“I would judge to be material in the realm of disclosure that which can be seen on a sensible appraisal by the prosecution: (1) to be relevant or possibly relevant to an issue in the case; (2) to raise or possibly raise a new issue whose existence is not apparent from the evidence the prosecution proposes to use; (3) to hold out a real (as opposed to fanciful) prospect of providing a lead on evidence which goes to (1) or (2).”
“It is readily accepted that such information is relevant. But the province of the law is practical affairs, and there must be a limit to the scope of discovery that can be required of the Crown. One must bear in mind that a defendant’s solicitor is in a position to enquire from a defence witness, or others, about his past, or about other matters affecting his credibility.”
“Thus, he puts the case in this way. Non-disclosure of the existence of records suggesting that the defendant had provided information deprived the defence of an opportunity properly to assess the approach to be made to the holding of a voir dire and/or the making of a submission under section 76 (2) and (3) of PACE.”
“Nonetheless, as it seems to us, the failure to disclose in advance the matters which only emerged in the course of cross-examination of DC Evans, deprived the defence of an informed opportunity to decide whether or not to seek a voir dire. Had the defence done so, we are by no means convinced that the judge would have admitted the confession. And at paragraph 19 ...that being so, we cannot be satisfied as to the safety of the conviction and the appeal is allowed.”
“During the course of this meeting Mr Bayes in the presence of Mr Barker at least, told me that they were very pleased that I had not told my solicitor of my status as an informant. They said that if I had that they would not been able to help me. Up until this point I believed that the police and Mr Fotheringham had helped me again.”