Wilson-Ford, R v [2020] EWCA Crim 1342
[1]Evidence Act 1999, and no matter relating to the complainant (to whom we shall refer to as "D") may be published in her lifetime if it is likely to lead members of the public to identify her as a witness in these proceedings.[4]indictment and a not guilty verdict was entered on those other counts. He now appeals to this court with the leave of the single judge.[5]17 September 2019 she arranged to collect the bankcard from the appellant. She travelled by taxi to meet the appellant outside his home address accompanied by her male cousin.[6]As she got out of the taxi the appellant ran towards her brandishing a hammer and a knife[7]fell from his back pocket. The appellant tried to strike at D's cousin with the hammer. D attempted to intervene before getting back into the taxi which drove away. These facts[8]constitute count 2 (the affray). Following that incident D asked her cousin to stay at her address overnight in case there were any further problems. At around 4.00 am on the following day (18 September 2019) the appellant threw a brick through D's living room window while she was sat on the settee. Two other windows at the front of the address were also smashed. D then saw the appellant trying to climb through her window holding a large knife which she thought looked like a machete. D called the police. The appellant then forced the door from its frame and entered the property. He was holding a knife. He threw D to the floor, causing soreness to her arm. He made a number of threats to kill her whilst brandishing a knife. D fled from the house and hid in a neighbour's garden until officers arrived (count 6).[9]facts constitute counts 8 and 9. When questioned, the appellant made no reply to questions in police interview.[10]subsume the sentences for the other offences into that sentence. The judge had read the victim personal statement and the pre-sentence report. The appellant had a background of violence dating back to his teenage years. At the time of this offence he had been on licence for offences of significant violence that were also committed within a domestic context. The previous offence licence period did not expire until November since felt the need to move.[12]begun giving evidence. The judge imposed an extended sentence comprising the custodial term of 7 years 4 months with an extended licence period of 2 years with[13]concurrent determinate sentences to reflect the other offences.[14]fowling grounds: (i). Although the threats to kill fell within category 1A they did not fall near the top of the range even after taking into account the aggravating factors; (ii). the offence was on the spur of the moment. There was no physical injury and possession of weapons was part of the threats; (iii). the 8 year starting point adopted by the judge was too high; (iv). in passing an extended sentence the judge did not invite submissions from counsel or indicate that he had such a sentence in mind; (v). the incident was isolated between parties known to each other. The wider public was not involved and the behaviour was limited to a specific individual; (vi). the appellant had only received one lengthy sentence previously albeit for a serious offence. He did not pose a significant risk of harm to members of the public through the commission of further specified offences. We deal first with the seriousness of the appellant's offending. As the judge noted, these were two significant and serious incidents which took place within 12 hours of each other. The more serious offence was the threats to kill. The appellant was intoxicated. He used significant violence to kick in D's door. He had a knife with him and he threatened to kill her. In fear, she fled from her own home. seriousness.[22]2014), grievous bodily harm with intent (2014) and assault occasioning actual bodily harm (two such offences in 2014). For the offences in 2014 he was sentenced to 9 years for the grievous bodily harm and 3 years on each of the assault occasioning actual bodily harm to be served concurrently with the lead sentence. He had been released from prison on licence on 21 December 2018 and was still on licence at the time of these offences. The culpability was plainly high, given the use of a visible weapon and the use of significant violence. The harm too was very high given the psychological consequences and the fact that D was forced from her home. There were statutory aggravation in the form of previous convictions and the fact that these offences were committed on licence. It was to reflect the totality of the appellant's criminal behaviour that the sentence was imposed.[23]All these factors easily justify a sentence in the order of 8 years as a starting point. We acknowledge that falls outside the category range of 3 to 7 years, applying the relevant guideline for intimidatory offences, but we note that the start point falls well within the maximum for this offence of 10 years. judgment, justified. dissocial personality disorder.[28]was. There was plenty of evidence to support that conclusion.[29]as any surprise. We dismiss this appeal. We conclude that the sentence was not manifestly excessive or wrong in principle.[31]proceedings or part thereof. Lower Ground, 18-22 Furnival Street, London EC4A 1JS Tel No: 020 7404 1400 Email: rcj@epiqglobal.co.uk