“So, members of the jury, as I say, it is up to you but you are entitled to take into account that this was to be a 999 year lease on terms attached.”
“You need to know what use you can make of that and how you can use them [sc. the conversations] and that is because they include on a number of occasions things said by one of the accused in that conspiracy, and if you have your indictments there you will see the three names are [Gabriel], [Kevin] and [Mr Barrett], when things are said by one of those accused which may, if you apply these directions I am about to give you, affect the case of another accused even if that other accused is not there and not involved in the conversation… The answer is when you are dealing with a statement made during the time that a conspiracy was underway by one person to another which involves the interests of a third one you need to have these factors in mind. Firstly, you would have to be satisfied… that the people who are talking are people who are involved in the conspiracy. Secondly, as to what is said, you would have to be satisfied that what was said is reasonably open to the interpretation that they were talking in furtherance of the conspiracy. That is that the discussion was a part of an ongoing conspiracy. Thirdly, before you could use that against the absent person… you would have to be satisfied in relation to the third person that that other person is within the conspiracy…”
“[I]t is your job to look in the way that I have just directed you to see what evidential value you believe those conversations have.”
“You only convict [on count 2] if you are sure that the defendant whose case you are considering took part in the creation of a bogus letter nothing to do with Jack Harness in order to obstruct or deflect their rivals and damage theirs or Harness’s economic interest and you bear in mind that the Crown’s case is that this was an attempt to spike the guns of the solicitors, Nicolaou & Co, who the defendants, say the prosecution, wished to discomfort and deflect and thereby to act to their own or another’s prejudice.”
“[The prosecution case] is using bogus documents... and that that falsehood... at least in part caused Samuels to make the transfer. I have said at least in part because of course it is perfectly clear from the evidence in this case that Bernard Samuels is a business which specialises in marginal business. Its primary concern when it makes a loan... is the value of the asset... So, members of the jury, you must only convict in this case if you are sure... that the effect [sc. of the false documents] was material, that is of some significance, real significance, on Mr Moses’ opinion and therefore on Samuels’ decision to make a loan.”
“It is axiomatic that it is for the prosecution to prove that the false representation acted on the mind of the purchaser, and in the ordinary way, and the court emphasises this, the matter should be proved by direct evidence... This court is anxious not to extend the principle in Sullivan more than is necessary. The proper way of proving these matters is through the mouth of the person to whom the false representation is conveyed.”
“There were therefore two reasons why the judge’s direction was wrong, that it was sufficient that any employee of the company was deceived who was concerned in the provision of each cheque. First, the question is not whether any employee of the company was deceived but whether any employee whose state of mind stood as that of the company knew of the falsity of the transaction, since if he or she did know, the company also knew. If the company knew, it would not matter how many fellow employees were personally deceived. Secondly, and in any event, a cheque could only be obtained from the company from an employee who had authority to provide it. The deception had to operate on the mind of the employee from whom the cheque was obtained. In no sense could a cheque be ‘obtained’ from the person who merely typed it out. So the judge’s references to ‘any’ employee were fatally wide. What the Crown had to prove was that when the cheque was obtained from the company it was obtained from a person who was deceived.”
“My Lords, credit card frauds are all toofrequently perpetrated, and if conviction of offenders for offences against sections 15 or 16 of theTheft Act 1968 can only be obtained if the prosecution are able in each case to call the person upon whom the fraud was immediately perpetrated to say that he or she positively remembered the particular transaction and, had the truth been known, would neverhave entered into that supposedly well-remembered transaction, the guilty would often escape conviction. In some cases, of course, it may be possible to adduce such evidence if the particular transaction is well remembered. But where as in the present case no one could reasonably be expected to remember a particular transaction in detail, and the inferenceof inducement may well be in all the circumstances quite irresistible, I see no reason in principle why it should not be left to the jury to decide, upon the evidence in the case as a whole, whether that inference is in truth irresistible as to my mind it is in the present case.”
“It is true that in R v Laverty... Lord Parker CJ said that the Court of Appeal, Criminal Division, was anxious not to extend the principle in Sullivan further than was necessary. Of course, the Crown must always prove its case and one element which will always be required to be proved in these cases is the effect of the dishonest representation on the mind of the person to whom it is made. But I see no reason why in cases such as the present, where what Humphreys J called the direct evidence of the witness is not and cannot reasonably be expected to be available, reliance on a dishonest representation cannot be sufficiently established by proof of facts from which an irresistible inference of such reliance can be drawn.”
“The defence rely on Sullivan and Laverty and distinguish Lambie and submit that the Crown can only prove that the deception operated on the mind of someone who authorised the loan by calling the individual who dealt with the application on the lender’s behalf. While I am sure this remains literally true in any instance where the individual is directly the target of a fraud, I rule that where a company is the target and the application is processed by one or more of teams of staff whose role is to check applications against criteria established by their employers, none of whom may be expected to have any recollection at all of one among many routine applications, there can be no universal rule requiring that such individuals be identified and brought to court.”
