"It is clear that perfectly hopeless defences which have no factual basis of support do not have to be left to the jury. But it is no less clear, in their Lordships' view, that if the accused's account of what happened includes matters which if accepted could raise a prima facie case of self-defence this should be left to the jury even if the accused has not formally relied upon self-defence."
"When is evidence sufficient to raise an issue, for example, self-defence, fit to be left to the jury? The question is one for the trial judge to answer by applying common sense to the evidence in the particular case. We do not think it right to go further in this case than to state our view that self-defence should be left to the jury when there is evidence sufficiently strong to raise a prima facie case of self-defence if it is accepted. To invite the jury to consider self-defence upon evidence which does not reach this standard would be to invite speculation. It is plain that there may be evidence of self defence even though a defendant asserts that he was not present, and in so far as the judge told the jury the contrary, he was in error..." (our emphasis) The learned judge in this case was not impressed by the appellant's submissions. He thought that where the defendant's case was one of pure alibi - that he was somewhere else - it would have been "wholly ridiculous" to say to the jury that even if the appellant was there, the jury should consider the issue of self-defence. The judge noted that the principle in Bailey required the evidence if accepted to raise a prima facie case of self-defence. He did not accept that he could do so in the circumstances of this case. He said this: "
"I put it down to the fact that I had the Mintos in my hand and I went up to him, but may be he thought I was going to ... strike him first."