Nazir, R. v [2003] EWCA Crim 901

Case No 2003/01381/Z3[2003] EWCA Crim 901
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL
CRIMINAL DIVISION
Venue Royal Courts of JusticeDate Tuesday 18 March 2003
Between
R E G I N ACrown
The Strand
London
WC2A 2LL
B e f o r e:
THE LORD CHIEF JUSTICE OF ENGLAND AND WALES
(The Lord Woolf of Barnes)
MR JUSTICE GAGE
and
MR JUSTICE MOSES
__________________
- v -
Between
KHALID NAZIR__________________Computer Aided Transcription bySmith Bernal, 190 Fleet Street, London EC4Telephone 020-7421 4040(Official Shorthand Writers to the Court)__________________MR P GIBBS appeared for APPELLANT____________________J U D G M E N T
[1]On 10 January 2003, at Southwark Crown Court, this appellant pleaded guilty to an offence of misconduct in a public office. On 27 February 2003, he was sentenced to three months' imprisonment, against which he appeals by leave of the single judge.[2]The facts are these. On 7 November 2001, a young probationer police officer, PC Waddington, based at Tooting Police Station, issued a Fixed Penalty Notice to the driver of a vehicle. It was the first such notice that that police officer had served. The passenger in the vehicle indicated to the police constable that she knew the appellant who was also a police officer and who was also based at Tooting Police Station. The next day the appellant approached PC Waddington and showed him the part of the Fixed Penalty Notice which had been issued to the driver, and explained that the latter was a friend of his. He invited PC Waddington to toss a coin for the purpose of deciding who should get the Notice. PC Waddington agreed. He lost and handed the Notice to the appellant, but reported the incident.[3]The same day the appellant was questioned by a senior police officer. He explained, frankly, that he had intended to destroy the ticket.[4]The appellant is of course a man of good character. He is aged 32. The pre-sentence report before the court showed that he had been married twice, the first being an arranged marriage, and that both marriages had broken down. He had also had to file for bankruptcy. In addition, there was before the court an occupational health report dated July 1999. It was said that the appellant was distressed, at that time had lost touch with his friends, and had taken an overdose, although he denied suicidal tendencies. The author of the report said that in moments of stress there was a danger that the appellant might act in a somewhat immature way.[5]At the sentencing hearing before the judge there were statements from two police officers, one a detective chief inspector. Both of them spoke highly of the appellant. He has of course now lost his job. In sentencing him the judge said:
“It is right that the public should have absolute faith and trust in their police officers who, by the nature of their job, have extensive powers and responsibilities. Fortunately, there are not so many officers who exploit that trust, but those who do must inevitably serve a prison sentence.”
With that observation this court agrees.[6]The offence was undoubtedly a serious one in view of the appellant's position as a police officer. Before this court the ground of appeal which is urged upon us is that, as short as this sentence was, it was nevertheless too long. This court agrees. The appellant has already suffered considerably. His conviction inevitably led to the loss of his job with consequent financial losses and the loss of accommodation. It seems clear that he was under some stress before the commission of the offence due to the breakdown of his two marriages. He has expressed remorse for what he has done and suffered additional stress. It was indeed, as counsel has said, a gross, indeed criminal, error of judgment. Nevertheless, this court takes the view that it was unnecessary for the sentence to be as long as three months. In the exceptional circumstances of this case the important feature of the sentence is the prison sentence itself. This court proposes to quash the sentence of three months and for it to substitute a sentence of one month. To that extent and for these reasons this appeal is allowed.

Cited in 1 later judgment