"… ultimately it would have been for the judge to rule and/or forthe jury to decide whether the cancellation charges in the present case were to be regarded as a 'penalty'." [Emphasis added]
"Questions of construction are questions of law in respect of which no burden lies on either party (Scott v Martin[1987] 2 All ER 813 )."
"With respect to the judge, I do not think that it is correct to say that the burden of proof on a question of construction lies on the plaintiff. A question of construction is a question of law, in respect of which no burden lies on either side. It is true that, if the plaintiff relies on surrounding circumstances as an aid to construction, then the onus is on him to prove those circumstances, but that is rather a different point."
"9. The distinction between a clause providing for a genuine pre-estimate of damages and a penalty clause has remained fundamental to the modern law, as it is currently understood. The question whether a damages clause is a penalty falls to be decided as a matter of construction, therefore as at the time that it is agreed: Public Works Comr v Hills[1906] AC 368 , 376; Webster v Bosanquet [ 1912] AC 394; Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co Ltd v New Garage and Motor Co Ltd[1915] AC 79 , at pp 86-87 (Lord Dunedin); and Cooden Engineering Co Ltd v Stanford[1953] 1 QB 86 , 94 (Somervell LJ). This is because it depends on the character of the provision, not on the circumstances in which it falls to be enforced. It is a species of agreement which the common law considers to be by its nature contrary to the policy of the law. One consequence of this is that relief from the effects of a penalty is, as Hoffmann LJ put it in Else (1982) Ltd v Parkland Holdings Ltd[1994] 1 BCLC 130 , 144, 'mechanical in effect and involves no exercise of discretion at all'. Another is that the penalty clause is wholly unenforceable: Clydebank Engineering & Shipbuilding Co Ltd v Don Jose Ramos Yzquierdo y Castaneda 1905] AC6, 9, 10 (Lord Halsbury LC); Gilbert-Ash (Northern) Ltd v Modern Engineering (Bristol) Ltd[1974] AC 689 , 698 (Lord Reid), 703 (Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest) and 723-724 (Lord Salmon); Scandinavian Trading Tanker Co AB v Flota Petrolera Ecuatoriana (The 'Scaptrade')[1983] 2 AC 694 , 702 (Lord Diplock); AMEV-UDC Finance Ltd v Austin(1986) 162 CLR 170 , 191-193 (Mason and Wilson JJ). Deprived of the benefit of the provision, the innocent party is left to his remedy in damages under the general law. As Lord Diplock put it in The 'Scaptrade' at p 702: 'The classic form of penalty clause is one which provides that upon breach of a primary obligation under the contract a secondary obligation shall arise on the part of the party in breach to pay to the other party a sum of money which does not represent a genuine pre-estimate of any loss likely to be sustained by him as the result of the breach of primary obligation but is substantially in excess of that sum. The classic form of relief against such a penalty clause has been to refuse to give effect to it, but to award the common law measure of damages for the breach of primary obligation instead'. … 32. The true test is whether the impugned provision is asecondary obligation which imposes a detriment on the contractbreaker out of all proportion to any legitimate interest of theinnocent party in the enforcement of the primary obligation. The innocent party can have no proper interest in simply punishing the defaulter. His interest is in performance or in some appropriate alternative to performance. In the case of a straightforward damages clause, that interest will rarely extend beyond compensation for the breach, and we therefore expect that Lord Dunedin's four tests would usually be perfectly adequate to determine its validity. But compensation is not necessarily the only legitimate interest that the innocent party may have in the performance of the defaulter’s primary obligations. This was recognised in the early days of the penalty rule, when it was still the creature of equity, and is reflected in Lord Macclesfield’s observation in Peachy (quoted in para 5 above) about the application of the penalty rule to provisions which were 'never intended by way of compensation', for which equity would not relieve. It was reflected in the result in Dunlop. And it is recognised in the more recent decisions about commercial justification. And, as Lord Hodge shows, it is the principle underlying the Scottish authorities. … 99. In our opinion, while the penalty rule is plainly engaged, the£85 charge is not a penalty. The reason is that althoughParkingEye was not liable to suffer loss as a result of overstayingmotorists, it had a legitimate interest in charging them whichextended beyond the recovery of any loss. The scheme in operation here (and in many similar car parks) is that the landowner authorises ParkingEye to control access to the car park and to impose the agreed charges, with a view to managing the car park in the interests of the retail outlets, their