"The starting point would be 57 months, less 25 per cent for plea, plus consideration of totality. Indication is 42 months before mitigation."
"The import of Goodyear is very clear. If the judge accedes to the application to give an indication, he and any other judge is bound by it if, but only if, the defendant thereupon pleads guilty. If there is any doubt about that it needs to be laid to rest. That is apparent from paragraphs 54 and 61 of the report of Goodyear. In paragraph 54, Lord Woolf, LCJ, said this: ' ... any advance indication of sentence to be given by the judge should normally be confined to the maximum sentence if a plea of guilty were tendered at the stage at which the indication is sought.' The Lord Chief Justice went on to say this: 'For the process to go further, and the judge to indicate his view of the maximum possible level of sentence following conviction by the jury ... would have two specific disadvantages.' And he set them out, in effect that it would be very unwise indeed for the judge to give any such indication on what would then be a hypothetical basis. In paragraph 61 of the judgment the Lord Chief Justice returned to the point and said this: 'Once an indication has been given, it is binding and remains binding on the judge who has given it, and it also binds any other judge who becomes responsible for the case ...' Then this: 'If, after a reasonable opportunity to consider his position in the light of the indication, the defendant does not plead guilty, the indication will cease to have effect.' In so far as Mr Bhatia's submission is that the sentence passed of eight years was wrong because the judge had referred to a notional starting point after trial of seven years when he gave his indication, that submission cannot succeed. There is no injustice whatever in that. There would of course be if a defendant acted to his detriment in reliance upon the indication and the judge then changed his mind. But this defendant did not rely in acting to his detriment in any manner at all. He chose not to accept the indication. Nor, we emphasise, can that proposition be in any manner affected by any exchanges between the defendant and those who represent him. We wish to make it clear that Goodyear means what it says. If the indication is not accepted by pleading guilty it lapses and it is thereafter irrelevant. In particular the reasons why a judge may subsequently perfectly properly form the view that his hypothetical thoughts at the time of the indication about sentence after trial were too low certainly include the case where the evidence has worsened for the defendant, but also extend to the case where the judge has simply had time to apply his mind with greater care and having heard the evidence to the proper balance of sentence between defendants. There is an appreciable difference for a judge between a short outline of the evidence by counsel for the Crown, or for that matter an agreed basis of plea which is not then taken up, on the one hand, and on the other three weeks of evidence."
"The attractions of Goodyear[2005] 1 WLR 2532 , summarised in Archbold para 5-79b and following, and its practical importance, are manifest. Goodyear indications will only serve their purpose if indications once given can be relied upon. Accordingly, and at least save exceptionally, indications thus given are binding in as far as they go, hence the need for circumspection before they are given. Particular caution is warranted where a Goodyear indication is sought in the case of a specified offence which might attract an extended sentence or a sentence of imprisonment for public protection... Mr Williams submitted, as we have already recorded, that the indication was binding once acted upon. With respect, we are unable to agree in this sense: Mr Williams' submission is couched in terms of private rights, where such concepts are of course valid and will prevail. But we are not dealing with that situation here. The public interest in an appropriate sentence must trump any question of disappointment in the rare cases where such a situation might arise. It goes without saying, however, as we have already underlined, that revisions to Goodyear indications should be very much the exception, and, as it seems to us, they can only be made in a manner which is fair to the defendant: in other words, where the matter can be revised without the defendant sustaining any prejudice other than mere disappointment... In the present case, the judge was plainly in error, as he himself acknowledged, with regard to the guidelines category in which he placed the offence. The judge was understandably anxious about the facts he had subsequently discovered in the pre-sentence report, and the questions which then arose as to whether the case merited a determinate or some other sentence. Had the judge left the matter as set out in the Goodyear indication, first there would have been the unfortunate consequence of an inadequate sentence being passed contrary to the public interest and, secondly, there would have been a risk of an Attorney General's Reference to the benefit of no one. The course the judge adopted, namely offering the appellant the chance of vacating his plea, was one which was entirely fair to the appellant. The appellant realistically and prudently, if we may say so, chose not to vacate his plea - but he maintained his plea knowing full well that the judge would no longer be bound by the initial Goodyear indication. In these circumstances, we are not persuaded that any injustice resulted or that the appellant now has any legitimate grounds for complaint."
"Chapter 7 of the Practice Direction deals under paragraph C with indications of sentence giving guidance in accordance with R v Goodyear[2005] EWCA Crim. 888 . At C.6 the Criminal Practice Direction provides that an indication once given is, save in exceptional circumstances, (such as arose in R v Newman[2010] EWCA Crim. 1566 ,[2011] 1 Cr.App.R (S) 68 ) binding on the judge who gave it and any other judge, subject to overriding statutory obligations such as those following a finding of dangerousness. The circumstances where a judge proposes to depart from the Goodyear indication this must only be done in a way that does not give rise to unfairness (see Newman). However, if a defendant does not plead guilty the indication will not thereafter bind the court. In Newman the judge on the occasion that he gave the Goodyear indication of sentence had erred in his interpretation of the guidelines. When it came to the actual day of sentence the judge acknowledged his error and his obligation to take a higher starting point within the guidelines. The judge then offered the defendant the opportunity to withdraw his guilty plea, which the defendant declined. In the case before us the only change in circumstances was the appellant's absconding from the court after pleading guilty. The applicant was properly given a consecutive sentence for that offence. He had pleaded guilty following the Goodyear indication from the judge and nothing else had changed. In those circumstances we are of the view that the judge was bound by the indication he had given and there was no justification in taking a higher starting point."