R v Lisa Ann Bradfield [2022] EWCA Crim 1634

WARNING: reporting restrictions may apply to the contents transcribed in this document, particularly if the case concerned a sexual offence or involved a child. Reporting restrictions prohibit the publication of the applicable information to the public or any section of the public, in writing, in a broadcast or by means of the internet, including social media. Anyone who receives a copy of this transcript is responsible in law for making sure that applicable restrictions are not breached. A person who breaches a reporting restriction is liable to a fine and/or imprisonment. For guidance on whether reporting restrictions apply, and to what information, ask at the court office or take legal advice.This Transcript is Crown Copyright.  It may not be reproduced in whole or in part other than in accordance with relevant licence or with the express consent of the Authority.  All rights are reserved.[2022] EWCA Crim 1634Venue Royal Courts of JusticeThe StrandLondonWC2A 2LLDate Thursday 24 th November 2022B e f o r e:THE LORD CHIEF JUSTICE OF ENGLAND AND WALES(Lord Burnett of Maldon)MR JUSTICE GOOSEMR JUSTICE LINDEN____________________
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R E XCrown- v –
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LISA ANN BRADFIELD____________________Computer Aided Transcript of Epiq Europe Ltd,Lower Ground, 18-22 Furnival Street, London EC4A 1JSTel No: 020 7404 1400; Email: rcj@epiqglobal.co.uk (Official Shorthand Writers to the Court)____________________Mr R Keene appeared for AppellantMiss K Wilkinson appeared for Crown____________________J U D G M E N T____________________
[1]On 26th February 2021, in the Crown Court at Basildon before His Honour Judge Hurst, the appellant pleaded guilty to conspiracy to pervert the course of public justice, contrary to section 1(1) of the Criminal Law Act 1977. The guilty plea was entered shortly after the first Crown Court hearing and in due course she was given an appropriate discount to her sentence of 25 per cent. On 24th June 2022, the appellant was sentenced to 27 months' imprisonment. She appeals against that sentence by leave of the single judge.[2]The appellant's co-accused, who had also pleaded guilty but at different stages of the proceedings, included Peter Jones, who was sentenced to seven and a half years' imprisonment, and Carmen Anghel, who was sentenced to 24 months' imprisonment, suspended for 24 months. Jones' guilty plea was to the same offence of conspiracy with which the appellant had been charged, together with a further similar offence and an offence of doing an act tending and intended to pervert the course of public justice. Carmen Anghel pleaded guilty to the same three offences as Jones. A further co-accused was also sentenced, the outcome of which is not relevant to this appeal.