customers and the public at large. That is an interest of the landowners because (i) they receive a fee from ParkingEye for the right to operate the scheme, and (ii) they lease sites on the retail park to various retailers, for whom the availability of customer parking was a valuable facility. It is an interest of ParkingEye, because it sells its services as the managers of such schemes and meets the costs of doing so from charges for breach of the terms (and if the scheme was run directly by the landowners, the analysis would be no different). As we have pointed out, deterrence is not penalif there is a legitimate interest in influencing the conduct of thecontracting party which is not satisfied by the mere right torecover damages for breach of contract. Mr Butcher QC, who appeared for the Consumers' Association (interveners), submitted that because ParkingEye was the contracting party its interest was the only one which could count. For the reason which we have given, ParkingEye had a sufficient interest even if that submission be correct. But in our opinion it is not correct. The penal character of this scheme cannot depend on whether the landowner operates it himself or employs a contractor like ParkingEye to operate it. The motorist would not know or care what if any interest the operator has in the land, or what relationship it has with the landowner if it has no interest. This conclusion is reinforced when one bears in mind that the question whether a contractual provision is a penalty turns on the construction of the contract, which cannot normally turn on facts not recorded in the contract unless they are known, or could reasonably be known, to both parties. 100. None of this means that ParkingEye could charge overstayers whatever it liked. It could not charge a sum which would be out of all proportion to its interest or that of the landowner for whom it is providing the service. But there is no reason to suppose that£85 is out of all proportion to its interests. The trial judge, Judge Moloney QC, found that the£85 charge was neither extravagant nor unconscionable having regard to thelevel of charges imposed by local authorities for overstaying incar parks on public land. The Court of Appeal agreed and so do we. It is higher than the penalty that a motorist would have had to pay for overstaying in an on-street parking space or a local authority car park. But a local authority would not necessarily allow two hours of free parking, and in any event the difference is not substantial. The charge is less than the maximum above which members of the BPA must justify their charges under their code of practice. The charge is prominently displayed in large letters at the entrance to the car park and at frequent intervals within it. The mere fact that many motorists regularly use the car park knowing of the charge is some evidence of its reasonableness. They are not constrained to use this car park as opposed to other parking facilities provided by local authorities, Network Rail, commercial car park contractors or other private landowners. They must regard the risk of having to pay£85 for overstaying as an acceptable price for the convenience of parking there. The observations of Lord Browne-Wilkinson in Workers Bank at p 580referred to in para 35 above are in point. While not necessarily conclusive, the fact that ParkingEye's payment structure in its car parks (free for two hours and then a relatively substantial sum for overstaying) and the actual level of charge for overstaying (£85 ) are common in the UK provides support for the proposition that the charge in question is not a penalty. No other evidence was furnished by Mr Beavis to show that the charge was excessive." [Emphasis added]
"31. In our opinion, the law relating to penalties has become the prisoner of artificial categorisation, itself the result of unsatisfactory distinctions: between a penalty and genuine preestimate of loss, and between a genuine pre-estimate of loss and a deterrent. … All definition is treacherous as applied to such a protean concept. This one can fairly be said to be too wide in the sense that it appears to be apt to cover many provisions which would not be penalties … However, in so far as it refers to 'punishment' and 'an additional or different liability' … this definition seems to us to get closer to the concept of a penalty than any other definition we have seen. The real question when a contractual provision is challenged as a penalty is whether it is penal, not whether it is a pre-estimate of loss. … The question whether it is enforceableshould depend onwhether the means by which the contractingparty's conduct is to be influenced are 'unconscionable' or (which will usually amount to the same thing) 'extravagant' by reference to some norm. 32. The true test is whether the impugned provision is a secondary obligation which imposes a detriment on the contractbreaker out of all proportion to any legitimate interest of the innocent party in the enforcement of the primary obligation. …" [Emphasis added]