“The Brain Injuries in Overview 78. Allow me to draw together these various strands of expert evidence concerning Summer’s brain injuries for a moment. 79. There appears to be little dispute that there was evidence of older, subdural bleeding as observed by Professor Al-Sarraj under the microscope. The issue for you will be whether that older bleeding represents another event in which Summer suffered deliberate, traumatic injury or whether it may represent, for example, bleeding that can occur during the birth process. 80. In relation to Summer’s death, the prosecution anticipates that there is little dispute about the location, type and ageing of the recent brain bleeding and associated changes identified in Summer. Instead, the focus of your assessment will be on whether the head injuries explain Summer’s collapse and, if so, how were they caused. 81. Was it that Summer collapsed as a result of pneumonia and Mr Peace unintentionally caused brain injury when handling her before the 999 call? Was it, for example, that Summer’s earlier brain bleeding exacerbated the degree of bleeding she suffered on 8th September? Or was it, as the prosecution say the evidence will demonstrate, that her head injuries were caused by the deliberate actions of the defendant shaking Summer, perhaps also impacting her head on a soft surface at the same time?”
“The following is not intended to be an exhaustive statement of the principles involved. We simply extract the following. The Court is concerned with the safety of the conviction. A conviction can never be safeif there is doubt about guilt. However, the converse is not true. A conviction may be unsafe even where there is no doubt about guilt but the trial process has been “vitiated by serious unfairness or significant legal misdirection” as in Smith (Patrick and Others) and in Weir. Usually it will be sufficient for the Court to apply the test in Stirland(1945) 30 Cr App R. 40 ,[1944] AC 315 , which, as adapted by Mr Perry, might read: “assuming the wrong decision on law or the irregularity had not occurred and the trial had been free from legal error, would the only reasonable and proper verdict have been one of guilty?”.”
“16. The Prosecution say that the Defendant is guilty of murder because he caused Summer’s collapse and subsequent death by shaking her and, depending upon your view of the evidence, striking her head against a soft surface and because, when he did so, he intended to kill her or, at least, to cause her really serious injury. By “shaking” the Prosecution mean a shaking action by the Defendant before Summer’s collapse which went beyond the bounds of normal handling and caused her collapse, and not the Defendant’s description of picking her up only after she had collapsed. 17. The Defence case is that Summer collapsed as a result of pneumonia, choking on milk, or some other unknown cause and that when the Defendant then picked Summer up he inadvertently caused her brain and eye injuries, aspects of which were made more likely or compounded by other factors such as Hypermobile Spectrum Disorder, CPR and raised intercranial pressure. The Defendant denies shaking Summer and he denies intending to kill her or cause her really serious injury. 18. A person is guilty of murder if he or she unlawfully kills someone, and at the time of doing so, intends to kill that other person, or at least intends to cause them really serious harm. In order to prove murder the Prosecution must make you sure that: a. The Defendant’s behaviour was unlawful; and b. The unlawful behaviour caused the death of Summer Peace; and c. At that time, the Defendant intended either to kill Summer Peace or to cause her at least really serious harm.” a. The Defendant’s behaviour was unlawful; and b. The unlawful behaviour caused the death of Summer Peace; and c. At that time, the Defendant intended either to kill Summer Peace or to cause her at least really serious harm.”
“108. In many criminal cases, of course, a jury may be made sure of guilt, viewing the individual strands of evidence cumulatively, even though each individual strand of itself may not suffice to justify a conviction to the criminal standard. Nevertheless, […] we accept that, as Mitchell confirms, the criminal standard can apply to an individual element of the prosecution case such as disputed bad character evidence. (A Lucas direction on lies is another example where the criminal standard is the applicable standard and a direction to that effect is normally given.) The very fact of this appeal on this ground thus indicates that it would no doubt have been better for the judge, even if very shortly, to have included in her bad character direction a reference to the criminal standard (“so that you are sure”) in circumstances where there was an issue of whether the defendant had been trying to mislead the jury and had derived money from illicit sources. The current version of the Compendium also would suggest that: although, it might be noted, such words had not featured in the relevant remarks in the seminal case (on propensity) of R v Hanson[2005] EWCA Crim 824 ;[2005] 1 WLR 3169 , as to how a summing-up in such a context should proceed: see para 18 of the judgment. But be that as it may, a failure to do so does not necessarily mean in any given case that a conviction is necessarily unsafe. 109. Viewed in the round, whilst we accept that the jury in this case needed to be sure, if to rely on this point, that the defendant had given a false impression (in that he had not been living entirely off legitimately acquired funds and that some or all of the cash deposits derived from criminality) we consider that that was sufficiently conveyed, overall, by the summing up; and in any event the lack of more specific direction on the standard of proof in dealing with the false impression issue was, in the circumstances of this case, not sufficient to render the conviction unsafe. 110. We should, in this respect, add that, with an intervening interlude of over seven years from the trial, we entertain considerable concerns that this whole issue of conveying a false impression is now being given a far greater prominence than it had acquired at trial, given the realities of this trial as revealed on the papers before us. This at least surely also finds some reflection in the fact that very experienced trial counsel agreed this direction at the time and thereafter saw no basis for it grounding an appeal following conviction. As stated in R v Hunter[2015] EWCA Crim 631 ;[2015] 1 WLR 5367 , quoting from Renda (cited above), even if there has been a misdirection on bad character it does not follow that the conviction will be quashed. And the court in Hunter also went on, at para 98, to say this: “We should also add that if defence advocates do not take a point on the character directions at trial and/or if they agree with the judge’s proposed directions which are then given, these are good indications that nothing was amiss. The trial was considered fair by those who were present and understood the dynamics.”