The Facts of the Offence

[3]Peter Jones was convicted in January 2008 for his part in the murder of John Ward on 21st March 2006. Before his arrest he left the jurisdiction and fled to Spain. Subsequently, he was arrested and extradited back to the United Kingdom and thereafter faced trial with two co-accused. All three were convicted of the murder.[4]In October 2013, over five years after conviction, Jones concocted a plan to appeal and overturn his conviction. He asserted a positive alibi for the night of the murder, backed up by false alibi witnesses. The explanation for his failure to rely on the alibi defence at trial was that he and his family were subjected to threats of violence if he did not maintain the defence agreed between Jones and his co-accused during the murder trial. This prevented him from running his falsely claimed defence of alibi whilst he was to admit at trial that he held the gun used in the murder, but that it had been fired by accident. Since the appeal relied on false alibi witnesses, it was necessary to contrive a reason for the failure to call those witnesses at his trial. The plan was, therefore, to manufacture a body of withdrawal statements claiming that the alibi witnesses were themselves in fear.[5]In furtherance of the false alibi plan, and to give it credibility, Jones manufactured a bogus intimidatory attack in January 2016 when a bullet was fired through the window of a car outside his family home.[6]Jones' concocted defence became a conspiracy when he brought others in to assist him, whilst he was serving his sentence of imprisonment following his murder conviction. In 2012, false alibi statements were gathered from Jones' then wife (Carmen Anghel) and also from others. In 2013, further statements were obtained which supported the alibi and the claimed threats with intimidation. On 26th July 2013 Jones submitted his application for leave to appeal to this Court through his solicitors. He provided a lengthy statement putting forward his bogus positive alibi for the night of the killing. In his statement Jones gave details of an anonymous female prospective business associate whom he claimed to have met in Spain to discuss a property transaction. That person was later named as the appellant, who was advanced as the principal alibi witness. Whilst that was asserted by Jones in July 2013 it was not until 2015 that the appellant became actively involved in the conspiracy. At that time further statements were obtained from the alibi witnesses stating that they wanted no further part in the appeal because of their fear of violent consequences. Carmen Anghel made such a statement.[7]On 14th December 2015 a single judge of the High Court considered Jones' application for leave to appeal and granted leave on the basis of the false alibi evidence. The appeal began to make its passage through to a full hearing. Before the full hearing was heard, investigation by the police into the bogus shooting was carried out. It was relied on by the conspirators as evidence of the witness intimidation. A significant amount of investigatory work was undertaken to discover who might be responsible for the shooting and what were the implications for the appeal. In due course the appeal was heard by this court: see R v Jones [2018] EWCA Crim 1599. After a full hearing the appeal was dismissed after this court concluded that further evidence had demonstrably proved the lies which underpin the appeal against conviction. This court stated that the claimed real defence was devoid of any credibility.[8]The appellant's role in the conspiracy to pervert the course of public justice was most apparent from late 2015 and during 2016. Although her involvement had been earlier trailed by Jones as the anonymous witness to whom he had referred in his 2013 statement, she was not involved in the conspiracy, as the trial judge was later to find, until 2015. The appellant's own false statement was added to the appeal evidence in March 2016. She stated that she supported the alibi, but sought anonymity through fear. Her involvement in the conspiracy, however, went further than that.[9]Upon entering her guilty plea to this offence, the appellant provided a basis of plea which sought to minimise her role. She stated that she was involved in the conspiracy for a short period; that she had been coerced by Jones; and that she had withdrawn from the conspiracy. The prosecution did not accept this and a Newton Hearing, to try the issue, was directed by the judge. The hearing lasted three days from 9th June 2022. The appellant gave evidence during the hearing.[10]In conspicuously fair and well-reasoned conclusions, His Honour Judge Hurst found in favour of the appellant as to when she became actively involved in the conspiracy, being from 2015 and not 2013, but he also found that she had not been coerced, nor had she withdrawn from the conspiracy although she became less active later on. The judge found that the appellant was a willing and enthusiastic assistant in furtherance of the conspiracy. She spoke regularly with Jones whilst he was in custody, wrote to him and visited him. She passed on instructions, dealt with Jones' solicitor, and co-ordinated the legal paperwork in pursuing the appeal. It was clear that the appellant was deeply romantically attached to Jones and, through her own wish to help him, did her utmost to advance the bogus appeal. The judge concluded on the evidence that the appellant became Jones' willing fixer and go-between, and was heavily involved in what she knew was a lying alibi.

The Sentencing Exercise

[11]In careful and well-reasoned sentencing remarks, the judge appropriately stated that this conspiracy to pervert the course of public justice was a very serious crime – one that went straight to the heart of the Criminal Justice system by a sophisticated, cynical effort to trick the Court of Appeal to quash a conviction. The judge also took into account the need for deterrent sentences, as identified by this court in R v Carter [2016] EWCA Crim 2114. Further, whilst identifying that there is currently no offence specific guideline for the offence of perverting the course of public justice, the judge assessed the three principles of sentencing in such cases, as identified in R v Abdulwahab [2018] EWCA Crim 1399 at [14] as follows:
"First, conduct which tends and is intended to pervert the course of public justice strikes at the heart of the administration of justice and almost invariably calls for a custodial sentence. Deterrence is an important aim of sentencing in such cases … Secondly, the appropriate sentence of course depends on particular circumstances of the specific case. The circumstances vary across a very wide range. Therefore, only limited assistance can be derived from considering previous decisions in other cases. Thirdly, in assessing the seriousness of a particular offence, relevant factors including the seriousness of the underlying offence, the nature of the deceptive conduct, the period of time over which it would continue, whether it casts suspicion upon or led to the arrest of an innocent person, and the success or otherwise in the attempt to pervert the course of justice. In addition, of course, the offender's previous character and any personal mitigation must be taken into account." 12. "
In this case the underlying crime was murder, one of the gravest crimes in law. The deception was extremely sophisticated, persisting over a number of years, travelling all the way to a full day before the full Court of Appeal … Others fell under suspicion, others were tried."[12]The judge took into account the mitigating factors in respect of the appellant's case. She had led an unblemished life and had vulnerabilities. Also, she had a genuine belief that the appellant was innocent. She had endured a challenging childhood, as disclosed in a psychotherapist's report provided to the court. Character references also spoke of the appellant as being a kind and decent person, but who had been diagnosed with depression. In addition, there had been some delay in the case, although whilst the appellant had made some admissions in her police interview in 2018, it was not until February 2021 that she entered a guilty plea on a limited basis. The judge concluded that an immediate term of imprisonment was inevitable for the role played by the appellant in this offence. The judge determined that after trial the sentence would be one of three years' imprisonment, which he discounted by 25 per cent for the early guilty plea, and arrived at a sentence of 27 months' imprisonment.

