“Yes, it would have fallen into the wrong hands otherwise, as you say….”
“There was indeed compelling evidence connecting the Appellant to this fraud. It included, but was by no means limited to, the following: The first attempt to pay in the stolen cheques had been at Barclays Bank but had been refused. The follow up call by the fraudsman to Barclay’s had been made from the defendant’s landline. The defendant was then caught on CCTV entering an HSBC branch just up the road from Tottenham Court Road Station to pay the same cheques in for the credit of a Bank of China account held by a friend of his who gave evidence that he had asked to use her account. The fraudulent Email account in the name of the deceased was accessed on numerous occasions from the broadband connection at the defendant’s flat. It was also accessed once from Brussels on the day that the defendant was there after leaving England abruptly the day after the body was found when police activity at the home of the deceased was obvious. The ‘Money TT’ account which was the intended destination of the£10,000 was connected to the defendant. He was shown by CCTV or identification evidence to have used the Sainsbury’s card in a restaurant, a shop and an ATM. Further, the same card had been used online to make a purchase for a business connected to him. When the fraudsman persuaded RBS to alter the security codes for the deceased’s account, the memorable date employed was the birthday of the defendant’s daughter. Cellsite and oyster card records consistently put the defendant in the same area as actions committed in the course of the fraud. The SIM card from the mobile telephone of the deceased was used for many of these transactions, not only in the deceased’s handset, but also in one of three handsets belonging to, or used by, the defendant. The defendant admitted only a very small part of this evidence, in effect where it was not practicably disputable. He admitted trying to pay in the stolen cheques at HSBC, but said that they had been handed to him by one of the gangsters with a request to pay them in. He admitted using the Sainsbury’s credit card, but said that the gangsters had given it to him. He admitted the connection to the Money TT account, but said that it was all part of the efforts of the gangsters to cash the cheques. He said that the telephone call to Barclays had been on an entirely innocent topic. He suggested that his daughter’s date of birth must have been used deliberately by the gangsters, having spotted it on a photograph in his flat. Otherwise he denied any part in the fraud.”
“Mr Robertson’s contention that none of this entitled the jury to conclude that the defendant was not only the fraudster but also the murderer proceeds on the basis of attacking various of the more theoretical aspects of the Crown’s suggested scenarios for the mechanics of the murder. We accept that there were arguments to be advanced against some parts of them, such as the theory that the murder must have been committed in the porch, even if the deceased had indeed surprised the thief interfering with his post. But such hypothetical scenarios are often ventured, and they may or may not end up convincing when the whole of the evidence is examined. If some details turn out not to be, that does not mean that there is no case at all to answer. Similarly, there were certainly arguments to be advanced for the defendant. There were cigarettes in the room next door to the one where the body was found, which enabled there to be the suggestion that there had been a number of people there, although they could not of course be dated. We agree also that the defendant was able to say that there was no scientific evidence linking him to the murder, and that a killing could be said to be out of character with what was known of him, and quite a lot was. All those arguments were, however, for the jury. The evidence that he was the fraudster, the fact that he denied what could be proved, and, most of all, the evidence that he had regularly used (in three different handsets) the sim card which must have been stolen at the same time as the murder, all created the plainest possible case to answer. We have asked ourselves whether the state of the evidence in this case leaves us with a lurking doubt as to the safety of the conviction. We have reminded ourselves of Mr Robertson’s complaint that the police approached the investigation after a certain point with the assumption that the defendant was responsible, and that there were other enquiries which might have been made but were not. In an investigation of this size it is always possible to find some such possible enquiry. The evidence was long, detailed and thorough. Its assessment was for the jury and not for us, but we have no doubt that the jury was entitled to conclude that it demonstrated that the defendant alone had been the fraudsman, that his suggestions that his actions had been motivated only by trying to obtain evidence against gangsters was untrue, and that he must have been the killer. We are not left with any doubt about the safety of its conclusion.”
“We have been watching your house, if you call the police we will kill your wife and baby”
“I found the intruder with a knife going through our papers”
“(a) whether the evidence appears to the Court to be capable of belief; (b) whether it appears to the Court that the evidence may afford any ground for allowing the appeal; (c) whether the evidence would have been admissible in the proceedings from which the appeal lies on an issue which is the subject of the appeal; and (d) whether there is a reasonable explanation for the failure to adduce the evidence in those proceedings”
“The Court of Appeal is entrusted with a power of review to guard against the possibility of injustice but it is a power to be exercised with caution, mindful that the Court of Appeal is not privy to the jury’s deliberations and must not intrude into territory which properly belongs to the jury.”
“…First, it reminds the Court of Appeal that it is not and should never become the primary decision-maker. Secondly, it reminds the Court of Appeal that it has an imperfect and incomplete understanding of the full processes which led the jury to convict. The Court of Appeal can make its assessment of the fresh evidence that it has heard, but save in a clear case is at a disadvantage in seeking to relate that evidence to the rest of the evidence tht the jury heard. For these reasons, it will usually be wise for the Court of Appeal, in a case of any difficulty, to test their own provisional view by asking whether the evidence, if given at trial, might reasonably have affected the decision of the trial jury to convict. If it might, the conviction must be thought to be unsafe.”
“The question which lies at the heart of it is one of fairness. The question which the appeal court must ask itself is whether after taking full account of all the circumstances of the trial, including the non-disclosure in breach of the appellant’s Convention right, the jury’s verdict should be allowed to stand. The question will be answered in the negative if there was a real possibility of a different outcome – if the jury might reasonably have come to a different view on the issue to which it directed its verdict if the withheld material had been disclosed to the defence.”
“The law is now clearly established and can simply be stated as follows. Where fresh evidence is adduced on a criminal appeal it is for the Court of Appeal, always assuming that it accepts it, to evaluate its importance in the context of the remainder of the evidence in the case…..The primary question is for the court itself and is not what effect the fresh evidence would have had on the mind of the jury.”
“The responsibility therefore rests with this court. In reaching our decision we reflect on how best to examine the fresh evidence and its possible impact on the safety of the conviction, and test our analysis to ensure that we have reached the right conclusion…..we were not making an assessment based on the advantages of seeing and hearing the witnesses; equally we do not know which parts of the evidence impressed the jury, and which did not. All this is clear enough, and we recognise the difficulties which can face this court when it is assessing the impact of fresh evidence on the safety of a conviction.”