“[S]ubmissions have been made to you that in these cases what you have lacked... is somebody who comes along and says, ‘I looked at this application and I made the decision to grant the loan. The decision I made was influenced by A, B or C.’ ... There is no such evidence in this case. The question is does that prevent you from reaching a conclusion on these counts? I direct you that it does not. If you are looking at a mortgage that is granted by a large commercial provider of domestic mortgages I direct you that you are entitled... to act on the evidence of a member of staff authorised to speak on behalf of the company about such matters... You do not need to root through a call centre or trawl through a processing centre to find which individual looked at a form and pressed the buttons... What you have to be sure of is the principle and the principle in this case was set out for you by Anne Bowes who her company puts forward as somebody who can speak on their behalf and what she said was that if the details on an application were found to be untrue they wouldn’t lend money.”
“References in this Chapter to evidence of a person’s “bad character” are to evidence of, or of a disposition towards, misconduct on his part, other than evidence which— (a) has to do with the alleged facts of the offence with which the defendant is charged...”
“[Gabriel] was pressed on whether or not he is a dishonest man and he said, ‘I did things in 1992 and I have paid for it’... I suppose that might have been a slip. He might have paid for it when in fact ‘paying for it’ would have been technically more accurate. If that’s as far as it went I should not have entertained the Crown’s application. He went on to say, ‘I broke the law in 1992 and paid my debt to society’. That was the point that I recollect my attention being drawn very strongly to what he was saying. He was asked, ‘You haven’t done anything wrong in this case?’ ‘No.’ ‘You must have decided to mend your ways?’ ‘I learned my lesson. I went to prison and I didn’t like it.’ The past tense is maintained in circumstances which lead to this impression [sic]. In my opinion, I am quite sure that the defendant was seeking to give the impression that he had learned his lesson before the events with which he is now being faced on this trial ever took place. In other words, that he had a past record, he was entitled to live it down and put it behind him and that he had learned his lesson. That is very different from somebody who... was only apprehended when his identity became known and at the point of arrest in this investigation which led to these proceedings. So [Gabriel] has given an impression which is false, in my judgment, which is that before he ever got involved working for Mr Derek Barrett in these events he is somebody who had (past tense) learned his lesson.”
“I have been asked by your dad to send you the enclosed mortgage application form, for your proposed purchase of one of his flats. I understand the purchase price to be£145,000 , and that you require 85% of this on a ‘self certification of income’ basis. In addition to the completed application form, I would also require from you a copy of either your passport or driving licence as proof of ID... On receipt of the above, I will be able to place it with a lender, and confirm to you the scheme, interest rate, payments etc, that you will need to know...”
“If you think that Mr Blackerby is right then Mr Burton’s confession in his second interview is valueless and don’t even bother reading it. If you think that he may be right, the same applies.”
“(1) In the normal situation which arises at the vast majority of trials where the admissibility of a confession statement is to be challenged, defending counsel will notify prosecuting counsel that an objection to admissibility is to be raised, prosecuting counsel will not mention the statement in his opening to the jury, and at the appropriate time the judge will conduct a trial on the voir dire to decide on the admissibility of the statement; this will normally be in the absence of the jury, but only at the request or with the consent of the defence: Reg v Anderson(1929) 21 Cr.App.R. 178 . (2) Though the case for the defence raises an issue as to the voluntariness of a statement in accordance with the principles indicated earlier in this judgment, defending counsel may for tactical reasons prefer that the evidence bearing on that issue be heard before the jury, with a single cross-examination of the witnesses on both sides, even though this means that the jury hear the impugned statement whether admissible or not. If the defence adopts this tactic, it will be open to defending counsel to submit at the close of the evidence that, if the judge doubts the voluntariness of the statement, he should direct the jury to disregard it, or, if the statement is essential to sustain the prosecution case, direct an acquittal. Even in the absence of such a submission, if the judge himself forms the view that the voluntariness of the statement is in doubt, he should take the like action proprio motu. (3) It may sometimes happen that the accused himself will raise for the first time when giving evidence an issue as to the voluntariness of a statement already put in evidence by the prosecution. Here it will be a matter in the discretion of the trial judge whether to require relevant prosecution witnesses to be recalled for further cross-examination. If he does so, the issue of voluntariness should be dealt with in the same manner as indicated in paragraph (2) above.”
“There was late disclosure in particular of the Griffiths papers relating to offers on the Claregate property and the signed blank forms from the Burton files. The problem appears to have flowed from the absence of a full time disclosure officer after March 2006 in place to oversee secondary disclosure once the defence case statements were served. However the judge was entitled to take the view he did that there had been no bad faith and that it could not be said that the disclosure process had broken down to such an extent that a fair trial could no longer be guaranteed.”
“’Falsely representing he was the true applicant’ in counts 7, 8, 9, 12: this ground does not appear sustainable. The Crown appear to have relied upon the overall circumstances of the development of the Grand Hotel enterprise, including the lack of physical involvement of the purported applicant in the property in question, the history of the resales, the apparent lack of income to sustain mortgage payments, the source of the deposit, to establish that the true applicant was yourself. It was for the jury to decide whether they were satisfied this was so but it was open to them so to conclude. It is noteworthy that this ground is not pursued by either [Sean] or [Mr Coyne].”
“So in each case the sentence of the court in total is one of four years imprisonment. The effect of that is that you serve two years in custody before your automatic release.”