Venue Royal Courts of Justice Strand London, WC2A 2LLDate Friday, 22 February 2019
B e f o r e:
MR JUSTICE WILLIAM DAVIS
THE RECORDER OF LIVERPOOL
HIS HONOUR JUDGE GOLDSTONE QC
(Sitting as a Judge of the CACD)
R E G I N A v
SHARON KOFFI
Computer Aided Transcript of the Stenograph Notes of Epiq Europe Ltd, Lower Ground, 18-22
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Mr S Fidler (Solicitor Advocate) appeared on behalf of the Applicant
Mr R Livingstone appeared on behalf of the Crown
J U D G M E N T
(Draft for approval)
Between
KoffiDefendantRCrown
[1]In June 2016, when she was aged 15, she allowed her bank account to be used to launder £3,600. This was part of a sum totalling £10,000 which had been obtained by fraud from a lady who had had building work done at her home. Those responsible for the fraud had hacked the lady's email account and from email correspondence gleaned that(a) she had had building work done, and(b) the builder had not been paid. So it was that they sent a bogus email purporting to be from the builder providing new bank details. The bank account in fact belonged to a man in his twenties name Katula. He was eventually convicted after trial of an offence of money laundering and sentenced to nine months'[2]imprisonment, the sentence being suspended for two years.[3]fraudulent money that had been paid into and then taken out of her account. She now applies for an extension of time for leave to appeal against sentence, her application having been referred to the full court by the Registrar. Her application for leave to appeal was 24 days out of time. The reason for the delay was that her solicitor only became aware of a particular decision of this court after that period of delay and consequently came to the conclusion that there were proper grounds of appeal. We accept the reasons why there was a delay and entirely without prejudice we shall give leave to appeal against sentence. There was a long delay before Sharon Koffi was charged. The postal requisition was not issued until November 2017. There was no proper reason we can identify for such a long delay. Although this was a clever fraud, it was hardly complicated. This kind of delay has become endemic in the criminal justice system. That is a delay of something approaching 12 months in what is a relatively straightforward set of criminal proceedings. Such delays are always to be considered unacceptable but that is particularly so where the proceedings include a defendant who at the time of the offence was aged only 15. The result in her case was that she was eventually sentenced more than two years after the offence.[4]separately.[5]the judge who eventually sentenced. In our view that makes no sense on the facts of this case. There was no conceivable basis upon which a Youth Court would not have had appropriate sentencing powers. We remind ourselves the Youth Court could in an appropriate case impose a sentence up to two years' detention and training order. Self-evidently this case fell far short of that. Why no application was made[6]in February 2018 is not apparent to us.[7]absolute discharge. That is the consequence of section 16 of the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000 for somebody in this appellant's position, namely an appellant not having been convicted of any criminal offence before. The Youth Court would have been faced with a report from the Youth Offending Team that in clear terms indicated that the normal structure of a referral order would not be suitable for this[8]particular person.[9]hospital.[10]these words:
"There is a good and arguable ground of appeal which should be dealt with expeditiously by the making of a referral order."
[11]circumstance would the judge be sitting in the Youth Court.[12]course.[13]conditional discharge.[14]But we cannot conclude that the sentence was wrong in principle or manifestly excessive. The offence committed was not trivial by any manner of means. Although the defendant was very young, she committed an offence which enabled a significant fraud to be perpetrated. We are not assisted with respect by a comparison of the precise facts in Dillon as opposed to the facts in this case. Dillon was a fact-specific decision in relation[15]to the sentence imposed.[16]those failings in the criminal justice system. Epiq Europe Ltd hereby certify that the above is an accurate and complete record of the proceedings or part thereof. Lower Ground, 18-22 Furnival Street, London EC4A 1JS Tel No: 020 7404 1400 Email: Rcj@epiqglobal.co.uk