragraph 4 of Schedule 21, whilst some adjustment downwards from the 25 year starting point was merited for the factors identified by the appellant. That was achieved by the judge.[17]In respect of the second ground, Mr Pratt submits that the judge was entitled to reach the conclusion that the appellant had picked up the knife as a weapon of surprise, having heard the evidence during trial.[18]So far as the third ground raises additional merited complaint, the judge had plainly taken into account the mitigating factors and had reduced by three years the starting point for the offence.

Discussion and Conclusion

[19]It is clear from the facts of this offence that the start of the violence began within the kitchen. Then, after being told to leave the property, both the appellant and the deceased, together with others, moved along the hallway and through the front door to the area in front of the house. Whilst that was not a substantial distance, it was a movement from inside to outside the property and into a public place.[20]Paragraph 4 of Schedule 21 to the Sentencing Act 2020 provides as follows:
"4. (1) If – (a) the case does not fall within paragraph 2(1) or 3(1), (b) the offence falls within sub-paragraph (2), and (c) the offender was aged 18 or over when the offence was committed, (d) the offence was committed on or after 2 March 2010, the offence is normally to be regarded as sufficiently serious for the appropriate starting point, in determining the minimum term, to be 25 years. (2) The offence falls within this sub-paragraph if the offender took a knife or other weapon to the scene intending to — (a) commit any offence, or (b) have it available to use as a weapon, and used that knife or other weapon in committing the murder."
[21]The issue for the sentencing judge to determine, having heard the evidence during trial, is whether he could be sure that the appellant had been a person who "took a knife … to the scene intending to –(a) commit any offence, or(b) have it available to use as a weapon, and used that knife … in committing the murder".[22]This issue of fact was the subject of close analysis by this court in the following decisions: R v Kelly and Others [2011] EWCA Crim 1462, [2012] 1 Cr App R(S) 56; and R v Paul Dillon [2015] EWCA Crim 3. In Dillon this court made the following observations at [32]:
"We consider that the following emerges from the cases cited to us:- (a) A knife taken from a kitchen to another part of the same flat or house, including a balcony … will not normally be regarded as having been taken to the scene, even if a door is forced open … (b) Conversely, if the knife is taken out of the house or flat into the street …, or into another part of the premises …, or on to a landing outside a flat …, it will normally be regarded as having been taken to the scene. (c) However, a starting point is not the same thing as a finishing point. The judgment in Kelly and Others emphasises the importance, in cases of similar culpability, of avoiding major differences in sentence based on fine distinctions. As the Lord Chief Justice observed by way of example in the passage cited …, to make a distinction of ten years in the minimum term between the case of a man who kills his partner with a knife from the kitchen of their home and a man who kills his partner with a knife which he bought on the way home would not represent justice in anyone's assessment. If a case is only just within paragraph 5A [now paragraph 4], because a knife was taken from a kitchen and used to inflict a fatal wound a short distance outside the door of the flat or house, this principle may well lead to a minimum term of less than 25 years …"
[23]It is clear to us that this very experienced judge, who had heard the trial, had these principles well in mind when he concluded that the appellant had picked up the knife and walked from the kitchen to outside the property, where he carried out the offence of murder In our judgment there can be no criticism of that conclusion on the evidence revealed within the trial. The appropriate starting point in assessing the minimum term was, therefore, 25 years. That was not, of course, an end to the matter because the aggravating and mitigating factors both as to culpability and harm needed to be assessed so as to reach the final sentence.[24]Whilst it is argued on behalf of the appellant that the judge could not have been sure that the knife was carried by the appellant behind his back, because the judge did not express himself to be so sure, we do not find this to be an effective ground of appeal. In describing how the knife was carried by the appellant (as a young witness stated it was) behind his back, the judge stated:
"You held it either behind your back or at the very least at our side, intending to use it in the prosecution's words as 'a weapon of surprise'."
In our view, this does not mean that the judge was undecided on the issue of whether the knife was being carried as a weapon of surprise, but as to how he achieved it. Either it was behind his back or by his side. In any event, he did not want the deceased to see the knife before it was used to stab him. The judge concluded on the evidence that, whilst it was a relatively short distance from the kitchen to the front of the property, the appellant picked up the knife for the purposes of using it to inflict violence upon the deceased. It was demonstrated by how the appellant concealed it before the murder.

The judge determined that there were two aggravating factors of seriousness:

[25]first, that the murder was in the presence of other people of varying ages, both inside and outside the property; and secondly, that the appellant had disposed of the knife after the murder. Whilst the appellant had readily accepted causing the deceased's death, it was important that the weapon was not available for examination.[26]In mitigation for the appellant, the judge plainly took into account that this was an offence which occurred relatively quickly after the argument had started with punching between the two men. The judge also made it clear that it was a mitigating factor that the distance between the kitchen and the outside of the property and the period of time that the appellant possessed the knife was short. Both of these factors reflected the spontaneity of the offence.[27]Ultimately, our decision must be based, therefore, upon whether the reduction in sentence in the minimum term from 25 years to 22 years was insufficient and thereby created an excessive sentence. We are not persuaded that it does. The reduction reflected the factors identified by the judge who had properly taken into account the appropriate principles and the evidence available. We do not find that there as any error of principle, nor that the sentence imposed was excessive.[28]Accordingly, we must dismiss this appeal. ____________________________ Epiq Europe Ltd hereby certify that the above is an accurate and complete record of the proceedings or part thereof. Lower Ground, 18-22 Furnival Street, London EC4A 1JS Tel No: 020 7404 1400 Email: rcj@epiqglobal.co.uk ______________________________