The Grounds of Appeal

[13]The appellant's grounds of appeal, whilst three in number, are principally twofold. Firstly, it is argued that the judge adopted too high a starting point for the sentence, which failed to reflect delay, the personal circumstances, and the reduced period of time with which the appellant was involved in the conspiracy, as had been determined in the Newton Hearing. Secondly, it is argued that there is objectionable disparity between the sentence imposed upon the appellant and that imposed upon her co-accused, Carmen Anghel. Mr Keene argued that the appellant has suffered greater hardship whilst in custody, both as a consequence of the Covid pandemic and due to her underlying symptoms of depression.[14]In the respondent's note it is argued that the judge was correct to impose an immediate term of imprisonment, given the seriousness of the offence, the role played by the appellant and the need for deterrence. In addition, the respondent submits orally that there is no disparity in the sentence between the appellant and her co-accused since their circumstances were different, both in relation to their involvement in the offending and their personal mitigation.

Discussion and Conclusion

[15]This was, as the trial judged appropriately identified, a very serious offence. It involved a sophisticated and carefully prepared attempt to undermine a conviction for murder, where there was no valid appeal. The appellant played a significant role in supporting the efforts of Jones. She was trusted by him and, through her regular contact with him, directed others and assisted the solicitor in promoting the appeal, which she knew to be falsely based. The need for a sentence to deter others was inevitable. The trial judge, who had the advantage of hearing the appellant in evidence during a Newton Hearing, was best placed to assess the roles played by those engaged in the conspiracy.[16]In sentencing the appellant, the judge expressly took into account the mitigating factors, which have been repeated in this appeal, including any delay in the course of the proceedings. We have also seen evidence of the appellant's work and education courses during her time in custody since sentence, which reflect well on her.[17]In accordance with R v Tunney [2006] EWCA Crim 2066 and R v Abdulwahad, we consider that it is difficult to contemplate a more serious offence than the murder for which Jones was convicted. The appellant played an important role between Jones, the false witnesses and the solicitor over a significant period in 2015 and 2016. Further, whilst the appeal was ultimately dismissed, the intended result was the overturning of a true conviction of a court. In those circumstances, we are not persuaded that a sentence of three years' imprisonment, before any discount for a guilty plea, was excessive. In our judgment, therefore, the sentence of 27 months' imprisonment, in the absence of truly exceptional circumstances, was correct.[18]The appellant's further submission is that objectionable disparity was created between the sentence imposed on the appellant and that imposed on her co-accused, Carmen Anghel. It is argued on the basis that Carmen Anghel was involved in the conspiracy for a longer period of time and that she pleaded guilty to the same offences as Peter Jones. It is argued therefore, that a suspended sentence lacks any apparent good reason, and the court should allow this appeal. The question for this court is whether an observer, with full knowledge of all the relevant facts and circumstances of these two sentences, would consider that something had gone wrong with the administration of justice, when one sentence involved immediate custody and the other a suspended sentence of imprisonment.[19]In passing sentence, the judge concluded that the position of Carmen Anghel was very different to that of the appellant. True it was that she had been involved in the conspiracy from an earlier time and had produced a number of false statements in support of the bogus alibi defence. However, her personal circumstances were very different to those of the appellant, as explained at page 11 B-F of the transcript of the sentencing remarks. The judge stated:
"In my judgment, Carmen Anghel was in an acutely difficult position. She was not so overborne that she ever could say she was acting under duress; however, she was easily exploited. She was without her own resources. She had in one sense little choice. She is a single mother of a teenage boy whose father is a convicted murderer serving life, and who he has never seen other than in prison. She is working. She has no previous convictions. She was in her 20s when she became involved in the conspiracy."
[20]It is clear that the judge determined on the evidence that the roles played between the appellant and her co-accused were not the same. In particular, the appellant was not coerced or overborne and had made her own choice to support and further the objects of the conspiracy. That could not be said of Carmen Anghel. In our judgment, there is no arguable disparity between these two sentences. Further, since we do not find that the sentence of 27 months' imprisonment imposed on the appellant was excessive, the question of the suspension of her sentence does not arise since it is in excess of the sentence that is capable of being suspended.[21]In conclusion, therefore, we are not persuaded that the appellant's sentence was excessive, nor that there was any objectionable disparity in her sentence when compared with that of her co-accused. It follows that we must dismiss this appeal. _____________________________ Epiq Europe Ltd hereby certify that the above is an accurate and complete record of the proceedings or part thereof. Lower Ground, 18-22 Furnival Street, London EC4A 1JS Tel No: 020 7404 1400 Email: rcj@epiqglobal.co.uk ______________________________