High, R v [2018] EWCA Crim 499
[1]This appeal, for which leave was given by the single judge with an extension of time, involves a very short point.[2]The appellant had pleaded guilty at the Crown Court in Maidstone to two counts of distributing indecent photographs of children contrary to section 1(1)(b) of the Protection of Children Act 1978, and two counts of arranging or facilitating the commission of a child sex offence contrary to section 14(1) of the Sexual Offences Act 2003.[3]The issue relates to the two concurrent sentences passed in respect of the section 14 offences on 21 August 2015. The sentences were concurrent to each other and to terms of three years' imprisonment passed for the 1978 Act offences, in respect of which no issue arises. The extended sentence, on what were described as Counts 2-1 and 2-2 on the indictment, were made up of a custodial term of five years and six months and an extension period of four years' licence; an overall extended sentence of nine and a half years, pursuant to section 226A of the Criminal Justice Act 2003.[4]The appeal comes before the court because the judge made clear that his starting point for the custodial part of the sentence was a term of eight years, and he acknowledged that the appellant's pleas of guilty to the offences were prompt and that he was entitled to full credit. With a starting point of eight years and full credit of 33 per cent, the custodial element of the sentence should have been a term of five years and four months, and not the five years and six months passed by the judge. A simple arithmetical error was made, which the appellant somewhat belatedly has identified. The prosecution has accepted that an error was made and that the single ground is well founded. It appears that the error was not noticed by counsel on either side at the sentencing hearing.[5]In these circumstances, we quash the sentences on Counts 2-1 and 2-2 and substitute an extended sentence of nine years and four months, made up of a custodial sentence of five years and four months and a period of four years of extended licence. To that limited extent, the appeal is allowed.[6]It was in these circumstances, and at the invitation of the appellant's counsel, that we agreed that it was unnecessary for counsel to appear today.